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THREE ESSAYS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS
MATTHEW GUDGEON
Boston University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2018
Major Professor: Johannes Schmieder, Ph.D., Associate Professor of
Economics
ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays exploring how individuals, groups, and rms
respond to public policy changes. The rst two chapters focus on labor supply and demand
responses to tax and unemployment insurance reforms, while the third explores the eects
of reconguring political boundaries on ethnic identity and social stability.
The rst essay (with Simon Trenkle) studies the speed with which workers increase
their earnings following a tax break. We do so in Germany, where a large discontinuity
in the tax schedule induces sharp bunching in the earnings distribution at the expected
cuto. We analyze earnings responses following two separate reforms that increase this
cuto. While some workers adjust instantly post-reform, others take several years to
increase their earnings. Adjustment behavior is strongly correlated within rms. We posit
that idiosyncratic dierences in labor demand across rms drive cross-rm heterogeneity
in adjustment rates, and nd support for this channel in the data.
The second essay (with Johannes Schmieder, Simon Trenkle, and Han Ye) studies older
workers’ responses to unemployment insurance (UI) extensions in Germany. Extending
UI benets can aect labor supply along two margins: it can lengthen the unemployment
duration of an individual on UI - the intensive margin - and it can alter the inows into UI
- the extensive margin. We document extensive margin responses in the form of bunch-
vi
ing in UI entries at precisely the age that ensures workers can transition into retirement
immediately following UI expiration. Consequently, we show that standard, intensive
margin estimates of the non-employment eect of UI are downward biased.
The third essay (with Samuel Bazzi) analyzes the eects of political boundaries on
ethnic divisions and conict. In the early 2000s, Indonesia created hundreds of new local
governments, thereby redrawing subnational boundaries and altering each districts’ eth-
nic composition. We argue that such changes in political boundaries can fundamentally
reshape ethnic divisions. Exploiting quasi-experimental variation in the timing of redis-
tricting, we show that redistricting along group lines increases social stability, but that
these gains are undone and even reversed in newly polarized districts. Our ndings show
that ethnic divisions are not xed and instead depend on political boundaries.
vii
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1Chapter 1
Earnings Responses, Adjustment Costs, and
the Role of Firm Labor Demand
Coauthored with Simon Trenkle (Institute For Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany)
1.1 Introduction
Short-run labor supply responses are often used to evaluate the revenue implications and
eectiveness of tax reforms. Yet, various frictions attenuate short-run responses, compli-
cating the use of such evidence for long-run projections. Understanding the extent of the
divergence between short- and long-run elasticities, and how this diers across contexts,
would help economists and policymakers draw more accurate conclusions from short-
term responses to tax changes. However, the magnitude and persistence of the attenua-
tion in short-run elasticities are not often explicitly quantied, and few studies determine
which mechanisms contribute to the divergence between long- and short-run responses
in practice.
This paper makes two contributions towards our understanding of short-term adjust-
ment behavior. First, we estimate the degree to which short-run earnings responses are
attenuated following two German tax policy changes that encouraged greater earnings.
We show that short-term earnings elasticities with respect to the tax rate are signicantly
dampened, particularly in the rst 1–3 years following each reform. The gradual accu-
mulation of estimates like these, across contexts, and across policies inducing dierent
2utility gains from adjustment, could allow policy institutions to make ner predictions of
how observed elasticities evolve following a tax reform.
The second, and central, contribution of this paper is to outline, test, and quantify
the importance of a rm-side mechanism responsible for the heterogeneity in adjustment
speeds. Motivated by the fact that the vast majority of early earnings responses occur
within workers’ pre-reform rms, we focus on understanding which rms are most likely
to oer adjustment opportunities. We posit that rms may have already optimized their
labor force size, constraining their ability to oer workers additional hours immediately
after a reform. Firms with growing labor demand will nd it easier to oer more hours
than rms with lackluster demand, generating heterogeneity in adjustment rates across
rms. We formalize these mechanics in a dynamic labor demand model and generate a
series of testable predictions. We nd robust support for this channel in the data. Further,
we quantify the importance of this channel by adapting existing bunching techniques for
estimating adjustment costs (Gelber, Jones, and Sacks, 2017). We nd that heterogeneity
in labor demand across rms explains a minimum of 19 percent of these costs. Overall,
our work highlights the crucial role that rm labor demand plays in moderating the speed
with which workers adjust to tax changes, complementing other established adjustment
channels – such as those those relating to information and job search (Chetty, Friedman,
Olsen, and Pistaferri, 2011; Chetty, Friedman, and Saez, 2013).
We examine short-term adjustment in the context of German mini jobs. Mini jobs pro-
vide an ideal setting for studying earnings responses. Mini jobs are tax- and social security
contribution-free up to a predetermined monthly income threshold (initially e325), after
which they become regular jobs, with gross earnings (not just the marginal euro) taxed
at relatively high, standard rates. This creates a discontinuous jump – or ‘notch’ – in the
average tax rate at the threshold and strongly incentivizes workers to keep earnings at
or below the notch (Kleven and Waseem, 2013). Mini jobs are very popular, employing
3over 7 million part-time workers in 2010, and the tax incentives indeed result in extensive
bunching at the mini job notch (Tazhitdinova, 2017).
Crucially for our study of earnings responses, the earnings threshold was increased
twice, to e400 in 2003 and to e450 in 2013. Following a reform, workers no longer have
any tax incentives to bunch at the old earnings threshold. Indeed, standard friction-less
labor supply models unambiguously predict that all the excess density of workers at the
old threshold should disappear immediately after the reform. In contrast, we observe a
sizable excess mass of workers at the old threshold after each reform, consistent with the
presence of adjustment costs. This mass dissipates over time.
We quantify the implications of the observed delays in adjustment for a sample of
prime-aged married women married to men with annual incomes slightly above the na-
tional average. The precise size of the mini job tax notch is aected by spousal earnings –
a consequence of joint taxation. Earnings below the threshold do not contribute to taxable
household income, while earnings above the threshold do and are taxed at the household’s
marginal tax rate. One advantage of this sample is that we can accurately draw workers’
budget sets over time.1 A second advantage is that this is a relatively homogeneous sam-
ple, allowing us to more credibly isolate dierences across rms. Furthermore, this is a
sample of presumably highly elastic workers, working relatively few hours – about 10 a
week at hourly wages around e6–8. Consequently, we would expect the women in this
sample to have ample scope for increasing hours after each reform.
We use bunching techniques to quantify the implications of the observed bunching
at the old notch after each reform on elasticities. Given enough time, the bunching mass
fully adjusts and we can recover the true ‘long-term’ elasticity of earnings with respect to
the net of tax rate. Following each reform, only some of the total bunching mass adjusts;
1While in principle we could focus on married men, there are far fewer married men working exclusively
in a mini job with a spouse earning e30,000-50,000 annually.
4implying a lower short-run elasticity. We estimate that these short-run elasticities are
signicantly attenuated. The 1-year elasticity is less than a quarter of its long-term value.
The 3-year elasticity is still less than two thirds of its long-term value. It takes about 6
years for the gap between the observed elasticity and its structural, long-term value to
close.
A host of potentially very distinct processes could delay earnings responses and create
the observed patterns in the data. The main contribution of this paper is to isolate one such
process. Adjustment frictions are most severe in the rst three years following a reform.
Over this short period, the vast majority of workers that adjust do so within their pre-
reform rms, suggesting that rms play an important role in adjustment. Furthermore, a
substantial portion of the adjustment that does occur is a result of workers increasing their
work hours, as opposed to working the same hours at higher pay. These facts motivate
a key question for understanding short-term responses: which rms are likeliest to oer
additional hours?
We posit that some rms will be constrained in their ability to oer increased hours.
Increasing paid hours for multiple mini jobbers without sucient product demand can be
overly costly. With time, labor attrition can ease the situation, but in the short-run, rms
with robust, growing labor demand will nd increasing hours easiest. Indeed, growing
rms likely prefer oering their workers more hours over hiring a new worker and incur-
ring hiring costs. We formalize these ideas in a dynamic labor demand model with linear
hiring costs and exogenous labor attrition (Nickell, 1986). In order to focus on rms, we
assume workers face suciently large switching costs to prevent them from moving rms
solely to increase their hours. We show, provided rms have to oer all their workers the
same hours packages, that rms may indeed prefer reducing hiring and waiting for la-
bor attrition before adjusting their workers’ hours post-reform. Heterogeneity in rm
characteristics, and labor demand in particular, leads to heterogeneity in the speed of ad-
5justment. Under this model, short-term labor supply responses will deviate from what
would be predicted purely by workers’ labor supply elasticity, with the extent to which
responses are attenuated partly determined by how many rms are growing.
The model motivates a series of predictions, which we test using high-quality, linked
employer-employee data. First, we show that rm characteristics matter for adjustment
beyond what would be expected by worker sorting. We nd that adjustment is highly
correlated within rms and that, even among rms with many mini jobbers, there is an
over-prevalence of cases where no one at the rm adjusts. Second, we show that the
hiring of a new mini job worker after the reform is associated with quicker adjustment
rates at the rm. Hiring should (noisily) predict adjustment because rms that have not
yet adjusted should hold o on hiring and wait for attrition to ease the adjustment process.
Third, we proxy for rm growth using growth in the non-mini job wage bill and show
that increases in this proxy around the time of the reform are also associated with faster
worker adjustment.
We show that these empirical results are robust across a variety of specications. We
include occupation, industry, and rm size xed eects in all specications. Importantly,
we show that the hiring and non-mini job growth results are not driven by rms that
generally hire versus ones that do not. Hiring right in the period of the reform has a
dierentially larger eect on the speed of adjustment than hiring in prior periods. We
show that results are robust to a battery of additional controls. Importantly, we show that
individual sorting on observables does not drive results and that sorting on unobservables
would have to be very extreme to overturn results (Oster, 2016). We also perform a rst
dierence analysis on rms subject to both reforms and results are highly comparable.
Overall, we nd robust support for the proposed labor demand driven adjustment channel.
We quantify the relative importance of this channel by building on the small literature
that has used bunching in similar settings to estimate adjustment costs (Gelber et al.,
62017; He, Peng, and Wang, 2017; Zaresani, 2017). We rst estimate the aggregate, xed
adjustment cost that rationalizes observed responses without accounting for dierences in
labor demand across rms. This xed cost conates dierent sources of frictions, ranging
from individual-level frictions, like scheduling costs, to search costs that could act through
our channel. In order to estimate the portion of this aggregate cost that is explained by
dierences in rm labor demand, we compare the bunching of workers in rms that hire
in the reform period to that of propensity score matched workers in rms that do not. We
adapt the model so that workers in rms that hire receive additional hours oers with
probability 1, while workers in rms that do not hire receive additional hours oers with
a probability below 1, which we estimate. Workers accept oers if the utility gain from
adjusting exceeds the xed cost, which is now purged of our labor demand channel. We
nd that heterogeneity in labor demand across rms explains at least 19% of the aggregate,
xed adjustment cost.
Related Literature. Our setting adds a clear case study, with a number of unique ad-
vantages, to the literature documenting frictions in adjusting labor supply (Chetty et al.,
2011, 2013; Gelber et al., 2017; Kleven and Waseem, 2013). High quality linked employer-
employee data coupled with the very large number of aected individuals allows us to
examine channels that would be statistically under-powered in other contexts. Impor-
tantly, this is also a setting that allows us to study adjustment costs beyond information
acquisition costs (Chetty et al., 2013; Chetty and Saez, 2013; Chetty, Looney, and Kroft,
2009; Saez, 2010). This is a rare context where tax reforms are easy to understand and
highly salient – with mini jobs popularly being called “400 euro jobs" (now “450 euro
jobs").
We explicitly quantify the discrepancy between short-term and long-term elasticities.
As such, we speak to a broader literature estimating the elasticity of taxable income (see
7Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz, 2012b, for a review). Our work emphasizes the importance
of using approaches like the one developed in Chetty (2012) to bound elasticity estimates
when trying to recover the long-term, structural elasticity from labor responses following
a reform. Our quantitative estimates of adjustment costs add to a small set of related evi-
dence in dierent contexts (Gelber et al., 2017; He et al., 2017; Zaresani, 2017). Our work
innovates by isolating one of the drivers of these estimated adjustment costs. Specically,
we suggest that short-term elasticities are more likely to be attenuated in cases where
multiple workers at the same rm want to work more and labor/output demand is lack-
luster.
Our adjustment channel highlights the important role that rms play in regulating
labor supply responses to taxes (Best, 2014; Chetty et al., 2011; Haywood and Neumann,
2017; Tazhitdinova, 2017). Our model is closest to Chetty et al. (2011), who trace out the
implications of search costs plus hours constraints for labor supply responses to taxes.
In their model, the action comes from the choice of workers to leave the rm in search
of a better option. Their predictions are about aggregate responses and neither rely on
nor detail which rms change their hours oerings. In contrast, we focus specically on
within-rm adjustment, explicitly asking which rms change their hours packages. We
argue that this shift in focus to understanding which rms adjust is particularly relevant
for the short-term. In highlighting the role of labor demand, we return to an older litera-
ture that focused on how rms choose labor in frictional environments (Anderson, 1993;
Bentolila and Bertola, 1990; Caballero, Engel, and Haltiwanger, 1997; Hamermesh, 1989,
1995; Nickell, 1978, 1986).
Tazhitdinova (2017) is the rst to apply a bunching approach to our context – mini jobs
in Germany. Her complementary paper focuses on the cross section and why bunching is
so large relative to other contexts. In contrast, our paper emphasizes the time dimension
by focusing on the un-bunching process after each of the two reforms. The principal thesis
8in Tazhitdinova (2017) is that equilibrium labor supply responses depend on whether the
statutory incidence of a tax falls on rms or workers. In the case of mini jobs, fringe
benets are discretely lower at the threshold, incentivizing rms to oer more mini jobs
relative to similarly paid regular jobs, thereby facilitating bunching. Instead of examining
the incentives of rms to hire mini jobbers relative to non-mini jobbers, we focus on when
and how rms increase existing mini jobbers’ hours in response to policy changes. Our
work speaks explicitly to the understudied question of how short-term labor adjustment
occurs.
1.2 Context: German Mini Jobs
1.2.1 Mini Job Tax Notch
Mini jobs are the most popular type of German marginal employment, employing more
than 7 million workers in 2010 – over 17% of the labor force. Mini jobs are employment
relationships characterized by a maximum allowable monthly earnings limit. Workers
with monthly earnings below the predetermined threshold – e325 in 1999 – are exempt
from both social security contributions (SSC) and income taxation.2 Jobs with monthly
earnings above the threshold are subject to the standard, higher social security and income
tax rates on the entirety of their earnings. Thus, mini jobs create a discontinuity – or notch
– in the tax schedule (Kleven and Waseem, 2013).
The mini job social security contribution exemption amounts to a 20% reduction in
taxes. In Germany, both employers and employees are required to pay SSC – approxi-
mately 20% each – on workers’ gross earnings (see column (3) of Appendix Table A.1 for
the annual series). The mini job exemption applies to the individual’s SSC and implies that
2Multiple mini jobs are allowed, with the threshold applied to the sum of earnings across jobs. The
threshold is binding at the monthly level; exceeding the threshold for 3 consecutive months results, when
detected, in an ex-post conversion of mini jobs into regular employment. In such cases, all social security
benets are paid by the employer (source: authors’ exchange with the Mini Job Zentrale).
9a worker with monthly gross pay below e325 can keep all of his/her income, whereas a
worker at e326 keeps approximately 80% of his/her income, or e261. Firms pay a special
mini job SSC rate that is above the SSC rate a rm would pay on a non-mini jobber (see
column (2) of Appendix Table A.1), but below the standard employee contribution. Thus,
the average SSC rate increases discontinuously at the threshold.
As a consequence of not paying SSC, mini jobbers do not qualify for health benets,
pension, and unemployment. As in related literature, we assume these are not valued
when constructing budget sets (Haywood and Neumann, 2017; Tazhitdinova, 2017). We
study married women whose husbands have a suciently high salary to ensure spousal
health insurance coverage. Mini jobbers are allowed to voluntarily contribute to their pen-
sions, but uptake is very low.3 While mini jobs do not provide unemployment insurance,
means-tested unemployment assistance is available to mini jobbers should they qualify.
Furthermore, much of our analysis centers on existing mini jobbers’ responses to the two
reforms, neither of which changed rules pertaining to benets.
In addition to being social security exempt, mini jobs are income tax exempt. For
single workers who only hold a mini job, this exemption has no bite as income taxes are
not due on taxable incomes below e7,000 a year, well above the e3,900 one might earn
in a mini job (see Appendix Table A.2 for the annual tax schedules). For married persons,
though, this tax exemption is consequential. In Germany, ling jointly always dominates
ling individually, and nearly all married couples choose to do so.4 As a consequence of
pooling taxable income, any additional taxable earnings from the low income earner get
taxed at the household’s marginal income tax rate (this rate hovers at around 26% for the
3Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung (2014) reports that about 5% of mini jobbers signed up voluntary
for pension insurance before the 2013 reform.
4The “splitting advantage" from ling jointly ranges from 0, if both spouses earn the same amount, to
above e10,000, if one spouse earns over e100,000 and the other does not work (Bach, Corneo, and Steiner,
2009; Steiner and Wrohlich, 2004). That almost all couples le jointly is thus unsurprising. Indeed in the
U.S. over 95% of couples le jointly despite that fact that – unlike Germany – ling jointly can result in a
marriage penalty.
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women in our estimation sample; see Appendix Table A.3). Hence, exceeding the mini
job threshold subjects the entirety of previously nontaxable earnings to income taxation
at the household marginal tax rate, once again creating a (or exacerbating the) notch.
The budget set arising from the mini job tax and SSC exemptions is shown in Figure 1·1
panel (a) for both a single person and for a married woman whose husband earns e41000
a year, the average level in our data (Appendix A.3 provides further details on how we
constructed these budget sets). As we detail in Section 1.4, there is extensive bunching at
this notch (see Figure 1·2 (a)). The focus of this paper is on workers’ adjustment patterns
in response to two reforms that shifted the mini job notch rightward, encouraging greater
earnings.
1.2.2 Mini Job Reforms
1 April 2003 Reform. The rst reform we analyze increased the mini job threshold
from e325 to e400.5 The 2003 reform was part of the Hartz II reform package which was
designed to combat unemployment and increase labor market uidity (Deutscher Bun-
destag, 2002). The bill was drafted on 5 November 2002 and passed on 23 December of the
same year, with a start date of 1 April 2003.6 In addition to changing the mini job thresh-
old, the 2003 reform attempted to smooth out the notch. Total (employer and employee)
social security contributions would no longer exhibit a discontinuous jump at the mini job
threshold. Instead, regular jobs with monthly earnings just above e400 would owe total
social security contributions in the same amount as those owed by employers of a e400
mini jobber. Social security contributions would then increase linearly, until they reached
5The e325 threshold originated with a 1996 reform. Between 1996 and 1999, when our data begins,
the mini job threshold was indexed to average worker earnings and increased slightly each year, from
approximately DM 600–630 (e305–e325). In 1999, the threshold was formally xed at DM 630 (e325)
(Arntz, Feil, and Spermann, 2003).
6The other parts of the concurrent Hartz I and II packages covered increases in the number of job centers
and additional support for vocational education and are not of direct relevance. The Hartz IV labor mar-
ket reforms came into eect January 2005 and lowered the generosity of the UI system, but these neither
coincide with our reforms nor do they appear to have any direct impact on mini jobs (Price, 2016).
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the standard employer plus employee total at e800.From the perspective of a single indi-
vidual ignoring employer contributions, there is still a small notch at the threshold as the
employee needs to make up the dierence between the standard employer rate and the
employer rate in a mini job. Importantly, married workers continue to experience a large
notch as income taxes remained fully exempt below the threshold and fully applied above
(see Figure 1·1 panel (b)).
The 2003 reform also abolished a 15 hour limit on the number of hours allowed per
week in a mini job. However, this hour limit was not a signicant constraint pre-2003
(Eichhorst, Hinz, Marx, Peichl, Pestel, Siegloch, Thode, and Tobsh, 2012; Steiner and
Wrohlich, 2005).7 Additionally, the reform allowed workers in regular employment to
hold one tax free mini job at a dierent establishment. This unusual policy creates strong
incentives to either take on more work or shift earnings to a mini job. We focus on exclu-
sive mini jobbers but discuss these new entrants when appropriate.
1 January 2013 Reform. The second reform diered in that relatively less changed.
It was motivated by trying to help constrained mini jobbers’ wages keep up with wage
growth (see Deutscher Bundestag, 2012). The mini job threshold increased from e400 to
e450 and the point of full phase in of social security contributions increased from e800
to e850 (see Figure 1·1 panel (c)).
Other Relevant Reforms. In addition to the preceding reforms, employers’ social secu-
rity contributions due on mini jobs increased over the period, from 22% in 1999-2003, to
7A 15-hour a week job earning e325 a month would pay an hourly wage of e5.40. Jobs with more
weekly hours would have to pay an even lower hourly wage. Thus, only jobs at a very low wage would
have been aected by the hours constraint. According to Eichhorst et al. (2012) in 2010 (7 years after the
hours threshold has been abolished and when the earnings threshold wase400) still only 12.7% of exclusive
mini jobbers worked more than 15 hours a week. This suggests that the constraint pre-2003 was non-binding
for all but a modest share of workers.
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25% in 2003-2006, to 30% after 2006 (see column (2) of Appendix Table A.1). Since these
are substantial tax dierentials, we follow Tazhitdinova (2017) and account for employer
social security contributions when constructing our budget sets.
One nal point worth noting is that Germany enacted a national minimum wage for
the rst time in 2015, the nal year in our data. This aects mini jobbers, many of whom
earned below the minimum wage of e8.50. The bill was passed on 3 July 2014, after a
decade-long debate on the subject. The passing of this bill could have impacted the tail
end of our observed responses to the 2013 reform.
1.2.3 Information Dissemination
The mini job reforms were well communicated to rms. A month before each reform, an
information sheet with details about the reform was sent to all rms that employed at
least one mini jobber.8 Additionally, the 2003 reform established the mini job zentrale –
a new central point of contact for employers of mini jobbers and employees in mini jobs.
All mini jobs were now to be reported directly and solely to this center for tax purposes,
simplifying reporting procedures. Because this change involved a non-automatic change
in reporting systems, it required compliance and awareness on the rm side. Thus, rms
employing mini jobbers likely knew about each reform.
Individuals were also likely more aware of these reforms than the typical tax reform.
Mini jobs are popular and the threshold is salient, with mini jobs often called ‘400 (and
later 450) euro jobs’. To support the idea that these reforms were salient at the time,
we plot Google search intensities for the terms “400 euro job(s)", “450 euro job(s)" and
“minijob(s)/ mini job(s)" over time in Appendix Figure A·9 (these data are only available
post-2004). The trends show a clear and relatively rapid decline in search intensity for
“400 euro job(s)" after the 2013 reform, a spike in a search for “mini jobs", and a jump
8Source: authors’ email exchange with the Mini Job Zentrale.
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in searches for “450 euro job(s)". Our own survey, which we explain in Section 1.3, also
supports the idea that individuals were well aware of the 2013 reform.9
1.2.4 Mini Job Descriptives
Here we describe the types of jobs we are studying in greater detail.10 As of 2010, about
5 million people work exclusively in a mini job. A typical mini jobber works about 10
hours per week at a wage of 6-9 euro per hour, with hours above 15 hours a week being
uncommon. 68% of exclusive mini jobbers are women. Mini jobs are also disproportion-
ately held by students and older workers. The top occupations (in decreasing order) are
cleaners, cashiers/sales clerks, secretaries, and transportation workers.
Employing a mini jobber is common: in 2010, roughly 70% of establishments had at
least one mini jobber. Many establishments employ just one mini jobber, but establish-
ments with multiple mini jobbers are not atypical.11 Indeed, 86% of mini jobbers are em-
ployed in establishments with at least 2 mini jobbers and 49% in establishments between 3
and 25 mini jobbers. In establishments with mini jobbers, the share of the workforce com-
posed of mini jobbers can vary substantially. The distribution of the share of mini jobbers
for a given rm size is skewed right with a non-negligible tail, indicating that there are
rms made up of almost all mini jobbers, but it is most common to have a smaller percent-
age of the workforce made up of mini jobbers. Appendix Figure A·2 provides additional
descriptive evidence. It plots the number of mini jobbers over time, the share of establish-
ments with a mini jobber by rm size, the distribution of mini and non-mini employment
size (for rms with at least one mini jobber), and the average share of the workforce made
up of mini jobbers (for rms with at least one mini jobber).
9Only 6% of respondents chose to respond that they heard about the reform in 2014 or later.
10Summary statistics provided in this section stem from own calculations based on a 2% random sample
of individuals (the SIAB) in mini jobs on June 30th of each year, a 50% random sample of establishments
(the BHP), and the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
11About 0.3 million of 2010’s 2.89 million establishments had at least 5 mini jobbers, about 0.11 million
at least 10 mini jobbers and about 3,000 establishments had a workforce of at least 100 mini jobbers.
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1.3 Data
We use linked employer-employee data based on administrative records from the Ger-
man Social Security system, assembled by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB)
into the Integrated Employment Biographies data le (IEB) (see also Card, Heining, and
Kline, 2013; Jäger, 2016; Schmieder, von Wachter, Bender et al., 2012). The data contain
earnings and employment duration for all jobs covered by the social security system.12
Earnings are reported by the worker’s establishment for social security purposes, mini-
mizing measurement error. Mini jobs are included beginning 1 January 1999. Worker and
establishment identiers allow us to construct detailed establishment-level information
from the worker-level data, such as employment size, total wage bill, hires, and exits, for
mini and regular workers separately.13 Additionally, we have a standard list of controls
covering industry, occupation, and employee demographics.
Correct construction of our individuals’ budget sets requires knowing their marital
statuses and partners’ annual earnings. To this end we obtain a sample of married women
using the method outlined in Goldschmidt, Klosterhuber, and Schmieder (2017). We use
geocoded addresses, last names, gender, and ages to identify members of the opposite
sex, who share the same last name, live at the same location, and have an age dierence
of less than 15 years. This produces a non-representative sample that identies about
35% of married couples with both members in registered employment or unemployment
(or about 17% of all married couples). This process is unlikely to make false matches.14
The couple identiers are then used to construct a list of married women with attached
12Around 80% of all jobs fall within the social security system (the main exceptions being the self-
employed, and civil servants). See Jäger (2016) for a comparison to the census.
13The data do not contain rm identiers. Throughout, our ‘rm level’ analysis is based on establish-
ments, which are delineated by municipality (gemeinde). Firms can and do operate multiple establishments
across municipalities, but this is unobservable to us.
14A false match will arise, for instance, if two siblings of the opposite sex are residing at the same location.
Goldschmidt et al. (2017) show evidence to support that 89%–94% of identied pairs are indeed married to
each other.
15
information on husband annual earnings.
1.3.1 Estimation Samples
Our primary sample consists of the earnings records from 1999-2015 for the married
women we identify, aged 26-55 and residing in West Germany.15 The age restrictions
are set to rule out students and individuals in partial retirement, as both can be subject to
additional policies that incentivize limiting monthly earnings belowe400. In addition, we
focus on married women with spousal annual earnings between e33,000-53,000. The up-
per limit is set just below the lowest cap in the data (e54,000 in West Germany in 2002) so
as to avoid situations where husband income is above the cap and hence marginal income
tax rates cannot be accurately calculated. The lower limit ensures that the household
marginal income tax rate is relatively stable (see Appendix Table A.3). For this sample
of married women, we can be quite condent in the exact size of the notch. The average
sample size across years is 618,400 women, of which 231,460 have monthly incomes below
e1000.
After presenting earnings responses to the reforms for the preceding sample, we turn
our focus to demand-side mechanisms. We analyze establishments employing the afore-
mentioned married women.16 When doing so, we construct establishment-level vari-
ables using all workers at the establishment, not just married women. While this par-
ticular sample of establishments is a convenience sample borne out of the need to have
15For now we (temporarily) make one important caveat to our results: our samples are created solely
using identied couples in 2008. These couples are then veried to still be couples in the other years using
last names. This potentially exacerbates the non-representativeness of our sample: all the women in our
sample and their husbands need to appear in the data (as employed or unemployed) in 2008. When the
geocoding work of another team is complete, we will be able to rerun everything based on couples generated
year-by-year. Nevertheless, we are not greatly concerned about this conditioning: our reduced-form results
replicate on a random sample of establishments, and the moments we use in our structural estimation look
relatively similar for a random sample of all women 26-55 in West Germany.
16Specically we use all establishments that employ our 26-55 year old identied married women in West
Germany with husband earnings between e33,000-53,000 and average monthly earnings below e1400 in
either 2002/2003a or 2012.
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establishment-level variables for these women in our bunching model, we do not believe
it greatly alters results. Indeed, we show that our key specications look very similar for
a 25% random sample of establishments employing mini jobbers.
1.3.2 Supplementary Data Sources
We draw on a number of additional data sources, which we introduce as appropriate. Ap-
pendix C.7 contains an exhaustive list of data sources and details pertaining to sample
construction. We make note of one, unique data source. We ran our own survey with
the goal of answering questions that could not otherwise be answered with existing data,
like ‘did you ask for more hours after the reform or did your employer ask you?’ Using
www.clickworker.de, an online platform similar to Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, we im-
plemented a two-step survey design. In the rst step we asked women on the platform
aged 30-59 whether they held a mini job in any of the years 2011-2015 and, if they held a
job in 2012, what their monthly earnings were in that year. The blurb indicated that the
survey was geared towards persons with mini job experience. We then selected women
who were working in 2012 in a mini job close to or at the earnings threshold of e400.
We reached 1042 women in the rst stage,185 of whom qualied for the follow up survey.
Of these 103 responded to our detailed follow-up survey. We reference survey responses
throughout the paper.
1.4 Aggregate Responses to the Mini Job Reforms
In this section we examine how the overall earnings distribution of married women
changes in response to each of the two reforms. Consistent with the presence of frictions,
we nd considerable bunching at the old threshold after the reform and this dissipates
over time. We use bunching techniques to quantify eective elasticities over time.
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1.4.1 Aggregate Earnings Responses
Figures 1·2 and 1·3 plot average monthly wages (from all employment sources) for iden-
tied married women aged 26-55 in each year in West Germany with husband annual
earnings between e33,000–53,000 (see Section 1.3).17 We plot these distributions year-
by-year as the data do not allow us to detect within-year wage changes at the same job.
The exception is for 2003, where as a result of the 1 April 2003 reform and corresponding
changes in the way mini jobs were reported, we are able to observe pre-reform and post-
reform earnings separately.18 Henceforth we refer to 1 Jan 2003 – 31 March 2003 as 2003a
and 1 April 2003 – 31 December 2003 as 2003b.
Figure 1·2 panel (a) shows that in 2002 there is clear and extensive bunching at the
monthly earnings threshold of e325. There is no such bunching elsewhere in the distri-
bution (see Appendix Figure A·1). As can be seen in Appendix Figure A·5, over 98% of
married women with average monthly earnings in this range are enrolled in a mini job.
Three notable changes take place in the rst months after the reform (see Figure 1·2
panel (c) which corresponds to April–December 2003). First, a sizable fraction of mini job-
bers adjust instantly to e400. Second, a number of mini jobbers start to earn a monthly
average between e325 and e400. These could be either people who move instantly to a
point like e375 or adjust to e400 at some later point in the year.19 Third, a clear excess
mass of workers remain at e325. This excess mass dissipates over time and is virtually
gone by 2008. These patterns are repeated in the 2013 reform (see Figure 1·3 panels (e)-(g)),
17Average monthly wage is calculated by taking total earnings from all employment sources over the
period divided by the number of distinct days worked multiplied by 365/12 or 366/12 in leap years. As such
it can be opaque for job-to-job transitions such as a mini job to a regular job.
18The vast majority of mini jobs that spanned this period are indeed split into two entries in our data.
Regular jobs, and the few mini jobs that are not split, are split manually, assigning the average wage over
all of 2003 to each of 2003a and 2003b. This means raises before the reform cannot be distinguished from
raises afterwards, but for regular jobs this is relatively inconsequential. Indeed, it does not appear to aect
the distribution of jobs to the right of the threshold.
19The latter behavior is more likely as the majority of these observations appear at the threshold in
following years.
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except that there is more excess mass at the old notch in 2013 than in 2003b.20 Overall, Fig-
ures 1·2–1·3 show that earnings respond to the tax schedule and that there are meaningful
lags in adjustment to changes in the schedule.
It is reasonable to ask whether the excess mass at the old notch after each reform is
a general feature of the economy or if it is arising from a few particular regions, indus-
tries, occupations, or persons. Appendix Figure A·3 plots the earnings distributions for
all women aged 26-55 in West Germany, as opposed to the identied married women.
The patterns are highly similar. In general, the shape and evolution of these earnings
distributions over time is qualitatively similar if we look separately at women in each of
the top 5 mini occupations, top 5 industries, the largest states, and rms of dierent sizes
(gures available upon request). While the extent of excess mass at the old notch varies,
the presence of non-negligible frictions is a robust feature across settings.
Adjustment over Time. We verify that adjustment to the new notch comes from those
persons that theory predicts should be adjusting. Standard analysis suggests that all the
workers who bunched at the old notch in the rst place should strictly prefer working
more post-reform, since these workers come from higher up in the ideal earnings distri-
bution (Kleven, 2016). Figure 1·4 veries that the women adjusting are precisely those that
were constrained at the old notch. Panel (b) shows that 48% of women earning around
e325 in 2002 adjust upwards after the reform (April-December 2003).21 Adjustment rates
follow the expected pattern: they are low for workers with earnings relatively far from
the threshold. Indeed, there is a break in trend around e275.22 A similarly clear pattern
20The 2013 reform involved a smaller movement of the threshold and hence a smaller utility gain from
adjusting. Thus, if we think of adjustment costs as being xed and comparable over time, we would expect
less adjustment in 2013.
21We dene adjust upwards as having average monthly earnings betweene325+12.5 ande400+12.5 to
accommodate for small changes in calculated earnings arising from leap years and diering period lengths.
22We also note that workers from higher up in the distribution are not moving downwards at high rates,
with the possible exception of (the comparatively few workers) in a region around 420-480. Movement rates
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emerges for the 2013 reform, with 39% of women at e400 adjusting upwards after the
reform.Panel (a) acts as a placebo. It conditions on earnings between e325–400 in 2001
and plots adjustment in 2002 according to the same denition as in panel (b). In 2002,
this higher earnings region is above the mini job threshold and hence is highly taxed. As
expected, almost none of the 2001 mini jobbers adjust to this dominated region and less
than 20% of (the few) women who were in this region in 2002 remain there.
Alternative dissipation channels for the excess mass at the old notch are second-order.
Some workers naturally leave employment or transition to regular jobs (or even mini jobs
with reduced earnings), but the primary channel by which bunching dissipates is by ad-
justment to the new earning levels (see Table 1.1 for transition rates based on mini job-
bers at the threshold in 2002). The distribution of new hires shows more rapid adjustment
than the overall distribution (see Figure 1·10), indicating that we should not be overly
concerned about the excess mass at the old notch coming from new workers.
Is Adjustment Driven by Hours or Wages? The earnings increases we observe post-
reform in Figures 1·2–1·3 could come from pure wage increases, increases in hours, or
a mix thereof.23 As a reference point, recall that at a wage of e10 per hour, increasing
monthly earnings from the 2012 threshold of e400 to the 2013 threshold of e450 purely
by changing hours would require a 5 hour increase per month. Adjustment from e400 to
450 could alternatively be accomplished via a raise from e10 to e11.25 per hour. Under-
standing which is the case is informative for thinking about adjustment mechanisms.
Data on hours from 2011-2014 allows us to calculate the share of women that adjust
by increasing hours.24 We view such statistics as a lower bound, given the likelihood that
to earnings of around 400 fall permanently below 3% for high earning workers (above e700).
23Earnings increases could also come from changing jobs or adding a new job. Table 1.2 shows that only
a small share of mini jobbers adjust at new rms.
24This hour information has historically been collected for the purposes of occupational accident insur-
ance. For the years 2011-2014 – and only these years– it was integrated in the reporting process of our
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hours changes may not be recorded by all rms.
Figure 1·5 panel (c) compares the hours changes per month for stayers and adjusters.25
Of the few stayers that have hours changes, most changes are small. In contrast, about
33% of adjusters experience hours increases between 2 and 8 hours per month (the com-
parable number is 7% for stayers). 49% of adjusters experience no hours change (68% of
stayers). Thus, at least a third of workers experience either pure hours adjustment or
hours adjustment accompanied by a wage increase.
We expect that larger establishments are more likely to accurately report hours
(among other dierences). Accordingly, panel (d) shows that the hour changes for stayers
and adjusters at establishments with at least 10 at-the-threshold mini jobbers. For this
sample, 45% of adjusters (9% of stayers) experience hours increases between 2 and 8 per
month. The share of adjustment occurring through pure wage changes decreases to 35%
(52% for stayers).26
When we outline our demand-side adjustment channel in Section 1.5, we will focus on
adjustment that is at least partially on hours. We do not view our channel as well suited to
explain pure wage changes. Indeed, we will see that evidence for our model is strongest
in rms with many mini jobbers, precisely the rms where the share of adjustment on
pure wages is lowest, reaching at most a third.27
administrative data.
25We use the sample of women earning between e362.5–412.5 in 2012. Women are classied as stayers
if they remain in the range of e362.5–412.5 and have an absolute earnings change below e20. Women are
classied as adjusters if they move up between e412.5–462.5 and have an earnings change larger than e30.
26Pure wage adjustment is also reported less frequently in our own survey data than observed in the
administrative data. Our survey results show that 34.5% respond to adjust purely on hours, 31% purely on
wages and 34.5% via a combination of both.
27We also note that pure wage increases may have been more common following the 2013 reform than
the 2003 one. The 2013 reform was intended as a way to increase wages. Implemented 10 years after the
previous reform, the e50 increase in the threshold essentially corrects for ination. This was less the case
with the 2003 reform, which allowed a e75 increase in 2003 from the 1999 level.
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1.4.2 Implications for Elasticities
Before turning to our proposed adjustment channel, we measure the bunching in Fig-
ures 1·2–1·3 and quantify its implications for elasticities. We measure bunching at the
old notch using the Chetty et al. (2011) counter-factual polynomial approach. These mea-
sures of the bunching mass provide a simple, reduced-form metric that captures the share
of non-adjusters at any point in time. Quantifying the implications of these measures
of excess mass for elasticities requires additional assumptions (see Kleven and Waseem,
2013), including specifying a specic quasi-linear utility function. Such elasticity esti-
mates are subject to the Blomquist and Newey (2017) critique.28 These estimates are not
crucial to the main point of this paper – that the labor demand side mediates the speed of
worker adjustment. Nevertheless, we report the elasticity exercise below for concreteness
and completeness.
Note that we can also use the methodology developed by Gelber et al. (2017) to quan-
tify the xed adjustment cost that rationalizes our data. We opt to not impose additional
structure at this point, discussing the matter in more detail in Section 1.6, but we include
the results of the Gelber et al. (2017) estimation in Appendix A.5.
Quantifying Bunching at theOldNotch. Following, among others, Gelber et al. (2017);
Kleven and Waseem (2013); Chetty et al. (2011), we assume workers have utility given by
the following iso-elastic, quasi linear function
u = z −T (z) − n1 + 1/e
(z
n
)1+1/e
where z denotes pre-tax earnings,T (z) is tax liability, and n is an ability parameter that is
28Ruling out income eects seems plausible in this setting where wives are married to much higher earn-
ing husbands. The large amount of bunching aords us the opportunity to explore bounding our elasticity
under assumptions on the counter-factual density, like monotonicity.
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smoothly distributed according to cumulative density function F (n). This utility function,
commonly used in the literature, rules out income eects and ensures that the utility of
moving to the notch is decreasing with ability n.29 e is the elasticity of earnings with
respect to the net of tax rate.
In the absence of taxes workers optimize by setting earnings equal to their ability
level (z = n) and hence the smooth ability distribution translates into a smooth earnings
distribution. We recover this ‘counter-factual’ earnings distribution from the data using
the standard approach of tting a polynomial to the earnings distributions. Following
Kleven (2016), we t a 5th degree polynomial, excluding bins to the left of the notch (up
to zl ), chosen visually, and bins to the right of the notch (up to zu). zu is chosen using an
iterative process that sets the bunching mass equal to the missing mass.
We note that our budget set has both a pure tax notch and a relatively large change in
slope after the notch (in contrast with the seminal example in Kleven (2016) which has a
small slope change). The intensive margin responses arising purely from this change in
slope would shift the density down relative to the counter-factual. This shift is ignored in
our estimation, but, in practice, our counter-factual turns out to be relatively at, making
shifts less relevant.
Appendix Figures A·6–A·7 show the estimated counter-factuals for each year after
the reform. We estimate counter-factual densities period by period, keeping the lower
omission threshold zl xed over time.We shade the excess mass at the old notch after each
of the two reforms in gray.30
29Income eects are potentially secondary in our context given that the wifes’ earnings are a relatively
small part of household earnings.
30One challenge arises from the fact that the old threshold is relatively close to the new threshold, such
that imprecision in targeting the new notch could be misinterpreted as excess mass at the old notch. When
looking at the years 2008-2012, it indeed appears that what is left over and counted as excess mass is more
likely imprecision in targeting the new notch. To remedy this we subtract the excess mass left at the old
threshold in 2012 from all estimates to obtain what we term ‘normalized bunching less the natural level’.
For the 2013 reform we do not see far enough into the future to make this correction appropriately, so we
subtract the amount we used for the 2003 reform.
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Figure 1·6 panel (a) plots this excess mass at the old notch following each reform over
time. We normalize the excess mass by the average counter-factual density from zl to the
old notch. Consistent with Figures 1·2–1·3, we note that the excess mass dissipates over
time, stabilizing in 2008. The excess mass at the old notch following the 2013 reform is
higher than that in 2003, consistent with lower potential gains from adjusting upwards
by e50 instead of e75.
Implications for Elasticities. The amount of bunching at the notch prior to each reform
can be used to recover the long-term, structural elasticity parameter in our utility func-
tion. Assuming, by this point, that all short-term frictions have dissipated, the Kleven and
Waseem (2013) bunching approach recovers this elasticity. The utility of relocating to the
notch point is strictly decreasing in ability (n), there is a marginal buncher with ability
nˆ who is indierent between relocating to the notch and staying at her optimal earnings
above the notch. Her indierence conditions are given by setting the utility she gets at
the notch point equal to the utility she would get at her optimal earnings level above the
notch:
nˆ(1 − ∆t )e − ∆T − ∆t (nˆ(1 − ∆t )e − z∗) − nˆ1+1/e (1 − ∆t ) (1+e ) − z∗ + nˆ1+1/e ( z
∗
nˆ )
(1+1/e ) = 0
(1.1)
Since the bunching mass estimated in the data gives us nˆ, the best way to read this
equation is as one that relates the unknown elasticity parameter e to known (∆T and ∆t ,
i.e. the change in level and slope of the budget set) and estimated (nˆ) quantities, allowing
us to solve for e numerically.
The budget set is constructed as in Tazhitdinova (2017). In order to take into account
rm SSC rates (that also change discontinuously at the threshold) we calculate the size of
24
the notch in terms of gross earnings (earnings + employer SCC + employee SSC), assum-
ing full pass through to the worker. Crossing the notch point (in terms of gross earnings)
subjects workers to taxation which depends on the amount of SSC due (calculated using
the midi job formula) and their household marginal tax rate. To get the relevant house-
hold marginal tax rate we use the average annual husband income in the sample (e41,000)
and assume 80% of this is taxable.31 We then apply the year-by-year tax formulas to this
amount to determine the household marginal tax rate.32 In this manner, we calculate the
size of the notch and the dierence in slope above the notch (∆T Married and ∆t Mar-
ried). In our implementation, we revert to modeling the budget set from the perspective
of the individual (no tax below the threshold), but use the ∆T and ∆t calculated above.
Appendix Table A.4 shows the relevant model inputs used and Appendix A.3 contains a
full explanation of how the budget sets are constructed.
Applying this estimation in 2002 and 2012 recovers a ‘long-term’ elasticity of 0.136 in
2002 and 0.188 in 2012, comparable to those in Tazhitdinova (2017).
To understand the implications of adjustment frictions for elasticity estimation, we
propose a simple exercise. Call the bunching mass at the notch in 2002, B2002. In a friction-
less economy, we expect all of this excess mass to dissipate immediately following the
reform. Now suppose that B2002 was unobservable to us and that all we observed was
the mass of persons moving after the reform (akin to what one might recover from a
dierence-in-dierence design in an environment without a notch/kink). If we observed
the equivalent of B2002 persons moving immediately, we would conclude that the elasticity
31The e41,000 that we see includes the employee SSC contribution, which hovers at around 20% and
much of which is not part of taxable income. In practice, employees can also benet from other deductions
which we cannot estimate, so we think it reasonable to assume 80% of observed earnings are taxable. We
do not and cannot account for non-labor income.
32We take the marginal household tax rate as approximately constant so as to have a linear budget set. As
such, we ignore the modest increases in the rate that arise from including wife’s earnings above the threshold
in household earnings and any increases from increasing earnings within the e400-1000 range. In practice
the marginal household rate increases only slightly when including this extra income (see Appendix Table
A.3).
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had to be e . Suppose we observed, instead, that only B˜ < B2002 mass moved right after the
reform. Then, we would have concluded that the elasticity was less than e . That is, we
would actually have recovered an attenuated, short-run elasticity.33
We calculate these ‘short-run’ elasticities using what we term ‘the observed adjust-
ment mass’ in each post-reform period. We dene the observed adjustment mass as the
original 2002/2012 bunching mass less the mass stuck at the old notch in each period. This
is meant to capture the real amount of un-bunching post-reform in the most precise and
conservative manner.34 Then, we calculate the 2002 elasticity using the standard bunch-
ing approach on the 2002 budget set, assuming that the bunching mass in 2002 was this
observed adjustment mass.
We plot these implied ‘short-run’ elasticities over time in Figure 1·6 panel (b). We see
that elasticities are signicantly and meaningfully attenuated in the short-run. The elas-
ticity immediately following the reform is 0.034 or one quarter of the long-run, structural
elasticity of 0.138. The 3 year elasticity gets closer at 0.091, but still only two thirds of the
true structural elasticity. It takes 6 years for the elasticity to reach its long-term, structural
value. Attenuation is even more severe for the 2013 reform. In the rst year responses
are so attenuated that this mass would not extend passed the dominated region, leading
to an elasticity of 0. The 3-year elasticity here is 0.075 or 40% of the long-term elasticity
of 0.188. The more severe attenuation makes sense given that the utility gain from ad-
justment post-2013 is lower. As Chetty (2012) suggests, the short-run elasticity is closer
to the long-run structural elasticity when the utility gains from adjustment are larger.
33An alternative approach involves simply using the bunching mass at the new notch, but not that at the
old notch, in each year from 2003-2012 to calculate the implied elasticity in each year. This approach yields
a similar qualitative picture, with elasticities increasing from 0 in 2003b to 0.18 (the 2012 elasticity). We
prefer the approach here as it does not get confounded with year-to-year changes in the budget set.
34We prefer this method to using the mass at the new notch for two reasons. First, some workers adjust
to the reform by moving into the midi job region, so we cannot simply recover the adjusted mass from the
mass between the old and new notch. Second, this eectively counts exits from the data or other unrelated
dissipation of mass at the old notch as adjustment. This biases elasticities upwards, and hence is the most
conservative choice.
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1.5 A Model of How Firm Labor Demand Aects Adjustment
Multiple sources of frictions could be responsible for the observed wedge between short-
run and long-run responses. The principal contribution of this paper is to delve into one
channel that aects the speed of adjustment. In this section we outline and formalize
a demand-side adjustment mechanism. We will show that rm-level labor demand can
aect short-term labor supply responses, and we will generate testable predictions that
we take to the data in Section 1.6.
1.5.1 A Model of Firm Adjustment
Motivation. In our data, the vast majority of intensive-margin adjustment takes place
within-rm. Table 1.2 shows that of the mini jobbers in 2002, 26.7% adjust within rm and
3.6% adjust at a new rm. That is, over 88% of the immediate adjustment that happens
occurs within rm. Over 80% of adjusted mini jobbers in 2004 are at their original 2002
rm, and the same is true for over 73% of mini jobbers at the new threshold in 2005. This
is consistent with the relatively modest average utility gain from adjusting to the new
notches. It seems highly plausible that search costs are suciently large in the short-run
to keep workers from leaving their rms just to increase their hours in response to the
reform.
Thus, when thinking about who adjusts in the short-term, it becomes important to
think about rm behavior and whether or not rms oer increased hours post-reform. If
rms are in any way constrained from making additional hours oers, these frictions will
pass through to workers.35
35Furthermore, in our set up, rms will be able to tell workers we can’t adjust you this year, but can do
so next year. This further reduces the perceived cost of non-adjustment, making it even more plausible that
workers stay at their rms even if not adjusted.
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A Firm-Level Labor Demand Model for Hours Adjustment. We propose a simple,
single-rm model that highlights one reason rms might be constrained in oering in-
creased hours to their mini jobbers immediately following the reform. The intuition we
are trying to capture is relatively straightforward: increasing all existing workers’ hours
to the desired, post-reform level in one shot will produce too little marginal revenue rela-
tive to marginal wage costs. Firms will thus search for alternative adjustment strategies.
Our proposed alternative, which hinges on hiring and ring costs and some constraints
on the hours packages that can be oered, has the rm reducing hiring and waiting for
worker attrition to ease the transition process. For example, consider a rm employing
multiple at-the-threshold mini job cleaners who clean oces. Without additional oces
to clean, the marginal revenue product of labor from increasing hours could be low rel-
ative to wage costs. As cleaners leave the rm, it becomes easier to accommodate the
remaining workers’ hours’ requests.
Model Assumptions. We assume a rm employs only at-the-threshold mini jobbers who
all want to work more hours post-reform. Workers only leave the rm through exogenous
labor attrition (at rate σ ). The rm pays a competitive wage w and choose employment
Nt (via its hiring rate at ) and hours ht in each period. However, workers are constrained
in the hours they can work by the mini job threshold. Specically, workers face large
tax penalties if they work more than h
¯
= Z/w hours, where Z is the mini job threshold.
The rm would have to pay a much higher wage to attract workers above this threshold.
We abstract from this possibility and instead treat h
¯
as a binding constraint. We further
assume that h
¯
is below the optimal hours level, so the rm chooses to set hours = h
¯
in all
periods. The mini job reforms will relax this threshold and lead rms to want to increase
hours.
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Further, we think of rms as being subject to two sources of frictions. First, rms will
face linear hiring (or training) costs (α ) on each new worker. This dierentiates existing
workers from new hires, and means that increasing existing workers’ hours is cheaper
than achieving a similar increase in person-hours through new hires. Given exogenous
turnover (at the rate σ ), these hiring costs will also imply that a rm employing mini
jobbers prefers to have fewer workers working more hours. Firms also face ring costs.
For simplicity, we will assume these are suciently large to rule out strategies in which
the rm chooses to re, instead of just waiting for attrition.
Second, rms will face constraints on the hours they oer. Importantly, rms will be
required to oer all mini jobbers the same hours. We view this fairness consideration
as reasonable given the homogeneity of mini jobbers. Furthermore, after the mini job
threshold increases and increasing existing worker hours becomes a possibility, we will
prohibit rms from increasing everyone’s hours by small amounts. The model could easily
be adapted to allow this behavior and would generate gradual adjustment over time. This
could be of interest in other settings, but in our setting there is limited scope for gradual,
imperfect adjustment. At a wage of e8, the 2003 reform creates room for a bit more than
2 extra hours of work per week.
Optimization Problem. Building o Nickell (1986)’s model of dynamic labor demand in
the presence of linear hiring and ring costs, we model the rm as choosing the number
of mini jobbers Nt in each period through its choice of hiring rate at . For now we ignore
non-mini jobbers, which we will discuss after developing the model. The rm sells each
unit of output at a constant price p and faces hiring costs of α per worker. The rm
discounts the future at a rate of δ = 11+r per period, where r is the interest rate. The rm
faces exogenous worker attrition at rate σ and pays for hires that enter next period in the
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current period. The rms dynamic optimization problem is:
maxNt ,at |inft=1
inf∑
t=0
δ t (pF (Nt ,h¯
) −wNth¯ − αatNt ) s.t. Nt+1 = (1 − σ + at )Nt and No given
The production function satises standard conditions:
FN (N ,h) > 0, FNN (N ,h) < 0, Fh (N ,h) > 0, Fhh (N ,h) ≤ 0
Moreover, we require that any complementarity between N and h is not too strong
(FNH (N ,h) < wp ). This ensures that the rm prefers lower employment at higher hours
levels.
Pre-Reform Steady State. The rst order condition with respect to Nt sets the marginal
discounted net revenue stream of an additional hire today equal to the hiring cost:
pFN (Nt ,h¯
) = wh
¯
+ α (r + σ ) (1.2)
We denote N ∗ as the solution to pFN (N ∗,h¯
) = wh
¯
+ α (r + σ ). This optimal ow con-
dition sets the marginal revenue from an additional worker above the worker’s marginal
wage-bill cost (wh), with hiring costs driving the wedge between the two. Naturally, the
wedge is larger the larger the hiring cost and the more attrition the rm faces. Note also
that the optimal employment size is decreasing in hours for the stated production function
conditions.36
This condition also dictates the steady state optimal employment level N ∗. If N0 < N ∗
the rm hires immediately to N ∗ and thereafter hires to replace exits at at = σ for all t . If
N0 > N
∗ the rm lets attrition take its employment down until next period’s employment
36Letting N˜ (h) be the optimal steady state employment level for any given hours level h; the implicit
function theorem tells us that ∂N˜ (h)∂h =
−(pFNH ( ·)−w )
pFNN ( ·) < 0.
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would rst fall below N ∗ at which point it hires to get to N ∗. Thereafter, it hires to replace
exits.
Modeling The Reform. We model the mini job reform in this context as a permanent
shock occurring in period τ . We think of the reform as being either unanticipated or
anticipated at most 1 period (τ − 1) before the reform.37 Starting in period τ , the rm can
now opt to costlessly increase all of its workers’ hours from h to h¯ > h hours. We ask
whether and when the rm increases hours worked from h to h¯.
Pre- and Post-Reform Steady State Comparison. Denote N ∗∗ as the optimal steady
state employment level under h¯. This steady state, with lower turnover costs, is strictly
preferred to the steady state atN ∗ underh
¯
. Appendix A.4 contains the proof, which hinges
on the fact that hours are constrained.
Optimal Response to the Reform. The fact that the rm prefers the new steady state
does not mean that the transition process is costless. Indeed, the optimal transition path
starting at N ∗ in period τ involves reducing hiring and waiting for attrition to bring em-
ployment closer to N ∗∗. Hours will generally be increased at some intermediate time
period. This path involves costly deviations from each of the two steady states. Gener-
ally, making the transition is preferred to not, but there are parameter values (such as
suciently low σ ) that make the transition not worthwhile. Nevertheless, for reasonable
parameters, increasing hours eventually will be desirable.
We simulate the rm’s optimal behavior using backward induction over a nite grid
space for the following parameters. Let the time period be a year and the interest rate
37In practice the 2003 reform was passed 3 months before its implementation and drafted only 1 month
earlier, allowing limited scope for anticipatory responses. There is no reason to believe the change was only
temporary.
31
r = 0.04 (δ = 0.961). Letw =e10 per hour. Let h
¯
= 32.5 · 12 so that mini jobbers would be
at the threshold in 2002. Let h¯ = 40 · 12, or the new threshold after the 2003 reform. Let
α = 200, or 4.2% of annual earnings, within the range that Nickell (1986) uses for blue-
collar workers. Let attrition σ = 0.05 and the output price p = 80. We set the production
function to F (Nt ,ht ) = 250 ln(Ntht ).38 For this stationary environment N ∗ = 5.10 and
N ∗∗ = 4.15.
Figure 1·7 panel (a) shows the optimal employment size in each year if starting at
N0 = 5.1. Unsurprisingly, the rm remains at Nt = 5.1 for all t by replacing hires at
the rate at = σ = 0.05. Panel (b) shows the optimal adjustment path in response to a
period τ reform (indexed by 0) that allows the rm to increase hours to h¯. We let the rm
anticipate the reform by one period. The rm now chooses Nt in each period and when
(and if) to optimally increase hours from h
¯
to h¯. We see that the optimal strategy involves
slowing down hiring in period τ − 1 in anticipation of the reform. The rm then ceases
hiring in periods τ to τ + 2, letting attrition draw down its work force. In period τ + 2
the rm increases its workers hours to h¯, but employment remains at Nτ+2 > N ∗∗ and the
rm continues to not hire. In the following period, the rm resumes hiring. It reaches the
new steady state employment level (N ∗∗) in period τ + 4, and returns to hiring at the rate
at = σ to replace exits. This rm’s workers thus face a 2 year earnings adjustment delay
(as shown by the shaded region).
Appendix A.4 discusses some general results for the stationary environment. Provided
adjusting is optimal, for a xed α , the higher the rate of attrition (σ ) and the smaller the
hours change ∆h = h¯ − h
¯
, the quicker the adjustment.
Non-Stationary Environments. The model captures the idea that under a xed out-
38We choose a logarithmic specication as we have no strong reason to think the cross partial with respect
to N and h should be positive or negative. Figures are very similar for F (Nt ,ht ) = ψ (Ntht )
1
2 .
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put price the rm does not always benet from immediately increasing hours. Here, we
discuss how heterogeneity in output price (or output demand) generates heterogeneity in
the speed of adjustment.
The central idea is that growing rms have incentives aligned with their workers.
If a rm wants to increase its person-hours, it is cheaper to do so by increasing hours
than hiring new workers, and post-reform workers also want to work more hours. So,
growth that coincides with the reform will quicken adjustment. In contrast, declining
rms wanting to reduce person-hours will nd increasing hours after the reform dicult.
Instead of proving general results in the non-stationary environment, we oer two
further model simulations. In the rst, shown in Figure 1·7 panel (c), we use the same
parameters as before but have the rm facing an exogenous, declining output price over
the reform period. Specically the price starts steady at e80, as before, and declines,
beginning in τ − 2 by e5 per year until it reaches e55, remaining steady thereafter. Panel
(c) shows the optimal choice of Nt in each period absent a reform. As would be expected,
the rm reduces hiring in responses to the negative output demand shock and allows
its employment size to decline. Panel (d) shows optimal behavior in the presence of the
reform. The rm nds it benecial to adjust eventually (in period τ + 6), but only after
prices have stabilized and employment has declined suciently.
Panel (e) performs the same analysis for an increasing output price over the reform
period. It shows the rm hiring in response to the output demand shock. Panel (f) shows
how this rm responds to the reform. As expected, this growth makes adapting to the
reform easier. In period τ − 1, when the rm rst becomes aware of the reform, the rm
reduces its hiring, saving on hiring costs, knowing that it will increase h¯ in the next period.
As soon as the reform passes, the rm increases hours and returns to its hiring.
These simulations show that growing rms will generally have speedier adjustment,
while workers at declining rms will experience the longest delays before seeing their
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hours increased. Heterogeneity in labor demand across rms can thus lead to hetero-
geneity in worker’s earnings responses to policy reforms.
Alternative Adjustment Strategies. We have seen how rms may delay making oers
to workers post-reform. We discuss potential alternative adjustment strategies here.
We have ruled out strategies where rms increase each workers hours by small
amounts, or where rms make oers to some workers and not others. We view the model
above as one about rm oers. Some mini jobbers may choose not to accept such oers,
but this should not change the model much (other than making it easier to adjust quicker).
We have also ruled out strategies by which the rm res some mini jobbers and adjusts
the others. Firing costs and fairness considerations make this unlikely to be a commonly
used strategy.
The model relies on the fact that a lack of adjustment in hours is not compensated for
adjustment on other dimensions like worker exits or wage decreases. We are comfortable
with downward wage rigidity in the short-term (Abbritti and Fahr, 2013). Worker exits
are an important and standard channel of adjustment, but as already discussed, this is less
relevant in the short-run for relatively small changes in hours.
Finally, the model has ignored the presence of non-mini jobbers. If mini jobbers act as
substitutes for regular workers, a rm could take advantage of attrition of regular workers
to adjust mini jobbers. Since one regular worker can potentially be replaced by multiple
mini jobbers, this could be an attractive strategy. This is ultimately a question that we can
and do explore empirically.
1.5.2 Empirically Testable Predictions
First and foremost, we have shown that if switching costs constrain workers to their rms,
then rm level characteristics like labor demand, attrition, and hiring costs, should inu-
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ence adjustment. Our rst prediction is simply that rms should be important deter-
minants of worker adjustment. We expect to see high within-rm correlation in
adjustment rates, going beyond that which might be expected from worker sorting.
Second, this model links rm hiring patterns to adjustment. In a stationary environ-
ment, rms that eventually adjust will reduce or stop hiring before increasing existing
workers’ hours.39 While we have not considered all possible non-stationary environ-
ments, in general, we expect that rms with sucient growth rates will nd it benecial
to both increase existing workers hours and hire. Declining rms will nd it benecial to
do neither.40 Overall, the hiring of a new mini jobber following the reform should
(noisily) predict adjustment. Similarly, hiring in subsequent periods should noisily
predict adjustment.
Third, proxies for labor demand should predict adjustment. If rms that are increasing
in scale hire both mini and non-mini jobbers outside of reform periods, we would expect
changes in non-mini job employment size to be a good proxy for mini job employment
size. Under these assumptions, we would expect thatrms that expand their non-mini
work force in the reform period have better adjustment than rms with steady
or declining non-mini employment.
1.6 Evidence of the Role Firm Labor Demand Plays in Adjustment
In this section, we take the testable predictions from our model in Section 1.5 to the data. In
subsection 1.6.1, we show that adjustment rates are correlated within rm. In subsection
1.6.2, we present a series of regressions that support our two predictions that adjustment
should be better in rms that hire a new mini jobber post-reform and in rms with non-
39Firms that choose never to adjust may hire right after the reform, but we expect these cases to be
relatively rare.
40Outside of the model, it is also possible that a rm may want to hire for one occupation but not another,
which we can account for empirically.
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mini employment growth. Finally, in subsection 1.6.3, we use a bunching approach to
quantify the relative importance of this labor demand channel.
1.6.1 Adjustment Within and Between Establishments
When search costs are suciently severe, establishment level factors should aect worker
adjustment. In this subsection, we use two exercises to establish that adjustment is indeed
correlated within rm. First, we decompose the variance in adjustment rates between and
within rms. Second, we show that the actual distribution of adjustment rates within es-
tablishments deviates signicantly from the distribution that would arise if workers facing
a constant individual level adjustment cost were identically and independently distributed
across establishments.
Throughout these and the following sections, we will show that results are insensitive
to the inclusion of individual level controls. In general, worker sorting to establishments
could drive the correlation in adjustment rates within rms. If workers whose ideal earn-
ings level is close to the original threshold or workers who face higher individual-level
adjustment costs are non-randomly distributed across establishments, then the correlation
in adjustment within-establishments will be partly due to worker sorting and not estab-
lishment characteristics. In practice, this sorting does not appear to be severe. Individual
level observable characteristics are not highly predictive of adjustment. Furthermore, we
will show that we require a large degree of selection on unobservable traits to negate our
central results.
Share of the Variance in Adjustment Accounted for by Establishments. We begin
by examining all mini jobbers – not just married women – in our sampled rms with
earnings in the proximity of the original threshold Z .41 In order to focus on exclusive
41Recall from Section 1.3 that these are the rms employing our married women.
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mini jobbers, we restrict to workers whose mini job and total average monthly earnings
are close toZ .42 We dene a worker as adjusting if their average overall monthly earnings
increase above the old threshold.43 This denition allows for partial upward adjustment
(e.g. adjusted to 375 instead of 400), as well as delayed adjustment (e.g. adjusted to 400 in
September instead of April). It also allows for adjustment at a new establishment.44
Table 1.1 shows the transition probabilities for all the workers in our establishment
sample. By 2003b, 31.4% of the workers originally at the threshold have adjusted, while
31.1% stayed in the same range. The rest either exit the data, move down, or move way up
to a regular job. In 2013, 26.1% adjust while 38.8% stay. The variance in 1-year adjustment
rates for the 2003 (2013) reform is thus 0.21 (0.19).
We decompose the variance of 1-year adjustment by estimating an establishment ran-
dom eect model.45 Specically, for individuals i at 2002/2012 establishment e , we esti-
mate an (initial) establishment random eect νe by estimating:
Adjustment 03b/13i,e = Cons + νe + ϵi,e
We assume E[ϵi,e |νe] = 0, V [νe] = σ 2ν , and V [ϵi,e] = σ 2e .46 We estimate the model via
feasible GLS and report the intraclass coecient (ICC) ρ = σ
2
ν
σ 2ν+σ
2
ϵ
, the proportion of the
total variance that falls between-establishments. A higher ρ implies a larger correlation in
42Specically, we restrict to workers whose average monthly mini earnings, average monthly earnings
at the rm, and average monthly earnings from all employment sources fall in the range of Z − 37.5 and
Z + 12.5 in the year prior to the reform. The chosen range is motivated by Figure 1·4.
43Specically, we dene a worker as adjusted if their average monthly earnings from all employment
sources increases to between Z + 12.5 and Z˜ + 12.5, where Z˜ is the new threshold
44It is worth reiterating that theory does not predict everyone at the old notch wants to adjust, just the
bunchers. If workers are randomly sorted to establishments, then dening adjustment as a binary variable
for persons originally bunching at the threshold simply introduces measurement error in the dependent
variable and only aects precision.
45In principle, one could also use a xed eect and calculate the within-R2. Doing so points to an even
greater role for within-rm correlation (establishment xed eects explain over 45% of the variation in
adjustment rates), but suers from over-tting due to the many rms with just one mini jobber. The more
parsimonious random eects model does not suer from this overparametrization.
46For the cases where we add additional controls Xi , we additionally require E[νe |Xi ] = 0.
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adjustment rates within-establishments. We benchmark the estimates by comparing them
to the share of the variance due to between variation of alternative groups: occupations,
municipalities, etc.
Table 1.3 shows estimates of the ICC (ρ) for both reforms. The rst row of Table 1.3
shows that about 21% (23%) of the variance in 1-year adjustment rates is accounted for by
between-establishment variation. In contrast, between-municipality variation explains
only 6% (8%) and between-municipality-by-occupation variation explains only 10 (12%)
of the variance in adjustment.
While we cannot rule out that the within rm correlation is due to worker sorting on
unobservables, the inclusion of worker level controls does very little to move the estimate
of σ 2ν despite adding over 0.06 to the overall R2 (about 0.05 to both within and between
R2).47
Variation in Adjustment Rates between Establishments. To further highlight the
variation in adjustment rates between establishments, we group establishments by the
number of mini jobbers in the proximity of the original threshold in the year prior to the
reform (N˜ ). For each establishment of size N˜ , we calculate the share of these workers that
adjust within-establishment by 2003b/2013 and plot the distribution across rms within
this size category. We contrast this distribution to the expected distribution of adjustment
across establishments if workers were independently and identically distributed across
establishments with adjustment propensity p (N˜ ), where p (N˜ ) is the average adjustment
rate across establishments in this size category.
Figure 1·8 plots the distribution for selected values of N˜ .48 The shaded rectangles show
47The included controls are monthly wages and days worked in the 2 years prior to the reform, a dummy
for not working 2 years prior to the reform, tenure, occupation tenure, age, education years, gender, a
dummy for German nationality, and a dummy for working in more than one rm in each of the 2 years
prior to the reform.
48Omitted values of N˜ portray the same picture.
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the actual distribution of adjustment rates across rms within each N˜ group. The empty
rectangles show the predicted distribution if workers were independently and identically
distributed across establishments (distributed Binomial(N˜ ,p (N˜ ))). The distributions are
skewed right as exits from the rm make 100% adjustment uncommon.49 The most strik-
ing pattern is the over-prevalence of establishments with no adjustment (above 20% for
all establishment sizes shown, even for establishments with 10 mini jobbers). Accord-
ingly, there is also an over-prevalence of establishments where most workers adjust. The
over-prevalence of 0 adjustment is strongly suggestive of establishments potentially not
oering any of their workers the opportunity to adjust. We caution that it is possible that
workers with low levels of optimal earnings or high individual adjustment costs all sort
to these rms, but no such pattern is visible on observables. Overall, adjustment rates
are correlated within-establishment, supporting the rst prediction of our model: rm
characteristics matter for whether or not workers adjust shortly after a reform.
1.6.2 Linking Establishment Labor Demand to Adjustment
Here we test the central predictions of our model (Section 1.5). Generally, we should
only observe a new mini hire after the reform after an oer/push to increase all existing
workers hours. The presence of any new mini hires right after the reform should be a
(noisy) predictor of adjustment. Moreover, increases in the scale of the rm, as proxied
for by non-mini jobber growth, should also predict adjustment.
Baseline: Eect of Any Hires on Adjustment at The Establishment Level. For our
sample of establishments employing married women, we take all mini jobbers at each
establishment with monthly earnings around the threshold in the year before the reform
(2002/2012) and examine how their adjustment relates to hiring patterns. Specically, we
49Appendix Figure A·8 plots the distribution for establishments with Nˆ non-exiting mini jobbers at the
original threshold.
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regress a measure of adjustment at the establishment level (e) on the sequence of any mini
hires at that establishment:
Adjustmente =
2∑
t=−2
βtAny Mini Hirese,t+ηminiocc .+ηindusty+ηstate+ηminisize+ηnonminisize+ϵe
“Any new mini hire" is dened as a binary variable equal to 1 if the rm has at least one
entirely new mini jobber in that period and 0 otherwise.50 We restrict to establishments
that have at least one mini jobber in each of the periods that we use the hiring variable.
This ensures that a 0 is truly no hiring, as opposed to simply the establishment no longer
existing. Since we are only looking at the adjustment patterns of mini jobbers at the
threshold in 2002/2012, we naturally also restrict to establishments with at least one mini
jobber at the threshold in those years.
We focus rst on 1-year adjustment rates, dening a worker as adjusted if she increases
her average mini earnings within the original establishment above the old threshold levelZ
(at or below the new threshold level Z˜ ) in the period immediately following the reform.51
We opt to look at adjustment within establishment as it is conceptually clearer. Thus all
exits, including exits to a new rm in which the work is at the new threshold, count as no
adjustment. In practice, only 3.6% (1.6%) of our workers adjust at a new establishment in
2003 (2013), compared with the 26.7% (23.3%) who adjust within the original establishment
(see Tables 1.1–1.2). Recall also that this denition of adjustment allows for both imme-
diate adjustment starting April 2003 and adjustment to the new threshold at some later
point in 2003. With this denition in hand, we can then calculate the fraction of workers
50Specically, a new mini jobber is dened as a person appearing in a mini job at the establishment that
has not been in any job at that establishment in the prior years up to 2000/2010. Persons with both a mini
and regular at the same establishment in the same period (which is uncommon) are counted as regular
workers and not mini jobbers).
51Specically, our sample consists of all workers at the establishment in the year prior to the reform with
average monthly earnings in mini, at the rm, and from all sources between Z − 37.5 and Z + 12.5, where Z
is the original threshold. We call a worker adjusted if her monthly earnings in mini jobs at the establishment
increases to between Z + 12.5 to Z˜ + 12.5.
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adjusting at the establishment, as well as an indicator for whether any workers adjust. We
show both, but opt for using any adjustment as our baseline. This measure captures those
20-30% of establishments with no one adjusting (see Figure 1·8). Conceptually, this picks
up establishments that truly do not allow adjustment, especially for establishments with
large numbers of mini jobbers.52 We explore 2- and 3-year adjustment in other tables.
We include a series of xed eects for 2-digit modal mini job occupation, the establish-
ments industry (out of 21 options), state (out of 10) and establishment sizes for mini and
regular workers separately in our baseline.53 We also include the entire hiring sequence
at the rm in the 2 years before and after the reform. We make both choices to help dif-
ferentiate our modeled channel from one in which rms that hire in the reform period
simply dier along un-modeled dimensions.While xed eects, like industry eects, can
absorb potentially valid identifying variation in output growth, we include them to em-
phasize that our model applies to idiosyncratic changes in output demand within industry,
location, and rm size.Including the sequence of hiring allows us to look at the jump in
coecients between the years before the reform and the year of the reform, helping us
dierentiate rms that generally hire from rms that hire at the right time.
We weight all regressions by the number of at-the-threshold mini jobbers at that es-
tablishment. Small establishments are most likely to cause spurious zeros, as a handful
of mini jobbers might just by chance all not want to adjust. A rm with all of its, many,
mini jobbers not adjusting is much less likely to arise by pure chance. We cluster standard
errors at the establishment level. We opt for a linear probability model, but consider logit
regressions in the appendix.
52While the ‘fraction of workers adjusting’ variable is more granular it is also more subject to confounding
from sorting. For example, the fraction adjusting will be lower if there are generally more exits.
53Specically, we dummy out the oor of duration-weighted employment for 1 to 25 workers. Beyond
that we group rms with 26-50, 51-75, 76-100, 101-150, 151-200, 201-300, 301-400, 401-500, 500+ into their
own bins
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Baseline Results. Table 1.4 columns (1) and (5) show our baseline specication for the
2003 and 2013 reform respectively. The coecients from columns (1) and (5) are also
shown graphically (as a fraction of the dependent variable mean) in panels (a) and (b) of
Figure 1·9.
Establishments that hire a new mini jobber in the months following the reform are
indeed more likely to have mini jobbers that adjust. The eect size is largest for the
2003 reform: having a new mini job hire in 2003b is associated with an increase in the
probability of observing any adjustment in 2003b from a mean of 0.80 to 0.87. Having
a new mini hire in 2013 increases the probability of observing any adjustment in 2013
from 0.71 to 0.74. The smaller eect in the second reform could, in part, be due to more
adjustment taking place on the pure wage dimension, a process less obviously linked to
labor demand. In addition, we note that in both reforms, the eect of hiring in the period of
the reform is much larger than the eect of hiring in preceding years, boosting condence
that this is not just about rms that generally hire versus rms that do not.
Turning our attention to past and future hiring patterns, we note that the coecients
on hires before the reform tend to be negative, while the coecients on hires after the
reform tend to be positive, but with magnitudes smaller than the main eect size. We
expect future hires to have positive eects. In our stationary model, rms may adjust
immediately, hold o on hires, and then hire in future periods. While rms that have
not yet adjusted keep on not hiring.54 The negative coecients on past hire turn out to
be strongly related to turnover. In the model, high turnover rms should have an easier
time adjusting. In practice though, if many of the workers at the threshold leave the
establishment then, by denition, we will be less likely to observe within-establishment
adjustment. This latter eect appears to dominate. This can be seen most clearly in the
54Future hires may also help signal that the establishment is indeed expanding (or at a new steady state),
as opposed to having had an odd hire.
42
specications examining the fraction of workers adjusting, which we discuss next.
Columns (2) and (6) of Table 1.4 repeat the same regression changing the dependent
variable from any workers adjusting to the fraction of workers adjusting. As expected,
having a new hire in the reform period continues to be associated with better adjustment
and a large jump in the regression coecients relative to hiring in prior periods. However,
the negative coecients on hiring in prior periods are now larger. Columns (3)–(4) and
(7)–(8) show that these negatives are driven by exit behavior.55 Columns (3) and (6) restrict
to workers who stay at the rm, which reduces the negative coecients on past hires. If
we further restrict to workers who stay at the establishment and either stay in the same
earnings range or adjust, this change is even clearer (columns (4) and (8)).56
Overall, the level and the jump in the eect of having a hire in the reform period are
highly consistent with our proposed adjustment mechanism. Taken at face value, our
estimates imply that having a hire increases the mean adjustment rate by 9-15% (based
on columns (4) and (8)). These numbers are non-negligible, given that we expect the
eect of any mini hires in the period of the reform to be attenuated. Some establishments
will adjust their workers and not hire that period. Establishments may also hire non-
substitutable mini jobbers for special tasks (e.g. in dierent occupations). These forces
pull the coecient on any hires downward, without contradicting the hypothesized link
between labor demand and adjustment. We will have more to say about magnitudes in
the next subsection when we estimate our modied bunching model.
These baseline results are consistent with responses to our survey. Several individuals
stated in open response questions that their reason for not adjusting was related to output
or labor demand situation at their rm. Moreover, we asked individuals directly about
55Appendix Tables A.16–A.17 column (6) veries that hiring in each period is positively correlated with
exits in 03b/13.
56While we might reasonably worry that conditioning on outcomes could bias results. It is worth noting
that exits between 2002/2012 and 2003b/2013 imply the worker left before the reform. Many such exits are
plausibly unrelated to the reform which was passed in December.
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their perceptions of whether their rm needed more or fewer mini jobbers. Adjustment
rates increase monotonically with four categories of self-reported employer demand for
mini jobbers, providing anecdotal support for our results.
Dynamic Adjustment Patterns. The labor demand process we propose is naturally
dynamic. Some establishments nd it optimal to not adjust and not hire immediately af-
ter the reform, but then to adjust and hire later (either because of sucient attrition or
changes in output demand). Table 1.5 examines how adjustment in the years after the
reform year relates to hiring. Columns (1) and (5) restrict to establishments that did not
adjust in the reform period and shows that we are more likely to observe workers ad-
justing in the year after the reform if the rm hires in that period. Columns (2) and (6)
perform a similar regression, this time restricting to establishments that did not hire in
the reform period (but may or may not have already had some adjustment). Hiring in
the post-reform year is again positively associated with having adjustment in either the
reform or post-reform year. The remaining columns perform the same exercise for adjust-
ment in 2005/2015 conditional on either no adjustment in each of the previous two years
(Columns (3) and (7)) or no hires in the previous two years (Columns (4) and (8)). These
yield consistent results for 2005, but not for 2015, which might dier as a consequence of
the introduction of the national minimum wage. The coecients from these regressions
are plotted (as a fraction of the dependent variable mean) in Figure 1·9. Panels (c) and (d)
show the results conditioning on no immediate adjustment, while panels (e) and (f) show
the results conditioning on no hires.
The Eect of Non-Mini Employment Growth on Adjustment. We can also test the
link between output demand and adjustment more directly by proxying for output de-
mand using growth in non-mini job workers at the establishment. Table 1.6 investigates
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how the presence of adjustment at the establishment varies with measures of growth in the
non-mini labor force. We calculate the total wage bill spent on non-mini jobbers in each
year and look at year-to-year changes in the natural logarithm of this total. This jointly
captures increases in regular worker size, wage growth, and hours growth. Columns (1)
and (4) clearly show that growth in the non-mini wage bill is positively correlated with
adjustment in 2003b/2013, and this eect is particularly strong for growth in 2003/2013.
Columns (2) and (5) simply dummy out growth from 2002–2003/2012–2013 to show that
large growth is positively correlated with adjustment while the largest declines are neg-
atively correlated with adjustment. The average non-mini wage bill is close to 0 and the
standard deviation is close to 0.3, implying that a one standard deviation increase in the
non-mini wage bill increases adjustment by about 2 percentage points. Being in the bot-
tom 20th percentile of regular worker total wage bill growth increases the probability
that no adjustment is observed from 0.233 to 0.281 (relative to being in the 40th-60th per-
centile of total wage bill growth). Finally, columns (3) and (6) show that any new non-mini
hires, while weaker, are also predictive of adjustment. Overall, this table corroborates the
proposed mechanism independently of using changes in mini job employment at the es-
tablishment.
Threats to Identication. The results in Tables 1.4–1.6 paint a consistent picture, but
could be driven by worker sorting or omitted variables at the establishment level. We
address these rst order concerns here.
We worry that workers with higher ideal earnings or lower individual adjustment
costs may be more likely to sort into rms that hire in the future. It is not that obvious
that individuals would sort to establishments in 2002/2012 with respect to future hires in
2003b/2013 but not current hires. Nevertheless, it is possible that individuals with higher
ideal earnings are more concentrated in establishments with hires in the period immedi-
45
ately following the reform. To address this we replicate our regressions at the individual
level and add individual controls.57 Table 1.7 shows results with these controls.58 As we
did for fraction adjusting, we look at 1-year unconditional adjustment, adjustment condi-
tional on still working at the same establishment, and adjustment conditional on staying
in the same range or moving up to the new threshold at the same establishment. The
adjusted R2 increases by a minimum of 0.03 and a maximum of 0.07 upon inclusions of in-
dividual controls, while the coecients on any hires remain stable or increase. The largest
changes are in the unconditional sample, where individual controls appear to help control
for worker exits from the rm (which is negatively associated with adjustment). There is
no evidence from these tables that the estimated eect is biased upwards by sorting on ob-
servables. We implement Oster (2016)’s test for selection on unobservables both counting
the xed eects as controls and including them as unrelated controls. The values suggest
that we require a high degree of sorting on unobservables to negate results. Specically,
for the xed eects as unrelated controls, we require selection on unobservables to be a
minimum of twice as strong as selection on observables to overturn results.
Omitted rm-level variables that are correlated with both adjustment rates and dier-
ential hiring during the period of the reform could be responsible for the estimated coef-
cients. For example, two rms that would benet equally from adjusting their workers
immediately could be dierentially covered by collective labor agreements, allowing one
to both hire and adjust immediately while forcing the other into negotiations. We take
a three pronged approach to help limit these concerns: i) we include a series of estab-
lishment level variables as controls, ii) we replicate results on a sample of establishments
57We include controls for earnings, days worked, a dummy for working in 2 or more establishments, and
a dummy for working in both a mini and a regular job in the year before the reform and the year prior
(both at the establishment and everywhere). We also include the individuals tenure, occupation tenure, age,
education years, gender, and a dummy for German Nationality.
58Appendix Table A.8 shows the results without individual controls. Appendix Table A.9 contains the
same regression as Table 1.7 but shows all the coecients on the controls.
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for which we can include additional covariates from the LIAB data, and iii) we run a rst
dierence regression on the sample of establishments that experience both reforms.
Appendix Table A.6 includes a battery of establishment-level controls. Columns (3)
and (6) replicate columns (1) and (5) from Table 1.4 including controls for the structure of
the establishment and the demographics of its employees.59 These controls have a mini-
mal eect on the estimated eect of hires in the reform period on any adjustment. Oster
(2016)’s tests suggest that selection on unobservables needs to be between 0.8 and 2.4 times
that on observables to null the eects of any hires in the reform period.60 Appendix Table
A.7 replicates our baseline regression on the largest sample of establishments for which
we have rm survey data (from the LIAB). Unfortunately sample sizes are small. Our ef-
fect replicates for the 2003 reform but not the 2013 reform.61 The inclusion of additional
controls for collective labor arrangements and information on vacancies does not move
our estimates much and enter mostly in the expected direction, but imprecisely. Finally,
we take advantage of the fact that some establishments employ mini jobbers in both re-
forms. We estimate a rst-dierenced version of our baseline, replacing Any Adjustment
59Specically we include both the fraction of mini jobbers at the notch and the fraction of the work
force that is mini jobbers. We further include the fraction of mini and non-mini jobbers in the modal
occupation, the fraction of mini and non-mini jobbers working year round, the rm age, and whether
the modal mini and modal non-mini occupations dier. To get at exibility, we also include the standard
deviation of earnings in mini and non-mini jobs separately. To control for the demographics of the work
force, we include average age, share of commuters, share of non-Germans, average education, share of
females, average tenure and occupation tenure for non-mini and mini jobbers separately. Lastly, we add the
local municipality (gemeinde) unemployment level and growth rate.
60The controls are of interest in their own right and they reveal relatively clear patterns: i) the relation-
ship between adjustment and the share of the workforce that is made up of mini jobbers is an inverted-U
with a peak at around 0.5, ii) the more exibility (multiple mini occupations, higher standard deviation of
mini wages), the better the chance of seeing some adjustment, iii) the higher the fraction of mini jobbers at
the notch (among mini jobbers) the better the chance of seeing some adjustment, iv) the higher the unem-
ployment level, the worse adjustment, v) the more females, the more year-round workers, and the higher
average worker tenure the better the adjustment (which could in part be a consequence of lower turnover).
Overall, this evidence suggests that other rm-level channels could play a role in determining adjustment,
but it does not detract from the plausibility of our labor demand oriented channel.
61This is just a consequence of unlucky sampling: our 2013 results hold for a random sample of estab-
lishments with at least one mini jobber in 2012 (see Appendix Table A.12).
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and Any Hires with their dierences across reforms.62 This controls for all xed estab-
lishment level factors between 2003 and 2013. Table 1.8 column (2) shows these results for
dierences in any mini hires. Column (3) shows the results for dierences in non-mini
wage bill growth. Results are statistically signicant and in the expected direction for
both specications.
We interpret these results as indicating that rms with labor demand are more likely
to make oers of additional hours to workers, speeding up the adjustment process. We
think the checks above help rule out alternative explanations of the results, but discuss
two specic, competing interpretations relating to information and under-the-table pay.
Information about the reform could potentially inuence hiring patterns immediately
prior to or following the reform.63 If this is the case, results may be partially driven by
better informed rms or workers and not labor demand. As described in Section 1.2, we
believe rms to be well informed about the reform. We are reassured by the fact that
our results are strongest for large establishments which are likely better informed. We
also nd the non-mini job results reassuring, as the reform should not directly impact
labor demand for these workers. We do think it is possible that establishments with new
hires are more likely to transmit information about the reform to their workers, but we
view this as isomorphic to our labor demand channel: establishments who can benet
from additional work hours are most incentivised to inform their workers and encourage
additional work.
Finally, we mention the possibility that workers are being paid under the table while
rms report earnings at the mini job threshold.64 In such a case, some of the immediate
62Regressions are now weighted using the minimum of the number of mini jobbers at the threshold in
the pre-reform year.
63 There is also the possibility that new hires bring information with them. A new hire at the new earnings
threshold for example could signal to other workers that it is now possible to earn more. In our own survey
results, none of the respondents chose the option that they heard about the reform via a new colleague.
64The rm itself does not benet from this as social security taxes are higher for mini jobbers than regular
workers, but of course they could take their cut of the tax savings in other ways. Given the large rm SSC,
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adjustment may come purely from reporting behavior. It is hard to see how this can be
a relevant omitted variable, as rms that pay under the table would also have to hire
(dierentially) more following the reform. Most of our results are driven by larger rms
that are more likely to be caught doing such illegal activity.
Appendix Tables A.10–A.19 contain additional robustness checks. Tables A.10 and
A.11 restrict to the married women in our structural estimation sample (as opposed to
all people at the mini job threshold). Tables A.12–A.13 replicate our baseline results on
a random sample of establishments with mini jobbers in 2002/2012. Table A.14 examines
how results vary with the number of mini jobbers at the threshold. Tables A.15–A.17
examine alternative denitions of adjustment. Tables A.18 and A.19 explore sensitivity to
alternative baseline specications.
Discussion. The weight of the evidence points to hiring in the period of the reform being
associated with adjustment in a manner that does not appear to be driven by individual
sorting to establishments or captured by any rst order establishment level controls. The
rst dierence results suggest that even within-establishment (albeit over a long stretch of
time), we see idiosyncrasies in hiring mattering. We interpret this evidence as validation
of our labor demand-driven adjustment channel: establishments with labor demand are
more likely to oer their workers additional work post-reform, easing adjustment. The
evidence of course does not rule out additional, complementary channels. Indeed, the role
of the next subsection is to quantify the relative importance of this channel.
the rm would do better to keep the entire employment relationship under the table, but it is plausible that
they reduce the chances of being caught by putting some workers on the books.
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1.6.3 Estimating Adjustment Costs Accounting For Labor Demand Heterogene-
ity
In this nal subsection, we attempt to quantify the relative importance of this labor de-
mand channel. We exploit variation in bunching and un-bunching patterns for individuals
in establishments that hire following the reform versus individuals in non-hiring rms,
controlling for past hiring and dierences in other observable variables. As expected, we
observe more rapid un-bunching in the distribution of individuals in hiring rms.
We quantify the importance of these observed dierences by extending an existing
method for estimating xed costs. Gelber et al. (2017) estimate a xed adjustment cost
after changes to a tax kink. This cost conates dierent sources of frictions. Here, we
explicitly separate out our demand-side channel to determine how much of the total xed
cost it explains. While this quantication approach is model specic, it helps deepen our
understanding of what these bunching-based adjustment cost estimators – used now in
several papers – are recovering.
Estimating Adjustment Costs With Establishment Labor Demand Heterogene-
ity. We will model individuals as randomly allocated to rms conditional on observable
variables. At the time of the reform, individuals randomly nd themselves in either an es-
tablishment with labor demand that can absorb their increased hours or one that does not
have such demand. Specically, we will exploit variation in any new mini hiring, con-
ditional on observable variables and past hiring patterns. Establishments that hire will
always oer their workers the opportunity to increase their hours (phire = 1).65 Establish-
ments that do not hire will oer additional hours to their workers with some probability
65We cannot separately identify a probability that persons at establishments with a hire are prohibited
from adjusting. The most conservative approach is to assume that establishments that hire always allow
adjustment: phire = 1. This will attribute all the excess mass at the old notch in 2003b in the any hire = 1
group to individual frictions and biases us against nding a role for our mechanism.
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pno hire < 1, which we will estimate. Since some rms will adjust workers but not need to
hire, this probability will be positive. As in Section 1.5, we do not allow for worker exits.
Individuals have the same quasi-linear utility function as in Section 1.4.2. In addi-
tion, we will impose an individual level, xed adjustment cost similar to that in Gelber
et al. (2017). This cost will directly enter the individual’s utility function and is only paid
if the worker changes earnings. This cost can be interpreted as a cost paid to change
one’s schedule around, but could conate a variety of costs. Without any such costs, all
the excess mass at the old notch would immediately dissipate in rms that allow hours
increases. In practice, not all workers will accept such oers. In this model, only work-
ers whose utility gains from adjusting (which are increasing in ideal earnings, or ability)
exceed this cost will adjust.
Specically, individual utility is given by
ut = zt −T (zt ) − n1 + 1/e
(zt
n
)1+1/e
− ϕ˜1(zt+1 , zt )
where ϕ˜ represents this xed cost of adjustment.
Moreover, and like Gelber et al. (2017), we assume this xed cost dissipates over time.
A convenient way to do so is to assume individuals draw a free adjustment chance with
some probability pit in each period. Since frictions dissipate in this context over 6 years,
it is reasonable to think that the 2002 and the 2012 bunching distributions recover the
long-term elasticity. We also assume workers are myopic.
We rst consider a 2 period model that only uses moments from the years 2002 and
2003b. The below tree outlines each possible scenario. We denev (n, e ) as the utility gain
that arises from adjusting earnings to the optimal point under the new notch. This gain
will depend on individual ability n and workers’ elasticity e . A worker at a hiring rm
will behave as if in the standard model, adjusting to the new notch only if her utility gain
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from doing so exceeds the xed cost. All workers at hiring rms get the opportunity to
make this choice. In contrast, a worker at a non-hiring rm will rst wait to see if she
receives an oer to work more hours. Some rms will make this oer, and the worker
responds in the same way that she would in a hiring rm. Other rms will not make this
oer, and then the worker will not adjust, regardless of her utility gain from doing so.
Person at establishment hiring after reform (w/ eAH1)
Firm Allows Adjustment
v (n, e ) ≤ ϕ˜ : Don’t Adjust v (n, e ) ≥ ϕ˜ : Pay ϕ˜ and adjust at rm
Person at establishment not hiring after reform (w/ eAH0)
Firm Allows Adjustment (applies to pno hire individuals)
v (n, e ) ≤ ϕ˜ : Don’t Adjust v (n, e ) ≥ ϕ˜ : Pay ϕ˜ and adjust at rm
Firm Does not Allow Adjustment (applies to (1 − no hire) individuals)
Regardless of v (n, e ): Don’t Adjust
We wish to identify 4 parameters: the elasticities for persons in each type of rm
(eno hire 03b, ehire 03b), the individual level adjustment cost (ϕ˜), and the probability that a
person in an establishment without hires is allowed to adjust (pno hire,03b).
The elasticities are recovered from the pre-reform bunching masses. Individual level
frictions will create the excess mass at the old notch in hiring rms. The dierential in
bunching at the old threshold between hiring and non-hiring rms will be determined by
the degree to which non-hiring rms are constrained in their ability to oer additional
hours.
Implementation. Empirically, we split earnings histograms by whether or not the
worker is at an establishment with a mini hire in the year of the reform. To do so, we
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take all of the married women in our main sample that are also in establishments with at
least one mini jobber in 2002 and calculate a propensity score for this establishment hav-
ing a new mini hire in 2003b. We estimate the propensity score using the same dummies
for state, industry, occupation, and establishment size (both mini and non-mini) used in
Section 1.6.2, as well as controls for the share of the period spent working and average
monthly earnings. We perform these propensity score estimations separately within 4 av-
erage monthly earnings ranges.66 Then, we use 1-1 nearest neighbor matching to match
each individual in the smaller group (no hire in the period of the reform) to an individ-
ual in the hires group. This gives us the rst four earnings distributions shown in Figure
1·11: the earnings distributions in 2002 and 2003 for workers in establishments that do not
hire in 2003b and the earnings distribution in 2002 and 2003 for propensity score matched
workers in establishments that do hire in 2003b. The estimated mass at the old notch in
each of these cases is shown in panel 1 of Table 1.9. Adjustment is visibly quicker in hiring
rms.
We minimize the squared distance between the moments generated from this model
(assuming a uniform counter-factual) and those in the data. We use an identity weighting
matrix that weights each of the four moments identically. We use the same budget sets
as in Section 1.4.2 (see Appendix A.3 for details). Standard errors are bootstrapped using
1000 trials.
Results. Table 1.9 shows the results of our two-period estimation. We estimate elasticities
of 0.086 and 0.105 for the no hire and hire group respectively. We estimate a xed adjust-
ment cost ϕ˜ of 31.8 and nd the probability that individuals at non-hiring establishments
are allowed to adjust to be pno hire = 0.91.
66We propensity match separately within the following average monthly wage categories: below e275,
between e275–320; between e320 – 335; above e335.
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We can shut down our labor demand channel by matching the same four moments
in the data, but requiring that non-hiring rms also make oers to all workers (that is
pno hire = 1). This model has a lower t and yields a larger adjustment cost of 39.3.67 In
other words, our labor demand channel accounts for 19 percent of the estimated xed
adjustment cost. Results are similar if we restrict elasticities to be equal across groups.
The estimated xed costs implies that workers whose utility gain from adjusting falls
below the utility from a e40 a month raise will choose not to adjust. This applies over
the period of April – December 2003. These costs are large and in the range of other
comparable estimates. They are approximately the equivalent of 10% of own income and
1% of household income and they imply large, economy-wide utility losses. The average
utility loss from non-adjustment for those stuck at the notch over this 9 month period is
e139 per head.68 Rough calculations suggest that there are approximately 400,000 such
women, implying that the welfare losses arising from non-immediate adjustment total
approximately e60 million.69 Our labor demand channel explains about a fth of these
losses.
We estimate that 10% of workers at non-hiring establishments are prohibited from ad-
justing. Recall that, overall, over 20% of establishments of sizes 3-10 had no one adjusting
(see Figure 1·8). This relatively small estimate is in part a consequence of assuming that
no one at rms with a hire is prohibited from adjusting. If phire were smaller than 1, we
would estimate smaller ϕ˜ and pno hire. For example, if we set phire = 0.9, we estimate a ϕ˜
of 14.348 and pno hire = 0.820. We prefer our less arbitrary conservative estimate, but note
67This is very close to the xed cost we estimate when running the standard Gelber et al. (2017) approach
on the raw, non-split moments (see Appendix A.5).
68We can integrate over the utility gain for everyone from 325 to 407 (the marginal unbuncher), assuming
a uniform distribution, to obtain the average utility gain from eliminating frictions among those stuck at
the old notch. This is e15.5 per month per head, or e139 over the 9 month period.
69The excess mass at the old threshold in 2003b in our sample is approximately 24% of the persons in mini
jobs. There are approximately 1,786,621 married females in mini jobs in 2003b (estimates from the SOEP).
If we assume our estimates are valid for all married women, this implies that over 400,000 of these women
will be constrained at the old notch.
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that it is a lower bound.
We t the same model to the data from the 2013 reform (see Appendix Table A.20). Es-
timated adjustment costs are similar in magnitude (e33–37). Consistent with the smaller
baseline regression coecients found in Section 1.6.2, rm labor demand explains a
smaller portion of the adjustment cost (3–12%).
3 period model. We can extend the 2-period model by adding moments from 2004. To
do so we re-estimate propensity scores for any hiring of mini jobbers in 2004 using the
same procedure as before, but this time based o of average monthly wages in 2003b.We
propensity score match within each of the any hire 2003b groups separately, creating four
additional moments.
In 2004, individuals randomly draw a chance to adjust costlessly, as long as their rm
allows it. This occurs with probability 1− pi04. In both years (2003b and 2004), we assume
that hiring implies all workers are allowed to adjust. Establishments that do not hire in
2004, but hired in 2003b, are assumed to prohibit adjustment at the same rate as those do
not hire in 2004 and did not hire in 2003b. Workers are myopic.
We now have 8 dierent bunching moments that we use to identify 6 parameters: eAH0,
eAH1, ϕ˜, pi04, and pAH0,03b , pAH0,04. Results from this estimation can be seen in the lower
panels of Table 1.9 and are comparable to the 2-period model.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper shows that sizable adjustment frictions attenuate short-term earnings
responses to tax reforms. This is true even in a context where the policy change is salient
and where the group under study is expected to be elastic with ample room to increase
hours. We established a novel adjustment channel that explains how heterogeneity in
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rm-level characteristics, and labor demand in particular, leads to heterogeneity in ad-
justment speeds.
Our ndings have implications that likely extend to other settings. For example, con-
sider a policy that increases the phase-out location for the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC). Our work would predict that adjustment is delayed, and moreover, such a policy
change would produce more rapid responses if rms that employ EITC-eligible workers
are growing.
Much additional research can be done to better understand short-term responses to
tax changes. More elasticity estimation studies could trace out the observed elasticity over
time, keeping track of the expected utility gains from adjusting as well as other context-
specic attenuating factors, like information and labor demand growth. In the same way
that the congressional budget oce has settled on a reasonable elasticity to use, we could
eventually settle on an expected response path over time, conditional on induced utility
gains. This would yield more ne-tuned predictions and better calibrate our expectations
of short-term earnings responses.
From a theoretical standpoint, we note that elasticities are most attenuated in the
very short-run, but standard adjustment mechanics, like movement to new rms, tend
to become relevant only over a longer time period. This points towards the importance
of thinking more deeply about within-rm adjustment mechanics. Our evidence tells
us that other adjustment channels matter; these would be worth exploring. Our adjust-
ment mechanism also hints at asymmetric responses, suggesting that responses to policy
changes encouraging labor might have dierent short-run eects than policies discour-
aging labor.
From a policy design perspective, our work highlights the large distortions induced by
the mini job tax notch, particularly for married women, and the utility cost lost to frictions
each time this tax notch is increased. Smoothing out the notch and no longer explicitly
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dierentiating between dierent types of jobs would likely help both in equilibrium and
after reforms. More generally, our work suggests that policies aimed at increasing labor
may produce more rapid responses if enacting during expansions as opposed to recessions.
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1.8 Figures
Figure 1·1: Approximate Tax Schedules
(a) 1999-Mar 2003 (b) Apr 2003 - 2012
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Notes: Budget sets are exact for the years 2002, 2003 and 2013 respectively. There is some variation year to year,
hence the term approximate. Single persons are assumed to have no other sources of income and hence earn too
little to be subject to income taxes, with all variation driven by changes in social security contributions. Budget
sets for married women are constructed assuming the husband earnse41000, the mean in our sample. Earnings
below the mini job threshold are income tax exempt, while earnings above the threshold enter into household
income and hence are taxed at the household’s marginal tax rate. All budgets are calculated taking into account
dierences in the rms’ social security contributions between mini and regular workers, assuming 100% pass
through to the worker. For further details on the budget set construction please see Appendix A.3.
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Figure 1·2: Earnings Distributions: Married Women 2002-2008
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Notes: This gure plots the distribution of average monthly earnings (all employment sources) for the married
women identied by our couple identication process. We restrict to women working in West Germany, aged 26
to 55 (inclusive) aged between 26 and 55 whose husband’s annual earnings falls between 33000 and 53000 euro.
Bins are 15 euro wide beginning with a bin from 20-35 euro, centered at 27.5. The mini job threshold, indicated
by the blue solid line, was at 325 euro prior to April 1st 2003, at 400 euro prior to January 1st 2013, and at 450
euro thereafter.
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Figure 1·3: Earnings Distributions: Married Women 2009-2015
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Notes: This gure plots the distribution of average monthly earnings (all employment sources) for the married
women identied by our couple identication process. We restrict to women working in West Germany, aged 26
to 55 (inclusive) aged between 26 and 55 whose husband’s annual earnings falls between 33000 and 53000 euro.
Bins are 15 euro wide beginning with a bin from 20-35 euro, centered at 27.5. The mini job threshold, indicated
by the blue solid line, was at 325 euro prior to April 1st 2003, at 400 euro prior to January 1st 2013, and at 450
euro thereafter.
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Figure 1·4: Next-Year Adjustment Rates by Monthly Earnings
(a) Share of women in 2001 who earn between e325 and e400 in 2002
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(b) Share of women in 2002 who earn between e325 and e400 in 2003b
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(c) Share of women 2012 who earn between e400 and e450 in 2013
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Notes: Panel (a) shows the earnings distribution for the same sample as in Figure 1·2 in light gray (left y-axis)
in 2001. The black squares show the average adjustment rate (right y-axis). Adjustment is dened as having
average monthly earnings in 2002 between 337.5 and 412.5. Rates are almost 0 for mini jobbers at or below the
threshold of 325, as expected given the large notch. Among the few people in this dominated region in 200,
less than 20% stay. Panel (b) performs the same exercise for women in 2002, adjusting to the new threshold in
Apr-Dec 2003. Most adjustment comes from persons close to the 325 euro threshold. Panel (c) does the same for
married women in 2012 adjusting to the new threshold in 2013.
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Figure 1·5: Hours Distribution: Married Women in Mini Jobs 2012
(a) Hours Worked (Mini Jobs, 2012) (b) Hours Worked (Regular Jobs, 2012)
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(c) ∆ Hours ’13-’12 (d) ∆ Hours ’13-’12, Estab. w/ >= 10 Mini
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Notes: Panel (a) plots the distribution of hours worked for the married women in Figure 1·2. In addition, we re-
strict to women average monthly earnings between 200 and 412.5 euro in 2012 (both in total and mini earnings).
Average weekly hours are calculated as total hours across employment sources divided by total days worked
times 7. Panel (b) plots the same distribution for married women with average total monthly earnings between
812.5 and 4000 euro per month in 2012. Panel (c) plots the change in average monthly hours worked between
2012 and 2013 for ‘stayers’ and ‘adjusters’ separately. Stayers are dened as persons with average monthly
earnings between 362.5 and 412.5 euro (both total and mini) in 2012 and 2013 whose average monthly earnings
change by less than 20 euro. Adjusters are dened as persons with average monthly earnings between 362.5
and 412.5 euro (both total and mini) in 2012 who earn between 412.5 and 462.5 euro in 2013 and whose aver-
age monthly earnings increase by at least 30 euro. Panel (d) is the same as (c) except it restricts to women at
establishments with at least 10 mini jobbers earning between 362.5 and 412.5 euro in 2012.
62
Figure 1·6: Bunching and Elasticity Estimates
(a) Bunching at the Old Notch following each Reform
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(b) Implied Elasticities
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Notes: Panel (a) plots normalized excess mass at the old notch (e325 post-2003 ande400 post-2013) in each year
following the reforms. Year 1 is Apr-Dec 2003 for the 2003 reform and 2013 for the 2013 reform. The bunching
mass is normalized by the average counter-factual density between 225 and 325 euro. Counter-factual densities
are estimated period by period keeping zl xed, chosen to be the bin centered at e225. We select (zu ) as the bin
that most closely sets the total bunching mass (not just at the old threshold) equal to the missing mass to the right
of the threshold. Average monthly earnings were divided into e15 bins starting at e20. The counter-factual
polynomial was quintic, and the estimation window extended up to e2007.5 euro. Appendix Figures A·6–A·7
show the counter-factual densities and shade in what counts towards bunching at the old threshold. We note
that the estimated excess mass in 2012 is likely due to imprecision in targeting the new threshold and term
this level the ‘natural’ level of excess mass. This gure plots excess mass at the old threshold less this ‘natural’
level. All estimates would be 3.67 units higher were this included. Panel (b) plots the implied elasticities from
the exercise described in Section 1.4.2. We plot 95% condence intervals around each estimate. We bootstrap
standard errors by drawing 1000 trials with replacement from the earnings distributions and running all of the
counter-factual estimation and model t programs. This means the standard errors take into account both the
natural variation in the data arising from the sample size and variation in the polynomial t.
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Figure 1·7: Model Simulations of Firm’s Optimal Hours Adj. Process
Optimal Emp. & Hiring Optimal Emp., Hiring, & Adj. Timing
(a) Fixed Output Price (no reform) (b) Fixed Output Price (reform)
-7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
 Years After Reform
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
 
O
pt
im
al
 E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t S
iz
e
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
 
H
irn
g 
Ra
te
 / 
 
Ex
og
. O
ut
pu
t P
ric
e 
(10
00
s)
-7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
 Years After Reform
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
 
O
pt
im
al
 E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t S
iz
e
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
 
H
irn
g 
Ra
te
 / 
 
Ex
og
. O
ut
pu
t P
ric
e 
(10
00
s)
(c) Declining Output Price (no reform) (d) Declining Output Price (reform)
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(e) Increasing Output Price (no reform) (f) Increasing Output Price (reform)
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Notes: This gure simulates the model described in Section 1.5 under 3 dierent environments. Panels (a) and (b)
do so for a stationary environment, (c) and (d) do so for a contracting rm (declining output prices), and (e) and
(f) do so for an expanding rm. The production function is ϕ ln(N · h). Parameters are w = 10, h = 32.5 · 12,
h¯ = 40 · 12, p = 80, α = 200, σ = 0.05, δ = 0.961, ϕ = 250. The left 3 panels show the optimal employment
path (Nt ) and hiring rate (at ) for the given price path when h is xed. The right three panels show the optimal
employment path (Nt ) and hiring rate (at ) with a period 0 reform (known in period −1) that allows the rm
to increase hours to h¯. For these panels, we also show the (optimally chosen) adjustment period, given by the
dashed red line. The shaded region indicates the years in which the rm has delayed increasing hours.
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Figure 1·8: Fraction of Mini Jobbers who Adjusted in 2003b/2013, Plotted
for Firms with N˜ at-the-threshold Mini Jobbers in 2002/2012
2003 Reform 2013 Reform
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(c) N˜ = 6 (d) N˜ = 6
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(e) N˜ = 8 (f) N˜ = 8
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Notes: These gures plot the fraction of mini jobbers who adjust to the new threshold in the period immediately
following the reform for establishments with a given number of minijobbers (N˜ ) at the old threshold (z). For our
sample of establishments employing married women, we keep all mini jobbers with average monthly mini job
earnings at the establishment between z−37.5 and z+12.5, in the year prior to the reform. We dene adjustment
as having average monthly mini job earnings at the establishment between z + 12.5 to z˜ + 12.5 in the period
immediately following the reform (z˜ is the new threshold). Movers or exiters are thus classied as non-adjusters.
The shaded bars plot the actual share of workers adjusting. The empty bars plot the distribution that would arise
if workers all had the gure-level average adjustment propensity and were randomly distributed across rms
(see Section 1.6.1). 95% condence intervals are calculated separately for each possible fraction adjusting and all
distributions are highly statistically dierent from their i.i.d counter-part in chi-squared tests.
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Figure 1·9: Regression Coecients: Any Adjustment at Establishment on
Any Hires
(a) 2003 Reform (b) 2013 Reform
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Notes: Panel (a) plots the regression coecients from Table 1.4 Column (1), as a fraction of the dependent
variable mean. It shows the estimated eect of having any new mini job hire in any given period on whether
the establishment has any of its at-the-threshold mini jobbers adjusting in 2003b (see notes to Table 1.4). Panel
(b) plots the regression coecients from Table 1.4 Column (5), as a fraction of the dependent variable mean.
Panel (c) takes panel (a) and adds the regression coecients from Table 1.5 Columns (1) and (3). It shows the
eect of hiring on whether any of the at-the-threshold mini jobbers adjust in 2004 conditional on having none
adjust in 2003b. Panel (d) takes panel (b) and adds the regression coecients from Table 1.5 Columns (5), and (7).
Panels (e) and (f) do the same as (c) and (d) except they add the coecients from columns (2) and (4) / columns
(6) and (8) from Table 1.5. They show the eect of hiring on whether any of the at-the-threshold mini jobbers
adjust in 04/14 conditional on having no hires in 2003b/13.
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Figure 1·10: Distribution of Monthly Earnings for New Mini Hires 2002-
2005; 2012-2015
(a) New Mini Hires Earnings 2002 (b) New Mini Hires Earnings 2003b
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(c) New Mini Hires Earnings 2004 (d) New Mini Hires Earnings 2005
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(e) New Mini Hires Earnings 2012 (f) New Mini Hires Earnings 2013
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(g) New Mini Hires Earnings 2014 (h) New Mini Hires Earnings 2015
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Notes: These gures plot the average monthly mini job earnings distribution for all new mini jobbers at our
sample of establishments employing married women in the period in which they are hired. New mini jobbers
are dened as not having previously had any earnings at the rm either in mini or overall (back to 2000/2010).
The distributions roughly mirror the overall mini job earnings distributions but show faster adjustment to the
new notch (400 in 2003b and 450 in 2013), particularly in 2003b. (The spike around 165 euro is due to workers
on employment benets who face benet withdrawal rates of 100% above this threshold. It is more common for
men to be in this region).
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Figure 1·11: Bunching at Old Notch 02-04 Split By Firm Hiring
(a) 2002; Any Hire 03b= 0 (b) 2002; Any Hire 03b= 1
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(c) 2003b; Any Hire 03b= 0 (d) 2003b; Any Hire 03b= 1
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Notes: Like Figure A·7, this gure plots the excess mass at the old notch in the year prior and the years following
the 2003 reform. The calculation of the counter-factual density and excess mass is as described in Figure A·7.
We split the earnings distribution by establishments with and without hires. As described in 1.6.3, we calculate
a propensity score for having any hire in 2003b based o the xed eects used in our regression tables, average
monthly wages, and days worked. We match each of the person’s in the establishments without a 2003b mini
hire (the smaller group) to a person in an establishment with a 2003b mini hire, using 1-1 nearest neighbor
matching. We plot the earnings distributions for these persons in 2002 and 2003b separately for the group that
does not have/will not have a hire in 2003b and the group that has/will have a hire in 2003b.
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1.9 Tables
Table 1.1: Distribution of Mini Jobbers at Notch in 2002/2012 in later pe-
riods
2003b 2004 2005 2013 2014 2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lower Earnings Mini 0.099 0.111 0.107 0.099 0.090 0.074
Same Earnings Mini 0.311 0.227 0.168 0.388 0.233 0.132
High Earnings (Adj.) Mini 0.314 0.312 0.293 0.261 0.281 0.271
Midi Job 0.060 0.064 0.066 0.080 0.092 0.098
Regular Job 0.042 0.073 0.099 0.052 0.125 0.185
Not in Data 0.174 0.213 0.267 0.120 0.178 0.240
N 677990 677990 677990 503001 503001 503001
Notes: This table takes all mini jobbers with average monthly earnings (both all and at
rm) in the range of Z − 37.5 and Z + 12.5 in 2002/2012, where Z is the notch threshold,
and tracks them over time. All numbers are expressed as a fraction of the total number
in 2002/2012. Lower earnings means average earnings fall below Z − 37.5 but larger than
0. Same earnings means their earnings stay between Z − 37.5 and Z + 12.5. High Mini
Earnings implies adjustment and is between Z + 12.5 and Z˜ + 12.5 where Z˜ is the new
notch. Midi Job range in 400-800 euro in 2003-2012 and 450-850 in 2013-on. Regular Jobs
start above that. Columns sum to 1 (rounding errors).
Table 1.2: Distribution of Mini Jobbers at Notch in 2002/2012 in later pe-
riods
2003b 2004 2005 2013 2014 2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Same Firm 0.699 0.582 0.469 0.799 0.632 0.509
Same Firm Mini 0.631 0.511 0.399 0.690 0.500 0.360
Same Firm, Lower Earnings Mini 0.070 0.065 0.053 0.074 0.052 0.035
Same Firm, Same Earnings Mini 0.276 0.185 0.124 0.358 0.199 0.101
Same Firm, High Earnings Mini 0.267 0.242 0.207 0.233 0.235 0.214
New Firm 0.127 0.205 0.264 0.081 0.189 0.251
New Firm Mini 0.093 0.138 0.170 0.056 0.103 0.116
New Firm, Lower Earnings Mini 0.027 0.043 0.052 0.019 0.035 0.037
New Firm, Same Earnings Mini 0.031 0.037 0.040 0.022 0.030 0.028
New Firm, High Earnings Mini 0.036 0.059 0.077 0.016 0.038 0.052
Left Data 0.174 0.213 0.267 0.120 0.178 0.240
N 677990 677990 677990 503001 503001 503001
Notes: This table takes all mini jobbers with average monthly earnings (both all and at
rm) in the range of Z − 37.5 and Z + 12.5 in 2002/2012, where Z is the notch threshold,
and tracks them over time. All numbers are expressed as a fraction of the total number in
2002/2012. Rows in bold sum to 1 down the column. The non-italicized, non-bold rows
sum to close to the italicized row. They are exact for new rms, and slightly low for same
rm when discrepancies between earnings at the rm and overall earnings arise.
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Table 1.3: Adjustment Rates Variance Decomposition Between/Within Firm
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2003 Reform 2013 Reform
Random Effect RE w/ Ind. Controls Random Effect RE w/ Ind. Controls
Var. Explained by Firm (ρ) 0.209 0.204 0.232 0.229
Var. Explained by 1-Digit Industry (ρ) 0.028 0 0.008 0.005
Var. Explained by 2-Digit Occupation (ρ) 0.017 0.004 0.027 0.002
Var. Explained by a State Dummies (ρ) 0.003 0 0.005 0
Var. Explained by a Municipality Dummies (ρ) 0.064 0.065 0.076 0.075
Var. Explained by Municipality × Ind. (ρ) 0.102 0.101 0.127 0.125
Var. Explained by Municipality × Occ. (ρ) 0.099 0.090 0.121 0.114
Observations 677988 677988 502988 502988
No. of Firms 153880 153880 123280 123280
No. of Industries 21 21 22 22
No. of Occupations 88 88 81 81
No. of States 10 10 10 10
No. of Municipalities 6246 6246 6131 6131
No. of Municipalities× Ind. 37279 37279 33405 33405
No. of Municipalities× Occ. 63412 63412 57062 57062
Notes: Each entry in the table corresponds to a dierent regression designed to estimate the fraction of the variance in adjustment
rates that can be attributed to between-group variation. We estimate Adji f = Const + νf + ϵi f , where νf is a rm (or industry, or
occupation, etc) random eect, and we report ρ = σ
2
ν
σ 2ν+σ 2ϵ
. The estimation sample consists of all mini jobbers at rms in our sample
who have average monthly earnings (both mini and overall) betweenZ −37.5 andZ +12.5, whereZ is the notch threshold. Adjustment
is dened as being equal to 1 if average monthly earnings in 2003b/2013 fall between Z + 12.5 and Z˜ + 12.5, where Z˜ is the new notch
after the reform. Hence, we allow adjustment outside the rm. Not adjusting encompasses all other earning levels as well as leaving
the data. 31.36% (26.15%) of workers adjust in 2003 (2013) and 31.15% (38.7%) stay in the same range. Restricting to persons who either
adjusted or stayed in the same earnings range strengthens the variance share of the rm (to about 0.28 for both reforms). Columns 2
and 4 include a matrix of controls X in the regression Adji f = Const +X ′i β + νf + ϵi f to check for sensitivity to rst order observable
sorting. The included controls are monthly wages and days worked in the 2 years prior to the reform, a dummy for not working 2
years prior to the reform, tenure, occupation tenure, age, education years, gender, a dummy for German nationality, and a dummy for
working in more than one rm in each of the 2 years prior to the reform. A "0" means that the best estimate of the variance of the
random eect is the corner solution of 0.
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Table 1.4: Adjustment At Firm on Any Mini Job Hires
2003 Reform: Adjustment to 400 2013 Reform: Adjustment to 450
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Any Adj. Fraction Adj. Frac (in Firm) Frac (Stay/Adj) Any Adj. Fraction Adj. Frac (in Firm) Frac (Stay/Adj)
Any Hires 01/11 -0.019 -0.035 -0.011 -0.002 -0.026 -0.032 -0.016 -0.009
(0.005)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004) (0.006)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*
Any Hires 02/12 0.000 -0.042 -0.002 0.010 -0.026 -0.051 -0.024 -0.013
(0.005) (0.003)*** (0.004) (0.004)** (0.006)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)***
Any Hires 03a -0.001 -0.014 0.007 0.016
(0.005) (0.003)*** (0.004)* (0.004)***
Any Hires 03b/13 0.073 0.039 0.059 0.072 0.032 0.014 0.025 0.035
(0.005)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.006)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)***
Any Hires 04/14 0.028 0.011 0.024 0.024 0.003 -0.001 0.005 0.010
(0.005)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)**
Any Hires 05/15 0.018 0.005 0.019 0.019 -0.003 -0.009 -0.006 -0.005
(0.005)*** (0.003)* (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.006) (0.004)** (0.004) (0.005)
# of Individuals 533842 533842 523825 511415 428283 428283 422192 414029
# of Firms 99586 99586 93303 87068 91448 91448 86801 81586
Adj. R2 0.180 0.120 0.113 0.118 0.168 0.071 0.061 0.057
Dep. Var. Mean 0.792 0.293 0.394 0.470 0.705 0.261 0.315 0.371
Mean Any Hires 03b/13 0.825 0.825 0.828 0.832 0.860 0.860 0.862 0.864
Mini Size Dummies X X X X X X X X
Reg Size Dummies X X X X X X X X
Occupation FE X X X X X X X X
Industry FE X X X X X X X X
State FE X X X X X X X X
Notes: Regressions are weighted by the number of workers with average monthly earnings (both mini at rm and overall) between
Z − 37.5 and Z + 12.5 in 2002/2012, where Z is the relevant notch threshold. All workers at the rm in the range are used. Any Hires
is a dummy for whether any new mini jobber was hired during that period. Regressions restrict to rms with at least one mini jobber
in all years 01-05 (11-15). Columns (1) and (5) look at whether any of the workers between Z − 37.5 and Z + 12.5 in 2002/2012 adjusted
to between Z + 12.5 and Z˜ + 12.5 in a minijob at the rm in 2003b/2013, where Z˜ corresponds to the new notch. Columns (2) and (6)
look instead at the fraction of workers between Z − 37.5 and Z + 12.5 in 2002/2012 who adjust to between Z + 12.5 and Z˜ + 12.5 in
2003b/2013. Columns (3) and (7) run the same regressions as (2) and (3) redening the fraction adjusting to be the fraction of workers
still at the rm. As a consequence rms with workers originally at the notch but with none left at the rm in 03b/13 are dropped from
the sample. Columns (4) and (8) look at the fraction adjusting among those workers still at the rm in 03b/13 who either stay in the
same earnings range or adjust to Z + 12.5 and Z˜ + 12.5. Again the sample drops rms if there are no such workers. 2003a is Jan-Mar
2003; 2003b is Apr-Dec 2003. Robust standard errors, clustered at the rm level, are in parentheses. Signicance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ :
5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 1.5: Dynamics: Any Adjustment At Firm in Later Periods
2003 Reform: Any Adjustment to 400 2013 Reform: Any Adjustment to 450
Any Adj at Firm in 04 Any Adj at Firm in 05 Any Adj at Firm in 14 Any Adj at Firm in 15
Conditional On No Adj in 03b No Hire 03b No Adj 03b & 04 No Hire 03b & 04 No Adj in 13 No Hire 13 No Adj 13 & 14 No Hire 13 & 14
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Any Hires 01/11 -0.016 -0.018 -0.001 -0.008 -0.020 -0.023 -0.017 -0.027
(0.006)** (0.006)*** (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.008)** (0.009)***
Any Hires 02/12 -0.020 -0.007 -0.012 -0.016 -0.020 -0.017 -0.029 -0.027
(0.007)*** (0.006) (0.006)* (0.008)** (0.007)*** (0.008)** (0.008)*** (0.009)***
Any Hires 03a -0.007 -0.007 -0.010 -0.017
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.013)
Any Hires 03b/13 0.011 . -0.015 . -0.012 . -0.033 .
(0.007) (0.007)** (0.008) (0.008)***
Any Hires 04/14 0.037 0.037 -0.004 . 0.020 0.022 -0.007 .
(0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007) (0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)
Any Hires 05/15 0.010 0.026 0.028 0.053 0.006 0.005 0.010 -0.003
(0.007) (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.009)*** (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
# of Individuals 111227 93555 78446 51075 126267 59825 84850 34142
# of Firms 42725 38101 33832 23241 47096 28517 36623 17862
Adj. R2 0.068 0.087 0.050 0.090 0.073 0.061 0.119 0.061
Dep. Var. Mean 0.295 0.613 0.166 0.582 0.328 0.563 0.407 0.597
Mean Any Hires 03b/13 0.642 0.000 0.613 0.000 0.759 0.000 0.731 0.000
Mini Size Dummies X X X X X X X X
Reg Size Dummies X X X X X X X X
Occupation FE X X X X X X X X
Industry FE X X X X X X X X
State FE X X X X X X X X
Notes: Regressions are weighted by the number of workers with average monthly earnings (both mini at rm and overall) between
Z − 37.5 and Z + 12.5 in 2002/2012, where Z is the relevant notch threshold. All workers at the rm in the range are used. Any Hires is
a dummy for whether any new mini jobber was hired during that period. Regressions restrict to rms with at least one mini jobber in
all years 01-05 (11-15). Columns (1) and (5) look at whether any of the workers between Z − 37.5 and Z + 12.5 in 2002/2012 adjusted to
between Z + 12.5 and Z˜ + 12.5 (the new notch) at the rm in 2004/2014 conditional on none of them adjusting in 2003b/2013. Columns
(2) and (6) look at whether any of the workers between Z − 37.5 and Z + 12.5 in 2002/2012 adjusted to between Z + 12.5 and Z˜ + 12.5
(the new notch) in 2004/2014 conditional on being at a rm with no new mini hires in 2003b/2013. Columns (3) and (7) look at whether
any of the workers between Z − 37.5 and Z + 12.5 in 2002/2012 adjusted to between Z + 12.5 and Z˜ + 12.5 (the new notch) at the
rm in 2005/2015 conditional on none of them adjusting in 2003b/2013 and 2004/2014. Columns (4) and (8) look at whether any of
the workers between Z − 37.5 and Z + 12.5 in 2002/2012 adjusted to between Z + 12.5 and Z˜ + 12.5 (the new notch) at the rm in
2005/2015 conditional on the rm hiring no new mini jobbers in 2003b/2013 and 2004/2014 (here the persons could have potentially
adjusted in 2003b/13 or 2004/14; results are qualitatively similar if we further condition on the worker staying in the original earnings
range in 03b/13 and 04/14). 2003a is Jan-Mar 2003; 2003b is Apr-Dec 2003. Robust standard errors, clustered at the rm level, are in
parentheses. Signicance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 1.6: Any Adjustment At Firm on Non-Mini Conditions
2003 Reform: Any Adjustment to 400 2013 Reform: Any Adjustment to 450
Any Adj at Firm in 03b Any Adj at Firm in 13
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Ln Non-Mini Wagebill 01-00/11-10 0.010 0.016
(0.006)* (0.009)*
∆ Ln Non-Mini Wagebill 02-01/12-11 0.025 0.057
(0.007)*** (0.011)***
∆ Ln Non-Mini Wagebill 03-02/13-12 0.068 0.109
(0.012)*** (0.019)***
∆ Ln Non-Mini Wagebill 04-03/14-13 0.033 0.017
(0.010)*** (0.015)
∆ Ln Non-Mini Wagebill 05-04/15-14 0.030 0.048
(0.008)*** (0.009)***
1st 20th % ile Bin (∆ Ln NMWB 03-02/13-12) -0.048 -0.055
(0.005)*** (0.007)***
2nd 20th % ile Bin (∆ Ln NMWB 03-02/13-12) -0.002 -0.020
(0.005) (0.006)***
3rd 20th % ile Bin (∆ Ln NMWB 03-02/13-12) . .
. .
4th 20th % ile Bin (∆ Ln NMWB 03-02/13-12) 0.007 0.013
(0.006) (0.006)**
5th 20th % ile Bin (∆ Ln NMWB 03-02/13-12) 0.018 0.016
(0.005)*** (0.006)**
∆ Any Non-Mini Hires 01/11 -0.006 -0.019
(0.006) (0.007)***
∆ Any Non-Mini Hires 02/12 -0.003 -0.011
(0.006) (0.006)*
∆ Any Non-Mini Hires 03a 0.000
(0.005)
∆ Any Non-Mini Hires 03b/13 0.031 0.013
(0.005)*** (0.006)**
∆ Any Non-Mini Hires 04/14 0.019 -0.007
(0.005)*** (0.006)
∆ Any Non-Mini Hires 05/15 0.010 0.022
(0.004)** (0.006)***
# of Individuals 528719 601307 530274 422533 460364 424228
# of Firms 101955 120526 102239 89807 101499 90459
Adj. R2 0.204 0.199 0.203 0.178 0.177 0.175
Dep. Var. Mean 0.780 0.767 0.780 0.703 0.691 0.703
Indep. Var Mean 03/13 -0.038 0.203 0.774 0.025 0.200 0.860
Mini Size Dummies X X X X X X
Reg Size Dummies X X X X X X
Occupation FE X X X X X X
Industry FE X X X X X X
State FE X X X X X X
Notes: Regressions are weighted by the number of workers with average monthly earnings
(both mini at rm and overall) between Z − 37.5 and Z + 12.5 in 2002/2012, where Z is the
relevant notch threshold. All workers at the rm in the range are used. All columns look
at whether any of these workers between Z − 37.5 and Z + 12.5 in 2002/2012 adjusted to
between Z +12.5 and Z˜ +12.5 (the new notch) at the rm in 2003b/2013. Columns (1) and
(4) regress on the change in the natrual logarithm of the total non-mini wage bill at the
rm. Total non-mini wage bill is calculated by adding up all employment expenses from
wages capped at the lowest limit across years. The change in the natural logarithm of the
total non-mini wage bill is capped at -1 and 1. Columns (2) and (5) take the change in the
logarithm of the total non-mini wage bill at the rm between 02 and 03 (12 and 13) and
create dummies for this being in one of 5 20th percentile bins. We omit the bin from 40th-
60th percentile, which corresponds to a growth around 0. Columns (3) and (6) are similar
to our baseline regression except they replace any new mini hire with any new non-mini
hire in that period. 2003a is Jan-Mar 2003; 2003b is Apr-Dec 2003. Robust standard errors,
clustered at the rm level, are in parentheses. Signicance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ :
1%.
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Table 1.7: Individual-Level Adjustment At Firm on Mini Hires With Controls
2003 Reform: Any Adjustment to 400 2013 Reform: Any Adjustment to 450
Adj. Adj. (in Firm) Adj. (Stay/Adj) Adj. Adj. (in Firm) Adj. (Stay/Adj)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any Hires 01/11 -0.016 -0.004 0.000 -0.007 -0.002 0.001
(0.003)*** (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)* (0.004) (0.005)
Any Hires 02/12 -0.006 0.011 0.016 -0.008 -0.000 0.002
(0.003)** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)** (0.004) (0.005)
Any Hires 03a -0.001 0.013 0.018
(0.003) (0.004)*** (0.004)***
Any Hires 03b/13 0.047 0.062 0.074 0.027 0.035 0.042
(0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)***
Any Hires 04/14 0.018 0.026 0.029 0.010 0.012 0.013
(0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)***
Any Hires 05/15 0.010 0.013 0.017 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
# of Individuals 533841 388671 323643 428283 346759 293444
# of Firms 99586 93303 87068 91448 86801 81586
Adj R2 0.109 0.086 0.087 0.094 0.067 0.054
Dep. Var. Mean 0.293 0.403 0.484 0.261 0.323 0.381
Mean Any Hires 03b/13 0.825 0.805 0.795 0.860 0.847 0.836
Selection on Unobservables Needed for β = 0 (δ ) -1.124 -2.099 -3.696 -0.759 -1.319 -2.727
Selection on Unobservables Needed for β = 0 (δ ), excl FE -7.333 6.638 3.749 -2.168 -6.583 -27.784
Individual Level Controls 01-02 / 11-12 X X X X X X
Mini Size Dummies X X X X X X
Reg Size Dummies X X X X X X
Occupation FE X X X X X X
Industry FE X X X X X X
State FE X X X X X X
Notes: This table is the individual-level analog of Table 1.4. We take all workers with average monthly earnings (both mini at rm and
overall) between Z − 37.5 and Z + 12.5 in 2002/2012, where Z is the relevant notch threshold. Columns (1) and (4) look at whether
the worker adjusts to between Z + 12.5 and Z˜ + 12.5 (the new notch) at the same rm in 2003b/2014. Columns (2) and (5) do the same
but condition on the worker still being in their 2002/2012 rm. Columns (3) and (6) do the same but condition on workers who either
stay at Z − 37.5 and Z + 12.5 or adjust to between Z + 12.5 and Z˜ + 12.5 (the new notch) at the same rm. 2003a corresponds to
Jan-Mar 2003; 2003b is Apr-Dec 2003. Selection on unobservables is calculated using Oster (2016)’s psacalc code, using the suggested
Rmax of 1.3 times the observed R2 from the regression with controls. The rst row counts all dummies as controls, the second uses the
mcontrol option to include these dummies as unrelated controls. Standard errors are clustered at the rm level. Signicance levels: ∗
: 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 1.8: First Dierence Regressions on the Sample of Firms Subject to
Both Reforms
(Any Adj at Firm 13 − Any Adj at Firm 03b)
(1) (2) (3)
(Anyhire11 − Anyhire01) 0.030
(0.009)***
(Anyhire12 − Anyhire02) 0.027
(0.008)***
(Anyhire13 − Anyhire03b) 0.096 0.066
(0.008)*** (0.009)***
(Anyhire14 − Anyhire14) 0.055
(0.009)***
(Anyhire15 − Anyhire15) 0.026
(0.008)***
(∆ Ln Non-Mini Wagebill 11-10 − ∆ Ln Non-Mini Wagebill 01-00) -0.016
(0.012)
(∆ Ln Non-Mini Wagebill 12-11 − ∆ Ln Non-Mini Wagebill 02-01) 0.021
(0.017)
(∆ Ln Non-Mini Wagebill 13-12 − ∆ Ln Non-Mini Wagebill 03-02) 0.072
(0.031)**
(∆ Ln Non-Mini Wagebill 14-13 − ∆ Ln Non-Mini Wagebill 04-03) -0.011
(0.027)
(∆ Ln Non-Mini Wagebill 15-14 − ∆ Ln Non-Mini Wagebill 05-04) 0.027
(0.012)**
Weighted Total # Individuals 264775 243106 243867
# Establishments 40071 34127 35472
Adj. R2 0.005 0.007 0.002
Dep. Var Mean -0.062 -0.056 -0.048
Notes: Regressions are weighted by the minimum (across reforms) of the number of mini
jobbers with average monthly earnings (both mini at rm and overall) between Z − 37.5
andZ +12.5 in 2002 and 2012. The dependent variable is the dierence in the indicator for
whether any of these workers adjusted in 2013 less the indicator for whether any of these
workers adjusted in 2003b, and hence takes values of -1, 0, and 1. No xed eects or con-
trols are included. Robust standard errors, clustered at the rm level, are in parentheses.
Signicance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 1.9: Adjustment Cost Estimation Across Establishments w/ Diering Hiring Patterns
Inputs: 2003 Reform
Sample Any Hires 03b = 0 Any Hires 03b = 1
2002 2003b 2004 2004 2002 2003b 2004 2004
AH04= 0 AH04= 1 AH04= 0 AH04= 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Norm. Bunching Old Notch 17.952 8.787 7.137 6.724 19.115 7.866 6.397 6.107
(0.305) (0.233) (0.423) (0.439) (0.337) (0.243) (0.423) (0.437)
Norm. Bunching Less ‘Natural’ Level 17.952 5.117 3.467 3.054 19.115 4.196 2.709 2.437
(0.305) (0.233) (0.423) (0.439) (0.337) (0.243) (0.423) (0.437)
2 Period Estimates: 2003 Reform
Elasticity Elasticity Ind. Adj. Cost Prob. Estab. Allows Adj.
AH03b = 0 AH03b = 1 AH03b = 0 AH03b = 1
eno hire ehire ϕ˜ pno hire phire
2-Periods (SSE: 0.000) 0.086 0.105 31.836 0.910 1
(0.006) (0.006) (2.979) (0.023) –
2-Periods (SSE: 0.770 (0.467)) 0.087 0.101 39.314 1 1
No Di. Across Estab. (0.006) (0.006) (2.321) – –
2-Periods same e (SSE: 0.676 (0.308)) 0.094 0.094 33.876 0.936 1
(0.006) (0.006) (3.018) (0.023) –
2-Periods same e (SSE: 1.100 (0.493)) 0.094 0.094 39.463 1 1
No Di. Across Estab. (0.006) (0.006) (2.318) – –
3 Period Estimates: 2003 Reform
Elasticity Elasticity Ind. Adj. Cost Prob. Estab. Allows Adj. Prob. of Paying Cost 04
AH03b = 0 AH03b = 1 AH03b = 0 AH03b = 1 AH04 = 0 AH04 = 1
eno hire ehire ϕ˜ pno hire phire pno hire 04 phire 04 pi04
3-Periods (SSE: 0.568 (0.757)) 0.085 0.103 31.121 0.906 1 0.731 1 0.670
(0.006) (0.006) (3.337) (0.025) – (0.183) – (0.088)
3-Periods (SSE: 1.551 (1.093)) 0.090 0.099 39.388 1 1 1 1 0.626
No Di. Across Estab. (0.006) (0.007) (2.322) – – – – (0.053)
3-Periods same e (SSE: 1.008 (0.766)) 0.094 0.094 32.986 0.928 1 0.760 1 0.654
(0.005) (0.005) (3.394) (0.025) – (0.193) – (0.087)
3-Periods same e (SSE: 1.688 (1.074)) 0.094 0.094 39.463 1 1 1 1 0.627
No Di. Across Estab. (0.005) (0.005) (2.319) – – – – (0.053)
Notes: This table shows the estimates from the model described in Section 1.6.3. The rst row shows the estimated bunching masses
coming from the moments in Figure 1·11. We subtract the 2012 bunching amount at the old threshold to ensure that we are not
counting imprecision in targeting the new notch as bunching at the old notch. The second panel shows estimates from the 2 period
model. The rst rows estimate the model allowing non-hiring rms to dier. The second row that states “No Di. Across Estab."
requires non-hiring rms to always make oers to their workers, just like hiring rms. The third panel shows estimates from the 3
period model. Standard errors are bootstrapped using 1000 trials and account for the counter-factual estimation as well as the model’s
minimum distance estimation.
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Chapter 2
The Labor Supply Eects of Unemployment
Insurance for Older Workers
Coauthored with Johannes Schmieder (Boston University), Simon Trenkle (Institute For Em-
ployment Research, Nuremberg, Germany), and Han Ye (Boston University)
2.1 Introduction
Unemployment Insurance (UI) benets are an important policy tool for helping work-
ers smooth their consumption after job-loss. A large literature has studied the eects
of UI extensions on labor supply using quasi experimental methods (see Schmieder and
Von Wachter (2016) for a review). This literature has typically found that UI extensions
have sizable eects on the non-employment duration of individuals who become unem-
ployed - the intensive margin, while not having an eect on the inow rates into un-
employment - the extensive margin. This can be most clearly seen in papers based on
regression discontinuity designs around age or experience thresholds, where a standard
validity check is to show that the density of inows into UI does not change at the thresh-
old (Card, Chetty, and Weber, 2007; Centeno and Novo, 2009; Schmieder et al., 2012; Lalive,
Landais, and Zweimüller, forthcoming). However, this literature is largely based on rela-
tively young workers in their 30s, 40s and early 50s, who are highly attached to the labor
force. Older workers, in their late 50s and onwards, are much closer to retirement and
may use UI as a stepping stone into retirement. This may be reinforced by rms that seek
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to reduce employment in response to a negative shock, by laying o or even buying out
workers with relatively high outside options, thanks to the possibility of going into early
retirement via an intermittent UI spell. Understanding the labor supply behavior of older
workers is particularly important given the common goal of extending the work life of
the elderly and reducing the burden on the social security system.
In this paper, we study the labor supply eects of UI extensions for older workers in
Germany using social security data from 1975 to 2013. Numerous reforms to Germany’s
UI and retirement system over this period altered both the payos to entering UI at dif-
ferent age thresholds and the search incentives of the unemployed. Workers in their late
50s responded sharply to these policy changes. We observe increases in inows to UI at
various age thresholds where maximum UI duration eligibility increases, as well as sharp
bunching of UI inows at precisely the age that allows workers to claim their pension im-
mediately after UI expiration. UI inows respond as expected to a series of UI extensions
and pension rule changes.
These extensive margin responses to UI policies are quantitatively meaningful. The
age at which workers can enter unemployment and subsequently receive a pension with-
out any uninsured period can be thought of as a kink in a lifetime budget set relating
income to exit age. We quantify the bunching in UI inows at the bridge-to-retirement
kink under several dierent policy regimes. The bunching in inows is large and yields
estimates of the elasticity of exit age with respect to the net return to work that are com-
parable to other settings in which individuals choose when to retire without having to go
through UI (Brown, 2013). Furthermore, we quantify the intensive-margin eect of UI ex-
tensions at 12 dierent age cutos that discontinuously extend UI for workers in their 40s
and 50s using regression discontinuity designs. Our evidence suggests that the intensive
margin eect is at least as large for workers in their early and late 50s as it is for workers
in their 40s. Using a simple, back of the envelope calculation, we show that ignoring the
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extensive margin eect can lead to signicantly downward biased estimates of the non-
employment eects of UI extensions for workers in their 50s – possibly less than half of
the true eect.
We emphasize that credible estimates of the total non-employment eect of UI exten-
sions for older workers cannot be simply derived from any combination of the preceding
bunching and regression discontinuity estimates without implausibly strong assumptions.
Instead, we argue that one needs to specify and t a dynamic labor supply model that cap-
tures transitions between employment, unemployment with search, and unemployment
as retirement. Such a model is beyond the scope of this chapter, which we conclude with
a short discussion of our future plans to make progress on this structural front.
Germany provides a particularly interesting context for studying UI extensions for
older workers, since there has been a tremendous amount of policy variation over the
past decades. In the early 1980s, the maximum potential benet duration (PBD) of UI was
capped at 12 months regardless of age. Throughout the 1980s, maximum PBDs increased
dramatically for older workers, reaching up to 32 months of UI benets for the oldest
group. Between 1999 and 2007, Germany reversed track. Maximum PBDs were reduced
for older workers and Germany began the process of eliminating early retirement at age 60
following unemployment. This increase (and later decrease) in UI generosity is matched
by a sharp increase (decrease) in the unemployment rate among older workers. Previous
authors, such as Buchholz, Rinklake, and Blossfeld (2013), have attributed this to a variety
of policy changes aimed at reducing the labor supply of older workers, but these papers
have not attempted to isolate the impact of UI.
While Germany provides many compelling advantages for studying the eects of UI
for workers it also oers a number of challenges. The main complication is that in addition
to UI there are a large number of other policies that changed over the past decades and
that may aect inows into UI and unemployment durations. Some of these changes are
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about regular and early retirement rules and are relatively easy to understand, but there
are also many rules based on collective labor agreements (CLAs) that are on the sectoral
level or even specic to individual rms. Such CLAs may themselves take policy induced
age discontinuities into account, for example by encouraging workers to exit rms at those
age thresholds with severance packages. In this case one can view CLAs as a mechanism
of how age discontinuities lead to extensive margin responses. On the other hand, CLAs
may also lead to bunching at age thresholds that are not directly related to retirement or
UI institutions. This complicates our setting and we consider a variety of approaches to
obtain meaningful estimates in light of such confounding.
Our setting also raises interesting methodological issues. While several papers have
estimated regression discontinuity designs in the presence of manipulation of the forcing
variable (see for e.g. Card and Giuliano, 2014; Gerard, Rokkanen, and Rothe, 2015; Barreca,
Lindo, and Waddell, 2016; Hoxby and Bulman, 2016), this manipulation has typically been
treated as a nuisance, with researchers attempting to avoid bias using techniques like
excluding observations close to the threshold (donut-hole regressions). However, whether
and when to enter UI is itself an important outcome and in practice individuals (together
with rms) can inuence this decision. When UI is used as a pathway to retirement, it
essentially constitutes a labor supply decision in the face of a budget set dened by wage
rates, the UI system and retirement rules. The UI system create kinks in this budget set and
individuals choosing to enter UI as a step towards retirement should bunch at these kink
points. We could thus use bunching techniques to back out labor supply elasticities for
these workers, based on the amount of bunching around such kinks (Saez, 2010; Kleven,
2016).1
1Note that not all bunching around UI age discontinuities is necessarily related to early retirement. It
may also be that rms postpone lay-os or workers postpone claiming UI benets until they reach the
threshold. This is likely to be most important at ages further away from the retirement age, such as the age
threshold at age 54 in the 1990s and the threshold at age 55 in the 2000s.
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While bunching can help recover extensive margin decisions, it complicates identi-
cation of intensive margin eects. Ideally, we would use the discrete changes in potential
benet duration at the age thresholds to estimate intensive margin responses. Yet, ex-
tensive margin responses at or around these thresholds lead to direct violation of the
RD assumption that there is no manipulation of the running variable and individuals on
both sides of the cuto are therefore comparable. We use three approaches to circumvent
this challenge and obtain plausible estimates of intensive margin responses: First, we use
donut-hole regressions to exclude the range where most of the bunching occurs. This
is most credible when the bunching is not too extreme and there does not appear to be
an overall shift in the density outside of a sharp window around the threshold. Second,
we include a series of individual level controls to help absorb selection eects. Third, we
estimate intensive margin responses at slightly younger age thresholds, where bunching
is less of an issue, in particular a threshold at age 54 during the 1990s.2
Our paper is related to a large literature on retirement decisions. Several method-
ologically related papers have analyzed bunching in retirement age to derive labor supply
elasticities, for example Brown (2013) looks at bunching at the regular retirement age
for teachers and Manoli and Weber (2014) analyze permanent exits from the labor force
around tenure thresholds in Austria that lead to discrete increases in severance payments.
Unlike these papers we look specically at entry into UI, rather than exits from the labor
force.
A handful of papers examine the eects of UI extensions on older workers (for ex-
ample Kyyrä and Ollikainen, 2008; Bennmarker, Skans, and Vikman, 2013). Riphahn and
Schrader (2017) and Dlugosz, Stephan, and Wilke (2014) show that the shortened UI ben-
2We can also estimate intensive margin responses on a sample of individuals who later return to the labor
market, which likely obtains a lower bound of the intensive margin response for these workers. Finally, we
can follow the approach in Gerard et al. (2015), who explicitly provide a framework to estimate bounds in
RD settings in the presence of sorting.
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ets for older German workers following a 2006 reform increased employment. A small
literature explicitly examines interactions of the UI system with retirement decisions. For
example, Lalive (2008) analyzes the eect of UI extensions for older workers around a
discontinuity at age 50 in the Austrian UI system as well as at a border discontinuity
and nds relatively large disincentive eects, especially for women. He also shows that
women seem to respond on the extensive margin to the change in UI generosity. Us-
ing partially the same variation as Lalive, Inderbitzin, Staubli, and Zweimueller (2016)
show that much of this was due to early retirement responses. Kyyrä and Pesola (2017)
show that postponing eligibility by two years for a retirement-via-UI pathway in Fin-
land increases employment by 7 months. Similarly, Kyyrä and Wilke (2007) show that
increasing the age threshold of early retirement via UI benets from 53 to 57 in Finland
signicantly reduced unemployment durations. Hairault, Langot, and Sopraseuth (2010)
provide some evidence based on French survey data, that job search behavior of the unem-
ployed depends on the distance to retirement age.3 Several papers analyze the interaction
between various retirement rules and labor supply in Germany (see Giesecke and Kind,
2013; Boersch-Supan, Schnabel, Kohnz, and Mastrobuoni, 2004; Boersch-Supan and Hen-
drik, 2011, among others). We focus on quantifying the overall eect of UI extensions on
labor supply for older workers, accounting for both extensive and, the well documented
(Card et al., 2007; Schmieder et al., 2012), intensive margin behavior.4
Finally, our work suggests that German rms play a role in regulating how worker
inows into UI respond to UI extensions. Jaeger, Schoefer, and Zweimueller (2017) study
job destruction following improvement in workers’ outside options using variation in
UI benets in Austria, nding that low surplus jobs are destroyed. A few studies have
3Coile and Levine (2007) nd that UI generosity has little impact on retirement in the U.S.
4While our focus is to quantify the overall eect of UI extensions rather than discussing optimal policy,
our analysis can be viewed as an important input into welfare computations. For papers on the optimal
design of UI for older workers see, for example: Hairault, Langot, Ménard, and Sopraseuth (2012), Michelacci
and Ruo (2015), and Inderbitzin et al. (2016).
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estimated the sensitivity of layos of older workers to monetary incentives with some
nding little sensitivity (Behaghel, Crépon, and Sédillot, 2008; Johnston, 2017), but not
others (Schnalzenberger and Winter-Ebmer, 2009).
This paper proceeds in four steps. We rst provide a very general decomposition of
the eect of UI extensions on time out of work in the presence of intensive and extensive
margin labor supply responses, which highlights the importance of imposing additional
structure to fully estimate these responses. In Section 2.3, we present the institutional
background and describe the core features of the German unemployment insurance and
retirement institutions. In Section 2.4, we present graphical evidence of bunching in UI in-
ows at the bridge-to-retirement kink and at the age cutos that discontinuously increase
PBDs. In Section 2.5 we present reduced form evidence of both intensive and extensive
margin responses. To do so, we estimate RDs at all the older age cutos available to us,
using various approaches to handle sorting at these cutos. We also estimate bunching
masses and age-of-exit elasticities at all kinks in the budget set for older workers enter-
ing UI, as if every worker were indeed choosing their exit age strategically. Under strong
assumptions, we perform a back of the envelope calculation showing that ignoring the
extensive margin eects of UI extensions on workers aged 50-60 produces downward bi-
ased estimates of the non-employment eect of UI extensions. Section 3.7 concludes by
oering a path forward towards more credible estimates that properly account for the
document extensive margin eect of UI extensions.
2.2 The Eect of UI Extensions on Total Time out of Work
To x ideas and terminology, we present a simple framework that describes how potential
UI benet duration aects time out of work in the presence of extensive margin responses.
There is a mass of workers N , who enter the workforce at age 1 and reach a mandatory
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retirement age at T R . Let potential UI duration be P . In practice this can be a function
of the age of entry into UI, but for simplicity of exposition we take P to be constant. In
each period t (meaning at each age), a worker is either working or not working. We do
not distinguish between unemployment and non-employment and use the terms inter-
changeably. The fraction of workers entering unemployment at age t is denoted as дt (P ).
If an individual becomes unemployed, the duration of non-employment is dened as the
time between entering unemployment and either starting a job again or when the individ-
ual retires. We denote the expected non-employment duration of individuals becoming
unemployed at age t as Dt (P ). The expected total time out of work (Tu) for an individual
is given by Tu (P ) = ∑T Rt=1 дt (P )Dt (P ).
Without specifying micro-foundations of this labor market, we can write the rela-
tionship between inows and durations on benet durations as reduced form functions
and decompose the eects of an increase in potential benet into intensive and extensive
margin components. A change in P can thus be decomposed into:
dTu
dP
=
T R∑
t=1
дt
∂Dt
∂P︸      ︷︷      ︸
Intensive Margin
+
T R∑
t=1
Dt
∂дt
∂P︸      ︷︷      ︸
Extensive Margin
(2.1)
The rst term represents the standard intensive margin eect of UI extensions on
non-employment durations that most of the UI literature has estimated. The second term
represents the changes in inows into unemployment.
The central question of this paper is how to credibly estimate this total eect for older
workers. This is challenging to estimate using purely reduced form techniques. Note that
∂дt
∂P is never likely to be 0. In practice, if P increasesD, employment falls, changing the pool
of people at risk of becoming unemployment. Hence, future дt might decrease, violating
∂дt
∂P = 0 for some t.
It is instructive to consider two simple cases. Let us assume that such eects on
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the pool of at-risk people are negligible and that we are focused on younger workers.
Schmieder et al. (2012) show that younger workers do not signicantly alter their entry
probabilities into UI in response to changes in P . In this case ∂дt∂P ≈ 0. In such cases dT
u
dP
can be recovered from RD estimates of the intensive margin eect at age cutos in P (as
in Schmieder et al., 2012).5
Now consider a case at the other extreme, with extensive but no intensive margin
eects. Suppose older workers only use UI as a bridge-to-retirement, and never become
unemployed except by their own choice. Once they exit they stay non-employed until
the age at which they can claim their pension (T R). So at each age, the expected non-
employment duration is xed and not dependent on P : ∂Dt∂P = 0. However, suppose that
these workers time their exit date (into UI) and that this responds to P . For example,
suppose there is a mass N˜ of workers that time their entry to maximize unemployment
coverage before retirement by entering UI at ageT R−P .6 Suppose that the mass of entries
at all ages is otherwise constant. Then an increase in P to Pˆ would decrease total non-
employment duration by DT R−P × N˜N at ageT R −P and increase non-employment duration
by DT R−Pˆ × N˜N at age T R − Pˆ . The total non-employment eect of the increase in P in
this pure, extensive margin setting would thus be given by dTudP = (DT R−Pˆ − DT R−P ) N˜N =
(Pˆ − P ) N˜N .
In practice, neither of these cases fully captures the complexity of reality. Older work-
ers are likely to still have strong intensive margin responses to changes in P , and some
older workers, even at later ages, will nd themselves unemployed not by their own
5Note also that if one is interested in more complicated changes in potential benet durations (that is
not just an increase at a single age level k), then it is still relatively straightforward to estimate the intensive
margin eect by aggregating estimates of ∂Dk∂Pk at dierent age levels.6This could be the case if we think of workers as maximizing lifetime utility over consumption and
leisure subject to their budget constraints. Depending on institutional parameters, such a lifetime budget
constraint might exhibit a kink at the ‘bridge-to-retirement-via-UI’ age ofT R −P , as we will show is the case
in Germany. Extending P moves this kink, and hence moves UI exit mass. If this were the correct model,
we could calibrate its key parameters using bunching techniques in a manner similar to Brown (2013) and
then simulate dTudP .
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choice. Note further, that a simple two type model (one representing each case above)
is problematic in its articiality – in practice workers may choose to transition between
states as a function of P . We opt here to present reduced form evidence on each mar-
gin and, in future work, to estimate a dynamic life cycle model by matching it to these
reduced-form generated moments.
2.3 Institutional Background and Data
2.3.1 Unemployment Insurance
The German unemployment insurance system provides income replacement to eligible
workers who lose their job. Prior to 1985, eligible workers were entitled to at most 12
months of benets. Replacement rates for UI were relatively stable over the period of
study (1980–2015) (67-68% for an individual with children and 63-60% for an individual
without children).7 Beginning in 1985, numerous reforms changed PBDs in a manner that
tied the maximum PBD to recipients’ exact age at the beginning of their UI spell.8
Reforms in 1985 and 1987 increased maximum PBDs for workers above age 42. The
most generous PBD – up to 32 months – became available to workers aged 54 and above
following the 1987 reform. Reforms in 1999 and 2006 gradually decreased the generosity
of the system. In 1999, age thresholds were increased, and then, beginning 2006, maximum
PBD was reduced from 32 to 18 months for workers above age 55, while everyone else
could only receive 12 months. There was a modest reversal of this trend in 2008 when
workers above 58 could attain a maximum PBD of 24 months.
Figure 2·1 plots maximum PBD by age for older workers in each dierent institu-
7Individuals who exhausted UI benets prior to 2005 and whose net liquid wealth fell below a certain
threshold were eligible for unemployment assistance (UA) benets with an eective average replacement
rate of around 30%. In principle, replacement rates were between 50% and 57% but lower in practice due to
deductions like spousal income. See Schmieder et al. (2012) for a discussion. From 2005 on, UA was replaced
by unemployment insurance benets 2 (UIB II), a completely means tested program. Both UA and UIB II
are unlimited in duration.
8See Hunt (1995) and Fitzenberger and Wilke (2010) for an analysis and discussion of these reforms.
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tional regime.9 Appendix Table B.1 provides details about each reform. These policy
changes provide highly useful empirical variation, both at the age thresholds, and by
changing incentives on when to enter unemployment if using unemployment as a bridge-
to-retirement, as we elaborate on in the next section.
2.3.2 Pension System and Early Retirement Via Unemployment
Germany has a generous pay-as-you-go public pension insurance with high eective re-
placement rates. Participation is mandatory, with the exception of civil servants and the
self-employed, which are not covered by our data. Pension benets depend on workers’
earnings, years of contributions, an adjustment factor, and the type of pension claimed.
Benets are roughly proportional to lifetime income at an average replacement rate of
50% (Deutsche Rentenversicherung, 2017).
The statutory retirement age (SRA) for a regular old age pension remained at 65
throughout our sample period, with the only prerequisite being 5 years of contributions.
Several alternate pathways made receiving a pension before 65 an option. The ve main
pathways to retirement were regular old-age pensions, old-age pensions for long-term
insured, old-age pensions for women, old-age pensions due to unemployment (and, later,
part-time work) and old-age pensions for severely disabled persons (see for e.g. Boersch-
Supan and Wilke, 2005). Appendix Table B.2 documents the earliest possible retirement
age for each of these pathways over the past 4 decades, while Appendix Table B.3 docu-
ments all relevant reforms. We focus primarily on the pathway into retirement via unem-
ployment.10
The unemployment pathway (UI pathway) provided eligible workers with an option
9We omit the short 1985 regime in the interest of brevity and because it appears that some individuals
who entered UI in 1985 retroactively beneted from the UI extensions in later years.
10While early retirement due to disability is also quantitatively important, Riphahn (1997) argues that in
practice they are not close substitutes and that retirement due to disability is in fact usually associated with
a health shock.
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to retire at the age of 60. The eligibility requirements for this pathway were: 1) at least
15 years of contributions, at least 8 of which must have occurred in the past 10 years,
and 2) being unemployed for at least 1 year after the age of 58 and a half. The generosity
of UI benets, combined with lenient job search requirements for older workers, made
old-age pensions due to unemployment attractive. Workers 58 and older could receive
unemployment benets without actively looking for a job or other obligations.11 For the
rst 3 cohorts we will focus on, the unpenalized/normal retirement age (NRA) as well as
the earliest possible retirement age (ERA) via the UI pathway was age 60. This means
persons satisfying the requirements could retire at 60 with no penalty other than the loss
of additional years of pension contributions.
This system incentivizes workers considering early retirement to time their entry it to
UI around the age that allows workers to transition directly from UI to pension, without
any uncovered period. We note that entering UI voluntarily is highly feasible in Germany
and at most lightly penalized.12 Put dierently, the possibility of using UI as a bridge-to-
retirement introduces a kink in a lifetime budget constraint relating lifetime income to
year of exit into UI. Individuals retiring before 60−P , with P being the maximum UI PBD,
are forced to spend time reliant on a spouse or on unemployment assistance (UA/UIB
2) before their pension, whereas individuals who leave at or after 60 − P can take the
full UI duration and transfer directly into pensions. This reduces the value of an extra
year of work after the kink, decreasing the slope of the budget constraint. In general, the
size of the kink is exacerbated by the generosity of the UI system, the size of the drop
comparing UI to UA/UIB 2, and how generously time on UI is counted towards pension
contributions.13 We will show that UI entries react to this kink at age 60 − P .
11This so-called “58er-Regelung” was formally introduced end of 1985 and in place until end of 2007.
12A worker may be sanctioned if he or she quits a job voluntarily. These sanctions take the form of losing
the rst few weeks of benets and vary from a 4-12 week penalty over the study period. These sanctions,
which are not always applied, are insucient to oset the appeal of using UI as a pathway into retirement.
13In practice, unemployment counts as an 80% contribution year calculated on pre-unemployment wages.
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The NRA and ERA via the UI pathway remained at 60 until a 1992 reform. Cohorts
born between January 1937 and December 1941 saw their NRA increase in steps by birth
month from 60 to 65. While they could continue to retire at the ERA of 60, they now
faced an actuarial adjustment in the form of a 0.3% pension reduction per each month
they retired in advance of the NRA.
Cohorts born in or after 1946 saw their ERA for the UI-pathway increase in steps
by birth month from 60 to 63, ending with cohorts born in December 1948. This meant
that these cohorts could no longer claim their pensions at age 60, even with a penalty.
Cohorts born after 1952 (after our sample) saw this pathway into retirement via UI entirely
abolished.
Figure 2·2 plots the evolution of stylized lifetime budget constraints for select cohorts
experiencing dierent UI and pension regimes. Appendix B.1 contains detailed descrip-
tions of how these budget sets are constructed. We assume workers earn a constant after
tax wage ofe30,000 and live 80 years. For simplicity, we assume that the max PBD is xed
over time for each cohort at the level that prevailed when they were close to the kink.14 In
panels (a)-(c), representing the 1924, 1929, and 1935 cohort respectively, the the NRA and
ERA for retirement via unemployment was age 60, but maximum PBD varied. In panel
(d), representing the 1941 cohort, the ERA remained at 60 but the un-penalized NRA was
increased to around 64, with slight variation by month of birth. This amounted to a nan-
cial penalty for retiring at age 60 of approximately 18% of gross lifetime pension benets.
In panel (e), representing the 1949 cohort, the ERA was increased to 63 and the NRA was
65.15 The penalty for retiring at age 63 via unemployment was 7.2%. In panel (f), repre-
senting the 1952 cohort, the pathway into retirement via unemployment was abolished,
leaving the earliest possible retirement age as 63 for long-term insured workers with over
14The dashed line shows the realized lifetime budget set that takes into account all the UI policy-induced
changes and age cutos.
15Retiring at 63 via the long-term insured pathway is slightly more costly.
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35 years of qualied contributions. The un-penalized NRA for long-term insured is 65.5,
making the nancial penalty for retiring at 63 9%.
Note further that the large, discontinuous increases in PBD at the various age cutos in
the PBD duration schedule (see Figure 2·1) could also induce selection into UI. This could
occur for both people who only plan to temporarily be on unemployment and among
people planning to retire.
Throughout the rest of this paper, we focus primarily on the rst kink induced by using
UI as a bridge-to-retirement, but we also discuss the notches at the PBD age cutos. In
practice, agents might also use UI as a bridge to the long-term contribution retirement age
of 63 or the regular retirement age of 65.16 Since we cannot credibly calculate whether or
not a person is eligible for the long-term contribution rate, examining bunching at these
kinks is challenging. Note also, that changes in other pathways may create alternative
substitutes for workers aiming to retire early. Appendix Table B.3 summarizes the reforms
for all of the dierent pathways over our study period.
2.3.3 Data
We use rich administrative data from the German Social Security system, assembled by
the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) into the Integrated Employment Biographies
data le (IEB) (see also Card et al., 2013; Jäger, 2016; Schmieder et al., 2012). This data
contains information on all employment periods covered by social security and on all pe-
riods of UI receipt between the years 1975 and 2013. The employment information covers
approximately 80% of the regular workforce, with the self-employed and civil servants
being the most common exceptions. The data on UI receipt stem from administrative UI
records and contain information on the exact duration of UI-receipt and the amount of
daily benets.
16Individuals cannot receive UI past 65, and cannot receive UI and pensions simultaneously.
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This version of the paper focuses on men, since early retirement rules dier for men
and women. Results for women are available upon request and yield a qualitatively sim-
ilar picture. We select all male UI-entries between 1980 and 2010 who qualify for their
age-specic maximum PBD based on their working histories. This leaves a ve year win-
dow before the rst year in the data (1975) and a three year window after the last (2013),
allowing us to calculate UI eligibility for all individuals and unemployment durations for
up to three years after UI entry. Since some of the requirements for maximum PBD eli-
gibility, such as the duration over which claims could be accumulated, changed over the
study period, the restrictions set on this duration dier slightly over time. We summarize
these restrictions in Appendix Table B.4. Additionally, we exclude mining and steel con-
struction from our analysis, since both sectors are known to have specic early-retirement
rules for at least some of the periods. For other specic subgroups which face some, but
less clear or pronounced early retirement rules we do not exclude cases a priori, but ad-
dress them throughout the analysis. For the selected individuals, we construct detailed
biographical information such as experience tenure or past exposure to unemployment.
2.4 Graphical Evidence
This Section documents the behavior of older individuals entering UI over three decades.
We present evidence of sizable extensive margin UI responses at the bridge-to-retirement
kink and show that UI inows react to UI and retirement policy changes. Specically, we
document spike in UI inows at each bridge-to-retirement age: at 59 when the ERA was
60 and maximum PBD was 1, at 58 when maximum PBD was extended to 2, and at age 57
and 4 months when maximum PBD was extended to 32 months. As the NRA increases this
bunching is reduced, and eventually as the ERA increases it dissipates. The next Section
quanties the bunching mass and estimates regression discontinuities at each of the PBD
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age cutos to quantify responses on the intensive margin.
We will also see evidence of clear bunching at various other thresholds, not all of
which corresponds to kinks or notches in our stylized budget sets. For example, begin-
ning with the 1929 cohort, we see bunching into UI entries at age 55. While some of this
could be round number bunching or bunching at reference points, much of this is driven
by specic collective labor agreements at the rm or sectoral level that specied retire-
ment packages and ages. Indeed, this type of bunching is almost entirely absent in the
years leading up to and including 1982, consistent with the timing of the rst major CLAs
specifying retirement ages (see Trampusch, Eichenberger, de Roo, Rissi, Bieri, Schmid,
and Steinlin (2010)). Our sample drops the mining and steel sectors which have clearly
dened CLAs, but inevitably picks up other sectors and rms with CLAs. During Ger-
many’s high unemployment years, many rms reduced employment through CLAs that
bought out older workers. Age 55, and to a lesser extent age 56, was a common cuto
used in these CLAs. The importance of these CLAs fades throughout the late 90s and
early 2000s. In robustness exercises, we consider alternate samples and ways to address
any confounding. Generally, the bunching at the kink into retirement exceeds bunching
at these alternative thresholds. Nevertheless, the data points to an active role for rms,
together with workers, in governing responses to UI extensions. Regardless of the source,
it will be clear that changes in UI durations generate extensive margin responses that
should be taken into account when designing policy.
Figure 2·3 shows the number of individuals entering UI by age for 6 select cohorts
in our sample, each chosen to represent a dierent institutional regime. We opt to dis-
play these annual cohort-level graphs to keep retirement rules constant within-gure. In
practice the retirement rules vary by month of birth (see Appendix Table B.3), but x-
ing year of birth is a good approximation and increases sample sizes. When constructing
cohort-by-cohort gures, the state of the economy is not xed at one point in time, so
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we also plot the prevailing unemployment rate at the time for reference. Furthermore,
since UI rules changed over time (and not by cohort) UI entrants at dierent ages in the
same cohort can have dierent PBDs (see Appendix Table B.1).17 Graphs of UI entrants
by calendar year oer dierent trade-os but ultimately yield a similar picture and are
available upon request. Figures 2·4 and 2·5 complement Figure 2·3 by plotting mean UI
benet receipt duration and mean non-employment duration (capped at 36 months) by
age for each cohort. We now discuss each cohort in turn.
Benchmark: 1924 Cohort. Figure 2·3 Panel (a) shows UI inows for the 1924 cohort.
Note that UI entries pre-age 59 track the ocial West German male unemployment rate at
the time (the dashed line).18 When this cohort was less than 61 years old, their PBD was 12
months.19 Cohorts born before 1937, including this cohort, could retire early and without
penalties at age 60 following a year of unemployment insurance. Since the maximum PBD
was 12 months for this cohort, the ‘bridge-to-retirement’ pathway, in which individuals
will be covered by UI or pensions without gaps, has individuals entering unemployment
at age 59. This is indicated by the red and blue shaded areas under the gure (see also
Figure 2·2 panel (a)).
We observe clear bunching in UI entries at age 59, precisely the age at which indi-
viduals can transition into retirement immediately following UI expiration. There is no
comparable bunching elsewhere. Figure 2·4 panel (a) shows average UI benet duration
17From the perspective of a single cohort, UI can change for two reasons. It can change at known age
cutos (represented by the dashed red lines in Figures 2·3 – 2·5), for example the 1941 cohort would have
turned 54 in 1995, amid a UI policy regime that had maximum PBD of 26 months for workers entering UI
below age 54 and 32 for workers above age 54. These age-cutos would be known to the individual years
before turning 54. Alternatively, UI can change for workers above a certain age in a cohort due to a policy
change in the future. These policy changes would not necessarily be know the the individual in advance.
18We seasonally adjust reported UI rates using X-13 ARIMA - SEATS.
19On January 1 1985, UI was extended to 18 months. This means that when the person born on Dec 31st
1924 turns 60 and a day, they would be eligible for 18 months of PBD. By age 61, everyone in the 1924 cohort
is eligible for 18 months of PBD. This ‘entire-cohort eligibility’ point is indicated by the change in the lower,
grey-shaded bars, which also show the later UI reforms.
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for the individuals in Figure 2·3 Panel (a). The average UI benet receipt of 11.8 months
around age 59 is very close to the maximum PBD of 12 months, supporting the idea that
entrants are predominantly using UI as a bridge-to-retirement. UI durations increase at
older ages, in step with the UI reforms in those years, and exhibit declining patterns be-
fore the retirement age for the long-term insured at 63 and the standard retirement age at
65. Figure 2·5 panel (a) plots average non-employment duration (capped at 36 months) for
the individuals in Figure 2·3 Panel (a). This peaks at age 59, averaging 35.4 months, again
supporting the idea that most entrants at this age retire. Together, this is clear evidence
of sizable, extensive margin responses to UI policy. This view is reinforced below, where
we examine UI entries for later cohorts facing longer PBDs and hence kinks at dierent,
earlier ages.
1929 Cohort. Figure 2·3 Panel (b) shows UI entries for the 1929 cohort. This cohort faces
the same potential retirement ages as the 1924 cohort, but has longer PBDs in their late
50s. Specically, those who enter UI at age 58 have 24 months maximum PBD. This shifts
the ‘bridge-to-retirement’ age to 58, and indeed, we see extensive bunching at around age
58, while we continue to note some excess mass at 59.
This gure also clearly shows bunching in UI entries at other, non-kink points, par-
ticularly at age 55 and 57. As discussed, these likely represent rm-specic collective bar-
gaining agreements to release or buy out workers once they turn 55. This also suggests
that the bunching at the bridge-to-retirement age is driven by joint decisions between
rms and workers.
Panel (b) of Figures 2·4 and 2·5 show average UI benet receipt and average non-
employment durations for this cohort. Figures 2·4 (b) reveals that average UI duration
at the kink is 23.0 months, very close to the full 24 around the 58 cuto. There are also
clear spikes in UI durations at age 55 and 57, mirroring bunching in UI entries at those
94
ages. Figure 2·4 Panel (c) shows that average non-employment duration at the bridge-to-
retirement age reaches 34.3 months.
1935 Cohort. The 1935 cohort continues to face the same potential retirement ages as
the prior cohorts, but even more generous UI. Workers entering UI at or after age 54 had
a maximum PBD of 32 months. Accordingly, Figure 2·3 Panel (c) shows that UI entries
exhibit strong bunching at precisely age 57 and 4 months, or 32 months before the early
retirement age of 60. We continues to see some excess bunching at age 58 and 59, as well as
some at 55 and 56. Panel (c) of Figures 2·4 and 2·5 conrm once again that people entering
at the bridge-to-retirement age take UI for close to the maximum duration (29.7 months)
and have a 35.3 month average capped non-employment duration. These gures also show
discrete jumps at age 54 and 55 in average UI duration and non-employment duration. The
jump at age 54 is consistent with the July 1987 reform that extended maximum PBD from
24 to 32 months (26 months) for workers above 54 (between 49 and 54). The jump at 55
in both gures continues to reect the fact that layos after age 55 dier in composition
and likely reect rm-level CLAs.
1941 Cohort. This is the rst cohort for which retirement rules change. The 1941 Cohort
could still retire at age 60 following a year of unemployment, but a 1992 reform introduced
actuarial adjustments for retirement before age 65. These were introduced gradually by
month and year of birth for cohorts born between January 1937 and December 1942, re-
sulting in an approximate 18% penalty for anyone in the 1941 cohort retiring at 60. The
maximum PBD remained at 32 months for workers above age 54. Figure 2·3 Panel (d) re-
veals that we continue to see bunching at age 57 and 4 months, but it is now more muted
relative to entries below this age. Moreover, consistent with the larger penalties, we see in
Figure 2·4 panel (d) that average UI benet duration no longer reaches 32 months at this
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bridge-to-retirement age, but instead averages just 25.3 months. Similarly, average non-
employment durations are also lower, around 30.5 months, suggesting that some workers
are returning to work instead of retiring at the penalized ERA. Spikes at age 55 and 56 con-
tinue to be visible in entries, UI receipt, and duration. Interestingly, this gure displays
what looks very much like a discrete jump in the level of UI entries after age 55.
Additionally, this cohort faced a stable PBD schedule in their 50s, with a known age
cuto at 54 (for which maximum PBD jumped from 26 to 32 months). We see some bunch-
ing at this cuto, which could arise from people expecting long unemployment timing
their entry into UI or from those considering very early transitions to retirement. The
sorting around this age cuto poses a challenge to standard RD estimates of the eects of
PBD extensions on non-employment duration, as we discuss further below.
1949 Cohort. The 1949 cohort faced both reduced PBD if retiring at later ages and a
stricter retirement law. Individuals born in 1949 could no longer retire early via unem-
ployment at 60, but instead could only draw pensions at age 63 at the earliest. They had to
wait until age 65 to draw pensions without actuarial adjustments (7.2% for retiring at 63).
Figure 2·3 Panel (e) shows some bunching at 61, consistent with an early retirement age
of 63 and the 2 years maximum allowable PBD, but it is not extensive. Importantly, now
that the bridge-to-retirement at 60 has been removed, we now no longer see bunching
between ages 57 and 59. We continue to see some age-55 bunching. Panel (e) in Figures
2·4 and 2·5 shows that average UI durations at the new bridge-to-retirement reach 13.7
months, well below 24, and non-employment durations average 33.2 months.
1952 Cohort. This cohort is no longer allowed to retire early via unemployment, al-
though if they are eligible for the long term old age pension, they could retire at age 63.
Unfortunately, we run out of data past age 59 (as we need 3 years post-2010 to calcu-
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late non-employment durations). Nevertheless, the distribution of UI entries continues to
look relatively smooth. The 1952 cohort would have known about the age 58 PBD cuto
extending maximum PBD from 18 months to 24 months starting in 2008 (i.e. when they
turn 56). As with the 1941 cohort at age 54, we see evidence of sorting into UI to take
advantage of this UI extension. We continue to see some bunching at age 55.
Overall, we observe clear bunching into UI at the bridge-to-retirement age. The bunch-
ing mass responds to UI extensions. We have also seen evidence of sorting into UI at
earlier age cutos where PBDs are extended discontinuously, including age 54 and 58.
Bunching at other points in the distribution related to CLAs, suggest that rms play an
important role. While we cannot easily identify the extent to which responses come from
workers or rms, it is clear that a full accounting of the eects of UI extensions on non-
employment need to take into account this extensive margin to avoid downward bias. In
the next section, we take a rst pass at understanding the potential magnitude of this bias
by quantifying the bunching mass and by comparing it to RD estimates of the intensive
margin eect.
2.5 Quantifying Intensive and Extensive Margin Responses:
A Back of The Envelope Calculation
We have seen that PBD extensions alter inows into in UI, which implies that the total
eect of PBD extensions on time out of employment for older workers cannot be estimated
solely from intensive-margin estimates (recall Equation 2.1). Yet, the extent of any such
bias remains unclear. In this section we quantify the bunching mass at each kink and show
that it is quantitatively meaningful. Next, we use Regression Discontinuity Designs to
estimate the intensive margin eects of PBD extensions for older workers. We perform a
simple, ‘back of the envelope’ calculation to show that the bias from ignoring the extensive
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margin is likely severe. We discuss the drawbacks and assumptions behind this calculation
and how future work can improve upon this.
2.5.1 Estimating Extensive Margin Responses using Bunching Estimators
In this subsection, we estimate the amount of bunching at each retirement-via-UI kink in
Figure 2·3.20 The amount of bunching can be viewed as a reduced form parameter, while
converting it into a labor supply elasticity requires additional structure.
In order to estimate bunching mass at each kink we need to t a counter-factual to the
data. We use two approaches. First, we use the polynomial approach suggested in Chetty
et al. (2011). In this approach, we exclude a region around the kink and t a seventh de-
gree polynomial to the data, including dummies for the excluded bins. The normalized
bunching mass is then given by the dierence between the actual density and the counter-
factual distribution, divided by the average of the counter-factual over this bunching re-
gion.21 Column (1) of Table 2.2 shows this normalized bunching mass; the footnote lists
the chosen excluded regions.22 As one would expect, the normalized bunching mass is
largest for the 1935 cohort and smallest for the 1949 cohort. Since this counter-factual
approach relies heavily on the shape of the counter-factual (Blomquist and Newey, 2017),
we also use an alternative approach. For this second approach, we take advantage of the
fact that UI entries closely track the male unemployment rate (UR).We scale the UR by
the ratio of the mean number of UI entries between age 49 and the kink to the mean UR
in this area, and use this re-scaled UR as a counter-factual. This approach yields a similar
qualitative picture, but suggests less bunching for the 1929 cohort and signicantly more
20There are 5 estimates because our data does not extend far enough yet to observe the kink for the 1952
cohort.
21We choose to count the bunching mass as the mass between the cuto and the right excluded point.
Including the imprecision on the left of the cuto is also an option and would lead to larger estimates.
22The exclusion region is chosen visually. For the rst three cohorts we simply exclude a region slightly
to the left of the cuto up to age 60. The most dicult and potentially arbitrary choice is for the 1941 cohort,
which displays a discrete jump in UI inows at age 55. We opt to exclude all of the region post-age 55, but
only count entries post-age 57.33 in the bunching mass.
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in 1935 and 1941 cohorts (see Table 2.2 column (2)).
To get a sense of how these magnitudes compare to other contexts, we make the strong
assumption that all workers around this age behave as if they were following a simple
lifetime labor supply model, as in Brown (2013). That is, we assume workers choose
their entry date strategically to maximize utility over lifetime consumption and leisure
subject to a lifetime budget set. As long as workers abilities are drawn from a continuous
distribution, the distribution of UI entries will be smooth. The introduction of a kink in
the budget set results in bunching at the kink point, and the amount of bunching allows
estimation of a labor supply elasticity, using by now standard techniques (see e.g. Saez,
2010; Kleven, 2016). We refer the reader to Appendix B.2 for the details and to Appendix
B.1 for how we construct the budget set. Under this model, the normalized bunching mass
allows us to recover the elasticity of exit age with respect to the net return to an extra year
of work. These estimates are contained in Table 2.2. The elasticity estimates for the rst
four cohorts range from 0.026–0.069 (0.026–0.101 under the UR-counterfactual). While
sensitive to the exact specication of the counter-factual, these fall squarely in the range
of Brown (2013)’s estimates for Californian teachers timing their retirement as a function
of pension benets.23 It is striking that we are seeing retirement-via-UI responses that are
comparable to standard retirement decisions that do not pass through UI. This should be
understood in context, and is likely a function of the lack of serious penalties for entering
voluntarily and the relatively low requirements whilst on UI as an older worker.24
23Brown (2013)’s preferred estimate is 0.04. She examines the retirement behavior of Californian teachers
whose normal retirement age is 60 and whose average pension replacement rate is 59%.
24It also lines up with ndings in other contexts, such as Kyyrä and Pesola (2017).
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2.5.2 Estimating Intensive Margin Responses using Regression Discontinuity
Estimators
In order to understand how these large bunching responses might bias our standard,
intensive-margin estimates of the non-employment eects of UI extensions, it is help-
ful to have estimates of the intensive-margin eect in this context. Fortunately, the PBD
step schedules shown in Figure 2·1 allow clean Regression Discontinuity (RD) estimates
of this eect (as in Schmieder et al., 2012). These estimates require that there is no sorting
into UI around the age cutos. This is satised at younger ages, but not at the oldest ages.
Here we estimate RDs pooling all years under each UI regime, starting with the 1987-
1999 period (see Appendix Table B.1).25 This gives us 12 age cutos at which we can
estimate the non-employment eect of UI extensions. In practice the age cutos provide
between an extra 3–6 months of PBD, and we will divide each estimate by the number of
months PBD was extended to get the marginal non-employment eects of an extra month
of PBD.
At each age cuto we estimate the following RDD specication:
yi = δ 1(ai ≥ A) ∆PBD + f (ai ) + Xiβ + εi (2.2)
yi is non-employment duration (capped at 36) for individual i , ai is the age at time of
UI entry (measured on the daily level) and 1(ai ≥ A) is an indicator function which equals
one when individuals age is above the age cuto A where benets are extended discon-
tinuously by ∆PBD months. In this specication, δ measures the eect of a one month
increase in PBD. The function f (ai ) is set to be a linear function with dierent slopes on
each side of the cuto in the baseline specication. Xi is a vector of additional controls.
We use a local polynomial regression with rectangular kernel and cluster standard errors
25We omit the period 1986-1987 due to it being a short transition period. There is no rst stage in this
period.
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on the daily level. We set the bandwidth to two years, but restrict it to one year on the
right hand side for the 49 and 54 years cuto during the 1987-1999 period due to other
discontinuities at 50 and 55.
This specication is well-identied for the age cutos where UI entries and other pre-
determined outcomes are smooth around the cuto. This is case for all of the younger ages
(Schmieder et al., 2012). Sorting at the cuto is a concern for some of the older cutos (this
can be seen, for example, at the age 54 cuto in Figure 2·3 panel (d)). The degree of sorting
varies between cutos and is usually most pronounced within the rst 1 to 2 months
around the cuto. We apply an imperfect solution to address this concern by excluding
2 months on each side of the cuto – the donut hole – in all our regressions. Second, we
add detailed individual controls such as education, tenure and other pre-unemployment
characteristics to help address some of this selection.26
The results of each RD estimation are depicted in Figure 2·6 and reported in Table
2.1. The results at the cutos at or below age 50 are relatively insensitive to the inclusion
of controls and average 0.089 meaning an extra month of PBD results in an extra 0.089
months – or about 3 days – of non-employment (as in Schmieder et al., 2012).27 We obtain
a similar estimate, if slightly higher, at age 52 and 54. Results for the oldest cutos are
biased upwards by sorting. Given the sorting it is dicult to draw strong conclusions, but
the evidence suggests that the intensive-margin, non-employment eect of UI extensions
may increase slightly for workers in their mid-50s relative to workers in their 40s. While
these patterns alone are of interest, the policy relevance of these results is compounded
by the presence of extensive margin eects.
26We are also exploring using a method due to Gerard et al. (2015), that allows explicitly to apply RDDs
in situations where the running variable is manipulated.
27Note that there are dierences in sample restrictions between this paper and that in that here we restrict
to men who tend to be less responsive to UI, omit some industries, and have dierent pre-unemployment
sample restrictions.
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2.5.3 Back of the Envelope Calculation
Estimating the total non-employment eect of UI on older workers requires accounting
for both the intensive and extensive margin. A credible estimate of this eect needs to
allow for individuals to transition between states of job search and unemployment without
search, as well as between entering and not entering UI, as a function of PBDs. There is
no simple way to credibly combine bunching and regression discontinuity estimates to
arrive at this number. If one were to, for example, specify a two-type model where one
type always times their entry into retirement via UI and the other type never does but
can become unemployed randomly, one could make progress. But the assumption that
individuals can be so easily categorized is unrealistic. Moreover, modeling this behavior
purely from the individual perspective is at odds with the evident role that rms play in
both generating un-desired layos and agreed-upon exits. A fully edged dynamic model
of labor supply, combined with a role for rms, is well beyond the scope of this chapter.
However, it is the subject of ongoing work.
Here, we instead perform a simple calculation to highlight the importance of the ex-
tensive margin under admittedly stark assumptions. Taking the 1935 cohort as a baseline,
we consider the eect of reducing maximum unemployment duration by 8 months from
32 months to 24 months for workers aged 50 to 60. We assume that this would shift the
entire bunching mass at the 57.33 kink rightward to age 58, without otherwise aecting
UI entries. This is somewhat consistent with the fact that the bunching mass is relatively
similar for the 1929 and 1935 cohorts (under the polynomial counter-factual). We con-
sider two scenarios for how the bunching mass might respond to this change: in the rst,
we assume each individual belonging to the entire bunching mass from 57.33 to 60 de-
lays entry by the full 8 months, in the second we assume only individuals in the reduced
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bunching mass between 57.33 and 58 delay entry, and the rest do not move at all.28
We imagine that all non-bunchers (aged 50 to 60) are red involuntarily and opt to
search for jobs. We ignore the idea that involuntary exits closer to the kink might switch
from searching to not-searching. We take the counter-factual polynomial estimate to rep-
resent the number of people aged 50 to 60 who respond to this intensive margin estimate.
Further, we assume that, conditional on unemployment, all these workers respond to a 1
month UI extension by increasing their non-employment durations by 0.089, the average
RD estimate for workers aged 40-50.
Under this set up, the intensive margin eect acting on workers aged 50 to 60 is a
reduction of 0.712 months of non-employment. The counter-factual accounts for 65% of
workers, so the expected intensive margin eect is -0.463 months. The full bunching mass
accounts for 35% of workers, so the expected extensive margin eect is -2.795 months.
The more conservative bunching mass estimate (in which only those between 57.33 and
58 respond to the change) accounts for 16% of workers, making the expected extensive
margin eect -1.277 months. The total eect of time out of work on this 8 month reduction
is thus -3.258, or using the conservative version, -1.740. That is, the total non-employment
eect is between 2.44 and 4.58 times as large in magnitude as the pure intensive margin.
While a number of things would deate this estimate – including using a larger es-
timate of the true intensive-margin eect, using the 1929 counter-factual instead of the
1935 one, and assuming that some bunchers respond by less than the full 8 months – it is
clear that the extensive margin plays a non-negligible role.
28In practice the conservative approach yields a distribution closer to the actual 1929 distribution. It nev-
ertheless over-estimates bunching between 58 and 60. In addition, the 1935 counter-factual under-estimates
the mass of people in UI between 52 and 56 for the 1929 cohort. Together, this means that we may be over-
estimating the importance of the extensive-margin eect.
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2.6 Conclusion
In this paper we document the labor supply eects of UI benet extensions for workers
approaching retirement age. We show that extensive margin responses, that is UI-induced
inows into non-employment, play an important role, and operate in addition to the stan-
dard intensive margin UI responses for younger workers that much existing literature
has focused on. The combination of intensive and extensive margin responses, as well as
voluntary and involuntary inows into UI, complicates the application of standard non-
parameteric estimators such as RD designs and Bunching estimators, but we argue the
discontinuities, kinks, and notches induced by the UI and retirement institutions can still
be used to learn about labor supply responses.
Our evidence reveals sizable labor supply responses on both the intensive and ex-
tensive margin. A naive, back of the envelope calculation suggests that using standard,
intensive-margin estimates of the non-employment eects PBD extensions for workers
aged 50 to 60 will severely underestimate the non-employment eects of UI. However,
such a calculation is also naively simplistic. We drew an unrealistic distinction between
types who bunch into UI for retirement and types who only get red involuntarily and
search for a job no matter what. In practice this is too simplistic for many reasons. We
have no empirical way of identifying these two types even if they did exist. Moreover,
these types are unrealistically separate, with reality surely being more uid: individuals
might voluntarily leave employment but not go into retirement and instead look for a job,
and individuals involuntarily red at later ages might choose to retire after attempting
job search.
Additionally, we have suggested that rms may play an important role in regulat-
ing individuals’ inows into UI after a PBD extension. This does not alter the fact that
extensive margin responses need to be taken into account when estimating total non-
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employment eect, but it does mean that UI entry decisions are not easily separated from
rm decisions.
In future work, we plan to obtain a more credible estimate of the total non-employment
eect of UI extensions on older workers by specifying and estimating a dynamic labor de-
mand model. This would need to model transitions between employment, unemployment,
and retirement and how they are aected by the structure of UI benets and parameters
of the old age pension system. We believe the data in Figures 2·3–2·5 provide compelling
moments to match using a simulated method of moments approach. Additionally we will
aim to explicitly match our model to our reduced form RD and bunching mass estimates.
We will use our 3 decades of policy variation to perform valuable out-of-sample simula-
tions. Rather than striving for maximal realism, we plan to develop a model that allows us
to capture the core mechanisms in an internally consistent way, while at the same time ab-
stracting from some other features of the data. For example we will not attempt to model
realistic wage evolution, retirement savings decisions, or the role of CLAs, among others,
but will instead focus on labor supply decisions of individuals, i.e. whether or not to retire
at any given point in time and how hard to search for a job in the case of unemployment.
We hope to also model the decision as a joint decision with rms, exploiting rm-level
variation in our linked employer-employee data. Model-in-hand, we will be able to an-
swer questions like how much of the stark decrease in employment among older workers
in Germany throughout the late 80s and 90s was caused by the UI extensions and how
much is likely explained by other factors.
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2.7 Figures
Figure 2·1: Maximum UI PBDs by Age in Dierent Time Periods in Ger-
many
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(c) PBD, Jul 1987- Mar 1999
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(d) PBD, Apr 1999 - Jan 2006
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(e) PBD, Feb 2006 - Dec 2007
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(f) PBD, Jan 2008 - 2010
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Notes: This table plots maximum potential benet durations for unemployment insurance in Germany between
1980 and 2010. We drop the brief 1985 regime in the interest of brevity. Appendix Table B.1 contains more
detailed information on each institutional regime, including eligibility requirements and benet levels.
106
Figure 2·2: Stylized Budget Sets by Exit Age for Dierent Cohorts
(a) Lifetime Earnings w/ 1 yr PBD, 1924 Cohort
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(b) Lifetime Income w/ 2 yr PBD, 1929 Cohort
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(c) Lifetime Income w/ 32 m PBD, 1935 Cohort
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(d) Lifetime Income w/ 32 m PBD, 1941 Cohort
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(e) Lifetime Income w/ 2 yr PBD, 1949 Cohort
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(f) Lifetime Income w/ 2 yr PBD, 1952 Cohort
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Notes: These gures contain lifetime budget sets as a function of exit age (into UI and eventually retirement).
See Appendix B.1 for details.The ERA is 60 for the rst 4 cohorts and 63 for the last two. The NRA (un-penalized
retirment age) for retirement via UI is 60 for the rst three cohorts, approximately 64 for the second cohort, and
65 for the last cohort. We assume PBD are xed at 1 year, 2 years, 32 months, 32 months, 2 years, and 2 years
respectively. In practice, cohorts experienced changes in UI policy that may not have been foreseen; the dashed
line represents the budget set as if these UI policy changes were known.
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Figure 2·3: UI Inows by Age for Dierent Cohorts in Germany, Men
(a) UI Inows, 1924 Cohort
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(b) UI Inows, 1929 Cohort
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(c) UI Inows, 1935 Cohort
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(d) UI Inows, 1941 Cohort
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(e) UI Inows, 1949 Cohort
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(f) UI Inows, 1952 Cohort
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Notes: These gures plot UI inows by age for dierent cohorts of West German Men with full UI eligibility,
excluding mining and steal construction. The bin width is 1/12 of a year. Red dashed lines represent ages at which
UI benet duration increases discontinuously; the black dashed line shows the earliest bridge-to-retirement kink.
The red bar under the gure indicates the period over which an individual would receive UI before drawing
pension (the blue bar). The dierent shades of grey represent dierent maximum PBD eligibility for UI, which
can change because of an existing age-cuto (the red dashed line) or because of an overall UI policy change
enacted in that year.
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Figure 2·4: Mean UI Benet Receipt by Age for Dierent Cohorts in Ger-
many, Men
(a) Mean UI Benet Receipt, 1924 Cohort
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(b) Mean UI Benet Receipt, 1929 Cohort
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(c) Mean UI Benet Receipt, 1935 Cohort
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(d) Mean UI Benet Receipt, 1941 Cohort
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(e) Mean UI Benet Receipt, 1949 Cohort
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Notes: These gures plot mean UI benet receipt duration by age for dierent cohorts of West German Men
with full UI eligibility, excluding mining and steal construction. The bin width is 1/12 of a year. Red dashed lines
represent ages at which UI benet duration increases discontinuously; the black dashed line shows the earliest
bridge-to-retirement kink. The red bar under the gure indicates the period over which an individual would
receive UI before drawing pension (the blue bar). The dierent shades of grey represent dierent maximum
PBD eligibility for UI, which can change because of an existing age-cuto (the red dashed line) or because of an
overall UI policy change enacted in that year.
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Figure 2·5: Mean Capped Non-Emp. Duration by Age for Dierent Co-
horts in Germany, Men
(a) Mean Non-Emp. Duration, 1924 Cohort
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(b) Mean Non-Emp. Duration, 1929 Cohort
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(c) Mean Non-Emp. Duration, 1935 Cohort
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Notes: These gures plot mean non-employment duration (capped at 36 months) by age for dierent cohorts
of West German Men with full UI eligibility, excluding mining and steal construction. The bin width is 1/12 of a
year. Red dashed lines represent ages at which UI benet duration increases discontinuously; the black dashed
line shows the earliest bridge-to-retirement kink. The red bar under the gure indicates the period over which
an individual would receive UI before drawing pension (the blue bar). The dierent shades of grey represent
dierent maximum PBD eligibility for UI, which can change because of an existing age-cuto (the red dashed
line) or because of an overall UI policy change enacted in that year.
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Figure 2·6: RD Results: 1 month PBD Extension on Non-Employment,
Men
(a) Donut-Hole RD Results: Non-Emp. Duration, Men
w/out controls
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(b) Donut-Hole RD Results: Non-Emp. Duration, Men w/
controls
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Notes: These gures contain Regression Discontinuity estimates of the eect of UI potential benet durations
at each age cut-o beginning July 1987. See Table 2.1 for the estimates. We pool all years under the same
UI regime. We employ a local polynomial regression with a rectangular kernel and cluster standard errors at
the daily level. 95% CI are plotted. All results are divided by the number of months PBD was extended. The
bandwidth is 2 years except for the ’87-’99 age 49 and 54 cutos where it is 1 year on the right due to other
discontinuities. We exclude 2 months on each side of the cuto – the donut hole – to partially address sort-
ing. We also include detailed individual controls. Controls include: pre-unemployment wage, gender, national-
ity (non-german), experience, wage/occupation/rm-tenure, education, industry (3-digit), rm-size, month and
year. Sample Restrictions: West German Men With full eligibility, excluding mining and steal construction.
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2.8 Tables
112
Table 2.1: The Eect of PBD on Non-employment Durations
All Exits
(1) (2)
No Controls Controls
Jul 1987 - Feb 1999
Age 42, P: (12-18), ∆P: 6 dydP 0.099 0.059
[0.023]*** [0.022]***
Observations 205478 205478
Mean of Dep. Var. 15.2 15.2
Age 44, P: (18-22), ∆P: 4 dydP 0.075 0.058
[0.038]** [0.035]
Observations 200089 200089
Mean of Dep. Var. 16.1 16.1
Age 49, P: (22-26), ∆P: 4 dydP 0.107 0.010
[0.063]* [0.056]
Observations 118965 118965
Mean of Dep. Var. 17.6 17.6
Age 54, P: (26-32), ∆P: 6 dydP 0.206 0.147
[0.037]*** [0.032]***
Observations 150812 150812
Mean of Dep. Var. 23.9 23.9
Mar 1999- Jan 2006
Age 45, P: (12-18), ∆P: 6 dydP 0.033 0.018
[0.026] [0.025]
Observations 181770 181770
Mean of Dep. Var. 15.2 15.2
Age 47, P: (18-22), ∆P: 4 dydP 0.078 0.055
[0.041]* [0.038]
Observations 170340 170340
Mean of Dep. Var. 16.3 16.3
Age 52, P: (22-26), ∆P: 4 dydP 0.154 0.102
[0.043]*** [0.040]**
Observations 149850 149850
Mean of Dep. Var. 19.9 19.9
Age 57, P: (26-32), ∆P: 6 dydP 0.471 0.321
[0.029]*** [0.022]***
Observations 208831 208831
Mean of Dep. Var. 28.5 28.5
Feb 2006- Dec 2007
Age 55, P: (12-18), ∆P: 6 dydP 0.463 0.212
[0.063]*** [0.056]***
Observations 35124 35124
Mean of Dep. Var. 17.8 17.8
Jan 2008- Dec 2010
Age 50, P: (12-15), ∆P: 3 dydP 0.139 0.117
[0.084] [0.077]
Observations 85107 85107
Mean of Dep. Var. 16.2 16.2
Age 55, P: (15-18), ∆P: 3 dydP 0.251 0.149
[0.088]*** [0.082]
Observations 67199 67199
Mean of Dep. Var. 19.2 19.2
Age 58, P: (18-24), ∆P: 6 dydP 0.300 0.240
[0.047]*** [0.042]***
Observations 62228 62228
Mean of Dep. Var. 22.7 22.7
Notes: This table contains Regression Discontinuity estimates of the eect of UI potential benet durations
at each age cut-o beginning July 1987.Standard errors are in brackets and clustered on day level (* P<.1, **
P<.05, *** P<.01)). We pool all years under the same UI regime. We employ a local polynomial regression with
a rectangular kernel and cluster standard errors at the daily level. 95% CI are plotted. All results are divided by
the number of months PBD was extended. The bandwidth is 2 years except for the ’87-’99 age 49 and 54 cutos
where it is 1 year on the right due to other discontinuities. We exclude 2 months on each side of the cuto –
the donut hole – to partially address sorting. We also include detailed individual controls. Controls include:
pre-unemployment wage, gender, nationality (non-german), experience, wage/occupation/rm-tenure, educa-
tion, industry (3-digit), rm-size, month and year. Sample Restrictions: West German Men With full eligibility,
excluding mining and steal construction.
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Table 2.2: Estimates of the Bunching Mass at each Bridge-to-Retirement
Kink
(1) (2)
Estimated Counter-Factual UR as Counter-Factual
Bunching at the Kink Induced by Early Retirement via UI
1924 Cohort
Age 59, P: (12), R: (60) Kink Size (wabove
wbelow
) 0.417 0.417
Normalized Bunching ( Bho (0) ) 15.826 16.343
Elasticity (e) 0.026 0.026
1929 Cohort
Age 58, P: (24), R: (60) Kink Size (wabove
wbelow
) 0.420 0.420
Normalized Bunching ( Bho (0) ) 37.914 22.294
Elasticity (e) 0.061 0.036
1935 Cohort
Age 57.33, P: (32), R: (60)A Kink Size (wabove
wbelow
) 0.414 0.414
Normalized Bunching ( Bho (0) ) 43.033 64.288
Elasticity (e) 0.069 0.101
1941 Cohort
Age 57.33, P: (32), R: (60)A Kink Size (wabove
wbelow
) 0.441 0.441
Normalized Bunching ( Bho (0) ) 14.540 23.204
Elasticity (e) 0.026 0.041
1949 Cohort
Age 61, P: (24), R: (63)A Kink Size (wabove
wbelow
) 0.447 0.447
Normalized Bunching ( Bho (0) ) 0.686 0.872
Elasticity (e) 0.001 0.001
Notes: This table contains estimates of the bunching mass at the bridge to retirement kink for each of the cohorts
depicted in Figures 2·3. The bunching mass is estimated in two ways. First, we t a 7th degree polynomial to
the UI entry data excluding a region around the kink point. For the 1924 cohort we exclude 0.3 years to the left
and 1 year to the right of the age 59 cuto; for the 1929 cohort we exclude 0.3 years to the left and 2 years to the
right of the age 58 cuto; for the 1935 cohort we exclude 0.3 years to the left and 2.66 years to the right of the age
57.33 cuto; for the 1941 we exclude 2.66 years to the left and 2.66 years to the right of the age 57.33 cuto; for
the 1949 cohort we exclude 0.3 years to the left and 0.66 years to the right of the age 61 cuto. The normalized
bunching mass is given by the dierence between observed and counter-factual N between the cuto and the
right exclusion region, divided by the average counter-factual in this region. We also use the unemployment
rate as a rough counter-factual by scaling it by the ratio of the mean number of UI entries between age 49 (or
lowest available) and the kink to the mean unemployment rate. The normalized bunching mass for this is dened
analogously. The bin-width is 1/12 of a year. We also show the point estimate for the elasticity of exit age with
respect to the net return to work. This is estimated as described in Appendix B.2.
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Chapter 3
The Political Boundaries of Ethnic Divisions
Coauthored with Samuel Bazzi (Boston University)
3.1 Introduction
Ethnic divisions are a persistent source of instability in diverse countries. Interethnic
tensions are widely associated with weak public goods provision and conict (Alesina,
Baqir, and Easterly, 1999; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray, 2012;
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005). With few exceptions, the longstanding literature on
diversity oers mostly pessimistic conclusions. As such, it remains unclear whether and
how governments can use policy tools to reshape ethnic divisions.
The redrawing of subnational boundaries oers one compelling opportunity. Chang-
ing political boundaries can reshape incentives for group mobilization and hence the scope
for certain ethnic divisions to matter more than others. Pioneering work on ethnicity and
conict recognized this possibility (Horowitz, 1985), and the global proliferation of ad-
ministrative units over the last 30 years of decentralization oers a unique opportunity
to provide some of the rst empirical evidence on this hypothesis. This massive wave of
redistricting constitutes perhaps the largest shift in the locus of politics since the creation
of new nation states after World War II.1 While policymakers often support political re-
1Grossman and Lewis (2014) document the global pervasiveness of this phenomenon across all levels of
administration. For example, from 1990 to 2010, Nigerian states increased from 22 to 37, Ugandan districts
from 34 to 112, and Kenyan districts from 47 to 70. Czechoslovakia and Hungary increased their munici-
palities by 50 percent from 1989 to 1993. Brazilian municipalities increased from 3,974 in 1980 to 5,560 in
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organization to placate interethnic grievances (see Brancati, 2009), both theory and case
studies suggest that the implications for ethnic divisions and conict are far from obvious.
The key contribution of this paper is to show that political boundaries endogenously
determine ethnic divisions. We exploit a natural policy experiment in Indonesia to esti-
mate the eects of redistricting on conict. Where feasible, creating homogenous new
political units reduces violence. Yet, in practice, redistricting along group lines is rarely
so simple and may instead foster new divisions. Indeed, we show that the potential gains
in stability are often undone and even reversed in areas where new group divisions be-
come salient and polarizing.2 Even without any changes in the local population, new local
government boundaries recongure which ethnic divisions are politically relevant. This
changes the way that dierent groups interact and compete. In newly polarized settings,
the ensuing electoral contests to control valuable public resources further amplify incen-
tives for violence and may give rise to fresh cycles of conict lasting beyond the rst few
years after redistricting.
Indonesia oers a rich setting to study changes in ethnic divisions and conict. First,
like many other new democracies, political violence remains a major policy concern
(Butcher and Goldsmith, 2017). After the fall of a highly centralized, authoritarian regime,
many feared the diverse country would break apart as local conicts tore at ethnic, reli-
gious, and regional seams. These large-scale internecine conicts have subsided, replaced
by more sporadic outbursts of low-intensity social conict and recurring electoral vio-
lence. Amplied by decentralization, ethnic mobilization around elections and political
patronage are pervasive.3 Meanwhile, institutional constraints on violence remain rela-
2000. Vietnam increased its provinces from 40 to 64 from 1996 to 2003.
2Consider, for example, two minority groups that break away to form their own district. Previously
pitted together against a larger majority, these two groups now face fresh incentives for conict in the
newly polarized district.
3Aspinall (2011, p. 298) notes that, “Since the introduction of direct local government head elections,
there has been a shift in favor of alignment between the ethnic identity of local government heads and
the local populations they govern. Electoral winners tend to be drawn from the largest ethnic group in
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tively weak. While distinct from civil wars, these outbreaks of local conict may accumu-
late over time and also exert lasting adverse eects by eroding trust in the political process
(Dercon and Gutiérrez-Romero, 2012), by undermining local institutions (Michalopou-
los and Papaioannou, 2013), by weakening social capital and deepening ethnic cleavages
(Dower, Ginsburgh, and Weber, 2017; Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti, 2013a), and by plant-
ing the seeds for more serious, future conict (Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti, 2013b).
Second, the Indonesian context allows us to overcome a host of endogeneity and mea-
surement challenges typically associated with identifying the eects of changing political
boundaries. Decentralization reforms beginning in the late 1990s led to a dramatic in-
crease in the number of district governments across the archipelago from 302 in 1999
to 514 in 2014 (see Figures 3·1 and 3·2). Motivated by a desire to reduce sociopolitical
tensions, the central government created a very favorable environment for such redis-
tricting.4 This allows us to rule out rst order concerns about strategic violence aimed at
achieving or preventing certain types of partitions. Moreover, we show that an abrupt
centrally-imposed moratorium between 2004 and 2006 generates plausibly exogenous
variation in the timing of redistricting across locations.5 We exploit this staggered process
in a generalized dierence-in-dierence framework.
Using universal Population Census data from 2000, we construct measures of how ho-
mogenized the new, smaller districts are relative to the original district based on the same,
initial populations. Indonesia is home to over 1,000 self-identied ethnic groups, allowing
the district or province.” We provide further qualitative context in Appendix C.6.1, which also shows that
greater diversity within newly created district boundaries is associated with closer elections and stronger
individual preferences for politicians’ ethnicities and patronage.
4Mietzner (2014, p. 62) notes that decentralization “was designed to secure the long-term survival of
the nation-state by reconciling the regions with a capital that had systematically undermined their local
identities since the 1950s.” And Aspinall (2013, p. 39) notes that the policy “rationale for creating a new
district out of an old one is to provide an administrative home for a local ethnic or sub-ethnic group that
lives in a concentrated area and to ameliorate tension with other groups.”
5We build upon Burgess, Hansen, Olken, Potapov, and Sieber (2012) who use similar variation in their
study of deforestation externalities due to redistricting.
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us to distinguish two key measures in the literature: fractionalization and polarization.
Ethnic fractionalization (F ), which captures the likelihood of meeting someone outside
your group, declines substantially on average at the original district level. However, some
of the newly drawn borders encompass fewer, large groups, thereby increasing ethnic
polarization (P ), which also captures dierences in preferences across groups proxied by
language. Indeed, while homogenization was an objective of redistricting in many areas,
policy constraints directly limited the feasible changes in diversity. We isolate these con-
straints to show that the cross-district variation in feasible redistricting schemes drives
the changes in diversity and conict.
We estimate the eects of these changes in ethnopolitical boundaries on conict using
new data developed by the Indonesian National Violence Monitoring System. Based on
systematic coding of print newspaper archives, the data capture over 230,000 violent inci-
dents at a high spatial and temporal frequency from 2000 to 2014. While limited initially
to high-conict regions, these data oer much more comprehensive coverage than other
conict data for Indonesia and rival some of the richest geospatial event-based sources in
sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (e.g., ACLED) in terms of depth and detail. Reported
events include, for example, attempts to inuence the allocation of resources and express
popular dissatisfaction with local governance (Barron, Jarey, and Varshney, 2014). Vigi-
lantism and public mobilization along ethnic lines are common (Wilson, 2015) as is strate-
gic violence around elections (Harish and Toha, 2017).
Despite policymakers’ goals, redistricting does not change the average incidence of
social conict. This somewhat surprising nding can be explained by heterogeneous
changes in ethnic divisions. Reductions in conict in newly homogenous units are o-
set by increases in newly polarized units. Our estimates suggest that political boundaries
can explain around half of the endogenous long-run correlation between ethnic polar-
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ization and conict in the cross-section.6 These changes arise in both the parent district,
which retains the original seat of government, and the child district, which acquires a new
local government and capital (see Figure 3·3 for an example). Robustness checks rule out
other confounding eects of redistricting and changes in media attention. Overall, the
abrupt reconguration of the diverse electorate gives rise to fresh incentives for violence
that are amplied in polarized settings.
These border-induced changes in ethnic divisions may have persistent eects on con-
ict as a result of political cycles. Violence ratchets up around the rst mayoral elections,
particularly where they are closely contested. New ethnic divisions, and polarization in
particular, exacerbate violence around these initial elections, particularly in child districts
where the stakes are high given the fundamental role of the initial administration in es-
tablishing the new government and its rst budget. Moreover, this amplication eect
persists into the next election ve years later and also drives violence in intervening peri-
ods, pointing to new cycles of political conict. The more pronounced cycles in child dis-
tricts are consistent with dierences in the scale of changes in contestable public resources
but may also point to nascent dierences in local state capacity. Ethnic favoritism helps
rationalize electoral violence and perpetuate grievances, a mechanism we validate using
nighttime light intensity to capture village-level changes in access to publicly-provided
electricity after redistricting.
Our results line up nicely with case studies in Indonesia. Our case study of redistrict-
ing in West Kalimantan in Section 3.6.3 illustrates how border-induced changes in ethnic
divisions can reshape conict. Diprose (2009) oers similar insights on Central Sulawesi
as do Nolan, Jones, and Solahudin (2014) on Papua, noting that “local elections in relatively
new districts can exacerbate existing social fault lines.” Wilson (2015, p. 33) nicely sum-
marizes the general context, arguing that redistricting “created confusion regarding lines
6We discuss additional benchmarking exercises in Section 3.5.3.
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of authority” and “involved renegotiating the boundaries of collective identities” as “local
government bureaucratic precincts were altered, and some networks of resource distribu-
tion that relied upon state agents were disrupted or excluded by these shifting boundaries.”
As a result, “ethnic identities have been politicised as clientilistic networks. . . mobilising
support along communal lines.” Of course, conict is by no means a foregone conclusion.
However, by localizing political contestation, redistricting may make it easier to solve
collective action problems that might otherwise forestall violence.
Similar ndings may be at play outside Indonesia as well. In Uganda, for example,
Green (2008) argues descriptively that “the huge expansion in the number of new dis-
tricts has led to local-level conict by altering relations between local ethnic groups.”
Although dramatic, the wave of redistricting we study is comparable in scale and pur-
pose to eorts across sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe (see Grossman and
Lewis, 2014; Grossman, Pierskalla, and Dean, 2017). A small but growing political sci-
ence literature examines this process, documenting similar institutional underpinnings
(see Pierskalla, 2016a, for a survey). In diverse countries, as in Indonesia, the resulting
shift in the locus of politics can fundamentally change relevant group boundaries. How
these changes aect incentives for conict is very much an open question to which the
Indonesian setting is uniquely well suited to answer.
Related Literature. This paper makes several contributions to the political economy
literature. Our central contribution is to show that subnational borders can reshape eth-
nic divisions and conict. We argue that the ethnic divisions underlying widely-used
diversity measures are neither xed nor exogenous and instead depend on the political
boundaries within which groups are organized. Case studies as well as lab and survey ex-
periments across Africa nd that interethnic preferences are context-dependent (Berge,
Bjorvatn, Galle, Miguel, Posner, Tungodden, and Zhang, 2015; Eifert, Miguel, and Posner,
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2010; Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, and Weinstein, 2007; Lowes, Nunn, Robinson,
and Weigel, 2015; Posner, 2004), and Blouin and Mukand (forthcoming) and Yanagizawa-
Drott (2014) show that public media can manipulate these preferences. We show that
subnational boundaries are a policy choice that can change ethnic cleavages by reorient-
ing which groups are relevant to one’s own.7 While prior literature has recognized this
political endogeneity of ethnic divisions (see Fearon, 2006), we provide the rst empirical
test using border changes. Our ndings highlight important policy tradeos and demon-
strate how electoral democracy may hasten the deepening of new ethnic divisions.
While Esteban and Ray (2011a) and Esteban et al. (2012) study the equilibrium relation-
ship between diversity and conict, we identify the transition path to a new equilibrium as
underlying ethnic divisions change. In this respect, our ndings are similar to Amodio and
Chiovelli (forthcoming) who show that abrupt, migration-induced changes in local polar-
ization exacerbate conict in post-Apartheid South Africa. Our eect sizes are smaller.
This is intuitive because their results are based on changes in the underlying population,
which introduces new groups and non-ethnic divisions (e.g., immigrant–native). By com-
parison, we hold the underlying population xed and simply reorient the relevant group
divisions within new boundaries. This is important from a policy perspective because bar-
riers to mobility often limit Tiebout (1956) sorting that might otherwise help neutralize
social frictions linking local diversity to conict.
We argue that redistricting provides a compelling setting to test the hypothesized dis-
tinction between fractionalization and polarization in new theories of diversity and con-
ict. Esteban and Ray (2011a) show that in conict over public goods (e.g., political power),
polarization should be relatively more important as it captures dierences in intergroup
7In this respect, our identication strategy is somewhat akin to Hjort (2014) who uses the random as-
signment of workers to ethnically mixed teams to understand how diversity shapes productivity in a ower
plant in Kenya around a period of national interethnic strife. Hence, our notion of time-varying diversity
is distinct from variation due to migration or dierential mortality and fertility, which may be confounded
with a host of other factors whose eects on conict are of separate interest.
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preferences and the strength of in-group ties.8 For conict over private goods (e.g., natu-
ral resources), however, fractionalization should matter more as the per capita spoils are
rival. Esteban et al. (2012) provide supportive cross-country evidence using rough proxies
for the relative publicness of resources within countries. Redistricting and local govern-
ment proliferation oer a more precise public resource shock. We nd that polarization
matters relatively more than fractionalization. We also nd that polarization matters more
in child than parent districts, consistent with dierences in the scale of the local shock to
public versus private resources.
On a practical level, we build on arguments for basing measures of diversity on group
divisions relevant to the nature of contestation. Our results suggest that the growing num-
ber of studies exploiting subnational variation in diversity should use spatial boundaries at
levels of aggregation that are outcome-relevant.9 This echoes recent work arguing that lo-
cal diversity can have dierent eects than diversity at the aggregate, country level given
the dierent nature of interaction within and between jurisdictions (Alesina and Zhu-
ravskaya, 2011; Desmet, Gomes, and Ortuño-Ortín, 2016; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol,
2017).
Furthermore, we add causal evidence to the literature on optimal borders. The unique
policy context in Indonesia allows us to take the complex determinants of administrative
8Spolaore and Wacziarg (2017) make similar points in a related setup with the additional insight that
contests over rival goods may be more likely between groups with similar preferences, a prediction borne
out empirically when examining international conict, which typically involves contestation of private
resources such as oil (Caselli, Morelli, and Rohner, 2015; Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2016). Other models of
conict emphasize the conditions giving rise to mobilization along ethnic as opposed to other group lines
(e.g., Caselli and Coleman, 2013; Esteban and Ray, 2008, 2011b). Consistent with some of these predictions,
our results highlight the important role of ethnic markers in mobilizing around newly contestable local
politics.
9As better data on subnational diversity become available (e.g., Gershman and Rivera, 2016), it is tempt-
ing to take the analysis to increasingly granular geography. This might be appropriate for questions about
intergroup contact and preferences but perhaps less appropriate for studying conict if the resources being
contested are determined and allocated at higher levels of administration. This is in line with the warning
by Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2017) regarding the modiable areal unit problem (MAUP) in the use
of spatial data where results depend on the level of aggregation.
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boundaries as given and focus on investigating its consequences. Alesina, Easterly, and
Matuszeski (2011) and Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2016) identify adverse long-run
eects of arbitrary, post-colonial partitioning of ethnic groups across national borders.
In the era of democracy and decentralization, one remedy might be to allow for subna-
tional borders to be formed from the bottom-up. Our ndings suggest that if not designed
properly, redistricting schemes may also have unintended adverse consequences for social
stability.
Finally, we add to a large literature on ethnic divisions and public goods (e.g., Burgess,
Jedwab, Miguel, Morjaria, and Padró i Miquel, 2015; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005) by tak-
ing a step back to investigate conict over control of the institutions that allocate those
goods. Our results suggest that violence may be informative about the tradeo between
population homogeneity and scalable public goods provision in redistricting schemes.
Roadmap. Section 3.2 details the context of decentralization and district proliferation
in Indonesia. Section 3.3 presents motivating evidence on diversity and conict and a
conceptual framework showing how redistricting can reshape ethnic divisions. Section 3.4
proposes measures of border-induced changes in diversity and presents the new conict
data. Section 3.5 develops the empirical strategy and core results. Section 3.6 identies
electoral mechanisms linking the changing ethnic divisions to new conict dynamics.
Section 3.7 concludes with a discussion of policy implications and future research.
3.2 Background: Local Government Proliferation
The number of districts in Indonesia increased by nearly 70 percent over a 15 year period.
This background section details the central role districts play in government, key features
of the redistricting process, and the fundamental changes in the scope of government that
follow. For reference, Appendix Figure C·1 provides a timeline of key events discussed
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below.
3.2.1 Decentralization and the Transfer of Power to District Governments
Indonesia has four main tiers of government. The largest tier is the province, of which
there were 34 in 2014. Provinces are divided into districts known as kabupaten in rural
areas and kota in urban areas. In 2014, there were 514 districts. Districts are in turn divided
into 7,094 subdistricts (kecamatan), which are further subdivided into more than 80,000
villages, the smallest unit of government.
The resignation of President Suharto in May 1998 ushered in a wave of decentraliza-
tion reforms that shifted the balance of power away from the central government and
provinces and towards the districts. Eective January 2001, districts assumed responsi-
bility for nearly all public policy with the exception of the few areas naturally reserved
for the central government (e.g., foreign aairs, scal and monetary policy). Accordingly,
districts assumed extensive decision-making power over local expenditures.
District heads or mayors, known as bupati and walikota, supervise the budget process,
amalgamating spending requests from lower levels of government and submitting the -
nal budget to local parliament for approval. The district executive plays a signicantly
larger role than local parliament in determining the composition and allocation of pub-
lic goods (see Lewis, 2017b; Martinez-Bravo, Mukherjee, and Stegmann, 2017).10 While
parliamentarians remain important, they tend to be less individually accountable than
mayors and more beholden to national party politics than to the local population (Lewis,
2017a).
Major electoral reforms also accompanied decentralization. Previously appointed by
10Mayors also appoint all subdistrict heads beginning in 2004 and have long appointed village heads in
urban areas (Martinez-Bravo, 2014). These local ocials play important roles in local public goods provision
by navigating relations with the district government where the resources initially ow from the center (see,
e.g., Section 3.6.2 on electricity). They also play an important role in mobilizing voters around elections,
eectively greasing the patronage politics discussed in Section 3.3.
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the central government, district heads were now elected via majority vote by members
of the local parliament, who were in turn popularly elected according to a closed-list
proportional representation system. Democracy deepened further in 2005 as district heads
and their running mates were now directly elected via plurality/majority voting. Given
the power of the district executive, these quinquennial mayoral elections, which occur at
dierent times across districts, are a focal point of local political contestation.11
3.2.2 Creating New Districts
Until the late 1990s, district boundaries were relatively stable (Booth, 2011). Many bound-
aries originated under colonial rule when the Dutch used local leaders for indirect rule.
In practice, these administrative divisions spanned large swathes of territory with many
dierent groups (Cribb, 2013). Post-independence, new districts arose with the goal of
uniform population (Charras, 2005). However, due to imbalances in population density
across islands, many districts continued to span large areas and multiple ethnic home-
lands. These expansive, arbitrary (post-)colonial boundaries remained largely in place
until the fall of Suharto, when subsequent governments facilitated dramatic redrawing of
the district map. The number of districts ballooned from 302 in 1999 to 514 in 2014 (see
Figure 3·1) through a process known colloquially as pemekaran or blossoming.
Redistricting Process. Subdistricts break o from their original district to create new
districts. After a split, the original district is divided in (at least) two: The single parent
district contains the original district name and capital with pre-existing institutions. The
child district(s) receives a new name, capital, district head, parliament, and government
apparatus. Figure 3·3 provides an example of this distinction with the original district of
11As Aspinall (2011, p. 305) notes, decentralization “shifted state resources and hence the focus of political
contestation down toward the base of the political system.” Booth (2011, p. 46) argues, “Certainly the
devolution of resources to the district level, where it has occurred has made the job of district head. . . very
attractive to those who in the past had only managed to achieve lower-level positions in provincial or
regional bureaucracies, or who had been largely excluded from ocial positions.”
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Aceh Tenggara splitting into the parent of Aceh Tenggara and the child of Gayo Lues.
This also highlights the fact that original districts split up along contiguous, pre-existing
subdistrict lines.
Local elites and interest groups initiate the action to split in accordance with a redis-
tricting law passed in 2000. The regulation stipulates that new districts must have: (i) at
least three subdistricts, (ii) support among the original district mayor and parliamentar-
ians, and (iii) demonstrated socioeconomic capacity in terms of basic public goods and
economic infrastructure.12 We discuss these policy constraints in Section 3.4.1 as they
determined the scope of feasible changes in ethnic divisions.
For identication purposes, we focus on the wave of redistricting from 2001–3 and
2007–8.13 The central government twice stopped the redistricting process via national
moratoria, the rst of which occurred from 2004–6 and the second from 2009–2012 as
clearly seen in Figure 3·1.14 In both cases, the duration and enforcement of the ban was
uncertain. Indeed, applications for new districts continued to arrive at the national parlia-
ment with more than 100 proposals at various stages of completion awaiting consideration
in 2005–6 (BAPPENAS, 2007). Our main empirical strategy, which builds on Burgess et al.
(2012), exploits this rst moratorium by comparing districts that split around this pol-
icy shock. What is crucial for our identication is that the timing of redistricting is not
driven by trends in conict or correlated factors therein.15 Section 3.4 provides supportive
12Given the favorable returns to parent and child districts (see below), splitting proposals were generally
widely supported by original district parliamentarians who represent constituencies in both areas prior to
redistricting (Pierskalla, 2016b).
13The redistricting in 1999 occurred before the new government regulation on pemekaran and substan-
tively diers from later rounds of redistricting. Several were long-standing requests from the Suharto era,
and others were initiated by the central government (Fitrani, Hofman, and Kaiser, 2005). These areas only
enter our main analysis if they later split again.
14The primary stated reason for the moratoria was the drain on scal resources and lack of capacity to
meet the stang needs of new child district governments. Upon lifting the rst moratorium, the government
tightened the law on redistricting by increasing the minimum number of subdistricts to ve and requiring
original districts to have existed for at least seven years.
15Note that this design does not exploit variation from districts that never split. This prioritizes internal
over external validity, a tradeo we discuss further in Section 3.5.5. Prior studies identify incentives for
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evidence.
Changes in Local Government. To understand how redistricting reshapes local gov-
ernment, a brief timeline is instructive. After a new child district is ratied, an interim
executive along with local parliamentarians oversee the transition process with a focus
on the rst mayoral election. On average, those quinquennial elections rst take place
within 21 months after redistricting. The mayor is then tasked with operationalizing and
stang up to 30 new local government agencies in the new capital. By this time, roughly
two years after redistricting, central government transfers have begun owing into child
district coers. Local public expenditures begin increasing shortly thereafter, taking simi-
lar shape as in other districts with around 40–50 percent of spending on personnel. In the
parent district, elections take place on the same local, ve-yearly timeline as they would
have absent redistricting, but in the meantime, local institutions undergo restructuring as
the governed area and populace change.
Taking the original district as a whole, there are considerable gains to redistricting in
terms of political representation and public resources as shown in Appendix C.1. First,
most child district residents experience a signicant reduction in distance to government
representatives and institutions in the district capital. Second, the number of legislators
per capita always (weakly) increases with redistricting due to apportionment rules. Third,
scal allocation rules imply a signicant, roughly 20 percent long-run increase in annual
transfers, relative to a base of around 200 USD per capita. While the scale of changes
in local government may dier between parent and child districts, the signicant shock
to politically-relevant ethnic divisions is shared by residents of both. We describe these
changes and their potential implications for violence in the following sections.
creating new districts, including eciency gains in the provision of public goods, ethnic homogenization,
and rent seeking (see Fitrani et al., 2005; Nolan et al., 2014; Pierskalla, 2016b). While we nd similar evidence,
what’s important for identication is that these underlying incentives do not predict early versus later
timing of redistricting.
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3.3 Conceptual Framework: The Political Boundaries of Ethnic
Divisions
Implicit in much of the literature on diversity is the notion that ethnic divisions are shaped
by political boundaries. The scope for ethnic mobilization and patronage networks de-
pends on the size and cohesion of groups within the electorate. This suggests that by
changing political boundaries, redistricting has the potential to reshape these intergroup
divisions and, in turn, social tensions and conict. But whether this actually happens,
and how quickly it happens in practice, is unclear and yet crucial for informing policy. In
the remainder of this section, we provide motivating evidence on diversity and conict
in Indonesia and then propose a simple conceptual framework showing how redistricting
can change the ethnic divisions underlying this relationship.
3.3.1 Motivating Evidence on Diversity and Conict in Indonesia
Ethnic diversity has long been associated with adverse social consequences ranging from
weaker social capital to greater conict. Since the seminal book by Horowitz (1985), re-
searchers have identied these relationships across many countries.
Similar patterns hold in Indonesia. Indeed, in the late 1990s, ethnic divisions were a
factor in major conicts across the archipelago, including, among others, separatist move-
ments in Aceh and Papua, communal violence in Maluku and Central Sulawesi, and polit-
ical violence in West and Central Kalimantan (Barron et al., 2014).16 Consistent with these
pervasive divisions, Mavridis (2015) shows that residents of more ethnically diverse dis-
tricts exhibit lower generalized trust and less community participation. Even as many of
the most intense conicts subsided by the mid-2000s, ethnicity remained a key vehicle for
16Like Fearon (2006), we view ethnicity as determined by descent but subject to politics and history and
not merely biological. In the Indonesian context, religious identity tends to be much more of a choice vari-
able than ethnic identity. Some of the communal violence in the late 1990s and early 2000s was widely seen
at the time as religiously grounded, but revisionist accounts increasingly view those conicts as ethnically
organized (Schulze, 2017).
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political mobilization across the country (see Allen, 2014; Aspinall, 2011; Fox and Menchik,
2011). The introduction of direct majority/plurality elections for mayors reinforced this
tendency.17 Indeed, we show in Appendix C.6.1 that electoral competition is much stier
in diverse districts, where fractionalization and polarization are associated with narrower
victory margins, especially in newly created districts. Relatedly, clientelism and patron-
age pervade local politics, with patronage networks often based on local ethnic identities
and intermediated by lower-level ocials such as village heads (Aspinall, 2013; Aspinall
and Sukmajati, 2016).
As in other countries, these ethnic group dynamics occasionally manifest in conict.
Ideally, group-based contests over distributive goods occur peacefully through the polit-
ical process. However, in settings with weak institutions (e.g., newly democratic coun-
tries), violence may be an eective means of inuencing elections or the allocation of
public resources. These low-intensity, localized bouts of violence are prevalent in modern
Indonesia.18 While distinct from full-blown civil war, these episodes of violence are a ma-
jor policy concern given their potential to undermine eorts to build local state capacity
and to snowball into more systematic, large-scale conict.
Using new data detailed in Section 3.4.2, we document a strong positive correlation be-
tween ethnic diversity—as measured by either fractionalization or polarization—and the
incidence of conict in Indonesian districts since 2000 (see Appendix C.3). Simple regres-
17Ethnic or regional political parties are eectively banned in Indonesia due to a host of legal require-
ments implemented with democratization in 1999, mandating that political parties must have widespread
geographic coverage—in terms of institutional presence—in order to be eligible to contest elections (see
Hillman, 2012, for details). Nevertheless, mobilization along identity lines in local elections is widespread
(see Aspinall, 2011, and associated quotes in the introduction). At the same time, class cleavages and family
dynasties are less important in local politics than elsewhere in Southeast Asia (see Aspinall and Asad, 2016).
18For example, Tadjoeddin (2012) nds that violence occurred in 23 percent of the rst direct mayoral
elections between 2005–2007. Harish and Toha (2017) show that conict around local elections is a persistent
problem. They classify over 1,000 electoral violence episodes into voter-targeted, candidate-targeted, and
government-targeted. We provide examples using our data in Section 3.4.2 and discuss their ndings in
Appendix C.2.2.
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sions suggest that a one standard deviation increase in fractionalization (polarization) is
associated with a 15 (8) percent increase in the likelihood of conict. We discuss similar
correlations in other settings when benchmarking the causal eects of border-induced
changes in diversity in Section 3.5.3.
3.3.2 A Simple Model
We present here a simple conceptual framework to clarify how redistricting can change
the ethnic divisions linking diversity to conict. We focus on what Ray and Esteban (2016)
call social conict that is often organized around groups. Esteban and Ray (2011a) formally
model the equilibrium eects of diversity on group-based conict over rival (private) and
non-rival (public) goods. They note that political power is a leading example of con-
testable public goods, and, for exposition purposes, we emphasize as much given the im-
plications of redistricting. They show that in a contest over a purely public resource, the
level of per capita conict is increasing in group polarization, the value of the resource,
and within-group cohesion. We use a vastly simplied two-group model below to frame
our discussion of how redistricting aects violence by changing political boundaries.19
Baseline Setup. Suppose an original district O is composed of two groups with pop-
ulation G1 and G2 and total population G = G1 + G2. Denote by дi the share of group
i in the population (e.g., G1/G). These groups compete over a public prize. The prize,
being non-excludable and non-rival, is not diminished by group size, but the winner of
the contest gets to choose the mix of public goods that their group prefers. We assume
the winner chooses a level that provides their own group with value R per person and the
other group with 0. The leader of each group i chooses total violenceVi given its per unit
cost γ . The probability of group i winning control over the public prize is given by the
contest function ViV1+V2 . Each group leader choosesVi to maximize per capita payos. That
19We thank Enrico Spolaore for suggesting this setup.
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is, each group i , taking as given the other’s choices V−i , maximizes
(
Vi
V1+V2
R −Vi γGi
)
.
The Nash equilibrium level of conict per capita, VG =
V1+V2
G1+G2
, is given by VG = д1д2
(
R
γ
)
.
Thus, total violence per capita in the district depends on the value of the public prize R,
the costs of conict γ and a measure of diversity, д1д2, which is greatest when both groups
are of equal size. For two groups, this measure equals 0.5× a standard fractionalization
measure.
Eects of Redistricting. Models of conict over a public good implicitly assume that
the boundaries of the contest are xed. In practice, though, the boundaries of local gov-
ernment are a policy choice. If the primary source of conict is over the control and
distribution of local public resources, then changes in the borders of the electorate should
have ramications for conict. Here we trace out the implications of changing borders on
conict under the assumption that splitting creates new, separate contests in parent and
child districts.20
Under these assumptions, changes in conict within the original district boundaries
are directly linked to changes in diversity. Conict within each of the new districts will
now be a function of the diversity within each new area. Assume for now that winning
the prize continues to yield R per person within group and 0 otherwise and that the costs
of conict remain unchanged. Using P to denote the parent and C the child district, the
change in total violence per-capita at the original district level is:
∆V
G
=
(GP
G
дP,1дP,2 +
GC
G
дC,1дC,2 − д1д2
) R
γ
, (3.1)
where дi,j is the share of group j in new district i , and G = GP +GC . That is, the change
in violence per capita is explicitly a function of the dierence in the population-weighted
average of diversity within the new units relative to the diversity in the original district
20Consistent with this assumption, the conict data detailed in Section 3.4.2 suggest very little cross-
border violence before or after redistricting in our setting (< 0.1% of all events).
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pre-split. In the event that the groups separate into perfectly homogeneous child and
parent districts, all violence in the original district ceases.
This simple model does not attempt to distinguish between ethnic fractionalization
and polarization. As written, it suggests using changes in fractionalization, which will
always decline with splitting (in population-weighted terms). Yet, this is not the case for
polarization. An original district with four equally dierent groups could split into two
districts, each with two similarly sized groups contesting power. In this case changes in
polarization would be positive. Esteban and Ray (2011a) show that it is precisely this fea-
ture of diversity that is relevant to the conict over public goods, which can be tailored to
the winning group’s preferences but not fully excluded from losers. In practice, redistrict-
ing sometimes implies tradeos between changing fractionalizatioapn and polarization,
and we will let the data speak by considering both measures.
It is also interesting to consider changes within the new borders. This requires taking
a stance on how violence is initially distributed across parent and child. Letting α be the
share of total violence falling in the parent district, the change in conict within the parent
district is given by:
∆VP
GP
=
(
дP,1дP,2 − α G
GP
д1д2
)
R
γ
. (3.2)
If violence is initially distributed according to population (α = GPG ), the change in per-
capita violence within the eventual parent border is given by the dierence in the diversity
within that new unit and the overall diversity in the original district.21 The same holds
for child districts.
The model also implies that changes in the value of the public prize (R) or the costs of
21We can test this assumption in the data using the pre-split distribution of violence across parent and
child districts. In general, the population weighted share of incidents in the original district is a very good
predictor of the actual number of incidents. Children have slightly less incidents than would be expected
based on population shares, and consequently parents have slightly more, but these dierences are not very
large.
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violence (γ ) will change conict. Redistricting is accompanied by an inux of government
resources (R) as well as reductions in the distance to the new capital, which could aect
γ . If R/γ increases in the newer units, then this will exacerbate ∆ conict, particularly in
newly diverse areas. Adapting the model to incorporate these changes, we nd a similar
link between changes in diversity and changes in conict but one that puts greater than
population-weight on diversity in the newer units. We opt not to take this simple model
too far. Rather, we pursue a reduced form empirical approach that focuses on changes in
ethnic divisions as a baseline while incorporating changes in proxies for R and γ for ro-
bustness. We also examine dierences between parent and child districts, as child districts
experience relatively larger changes in R and γ (see Appendix C.1).
3.4 Data: Measuring Changing Ethnic Divisions and Conict
This section presents our granular data on ethnic diversity and conict (see Appendix C.7
for details).
3.4.1 Border-Induced Changes in Diversity
Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world and among its most diverse.
More than 1,000 self-identied ethnic groups speaking more than 400 languages span the
archipelago. Indonesians are predominantly Muslim (87 percent) with minority Christian,
Hindu, and Buddhist groups. From a policy perspective, diversity manifests at dierent
levels of governance but became especially salient at the district level with decentraliza-
tion. This section shows how redistricting fundamentally changes which group divisions
are politically relevant.
We measure diversity using microdata from the universal 2000 Population Census.
This data allow us to link the initial subdistricts in 2000 to their nal 2010 district bound-
aries, providing us with measures of diversity at the original, parent, and child district
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levels. These are all based on the initial population in 2000 and hence not subject to
concerns about endogenous sorting in response to redistricting. The 2000 Census was the
rst since 1930 to record ethnicity, allowing respondents to report a single aliation. This
led to remarkable cultural distinction, capturing over 1,000 self-identied ethnic groups
(Ananta, Arin, Hasbullah, Handayani, and Pramono, 2015).22 The sub-ethnic variation
within broader ethnic groups may be relevant for conict (Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and
Wacziarg, 2017). We also capture deeper interethnic cleavages using linguistic dierences
(Fearon, 2003).
We focus on two widely-used measures of ethnic diversity. Ethnic fractionalization
in district d measures the probability that two randomly chosen individuals belong to
dierent groups: F = ∑Nej=1 дj (1 − дj ), where Ne is the number of ethnic groups in the
district, and дj is the population share of group j. Given the large number of self-reported
ethnic identities, fractionalization is quite high and indeed above 0.5 in many districts
we study. Adopting the Esteban and Ray (1994) metric, ethnic polarization is given by
P =
∑Ne
j=1
∑Ne
k=1 д
2
j дkηjk , where ηjk is the distance between groups j and k . Polarization
aims to capture the deeper cleavages in society and diers from fractionalization in two
key respects. First, the squaring of the own-group term emphasizes that stronger within-
group identication coincides with greater out-group alienation, which together exacer-
bate intergroup tensions. As such, polarization is maximized when there are two distinct,
equally sized groups. Second, it formally incorporates distances between groups while the
standard measure of fractionalization (F ) does not. We use linguistic distances and adopt
parameter values as in Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Weber (2009); Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín,
and Wacziarg (2012) and Esteban et al. (2012) (see Appendix C.4.7 for details). Although
less pervasive, religious divisions may be important in some locations. In what follows, we
22In our average original district, there are 549 distinct ethnic groups with 21 having more than 0.1 percent
of the population. Consolidating subgroups based on language reduces these numbers to 271 groups, 18 with
more than 0.1 percent.
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focus on ethnic diversity but nevertheless incorporate religious diversity in our empirical
analysis for robustness.23
Changes in Diversity. Prior to redistricting, these measures of diversity at the original
district level demarcated the boundaries of politically-relevant ethnic divisions. After re-
districting, diversity within the new parent and child district boundaries becomes salient.
Motivated by our conceptual framework, we propose simple but generalizable measures
to capture these changes in ethnic divisions.
We compute the dierence between the population-weighted average diversity in
the new units and diversity in the original 2000 district. For example, if original dis-
trict O splits into parent P and child C, the change in ethnic fractionalization, ∆F =(
GP
G FP +
GC
G FC
)
− FO , where the rst term captures the implied F within the new bor-
ders. This can be seen as a multi-group generalization of equation (3.1). By denition, ∆F
(weakly) declines. However, the sign of ∆P is less clear, and sometimes, the new borders
increase polarization.
On average, ∆F = −0.059 (std. dev.= 0.083) while ∆P = −0.0002 (0.005). Figure 3·5
compares the original district diversity to the implied diversity after redistricting with the
distance to the 45 degree line capturing the∆. Importantly, there is variation in∆diversity
across districts with similar initial diversity. Later, we link this variation to constraints
imposed by redistricting regulations. Note also that Indonesia’s remarkable diversity im-
plies scope for dierentiating between the two measures (the correlation between ∆F and
∆P is 0.38).24 Moreover, these ∆P reect sizable shifts in ethnic divisions.
To make these numbers concrete, consider two examples of redistricting in our setting.
23We account for religious polarization, but lacking an obvious notion of distance, set ηjk = 1 ∀j,k .
Given that most religious diversity implies one sizable non-Muslim group, polarization is nearly identical
to fractionalization (rank correlation≈0.99). By comparison, ethnic polarization and fractionalization exhibit
lower correlation (<0.2) and are statistically independent.
24By comparison, the migration-induced measures of ∆F and ∆P in the less diverse South African context
are correlated at 0.94 (Amodio and Chiovelli, forthcoming).
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First, some areas, like the original district of Aceh Tenggara, were able to leverage the
geographic distribution of groups across subdistricts to split along ethnic lines, and create
homogeneous governing bodies. Aceh Tenggara split into one child with 93 percent ethnic
Gayo while the parent comprised 47 percent Alas, 17 percent Batak, and 15 percent Gayo.
This implied a signicant reduction in diversity relative to the original district, which had
39 percent Gayo, 33 percent Alas, and 12 percent Batak. These changes led to ∆F = −0.180
and ∆P = −0.003 and can be seen in Figure 3·4(a), which plots the boundaries of villages
(colored by ethnic majority), subdistricts, and districts, with the latter shown pre- and
post-redistricting.
Other districts split in ways that thrust hitherto less salient divisions into the limelight.
One interesting example comes from Kotawaringin Timur, once the largest district in
Central Kalimantan province and a legacy of Dutch administration in the 1930s, which
was comprised of six relatively large groups spanning 26 subdistricts. It was not feasible
to homogenize in the way that Aceh Tenggara did (see Figure 3·4(b)). Instead, the original
district split into two child districts and one parent. This reduced fractionalization ∆F =
−0.068 but increased polarization ∆P = 0.004 as the new districts comprised similar or
fewer groups in more equal proportions than the original district. Section 3.6.3 discusses at
length another interesting case from Bengkayang in West Kalimantan that further claries
why these border-induced changes in diversity matter politically.
Together, these examples point to the institutional constraints on feasible redistrict-
ing schemes. With multiple groups spanning the same subdistricts, creating completely
homogenous new districts would have been unworkable given the policy regulations on
economic viability, which required sucient scale. Nevertheless, a menu of possible parti-
tions was available in many districts, and in Section 3.5.4, we examine whether the eects
of redistricting on conict depend on where the actual ∆diversity falls within the set of
feasible ∆diversity.
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3.4.2 New Conict Data
We estimate the eects of changes in ethnic divisions using new monthly data on conict
from the National Violence Monitoring System, referred to hereafter by its Indonesian
acronym, SNPK (Sistem Nasional Pemantauan Kekerasan). Coverage begins in 1998 for
nine conict-prone provinces and increases to 15 provinces plus greater Jakarta beginning
in 2005.25 Crucially, conict locations are recorded at administrative levels that allow us
to link event locations to parent and child districts prior to redistricting.
Like other geospatial conict databases such as the Armed Conict Location & Event
Data (ACLED), media reports of violence are the key input to the SNPK. Over a four-year
period, project architects collected over 2 million images from the print archives of around
120 local newspapers, including multiple outlets for each province and excluding those
with clear biases or no fact-checking (see Barron, Jarey, and Varshney, 2009; Barron et al.,
2014). Despite this rigor, as with all event-based conict data, one may still worry about
bias from selective reporting. We systematically address these concerns in two ways. First,
we exibly control for the number of papers available to coders for each province–month.
Second, we use auxiliary Google Trends data to rule out confounding media attention due
to redistricting.
Coders used a standard template to assign incidents to 10 mutually exclusive cate-
gories based on the underlying trigger. They rst code incidents as domestic violence, vi-
olent crime, violence during law enforcement, or conict. Within conict, coders further
categorize based on what is being violently contested: elections and appointments, gov-
ernance, resource, identity, popular justice, separatist, and other (could not be classied).
As a baseline, we exclude domestic violence and crime given our focus on group-based
25We show in Appendix C.4.8 that our results are not likely to be driven by this sample selection. While
the data is not representative of Indonesia, it spans all major island groups and covers a majority of the
Indonesian population. We omit districts in Papua due to problems with the underlying administrative and
census data. Data coverage is less reliable in the earliest years, and hence we exclude 1998 and 1999.
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conict. In Appendix C.4.6, we demonstrate robustness to misclassication. From 2000 to
2014, these social conict events occurred in around 63 (36) percent of the district–months
based on the original district (parent/child) borders. Further background can be found in
Appendix C.2.1, which also highlights important advantages of the SNPK relative to other
violence data.
Before proceeding to results, we oer a few illustrative examples of the types of con-
ict reported in the SNPK. The following translated incident descriptions in Maluku Utara
district help x ideas: “(July 13, 2010): In Galela Selatan, supporters of Djasa (a mayoral
candidate) destroyed the oce of Galela subdistrict, 2 ocial cars, and billboards of other
candidates.” “(August 18, 2011): Oce of Morotai District Legislature was bombed; it is
suspected as terrorism to prevent the inauguration of the elected mayor.” SNPK records
point to various forms of political violence—protests over voter eligibility, clashes between
supporters, direct targeting of candidates and government oces overseeing elections—
often related to local, mayoral elections (see Harish and Toha, 2017, for a rich accounting).
Such violence often involves building damage and injuries rather than deaths. Neverthe-
less, such incidents can and do escalate.26 Moreover, violence is not limited to election
periods. Many events capture groups violently expressing grievances over policy and
resource allocation issues.27
26 Consider these incidents from the districts of Kota Subulussalam and Maluku Tenggara Barat:
“(November 2, 2013): Demonstrations involving hundreds of supporters of candidates for mayor and vice
mayor. The masses demanded an explanation from the Independent Election Commissioner. [7 injured].”
and “(May 30, 2002): The chaos of the mayoral election of West Southeast Maluku district is bad. Support-
ers of Heri Kadubun who were riding in boats were attacked by supporters of the Taher Hanubun group [3
killed, 8 injured].”
27For example, “(April 14, 2008): Hundreds of villagers in Seram Bagian Barat district, demonstrated at
the mayor’s oce and local parliament. The action continued by blocking Trans-Seram Street until the next
day. This action is the result of their demands for development." See Appendix C.2 for other examples.
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3.5 Results: The Eects of Political Boundaries on Diversity and
Conict
This section presents our core empirical results linking changes in ethnopolitical bound-
aries to changes in conict. We rst provide simple dierence-in-dierence (DiD) esti-
mates showing that boundary-induced changes in diversity are associated with conict.
We then estimate a rigorous, generalized DiD that, rst, recovers the causal eects of
redistricting and, second, identies changes in ethnopolitical divisions on violence. We
show that despite policymakers’ goals, redistricting causes no change in the average in-
cidence of conict. We argue that this somewhat surprising nding can be explained by
heterogeneous changes in ethnic divisions. In areas able to create homogenous new dis-
tricts, conict falls. However, conict increases in areas where redistricting led to greater
polarization among the newly dened electorate.
3.5.1 Simple Dierence-in-Dierence: Changes in Ethnic Divisions and Con-
ict
We begin with motivating evidence that changes in ethnic divisions are associated with
changes in conict incidence. Our main DiD analysis restricts to 52 original districts (d) in
2000 that split into 133 districts by 2014. Among these, 29 original districts are observed
from 2000–14 in the SNPK while 23 enter the data in 2005. Nearly all redistricting occurs
in the two years before and after the moratorium on splitting from 2004–6.28
We regress the change in the average monthly likelihood of social conict before after
and redistricting on the change in ethnic divisions implied by the new borders. Figure
3·6 presents results in graphical form, normalizing ∆diversity and including regression
28Only one area in our study splits again after 2008 (in January 2013), and for simplicity we drop obser-
vations in 2013 and 2014 for this district. Results are unchanged under other treatments. Four other areas
split for the rst time in late 2012–13. However, we exclude these from the analysis in order to focus on
areas that were credibly aected by the moratoria. Section 3.5.5 explores the generalizability of our sample
of 52 districts using a reweighting approach.
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lines with robust 95 percent condence intervals. In graph (a), a one standard deviation
increase in ∆polarization (P ) is associated with a signicant 6.8 percentage point (p.p.)
increase in group conict after redistricting. As a benchmark, consider two districts with
roughly one standard deviation dierence in ∆P . In Kupang, ∆P = −0.001, and conict
fell by 22.2 p.p., whereas in Kotawaringin Barat, ∆P = 0.002, and conict increased by 12.4
p.p.29 Interestingly, the DiD estimate is similar to the cross-sectional correlation between
initial polarization and the long-run incidence of conict for all districts between 2000
and 2014 (see Appendix C.3). Meanwhile, graph (b) shows that conict is less responsive
to border-induced changes in fractionalization, despite the positive long-run correlation
between initial fractionalization and conict.
The data in Figure 3·6 suggests a strong relationship between the political boundaries
of ethnic polarization and conict.30 Nevertheless, there are many reasons why these
simple DiD estimates might not reect causal relationships. The rest of the paper aims
to rule out these concerns, to understand the dynamics of conict after redistricting, and
to oer a deeper interpretation of the underlying changes in group divisions and social
tensions.
3.5.2 Average Eects of Redistricting
We use a standard generalized DiD specication to identify the eects of redistricting on
conict:
conf lictdt = ν + βpost-splitdt + θt + θd + θd × t + εdt , (3.3)
29Recall that these small changes in polarization often imply large changes in ethnic divisions. In Kupang,
for example, ∆P = −0.001 captures the split of an original district with three fairly large groups (38 percent
Atoni Metto, 32 percent Rote, and 18 percent Sabu) into three homogenous new districts for each (parent
with 63 percent Atoni Metto, one child with 93 percent Rote, and another child with 98 percent Sabu).
30As detailed in Appendix C.4.1, these descriptive results exclude one extreme outlier with∆P six standard
deviations below the mean, are robust to controlling for all three ∆diversity regressors simultaneously,
estimating robust Huber (1973) regressions rather than OLS, and conducting small-sample inference.
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where post-splitdt is an indicator equal to one for all months after the original district’s
rst redistricting was passed into law.31 The month xed eects, θt , sweep out shocks
to conict incidence that are common across all districts (e.g., parliamentary elections or
religious holidays). The district xed eects, θd , take out time-invariant level dierences
in conict incidence across districts. Meanwhile, the district-specic time trends, θd × t ,
are important given dierential regional trends in violence and are consistent with panel
specications in the conict literature (e.g., Dube, García-Ponce, and Thom, 2016; Dube
and Vargas, 2013; Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti, 2004). We measure conf lictdt as a bi-
nary indicator for any reported incident of social conict and show robustness to intensive
margin specications in Appendix C.4.8. We estimate all specications using linear prob-
ability models (LPM). The coecient β identies the average post-redistricting deviation
from district-specic conict trends. We further estimate versions of equation (3.3) that
disaggregate the original districts d and identify separate β for parent and child districts,
allowing each to have its own xed eect and trend.
The monthly panel specication leverages the granularity of both the conict data
and the policy changes (split approvals vary at the month level). This allows us to cap-
ture episodic as well as recurring violence associated with discontent. This is especially
useful for exploring political cycles of violence in Section 3.6, which vary at a sub-annual
frequency. In addition, it may oer power benets relative to a coarser annual frequency
given the considerable within-year variation and relatively weak autocorrelation of con-
ict (see McKenzie, 2012). We cluster standard errors at the original district level as a
baseline, and in Appendix C.4.1, we demonstrate robustness to a battery of alternative
31Districts that split into three or more all at once pose no particular diculty. Out of 52 original districts,
11 split at multiple points in time. Consider, for example, Manggarai district, which rst created one child,
Manggarai Barat in 2003, and then later the parent district was further subdivided to create Manggarai
Timur in 2007. In our baseline, we code these using the rst date of the split. Results are robust to dropping
these multi-split areas or to assigning the date of the split to the month in which the most splits took place
for the given original district. However, in all cases, ∆diversity is computed over the full period, taking the
original district and nal parent and child districts.
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approaches to inference (and treatment of outliers).
Identifying Assumptions. Two key assumptions underlie the generalized DiD strat-
egy: (i) the timing of redistricting is orthogonal to conict and its determinants, and (ii)
districts would have exhibited parallel departures from their conict trends in the post-
split period absent splitting. We provide supportive evidence here and present further
robustness checks in Section 3.5.5.
First, we show that the timing of redistricting is plausibly exogenous. Cross-sectional
regressions in Table 3.1 relate a normalized x variable to the timing of the initial split in
original district d—measured either as the number of months since January 2000 or an
indicator for whether splitting occurred after the moratorium. There are no statistically
or economically signicant eects of initial diversity within the original district borders
in 2000, the eventual parent/child district borders in 2010, or the border-induced change,
∆diversity. Although diverse districts are more likely to split, they are no more likely
to do so earlier. Moreover, as seen in the bottom panel, we nd similarly insignicant
timing eects for a large set of 65 confounding variables considered in robustness checks
in Section 3.5.5. Our results are consistent with Burgess et al. (2012) who present comple-
mentary evidence on exogenous timing.
Second, we provide evidence of parallel pre-trends. One might worry about spikes or
dips in conict prior to redistricting, particularly if such trends were dierential with re-
spect to (changes in) diversity. Event study specications discussed below rule out these
concerns.32 Moreover, a standard hazard model specication further shows no systematic
32 That redistricting is a largely peaceful process here is likely a consequence of the limited and often
favorable scal and legislative consequences for the parent, combined with these obvious benets for child
districts. While there are cases of violence perpetrated for and against redistricting, such episodes are
limited and do not explain the timing of splitting. Indeed, the leading conict watchdog group in Indonesia
highlights a case of violent pressure for splitting in a district of West Sulawesi but notes that “In most cases,
this fragmentation [redistricting] has taken part without violence and indeed without much opposition”
(International Crisis Group, 2005).
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relationship between changes in prior conict and the timing of redistricting.33 Over-
all, this evidence is consistent with the favorable environment for redistricting and the
arbitrariness of approval timing due to the moratorium and other factors.
Null Average Eects. Estimation results for equation (3.3) can be found in Table 3.2,
which shows that redistricting does not change the local incidence of conict. Column 1
shows a null eect of splitting on the likelihood of conict incidents at the original district
level. The point estimate and standard error are very small relative to the pre-split mean
of around 57 percent of original district–months with any incidents. Nor are the null
eects explained by dierential pre-trends or countervailing ups and downs in conict
after redistricting. This can be seen in the event study specication in Appendix Figure
C·6(a). The average likelihood of conict is relatively at pre- and post-split.
While informative about overall changes in violence, these original district level re-
sults may obscure the dierent implications of redistricting for child and parent districts.
Nevertheless, estimating at this more granular level in column 2 leads to similarly null ef-
fects. Moreover, this is not due to dierential, osetting eects in parent or child districts
as seen in columns 3 and 4. We discuss potential dierences between parent and child
districts below.
3.5.3 Dierential Eects of Redistricting: New Ethnic Divisions Amplify Con-
ict
Next, we identify a much richer set of post-split conict dynamics by explicitly consider-
ing how redistricting reshapes ethnic divisions. At the original district level, we therefore
33In particular, we estimate a Cox (1972) proportional hazards model for time to split and cluster standard
errors by original district. Doing so yields a small and insignicant hazard ratio of 1.18 with a p-value of
0.8.
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augment equation (3.3):
conf lictdt = ν +βpost-splitdt +ϕ (post-splitdt × ∆ diversityd )+θt +θd +θd × t +εdt . (3.4)
The ϕ coecients identify whether areas that split into more homogeneous and less po-
larized units experience a dierential reduction in conict. As outlined in Section 3.3.2, if
original district diversity shapes conict pre-split while diversity within parent and child
districts shapes conict post-split, then post-split changes in conict incidence should be
a function of ∆diversityd (ϕ > 0).
Importantly, the xed eects, θd , absorb the time-invariant eects of initial diversity
on conict. Unlike the simpler DiD in Figure 3·6, equation (3.4) accounts for common
shocks across districts, as well as dierences in district-specic conict trends. Recall that
the timing of redistricting is uncorrelated with ∆diversity, which also does not exhibit
dierential pre-trends in conict (see Appendix Figure C·7). Moreover, we take several
steps in Section 3.5.5, including a Lasso-based “post-double-selection” procedure (Belloni,
Chernozhukov, and Hansen, 2014), to show that ∆diversity is not simply proxying for
other initial district characteristics that amplify conict after splitting.
Core Results. Table 3.3 reports estimates of equation (3.4) at dierent administrative
levels and normalizing the ∆diversity measures. Column 1 demonstrates the conict-
enhancing eects of creating more polarized districts. A one standard deviation increase
in ∆P implies a 3.6 percentage point (p.p.) increase in social conict that is signicant at
the 5 percent level. This is smaller than the simple dierence-in-dierence estimate (Fig-
ure 3·6) and implies a 6.3 percent increase in the likelihood of conict relative to the mean
before redistricting.34 Furthermore, while ∆ religious polarization also enters positively,
34Note that unlike the simple DiD, the regression in column 1 is based on all districts including the
extreme outlier in ∆P . Omitting that outlier here leads to a larger eect of 5.8 p.p. See Appendix C.4.1 for
further robustness checks on outliers.
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it is less precisely estimated, perhaps due to the more limited range of districts with sig-
nicant religious divisions.35 Meanwhile, ∆F has a weaker eect close to zero, albeit less
precisely estimated and hence not statistically dierent from ∆P (p-value=0.17).
We note upfront a few key points of robustness, leaving details to Section 3.5.5. First,
these results look similar when estimating equation (3.4) with each diversity measure on
its own. Second, the results are more striking after the principled removal of outliers,
which leads to a large increase in the eect size for ∆P in particular (see Appendix C.4.1).
Third, the qualitative takeaways are robust to alternative (randomization) inference pro-
cedures accounting for the small eective sample size (Young, 2016) and spatial correlation
in unobservables (Conley, 1999).
We consider several benchmarks to shed deeper light on these boundary-induced
changes in ethnic divisions. First, the estimated eects of ∆P and ∆F are smaller than
the large positive correlations between conict incidence and diversity across all districts
as discussed in Section 3.3. Hence, the causal component due to political boundaries is
slightly smaller for polarization and signicantly smaller if not null for fractionalization.
Second, the eect of ∆P on conict is around one-half of the cross-country correlation
between ethnic polarization levels (P )—dened similarly based on Ethnologue denitions
of ethnolinguistic groups—and low-intensity civil conict in the Esteban et al. (2012) spec-
ications.36 Third, the eect of border-induced ∆P in Indonesia is roughly one-quarter as
large as the eects of migration-induced ∆P within the black population of South Africa
35We continue to control for ∆ religious polarization in all subsequent tables but suppress it for presen-
tational purposes.
36This is based on re-estimating column 1 of Table 4 in their paper and comparing normalized eect
sizes. We omit the Greenberg-Gini index of diversity to maintain a stricter comparison to our results, but
the eect sizes are similar when including it. Their estimates are based on pooled OLS panel regressions
at the ve-year frequency, and the dependent variable equals one if the country experiences more than 25
conict-related deaths with a mean of 0.28. By comparison, this same threshold and ve-year frequency in
our data implies a mean of 0.29. Interestingly, they too nd weaker eects of ethnic fractionalization on
conict (when using the full breadth of groups in Ethnologue), an issue we revisit in Appendix C.4.7.
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(Amodio and Chiovelli, forthcoming).37 This large dierence is plausibly due to the fact
that changes in local diversity due to migration capture additional conict-relevant group
divisions besides solely ethnic ones, e.g., between native “sons of the soil” and immi-
grants (Fearon and Laitin, 2011; Weiner, 1978). Together, these comparisons suggest that
the causal component of the diversity–conict relationship due to borders is important.
The strong eects of ∆P in column 1 of Table 3.3 highlight a potentially important
unintended consequence of using redistricting to create homogenous political entities. In
diverse settings with many groups, while it is possible to reduce the number of groups and
hence F , it may not be feasible to simultaneously ensure that the new boundaries do not
engender new polarizing divisions. The two districts of Maluku Utara (MU) and Bolaang
Mengondow (BW) illustrate the importance of ∆P . While both signicantly homogenized
based on F (∆FMU = −0.125 and ∆FBW = −0.097), the new borders generated new ethnic
divisions and a larger increase in polarization in MU (∆PMU = 0.005 and ∆PBW = 0.002).
We observe a 36 p.p. increase in conict in MU compared to a 7 p.p. decline in BW after
redistricting.
Parent and Child District Results. To shed further light on the tradeos associ-
ated with redistricting, we estimate equation (3.4) at the smaller, child and parent district
boundaries. As noted in Section 3.3.2, changes in violence within these smaller units
should also be a function of ∆diversity, specied here as the dierence in diversity be-
tween the given child or parent district and the original district. As with specication
(3.4), the goal is to identify how changes in the salience of local diversity aect conict.
There are several advantages to running our specication at this lower geographic
level. First, it leverages greater variation in ∆diversity. Second, it allows us to analyze
violence around post-split elections, which occur at dierent times in the parent and child
37This is based on rescaling their estimate in column 5 of Table 3 by the standard deviation of ∆P , 0.09,
in Table A.2.
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(see Section 3.6). Finally, it provides a natural way to investigate whether the eects of
changing ethnic divisions vary with the scale of changes in local government. As doc-
umented in Appendix C.1, children experience larger increases in scal transfers and a
reduction in distance to the capital. In the framework of Section 3.3.2, this arguably im-
plies a larger, post-split increase in Rγ in children than parents. Consequently, we would
expect the eects of ∆diversity to be amplied in child districts, a result we corroborate
in the following section.
Columns 2–4 of Table 3.3 estimate these relationships within the given child and par-
ent boundaries. Together, these more granular results reveal similar eects as those at the
aggregate original district level, but also point to potential changes in the geography of
violence. Pooling parent and child districts in column 2 yields estimated eects that are
statistically indistinguishable from those in column 1. Turning to columns 3 and 4, we see
that∆P has similar eects when splitting the sample into parent and child districts, respec-
tively. The eect size is slightly larger for child districts, which also have relatively lower
mean conict before redistricting. Although this dierence is imprecise (p-value=0.23), it
is nevertheless consistent with the larger changes in Rγ for child districts. Looking at ∆F ,
we see similarly weak eects as in the original district specication. However, the posi-
tive albeit noisy estimate in column 3 suggests that some of the conict-inducing changes
in ethnic divisions may dierentially load onto fractionalization in parent districts, a con-
jecture we further substantiate in Appendix C.4.7.
Discussion. While recent models clarify how conict responds to diversity in long-
run equilibrium, our results identify how political boundaries can shock that equilibrium
by changing the salience of dierent group cleavages in society. The point estimates in
Table 3.3 identify the magnitude of this shift over a 5–10 year period. That redistricting
can alter the eects of diversity so quickly is perhaps surprising. In Section 3.6, we link
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the resulting conict dynamics to the nature of politics and majoritarian elections in new
democracies. While these eects may yet die out over time, the new ethnic divisions may
also deepen, bringing us closer to the long-run correlation between diversity and conict
(within stable boundaries).
Our ndings oer two policy-relevant, methodological innovations. First, prior work
shows how the colonial partitioning of ethnic groups across international borders con-
tributes to modern conict (e.g., Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2016). Our strategy
moves beyond static dierences to show how changes in political boundaries reshape the
ethnic divisions underlying conict. While infeasible to study these dynamic changes
in national boundaries, within-country boundary changes are pervasive and informative
about general mechanisms linking diversity to conict. Second, by isolating the contri-
bution of political boundaries, we rule out a host of other confounding changes in local
ethnic diversity often associated with migration ows, which are of independent interest
in the study of conict.
Our focus on boundary-induced changes in ethnic divisions further contributes to an
ongoing debate over which type of diversity matters for conict. To the extent that re-
districting changes the incidence of local public goods, one expects greater heterogeneity
in preferences among the governed population to lead to greater conict. Moreover, if
private resources are changing more slowly than public ones, one would expect changes
in fractionalization to be less important than changes in polarization (Esteban and Ray,
2011a).38
38This may also explain some of the dierential eects of diversity in parent and child districts as noted
above. The relative importance of ∆F (albeit noisy) for parent districts could be consistent with a many-
group generalization of the conceptual framework that also allows R to reect the ratio of public to private
goods as in the original Esteban and Ray (2011a) model. While both goods may be growing over time with
redistricting in parent and child districts, public goods grow more slowly in the former, leaving greater scope
for per capita payos (to private goods) to shape conict incentives. This would imply that changes in ethnic
divisions reected in ∆F amplify conict relatively more than those in ∆P . In Appendix C.4.7, we further
probe the dierences between polarization and fractionalization and show that border-induced changes
in the deeper ethnolinguistic divisions in society are driving the changes in violence around redistricting.
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3.5.4 Identication Checks: Isolating Policy-Induced Changes in Ethnic Divi-
sions
This section addresses three key threats to our interpretation thus far: (i) that ∆diversity
is a proxy for other features of Indonesian districts correlated with future conict, (ii) that
changes in contestable public resources confound the eects of ∆diversity, and (iii) that
the variation in ∆diversity captures endogenous boundary choices.
Accounting for Confounders. We begin by ruling out omitted factors correlated with
∆diversity and conict. Specically, we follow a standard approach in heterogeneous DiD
specications and augment equation (3.4) with interactions of post-split and an array of
confounding variables plausibly correlated with diversity and conict. Our approach is
twofold. First, we separately consider groups of initial predetermined variables chosen
based on intuition and prior work (see, e.g., Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Esteban et al., 2012).
These include, among others: security presence; public goods access; remoteness, trans-
portation infrastructure and access to markets; population size and age distributions; nat-
ural resource intensity; educational and occupational distributions; and topography, soil
quality, and water access. Many are indeed highly correlated with diversity.39 As shown
in Appendix Tables C.8–C.11, some of these factors also mediate the eects of redistrict-
ing on conict. However, the key coecients of interest on ∆P and ∆F remain mostly
unchanged across these dierent specications. There are of course hundreds of poten-
tial confounding variables that one could combine in various ways in this type of exercise,
and with limited degrees of freedom, this leaves the door open to cherry-picking (Gelman
and Loken, 2014).
We also show there that the key results on ∆F and ∆P hold up to inclusion of ∆G/N where G/N is the
Greenberg-Gini index scaled by population as in the structural equation of Esteban and Ray (2011a) tested
by Esteban et al. (2012).
39In a cross-section of 310 Indonesian districts, the full set of 65 covariates used in the Lasso procedure
below explain 80 (51) percent of the variance in fractionalization (polarization).
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Therefore, we adopt a second strategy that leverages machine learning to take a more
disciplined approach to ruling out omitted variable bias. In particular, we utilize the Bel-
loni et al. (2014) double-selection post-Lasso method to select a parsimonious set of in-
uential controls from the large number of variables potentially confounding the rela-
tionship between ∆diversity and conict. In practice, we expand upon the broad set of
sensible covariates noted above and use this approach to select additional interactions
with post-split while penalizing the tendency towards overtting through a penalty pa-
rameter λ.40 Acknowledging the limits of our natural policy experiment, we choose λ to
ensure that the number of variables selected remain suciently smaller than the eective
degrees of freedom. We set λ = 3, 000 as a baseline and consider alternative values in
Appendix C.4.2.
Panel A of Table 3.4 presents results based on this principled approach to variable se-
lection. Although noisier than the baseline ndings in Table 3.3, the main qualitative and
quantitative ndings remain unchanged. The point estimates on ∆P with this rich set of
Lasso-selected controls are statistically indistinguishable from the baseline without con-
trols except in column 3 where the estimates here are larger. Note that the xed λ selects
a dierent number of highly relevant controls across columns, which is due to variation
in both the sample size as well as the relevant confounders of ∆diversity. Overall, the
conclusions remain unchanged for other reasonable values of λ.
Changes in the Local Public Resources. While the confounding eects of other
initial district characteristics is limited, it is also important to account for other factors
associated with conict that change with redistricting. We consider here two signicant
40Appendix C.7 details the full set of 65 potential confounding variables, and Appendix C.4.2 details our
application of this method, which is particularly eective at dealing with the problem of overtting in a
setting where one aims to learn about a particular causal eect of interest rather than simply develop a
good prediction of the outcome. We discipline variable selection around ∆P and ∆F but nd similar results
when also disciplining on ∆Reliд. Interestingly, when disciplining on ∆P alone, ∆F is selected among the
small number of included confounders.
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changes noted in Section 3.2.2, namely local government transfer revenue and proximity
to government institutions in the newly created child district capital. Drawing upon the
measures developed in Appendix C.1, Appendix Table C.12 adds changes in transfers and
distance to our baseline specication in Table 3.3.
We draw a few important takeaways from this exercise. First, these additional con-
trols leave the eects of ∆diversity unchanged with polarization continuing to amplify
conict. Second, both ∆trans f ers and ∆distance enter as expected based on the concep-
tual framework in Section 3.3.2. Greater transfers (higher R) and greater proximity to the
district capital (lower γ ) are associated with more conict after redistricting, particularly
in child districts where these changes are much more pronounced. Together, these results
suggest that border-induced changes in ethnic divisions matter per se. When redistricting
also changes contestable public resources, ethnic divisions may be even more important, a
conjecture borne out in additional results in Appendix Table C.13 interacting ∆diversity
with ∆trans f ers and ∆distance . Overall, these ndings are suggestive, but we do not
push the interpretation too far given concerns about endogeneity and limited degrees of
freedom.41
Feasible Redistricting. Although initial diversity in 2000 is predetermined, the partic-
ular way in which the borders are drawn, and hence ∆diversity, may be endogenous. One
concern is that districts that chose particularly unfavorable borders with high ∆P were
the ones where future conict would have risen anyway, say because of bad governance.
We show here that the eects of ∆diversity on conict are not explained by the particu-
lar way that districts chose to draw new borders but rather by institutional constraints on
redistricting and ethnic geography that did not allow for more homogenous new districts.
41Further exogeneity may be possible using rules on transfers (Cassidy, 2017) and geographic determi-
nants of capital locations (Campante, Do, and Guimaraes, 2017). However, our main goal here is to rule out
confounders of ∆diversity, and the OLS results should help assuage rst-order concerns.
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To do so, we consider all the possible ways an original district could split along sub-
district lines into k new districts, given that regulations require each new district has at
least three contiguous subdistricts. This provides us with a distribution of feasible parti-
tions, and associated ∆diversity, for each district. Appendix C.5 provides full details on
this NP-hard combinatorial problem.
We use this set of feasible partitions to clarify that our identifying variation in
∆diversity comes from cross-district variation in the set of feasible partitions, as opposed
to similar districts choosing very dierent ways of redrawing their borders. First, we re-
estimate our baseline specications from Table 3.3, replacing the realized changes in di-
versity with the mean, feasible ∆P and ∆F for each district. Panel B of Table 3.4 shows that
this produces very similar results to our baseline, providing initial evidence that strategic
redistricting is unlikely to explain our core eects.
To further clarify this point, we look not at the average but rather at random combina-
tions of extreme feasible∆diversity. Specically, we re-estimate our baseline specication
randomly assigning ∆P (and associated ∆F ) for each district to be either the maximum
or minimum from the feasible set.42 We repeat this randomized procedure 50,000 times
at the original district level and plot the resulting estimates in Appendix Figure C·11. Re-
assuringly, all the estimated eects of min or max feasible ∆P are greater than zero and
smoothly distributed around the baseline estimated eect size. This is consistent with the
fact that within-district variation in feasible splits is small relative to the between-district
variation.43
Together, these results suggest that unobserved heterogeneity in boundary choice
does not explain the eects of ∆diversity on conict. This further highlights the im-
42That is, on any given draw, one district would receive its minimum ∆P while another district would
receive its maximum ∆P , thereby shuing randomly across all districts.
43Appendix Figure C·10 further illustrates this point by showing examples of how there is relatively little
overlap in the distributions of feasible ∆P across original districts. Indeed, original district xed eects
account for over 88 percent of the variation in feasible ∆P .
152
portance of the preceding exercise ruling out confounding interactions with post-split .
More substantively, these results demonstrate the importance of designing redistricting
schemes that account for constraints on strategic border formation.
3.5.5 Additional Robustness Checks
This section describes a battery of robustness checks fully detailed in the Appendix. Over-
all, this series of tests further bolsters our causal interpretation of the main ndings.
We rst address concerns about the eective sample size in Appendix C.4.1. Most im-
portantly, we take the disciplined approach of Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (2005) to rule out
the inuence of outliers in the baseline panel regressions in Table 3.3. Doing so system-
atically increases the overall eects of ∆P . Moreover, new conservative renements to
inference due to Young (2016) suggest that outliers are not driving our qualitative take-
aways.
Second, in Appendix C.4.4, we address the concern that SNPK coverage might be
changing systematically with redistricting. The main concern is that newspapers dif-
ferentially report on events in locations with greater changes in ethnic divisions, leading
to overestimates of the actual eects. The comprehensive coverage of SNPK from many
dierent outlets provides some reassurance. We provide further supportive evidence us-
ing auxiliary Google Trends data capturing the relative monthly frequency of search for
the original, parent and child district names. While imperfect, this proxy reects the fre-
quency of general interest in the given location, some of which may be orthogonal to
media reporting incentives. To the extent that Google trends are less prone to dieren-
tial underreporting than the SNPK data, controlling for such trends should dampen the
overall eects we estimate. Nevertheless, doing so leaves our key results unchanged.
Third, we rule out several additional concerns about the baseline generalized DiD
specication in Appendix C.4.8. First, we separately exclude the regions of Aceh and
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Maluku, which experienced intense conict in the late 1990s and early 2000s at the on-
set of decentralization. Second, we omit the years 2011 to 2014 to ensure results are not
driven by periods well beyond the unexpected moratorium. Third, we omit districts that
enter the data in 2005, which is important given that these later entrants were selected on
account of policy concerns about recent violence. Fourth, we consider the number of con-
ict events rather than a binary indicator, leaving the key takeaways mostly unchanged,
though introducing more noise. Fifth, we consider alternative parametrizations of the
time and location xed eects and trends as well as an alternative identication strategy
that includes as additional control areas those nearby districts that have not undergone
redistricting. Sixth, we consider alternative measures of ∆diversity that scale the changes
by initial levels. Finally, Appendix C.4.6 shows that results are robust across alternative
groupings of violence categories and hence are not an artifact of our denition of social
conict.
Beyond these robustness checks, we also oer evidence in Appendix C.4.8 on the ex-
ternal validity of our ndings across Indonesia. Recall that our baseline sample of 52
original districts is based on two restrictions: (i) inclusion in the SNPK conict data and
(ii) redistricting between 2000 and 2010. While the internal validity of our estimates is
high, these restrictions might raise questions about generalizability. Nevertheless, key re-
sults in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 remain unchanged when reweighting by the inverse probability
of selection on (i) and (ii), estimated using a Lasso-based propensity score model with the
full array of covariates discussed in Section 3.5.4. This standard reweighting approach
of Horvitz and Thompson (1952) suggests that our results are not driven by (observable)
peculiarities of these 52 districts.
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3.6 Ethnic Reconguration and Political Cycles of Violence
Our core results show that changes in ethnic divisions—arising purely from a reshuing
of political boundaries—can aect conict within a matter of years. This suggests that
the boundaries of political contests fundamentally shape the way that diverse groups in-
teract and compete with one another. This section bolsters this interpretation by linking
changes in violence to district politics and local elections. As noted in Section 3.2.1, dis-
trict governments play a large role in the local polity with mayors in control of vast public
resources. Given the salience of ethnicity during mayoral elections, we investigate how
border-induced changes in ethnic divisions aect violence around these political contests.
We show that violence surges around new, closely contested, mayoral elections, and that
these political conict cycles are amplied in high ∆diversity areas. Further, we provide
evidence of ethnic favoritism in the allocation of public resources as a potential mecha-
nism for generating grievances and amplifying incentives for ethnic mobilization around
these majoritarian contests. We conclude by discussing a case of redistricting that nicely
captures our broad empirical ndings and claries the way that political boundaries can
reshape ethnic divisions.
3.6.1 Electoral Violence
The empirical evidence thus far suggests redistricting may create strong incentives for
group mobilization and violence. In settings with weak institutions, such violence may
help shape the degree of control that one’s group exerts over new institutions responsible
for public goods or help inuence resource allocation after another group assumes con-
trol. Here, we provide empirical evidence of these mechanisms in the context of mayoral
elections.
In Table 3.5, we augment the parent/child specications in Table 3.3 with indicators for
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direct mayoral election periods. These quinquennial elections, which began in 2005, vary
in their timing (i) in parent districts, due to predetermined path dependence from Suharto-
era election schedules (see Martinez-Bravo et al., 2017; Skouas, Narayan, Dasgupta, and
Kaiser, 2014), and (ii) in child districts, due to the timing of redistricting (with elections
typically occurring 1.5–2.5 years after the split).44 Following Harish and Toha (2017) and
others cited therein, we dene the election period as a six month window centered on
the month of the election, but results are similar for other bandwidths. The coecient on
post-split×rst (second) election identies whether the incidence of conict during the rst
(second) election deviates from the average incidence after redistricting. To see whether
electoral violence cycles are more likely in newly polarized areas, we further interact
post-redistricting election periods with ∆diversity.
Looking across columns of Table 3.5, the likelihood of social conict after redistricting
is generally higher around the initial mayoral elections, particularly where redistricting
sharply changed ethnic divisions. Column 1 shows this result pooling parent and child
districts. Columns 2 and 3 show results separately for parent and child districts, pointing
to important dierences between pre-existing and new seats of government.
Child districts with ∆P one standard deviation above the mean are nearly 70 percent
more likely to exhibit dierentially more violence around the rst election (comparing
0.027 to 0.041). This result lines up with the fact that polarization is associated with closer
elections (see Appendix Table C.27), and violence is signicantly more pronounced during
those close elections (see Appendix Table C.29). Moreover, the amplifying eect of ∆P on
political violence persists and may even be larger during the second election period 5–8
years after redistricting.
44All direct elections in child districts follow splitting. Some original district have rst direct elections
that precede splitting, and hence we include a term for rst direct elections in addition to the term post-
split×rst election. We observe a second quinquennial election for the three-quarters of new districts in
existence long enough to hold a second round by 2014.
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Meanwhile, in parent districts, initial elections are generally less violent. Border-
induced changes in ethnic polarization seem less important than changes in fractional-
ization, which exerts a large albeit noisy positive amplication eect.45 Second election
periods appear dierentially less violent in high ∆P areas, which is unexpected and helps
explain the null ∆P in that bottom section of column 1.
The dierential eects of changing ethnic divisions on electoral violence in parent
and child districts admit several possible interpretations. The relatively stronger eects
of changes in ethnic polarization in child districts might be explained by the greater stakes
of winning initial elections to control a completely new local government as opposed to
winning control of an existing one. Another explanation for these diverging results could
be dierential institutional capacity. Parent districts may not only run more eective and
safer initial elections than child districts but also learn more quickly how to manage the
changing ethnopolitical divisions.
Overall, the results in Table 3.5 suggest that ethnic mobilization around mayoral elec-
tions are an important feature of conict dynamics after redistricting.46 Additional results
in Appendix C.6.2 further corroborate these new and distinct political cycles of conict
around mayoral elections. First, we rule out confounding media attention using Google
trends data and show similar intensive margin eects using the number of conict events.
Furthermore, we show that the amplifying eects of ∆diversity on conict around may-
oral elections are a distinctive feature of the high contestability of political resources in
this setting. In particular, the eects of ∆diversity on conict do not systematically dif-
45This may be consistent with the stronger correlation of F than P with victory margins in parent districts
(see Appendix Table C.27), and, like child districts, more closely contested elections are associated with
greater violence (along the intensive margin, see Appendix Table C.29).
46This is consistent with Tanasaldy (2012, p. 263) who notes that in several areas of West Kalimantan
(in our study), “Due to ethnic polarization introduced in previous elections, masses from each ethnic group
tended to rally for candidates from their own ethnic group.” Indeed, we bear this out more generally using
individual-level data from a 2014 survey, which shows that ∆diversity, and, in particular, ∆polarization
is strongly correlated with the reported importance to voters of mayoral ethnicity and patronage (see Ap-
pendix C.6.1 for details.).
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fer during the province-specic rice harvest period, the (lunar) holy month of Ramadan,
or the quinquennial parliamentary (and presidential) elections. In each case, ∆diversity
exhibit small, insignicant heterogeneous eects that are statistically dierent from the
amplifying eects of ∆diversity around mayoral elections. The lack of a similar amplify-
ing eect around parliamentary elections is particularly interesting. It is also consistent
with the fact that proportional representation legislative elections impart very dierent
group-based incentives than the majoritarian mayoral elections (see Fjelde and Höglund,
2016, for similar evidence in sub-Saharan Africa).
Furthermore, the changes in violence due to changing ethnic divisions are not merely
a transitory phenomenon around elections. Across all three columns, the coecient on
post-split × ∆P is statistically indistinguishable from that in Table 3.3, meaning that the
post-split dierences in the incidence of social conict extend beyond election periods.
This is what one would expect if grievances among losing group continued to manifest in
violent acts protesting governance- and resource distribution-related issues in the future.
Further evidence can be found in the fact that second elections continue to be violent.
Next, we provide evidence for one potential reason for such grievances, namely ethnic
favoritism in the allocation of public resources.
3.6.2 Ethnic Favoritism
Given hotly contested mayoral elections and their interplay with ethnic divisions, one
would expect political favoritism towards co-ethnics. Recent studies document favoritism
in resource allocation towards newly elected leaders’ ethnic homelands in sub-Saharan
Africa (see, e.g., Burgess et al., 2015; Hodler and Raschky, 2014). While a full accounting
of this phenomenon in Indonesia is beyond the scope of this study, we present here evi-
dence consistent with ethnic favoritism as a potential factor contributing to the patterns
of discontent underlying the link between changes in ethnic divisions and conict.
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Following prior literature, we use nighttime light intensity as a proxy for local eco-
nomic development and targeted public resources.47 Importantly, electricity cannot be
provided solely by villages and often requires support from higher levels of government.
Mayors have been responsible for setting electricity policy within their districts since 2005
(Jayawardena, 2005).48 Moreover, as noted by Pal and Wahhaj (2016), mayors generally
have signicant discretionary power in their choice of how to allocate resources across
villages. Altogether, this suggests scope for rivalry across villages in access to this pub-
lic resource, and indeed, publicly-provided electricity is a factor underlying some of the
violent incidents reported in the SNPK data.49
We investigate ethnic favoritism by exploiting the fact that redistricting often changes
either the identity or strength of the dominant group in the district. In particular, we ex-
amine changes in resources owing to village v after redistricting as a function of that
village’s initial ethnic composition. Specically, we ask whether the new boundaries im-
ply that the village’s initial population (N ) share of ethnics from the new districts’ largest
group is (i) larger, (ii) smaller, or (iii) the same as the village’s initial share of ethnics from
the original districts largest ethnic group. Formally, we compare NeOvNv to
Neiv
Nv
where eO is
the largest ethnic group in original district O, and ei is the largest group in child or parent
district i .50
47Olivia and Gibson (2015) validate a strong correlation of light intensity with district-level output and
expenditure data. In the predominantly rural areas of our study, nighttime lights tend to disproportionately
capture public street lights. Moreover, not unlike other areas of the developing world, electricity provision
in Indonesia is almost exclusively concentrated in a single public utility company, which is often subject to
the same sort of political manipulation identied in South Asia (see Baskaran, Min, and Uppal, 2015; Min,
2015).
48 Aspinall and Asad (2015) provide nice examples of other ways in which mayors strategically target
resources to villages.
49For example, in Aceh Selatan district on 17 August 2007, “Hundreds of residents of Meukek subdistrict
damaged PLN (Public Electricity Company) oce and head of Subranting PLN’s house by throwing stones.
Citizens were induced to action by irritation due to irregular schedules of power outages. Other examples
are provided in Appendix C.2.1. More recent examples, not (yet) in SNPK, provide further insight into the
politicization of electricity provision with demonstrations against both PLN and the mayor (KabarNias,
2015) or being led by village heads against PLN (ProKal, 2016).
50Note that if the largest group does not change with splitting, the village will fall under category (iii).
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For example, appealing to Figure 3·4, those Gayo majority villages in the new parent
district will fall under (ii) since the Gayo are no longer the largest group. Meanwhile, the
Gayo majority villages in the new child district of Gayo Lues will fall under (iii) as the
largest group has not changed with redistricting. Nevertheless, note that, like most vil-
lages in category (iii), the size of their majority has increased, consistent with the general
reduction in fractionalization that comes with redistricting.
In Table 3.6, we show how nighttime light intensity evolves across these three dier-
ent types of villages after redistricting. In particular, we examine interactions of post-split
with indicators for the change in alignment status, conditional on year and village xed
eects. Villages that lose their alignment with the largest ethnic group (ii) exhibit dif-
ferentially lower light intensity after redistricting compared to those that either remain
(iii) or become newly (i) aligned with the largest group. The results are consistent at both
the parent and child level albeit slightly larger and more precisely estimated for the lat-
ter. Column 1 suggests that villages that become newly (remain) aligned with the largest
group have 1.1 p.p. (2.8 p.p.) more village area with light coverage post-redistricting rela-
tive to those that lose their alignment. These are large dierences relative to the mean of
16.3 percent of village area covered with any lights.
These results are consistent with ethnic favoritism, which may be one vehicle for gen-
erating the sort of grievances that lead to persistently higher violence in areas where new
boundaries create fresh ethnic divisions, even outside of election periods. We turn now
to a case study highlighting some of the particular mechanisms underlying our empirical
results.
Nearly 70 percent of these villages are in districts where the share of the largest group increased. There are
1,764 villages in 32 districts in category (i), 558 villages in 28 districts in category (ii), 12,182 villages in 119
districts in category (iii).
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3.6.3 Case Study
We discuss here an illustrative case study in West Kalimantan. This region has a signi-
cant history of ethnic strife including Dayak violence against the Chinese, and repeated
clashes between Dayak and Madurese as well as Malay and Madurese. As in the rest of
Indonesia, these large-scale open conicts largely subsided in the early 2000s, replaced
by more sporadic violence that remains a serious concern to policymakers (see Barron,
Engvall, and Morel, 2016). We briey present this interesting case below.
We focus on the original district of Sambas, which split into three separate districts:
Sambas, Bengkayang (in 1999), and Kota Singkawang (from Bengkayang in 2001). Before
splitting, Sambas was comprised of 52 percent Malay ethnics, 15 percent Dayak, and 15
percent Chinese, with other smaller groups including Javanese and Madurese. Redistrict-
ing signicantly altered these group shares.
After the fall of Suharto, demands for decentralization and local empowerment spread
across Indonesia, and West Kalimantan was no exception. As Tanasaldy (2012, p. 269)
notes “In West Kalimantan such [native empowerment] movements were initially led by
Dayaks who demanded more top jobs in the government and competed zealously against
the Malays, for those political positions. Held in check during the authoritarian New
Order [Suharto era], political polarization between the two ethnic groups was now un-
avoidable."
With these mounting tensions came a push for redistricting, motivated in part by a
desire to reduce ethnic divisions. Tanasaldy notes that “government ocials thought that
separating conict-prone areas and allowing the Dayaks to govern their own areas was
a solution to chronic ethnic conicts there." After the two splits, the now-parent district
of Sambas was about 80 percent Malay, with the next largest group being ethnic Chi-
nese at 11 percent. Bengkayang became 52 percent Dayak, 19 percent Malay, and 10
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percent Chinese, while Singkawang was 42 percent Chinese, 27 percent Javanese, 8 per-
cent Malay, and 7 percent Dayak. This split is often depicted as having cleanly separate
the three groups: “the Malays in Sambas, the Chinese in Singkawang, and the Dayaks
in Bengkayang” (Kobayashi, 2011, p. 374). However, as evident from the group shares,
Singkawang remains far more polarized than Benkayang.
In Sambas and Bengkayang, the split was successful in reducing violence as the chang-
ing ethnic divisions translated into more amicable politics. Kobayashi nicely summarizes,
noting that “district head elections became less tense because the Dayaks and Malays
understood each others’ rights to lead districts where they were dominant,” and more
generally that “interethnic strife to obtain political positions has declined since 2000.”
Government ocials often argue that redistricting “contributed to prevention of ethnic
violence,” drawing connections, for example, between increased Dayak representation in
the civil service and the end of violent street demonstrations.
Meanwhile, Singkawang presents an interesting contrast. Despite being a signicant
40 percent plurality, the Chinese had generally stayed out of politics, with the “sons of the
soil” Malay typically dominating. However, in 2007, the rst direct mayoral election after
redistricting brought their numeric advantage to the fore amidst a growing “desire within
the Chinese community to increase the number of Chinese in the government and to elect
a Chinese mayor” (Kobayashi, 2011, p. 295). In the 2007 election, much to the surprise of
the Malay candidates, Hasan Karman, an ethnic Chinese beat the three Malay candidates
(whose votes were split). Once in power, though, Karman “fumbled the delicate issue of
ethnicity”, as he “irked Malays by building a [Chinese] dragon statue. . . in the heart of
the city” and “disparaged the Malay community. . . by [publicly] linking them to pirates”
(Sukarsono, 2012).51 In the 2012 election, tensions mounted amid Chinese accusations of
51These violent incidents are reported in the SNPK data with event details such as “series of arson cases
by unknown perpetrators believed to be related to ethnical issues” in May 2010, and “there was a clash in
the parade of Singkawang Parliament, the village of Pasiran, the city of Singkawang. Clash involving two
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intimidation and vote-tampering after the Malay candidate won. Violent clashes erupted
between Malay security personnel and Chinese protestors outside the election commis-
sion oce.52
Overall, West Kalimantan highlights both the promise and pitfalls of redistricting as
a vehicle for reshaping ethnic divisions in society. Greater homogeneity in Sambas and
Bengkayang may have helped to resolve some of the longstanding interethnic grievances.
However, the new district of Singkawang gave rise to fresh grievances and cycles of vi-
olence by invigorating hitherto less salient ethnic divisions. These cases highlight the
tradeos of redistricting in diverse societies where creating purely homogenous political
units is not feasible everywhere.
3.7 Discussion
This paper identied the casual eect of political boundaries on ethnic divisions. We
showed how redrawing subnational boundaries can alter the salience of dierent ethnic
cleavages in society, and, in turn, aect conict. By bringing the government closer to the
governed, redistricting holds promise for increasing social stability. However, this com-
mon policy reform is not without pitfalls. Our natural experiment showed in particular
that fresh cycles of violence may erupt when new borders increase ethnic polarization. We
argued further that electoral democracy may amplify the underlying incentives for group
mobilization that often lead to violence. Overall, our ndings provide novel evidence on
the interlinkages between ethnic and political divisions. These results help inform ongo-
ing debates on the causes of violence as well as policy eorts aimed at curbing it.
Some of our ndings suggest that border-induced changes in ethnic divisions may
groups of the pro and contra period of the construction of a dragon statue that will be built at the crossroads
(2 injured)” in July 2010.
52This event is reported in the SNPK data on October 1st, 2012 as “a clash between the masses and the
police when the Mayoral Candidate campaign handed over evidence of more than 3,000 people being denied
the vote. [2 injured]”
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have persistent eects on conict. This persistence can be interpreted through the lens
of models like Rohner et al. (2013b), which feature vicious cycles of inter-group violence
and erosion of trust. Political violence in newly created districts may be particularly prone
to such dynamics as seen, for example, in the case of Singkawang. While over the long-
run redistricting may foster new interethnic interactions, learning and cooperation, it is
important to understand and prepare for the scope for violence during the transition.
Local government proliferation is a pervasive feature of decentralization today. Al-
though our ndings may not fully generalize to other settings, the widespread preva-
lence of ethnic mobilization (Fearon, 2006) and favoritism (De Luca, Hodler, Raschky,
and Valsecchi, 2017) suggest that similar conict dynamics could play out in other di-
verse countries. For example, Green (2010) discusses some of the same unintended conse-
quences of redistricting in Uganda that we identify empirically in Indonesia. Nevertheless,
we acknowledge that ours is only a partial analysis of the vast political and economic im-
plications of redistricting.
We see four important directions for future research on redistricting in Indonesia
and elsewhere. First, a small but growing literature highlights the importance of within-
ethnolinguistic or -religious group heterogeneity in culture (Desmet et al., 2017), genes
(Arbatli, Ashraf, and Galor, 2015), or income (Esteban and Ray, 2008; Mitra and Ray, 2014)
in shaping conict. This is an interesting question in the context of decentralization and
one that can be explored using heterogeneity in responses to household survey questions
on preferences, variation in vote shares for dierent parties of the same religion, and
within-group educational or occupational inequality.
A second question is whether redistricting can be a vehicle for a central government
to constrain secessionist tendencies. Coming on the heels of East Timor’s independence
and concerns about breakaway regions in Aceh and Papua, Indonesian policymakers in
the late 1990s strategically chose districts rather than provinces as the primary adminis-
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trative units allowed to proliferate. According to observers like Booth (2011), their goal,
among others, was to fracture the strength of broader regional identities. It would be
interesting to explore whether this policy of “breaking up to stay together” sties seces-
sionist sentiments and ultimately shifts violence from higher to lower levels.
Third and relatedly, redistricting has the potential to activate more granular cultural
distinctions. Although many areas created ethnically homogenous districts, sub-ethnic
distinctions may have emerged over time as groups sought new vehicles for political mo-
bilization. Redistricting may have contributed to the dramatic growth in the number of
self-reported ethnic identities from 1,087 in the 2000 Census round to 1,331 in the 2010
round. As recounted in Fearon (2006), Horowitz (1985, p. 66) provides a telling exam-
ple of this burgeoning of local identity in the Indian context of state proliferation in the
1950s: In Madras state, “. . . with large Tamil and Telugu populations, cleavages within
the Telugu group were not very important. As soon as a separate Telugu-speaking state
was carved out of Madras, however, Telugu subgroups—caste, regional, and religious—
quickly formed the bases of political action.” In the Indonesian context, one could explore
empirically how political boundaries lead to new forms of identity related not only to
sub-ethnic distinctions but also to shared national identity (Bazzi, Gaduh, Rothenberg,
and Wong, 2017).
Finally, there are several open questions about the public goods and welfare conse-
quences of redistricting. Recent studies identify environmental externalities (Burgess
et al., 2012; Lipscomb and Mobarak, forthcoming). There are other interesting implications
of reduced government scale and changes in the network of administrative responsibili-
ties; not to mention increased proximity to service providers in the new district capitals. A
full account of the welfare implications of redistricting clearly extends beyond the eects
of changing ethnic divisions.
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3.8 Figures
Figure 3·1: Indonesia’s Remarkable Wave of Redistricting
Notes: This gure captures the evolution of new districts across Indonesia from 1980–2014
based on the month each district was passed into law.
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Figure 3·2: Redistricting across the Country
Notes: This map plots the original and new district borders based on district-level shape-
les for 2000 and 2010.
Figure 3·3: Example of Redistricting into Parent and Child Districts
Notes: This gure provides an example of the redistricting process and our nomenclature
for the dierent administrative divisions.
167
Figure 3·4: Examples of Border-Induced ∆ Diversity
(a) Homogenizing Case: Aceh Tenggara District
(b) Newly Salient Divisions: Kotawaringin Timur District
Notes: This gure provides two examples of the types of redistricting patterns that we see in our data in terms
of changes in policy-relevant ethnic diversity. Figure (a) shows the original district of Aceh Tenggara as in
Figure 3·3, and Figure (b) shows the original district of Kotawaringin Timur, which splits into two child districts,
Seruyan on the left and Katingan on the right with the parent district in the middle. In both gures, we color code
the villages based on the majority ethnic group in the village in the 2000 Population Census with red indicating
the largest group in the original district as a whole, aqua the second largest, and so on, with a few villages in
white with missing data or inability to match with shapeles.
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Figure 3·5: Diversity Before and After Redistricting
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Notes: These gures plot diversity at the original district level baseline boundaries in 2000
(x-axis) against the 2010 boundaries after redistricting (y-axis). The latter measure is the
population-weighted average of diversity in the new parent and child districts, but again
based on the population residing in those areas at baseline in 2000. The dashed 45 degree
line indicates the locus of points along which the new borders imply no change in diver-
sity, and the vertical distance between each point and the line captures our ∆diversity
measure. For presentational purposes, we omit the top 4 districts with baseline polariza-
tion >0.025, though they are of course included in all regression analysis. In both graphs,
we identify the two example districts seen in Figure 3·4.
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Figure 3·6: Simple Dierence-in-Dierence: ∆ Conict against ∆ Diver-
sity
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Notes: This gure presents a simple dierence-in-dierence regression relating∆diversity
to changes in social conict captured by the dierence in the mean monthly likelihood
of any violence before versus after redistricting. The results are restricted to those 38
original districts with conict data pre- and post-redistricting. Graph (a) shows results
for fractionalization and (b) for polarization. The thick dashed lines are robust 95 percent
condence intervals. The point estimate in (a) is 0.002 (0.050) and in (b) is 0.068 (0.029)**
with robust standard and the HC3 degrees-of-freedom adjustment. We omit one extreme
outlier (with ∆P six standard deviations below the mean) based on the outlier detection
methods discussed in Appendix C.4.1, which presents further small-sample robustness
and alternative approaches to inference.
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3.9 Tables
Table 3.1: Plausibly Exogenous Timing of Redistricting
Dependent Variable:
no. months until split 1(post-moratorium split)
mean: 53 mean: 0.31
Panel A: Diversity Standardized Coecient
original district ethnic fractionalization 2.183 0.011
(4.267) (0.071)
original district ∆ ethnic fractionalization 2.328 0.033
(3.417) (0.061)
child district ethnic fractionalization 2.641 0.009
(3.984) (0.069)
parent district ethnic fractionalization 4.416 0.051
(3.962) (0.066)
original district ethnic polarization -1.829 -0.006
(2.882) (0.048)
original district ∆ ethnic polarization 2.168 0.039
(1.880) (0.026)
child district ethnic polarization -1.545 -0.002
(3.122) (0.045)
parent district ethnic polarization 1.412 0.045
(4.002) (0.071)
original district religious polarization 1.530 -0.024
(3.343) (0.060)
original district ∆ religious polarization -1.461 0.022
(2.276) (0.033)
child district religious polarization -1.107 -0.063
(3.821) (0.060)
parent district religious polarization 2.653 0.013
(3.749) (0.063)
Panel B: 65 Potential Confounders (see Appendix C.4.2)
mean standardized coecient 0.096 -0.005
actual number of signicant eects at 5% level 4 3
expected number of signicant eects at 5% level by chance 3.3 3.3
Notes: Each cell is a dierent bivariate OLS regression of the timing of the rst split on
initial district characteristics, each of which is measured in 2000 before the onset of re-
districting. The dependent variable in column (1) counts the number of months between
January 2000 and the month in which each original district split, and in column (2) is
an indicator for whether the split happened after the moratorium from 2004–6. Coe-
cients are based on standardized variables. Panel A looks at ethnolinguistic and religious
diversity, including the ∆ measure capturing dierences between parent/child and orig-
inal district diversity levels. Panel B looks at the 65 controls capturing a broad array of
confounders associated with proximity to security forces, economic development, public
goods, demographics, natural resource intensity, political factors, economic structure, ge-
ography/topography, and remoteness. See Appendix C.4.2 for discussion and Appendix
C.7 for details on the variables. The mean eect size is the average standardized coe-
cient. The sample size is the 52 original districts in our main analysis, and all regressions
include an indicator if the district entered the SNPK data in 2005. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses. Signicance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 3.2: Average Eects of Redistricting on Social Conict
Administrative Unit Original Parent Parent Child
District and
Child
(1) (2) (3) (4)
post-split -0.008 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.026) (0.022) (0.028) (0.025)
Number of District-Months 7,956 20,220 7,956 12,264
Number of Districts 52 133 52 81
Dep. Var. Mean, Pre-Split 0.57 0.33 0.47 0.25
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is an indicator equal to one if there is any
social conict in that district–month. post-split is an indicator equal to one for all months
after which the original or parent district experiences its rst redistricting and a child
district is ocially passed into law. Columns 1–4 are estimated at the respective adminis-
trative unit level listed at the top of the column. There are 52 original districts in column
1, 133 parent/child districts in column 2, 52 parent districts in column 3, and 81 child dis-
tricts in column 4. All specications include month FE, district FE, district-specic time
trends, and dummies for the number of papers used by coders for the given province–
month. Standard errors are clustered by original district. Signicance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ :
5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
172
Table 3.3: Redistricting, Changing Ethnic Divisions, and Conict
Administrative Unit Original Parent Parent Child
District and
Child
(1) (2) (3) (4)
post-split -0.012 -0.003 0.001 -0.005
(0.025) (0.021) (0.026) (0.025)
post-split × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.036** 0.032 0.027** 0.043*
(0.018) (0.019) (0.013) (0.025)
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.003 0.000 0.035 -0.011
(0.019) (0.012) (0.026) (0.019)
post-split × ∆ religious diversity 0.014 -0.009 -0.031 -0.005
(0.013) (0.011) (0.021) (0.014)
Number of District-Months 7,956 20,220 7,956 12,264
Number of Districts 52 133 52 81
Dep. Var. Mean, Pre-Split 0.57 0.33 0.47 0.25
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is an indicator equal to one if there was any
social conict in that district–month. post-split is an indicator equal to one for all months
after which the original or parent district experiences its rst redistricting and the child
district is ocially passed into law. ∆diversity measures are normalized to mean zero,
standard deviation one. Columns 1–4 are estimated at the respective administrative unit
level listed at the top of the column. ∆ of the given diversity measure captures the dier-
ence in diversity between pre-redistricting (2000) and post-redistricting (2010) boundaries,
based on the initial population in 2000. For the original district, this is a weighted aver-
age of the parent and child districts. For the parent and child districts, this is a simple
dierence of their diversity and the original district’s diversity. All specications include
month FE, district FE, district-specic time trends, and dummies for the number of papers
used by coders for the given province–month. Standard errors are clustered by original
district. See the notes to Table 3.2. Signicance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 3.4: Further Isolating the Eects of Changes in Ethnic Divisions
Administrative Unit Original Parent Parent Child
District Child
Boundaries 2000 2010 2010 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Other Controls×Post-Split
Selected via Double Lasso (λ = 3, 000)
post-split -0.013 0.001 -0.011 -0.005
(0.026) (0.019) (0.024) (0.023)
post-split × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.025* 0.034** 0.060*** 0.048*
(0.014) (0.015) (0.020) (0.026)
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.024 -0.004 0.036 0.010
(0.019) (0.013) (0.033) (0.027)
number of post-split × Lasso-selected controls 7 18 15 10
Number of District-Months 7,956 20,220 7,956 12,264
Dep. Var. Mean, Pre-Split 0.57 0.33 0.47 0.25
Panel B: Mean Feasible ∆diversity
Based on Potential Redistricting Schemes
post-split -0.016 -0.009 -0.005 -0.011
(0.026) (0.020) (0.027) (0.027)
post-split × mean feasible ∆ ethnic polarization 0.053** 0.033*** 0.052*** 0.030**
(0.024) (0.012) (0.016) (0.014)
post-split × mean feasible ∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.019 -0.011 0.017 -0.019
(0.017) (0.012) (0.021) (0.015)
Number of District-Months 7,680 18,540 7,680 10,860
Dep. Var. Mean, Pre-Split 0.57 0.34 0.47 0.25
Notes: This table presents two robustness checks on the main results in Table 3.3. Panel A
introduces additional interactions of post-split and initial district characteristics. We rely
on the Belloni et al. (2014) double-selection post-Lasso approach to select a parsimonious
set of inuential confounders from the large set of potential covariates we marshal from
various data (see Appendix C.4.2 for details). Subject to a penalty parameter, λ, that helps
control overtting, each column includes a given set of additional post-split interactions
with the number varying with the specication. Alternative values of λ are explored in
Appendix C.4.2. The p-values for a test of coecient equality with the baseline results
for ∆Polarization in Table 3.3 are as follows across columns: 0.17, 0.79, 0.03, 0.43, and for
∆F ractionalization, 0.25, 0.79, 0.99, and 0.16. Instead of actual ∆diversity, Panel B uses
the mean of feasible ∆diversity based on the simulation of potential legal redistricting
schemes (see Section 3.5.5 and Appendix C.5, which also considers other moments be-
sides the mean). ∆diversity measures are normalized to mean zero, standard deviation
one. These regressions omit two original districts for which a large number of feasible
partitions (over which to compute reliable moments) was computationally intractable.
The dependent variable in all columns is an indicator equal to one if there was any social
conict in that district–month. All specications include month FE, district FE, district-
specic time trends, and dummies for the number of papers used by coders for the given
province–month. Standard errors are clustered by original district. Signicance levels: ∗
: 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 3.5: Changes in Ethnic Divisions, Mayoral Elections and Conict
Administrative Unit Parent Parent Child
Child
(1) (2) (3)
post-split -0.003 -0.003 -0.008
(0.022) (0.028) (0.025)
post-split × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.030 0.026 0.042*
(0.019) (0.016) (0.025)
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.001 0.033 -0.011
(0.012) (0.028) (0.019)
post-split × 1st election period 0.044 -0.009 0.041*
(0.044) (0.051) (0.021)
post-split × 1st election period × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.026** 0.012 0.027***
(0.010) (0.022) (0.010)
post-split × 1st election period × ∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.005 0.041 -0.012
(0.018) (0.034) (0.020)
post-split × 2nd election period 0.049** 0.044 0.053
(0.023) (0.028) (0.032)
post-split × 2nd election period × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.008 -0.042*** 0.057**
(0.011) (0.012) (0.023)
post-split × 2nd election period × ∆ ethnic fractionalization 0.007 0.021 -0.008
(0.019) (0.027) (0.019)
Number of District-Months 19,980 7,836 12,144
Number of Districts 133 52 81
Dep. Var. Mean, Pre-Split 0.33 0.47 0.25
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is an indicator equal to one if there was any
social conict in that parent or child district–month (see the notes to Table 3.2). post-split
is an indicator equal to one for all months after which the child district is passed into
law. ∆diversity measures are normalized to mean zero, standard deviation one. The rst
election period is an indicator capturing the 6 month window around the district-specic
date of the rst direct election for the district head after splitting into child and parent dis-
tricts. The parent district elections occur based on the predetermined schedule inherited
from the Suharto era while the child district elections typically occur around 1.5–2 years
after redistricting. Hence, parent and child district elections occur at dierent times. The
second election period is dened similarly and occurs ve years after the initial election.
These second election coecients are only identied for the three-quarters of districts
observed for long enough to hold that second round during our study period. We also
include controls for the pre-split election periods, which take place in 10 of the original
districts. Hence, the reference period in all columns is the pre-redistricting, non-election
period. See Appendix C.7 for details. All specications include month FE, district FE,
district-specic time trends, and dummies for the number of papers used by coders for
the given province–month. Standard errors are clustered by original district. Signicance
levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 3.6: Light Intensity and Changes in Village-Level Alignment with the Largest Ethnic Group in the New
Versus Original District
Parent Parent Child
Child
(1) (2) (3)
post-split -0.020 -0.006 -0.033**
(0.012) (0.022) (0.013)
post-split × ∆ share of village in largest ethnic group in district > 0 0.011* 0.012 0.021*
(0.006) (0.009) (0.011)
post-split × ∆ share of village in largest ethnic group in district = 0 0.028** 0.017 0.040**
(0.013) (0.017) (0.018)
Number of Village–Years 164,594 85,401 79,193
Dep. Var. Mean, Pre-Split 0.163 0.229 0.114
Notes: The dependent variable is share of village area covered with any nighttime lights. The village-level panel spans 2000–2013.
The regressions also control for village and year xed eects. The regressor in row 2 (3) equals one if the share of the given village
belonging to the largest ethnic group in the district increased (remained the same) as a result of redistricting. The ethnic shares are, as
throughout the paper, dened based on the population in 2000. Standard errors are clustered at the original district level. Signicance
levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Appendix A
Appendix: Earnings Responses, Adjustment
Costs, and the Role of Firm Labor Demand
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A.1 Supplementary Figures and Tables
Appendix Figures
Figure A·1: Full Earnings Distribution: Married Women 2002 and 2012
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Notes: This gure plots the same 2002 and 2012 earning distributions as Figures 1·2- 1·3, but shows the entire
distribution.
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Figure A·2: Mini Job Descriptives
(a) Number of Mini Jobs Over Time (b) Establishments With ≥ 1 Mini Jobber
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(c) Dist. of Mini and Total Employment (d) Establishment Mini Jobber Share
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
D
e
n
s
it
y
0 2 4 6 8 10
ln(# employees), cond. on at least one mini jobber
all employees mini jobber
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
fr
a
c
ti
o
n
 o
f 
to
ta
l 
w
o
rk
fo
rc
e
 m
a
d
e
 u
p
 o
f 
m
in
i 
jo
b
b
e
rs
0 1 2 3 4 5
ln(# of all employees), cond. on at least one mini jobber
Notes: This gure summarizes the development of mini jobs over time and the distribution of mini jobbers across
rms. Panel (A) shows the number of mini jobbers over time for exclusive mini jobbers as well as workers with
a mini job as a second job. It is constructed from the SIAB data by taking the number of distinct individuals
holding a mini job (erwstat = 109) in June 30th in each year in the SIAB data. Individuals having both a mini job
and any other non-mini employment on June 30th are classied as having a mini as a second job. Vertical dashed
lines indicate the two reforms. Panels (B)-(D) are based on the BHP for the year 2010, a 50% random sample
of establishments as of June 30th. Panel (B) is a binned scatterplot that shows the share of establishments that
employ at least one mini jobber and how this varies with the natural logarithm of (all) employment. Panel (C)
compares the distribution of log employment size for mini jobbers and all workers separately, at establishments
with at least one mini jobber. Panel (D) shows the fraction of the total workforce in the establishment that is
working in mini jobs. Like (B), it shows how this fraction varies with the natural logarithm of employment size
using a bin scatter. Like (C), it restricts to establishments with at least one mini jobber.
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Figure A·3: Earnings Distributions: All Women 2002-2008
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Notes: This gure replicates Figures 1·2–1·3 for all women, instead of just the identied married women with
husband annual earnings between 33000 and 53000. It still restricts to women working in West Germany, aged 26
to 55 (inclusive) aged between 26 and 55 and plots the distribution of average monthly earnings (all employment
sources). The mini job threshold was 325 euro prior to 1 April 2003, 400 euro prior to 1 January 2013, and 450
euro thereafter.
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Figure A·4: Earnings Distributions: All Women 2009-2015
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Notes: This gure replicates Figures 1·2–1·3 for all women, instead of just the identied married women with
husband annual earnings between 33000 and 53000. It still restricts to women working in West Germany, aged 26
to 55 (inclusive) aged between 26 and 55 and plots the distribution of average monthly earnings (all employment
sources). The mini job threshold was 325 euro prior to 1 April 2003, 400 euro prior to 1 January 2013, and 450
euro thereafter.
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Figure A·5: Adjustment Rates by Monthly Earnings
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(c) Has Mini, Has Midi, Has Reg. 2012 (d) Has Mini, Has Midi, Has Reg. 2013
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Notes: This gure takes the same sample as Figure 1·2–1·3 and again puts average monthly earnings (from all
employment sources) on the x-axis. The y-axis plots the average of an indicator variable for a mini job (black
lled circle), midi job (light x), or regular job (empty circle). The vast majority of persons with average monthly
earnings close to the mini job threshold have a mini job in that year. It is of course possible for people to have
both a mini and a regular job in the same year. The midi jobs code are reliable beginning 2004; all midi jobs are
also classied as regular jobs. It appears that many people with earnings in the midi-job range are not recorded
as midi jobbers, but we do not make further use of these midi jobber data. The earnings threshold for mini jobs
was 325 in 2002 and midi jobs did not exist. The threshold was 400 in 2004 and 2012 and the midi job threshold
was 800. The threshold was 450 in 2013 and the midi job threshold was 850.
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Figure A·6: Bunching at Old Notch: Married Women 2002-2012
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Notes: These gures show the excess bunching mass at the old notch (325 euro) after the 2003 reform for the
period-by-period sample of married women in Figure 1·2. The estimated period-by-period counter-factual den-
sity is depicted as a light green line, while the bunching mass at the old notch is shaded in dashed-gray. When
estimating the counter-factual we choose the lowermost omitted bin (zl ) to be the bin centered at 225 euro. We
select (zu ) as the bin that most closely sets the total bunching mass equal to the missing mass to the right of the
threshold. Bin size is e15, starting at e20. We use a quintic polynomial in a window extending to 2007.5 euro.
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Figure A·7: Bunching at Old Notch: Married Women 2012-2015
(a) 2012 (b) 2013
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Notes: These gures show the excess bunching mass at the old notch (400 euro) after the 2013 reform for the
period-by-period sample of married women in Figure 1·3. The estimated period-by-period counter-factual den-
sity is depicted as a light green line, while the bunching mass at the old notch is shaded in dashed-gray. Average
monthly earnings (from all employment sources) are divided into 15 euro bins, starting at 20 euro. When esti-
mating the counter-factual we choose the lowermost omitted bin (zl ) to be the bin centered at 297.5 euro. We
select (zu ) as the bin that most closely sets the total bunching mass (not just at the old threshold) equal to the
missing mass to the right of the threshold. We use a quintic polynomial. The estimation window extends up to
2007.5 euro. Table A.5 contains the estimated excess masses normalized by the average counter-factual density
between 295 and 400 euro.
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Figure A·8: Fraction Adjusted in 2003b/2013 for rms w/ Nˆ non-exiting
workers at Z in 2002/2012
2003 Reform 2013 Reform
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Notes: These gures are the same as those in Figure 1·8, except that they plot the share of non-exiting work-
ers who adjust. So instead of using N˜ , which was the number of mini jobbers at the earnings threshold in
2002/2012 at the establishment, we use Nˆ , the number of mini jobbers at the earnings threshold in 2002/2012 at
the establishment who are still employed at the rm in 2003b/2013.
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Figure A·9: Google Search Intensity
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Notes: This gure shows the google search intensity for three terms in Germany over time. The solid line shows
searches for any of the words “mini job" “mini jobs" “minijob" or “minijobs". The bold dashed line shows searches
for “400 euro job" or “400 euro jobs". The lighter dashed line shows searches for “450 euro job" or “450 euro jobs".
Google search intensity is a relative measure ranges from 0 to 100, with 100 representing the most searched term
over the time period (in this case “min()job(s)" in 2015). Google search intensity is only available post-2004. The
vertical dashed line corresponds to the 2013 reform.
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Appendix Tables
Table A.1: Social Security Contribution Rates
Mini Job Region Regular Job Region Midi Job Region
Year Employee Employer (τmini ) Employee or Employer τ f ull Employee (at Z + ϵ) Employer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2000 0 22.00 20.54 41.07 – –
2001 0 22.00 20,44 40.88 – –
2002 0 22.00 20,64 41.28 – –
2003 (Apr-Dec) 0 25.00 20.85 41.70 4.15 20.85
2004 0 25.00 21.00 42.00 4.00 21.00
2005 0 25.00 20.95 41.90 4.05 20.95
2006 0 25.00 20.95 41.90 3.50 20.95
2007 0 30.00 19,55 39.10 10.45 19,55
2008 0 30.00 19.40 38.80 10.06 19.40
2009 0 30.00 20,08 40.15 9.92 20,08
2010 0 30.00 19,78 39.55 10.22 19,78
2011 0 30.00 20,18 40.35 10.82 20,18
2012 0 30.00 20,03 40.05 9.97 20,03
2013 0 30.00 19,73 39.45 10.27 19,73
2014 0 30.00 19,73 39.45 10.27 19,73
2015 0 30.00 19,78 39.55 10.22 19,78
Notes: Table shows approximate SSC rates for mini-, midi- and regular employment over
time that are used in the calculation of the budget sets. For regular employment, the
SSC by the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Aairs (BMAS) are reported (τf ull ).
These rates avoid any notch between the transition from mini- to midi-job region. For
employer and employees equal split of SSC rates is assumed for simplicity (τf ull ). Col-
umn (3) and (6) highlight identical SSC employer contributions for regular- and midi-
jobs. Due to the smooth change in total SSC-contributions, employee contributions at the
lower midi-jobs threshold are calculated as τmini - τf ull/2. Sources: http://tinyurl.
com/table-minijobzentrale, https://tinyurl.com/BMAS-F-factor, http://www.
sozialpolitik-aktuell.de/.
187
Table A.2: German Tax Schedule for Taxable Income
Taxable Income Cutos (eper year) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2000 0 6902 8946 58643 –
Marginal Rates on Taxable Income 0 22.9-25.0 25.0-51.0 51.0 –
2001 0 7206 9249 55009 –
Marginal Rates on Taxable Income 0 19.9-23.0 23.0-48.5 48.5 –
2002-3 0 7235 9252 55008 –
Marginal Rates on Taxable Income 0 19.9-23.0 23.0-48.5 48.5 –
2004 0 7665 12740 52152 –
Marginal Rates on Taxable Income 0 16.0-24.05 24.05-45.0 45.0 –
2005-6 0 7665 12740 52152 –
Marginal Rates on Taxable Income 0 15.0-23.97 23.97-42.0 42.0 –
2007-8 0 7665 12740 52152 250000
Marginal Rates on Taxable Income 0 15.0-23.97 23.97-42.0 42.0-45.0 45.0
2009 0 7835 13140 52552 250400
Marginal Rates on Taxable Income 0 14.0-23.97 23.97-42.0 42.0-45.0 45.0
2010-12 0 8004 13470 52881 250730
Marginal Rates on Taxable Income 0 14.0-23.97 23.97-42.0 42.0-45.0 45.0
2013 0 8130 13470 52881 250730
Marginal Rates on Taxable Income 0 14.0-23.97 23.97-42.0 42.0-45.0 45.0
2014 0 8355 13470 52881 250730
Marginal Rates on Taxable Income 0 14.0-23.97 23.97-42.0 42.0-45.0 45.0
2015 0 8473 13470 52881 250730
Marginal Rates on Taxable Income 0 14.0-23.97 23.97-42.0 42.0-45.0 45.0
Notes: Taxes apply to singles. Taxation of married couples follows the same schedule
except that tax liability is determined by pooling income and dividing it in half. The tax
brackets are applied to this sum to calculate tax liability, which is then doubled to come
up with the nal amount owed. In each range, marginal tax rates increase linearly with
taxable income. Cutos for 2000 and 2001 are expressed in Euros (From DM) using the
conversion 1DM = 1.95583 euro. Source: https://www.bmf-steuerrechner.de/
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Table A.3: Marginal Household Income Tax Rates
Wife Gross Income 0 0 0 0 0
Husband Gross Income 13000 23000 33000 41000 53000
Household Net Income 10400 18400 26400 32800 42400
– After Splitting Rule – 5200 9200 13200 16400 21200
Marginal Tax Rate (e1 extra to Taxable income)
2000 0 0.25 0.27 0.29 0.31
2001 0 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.30
2002-3 0 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.30
2004 0 0.18 0.24 0.26 0.30
2005-6 0 0.18 0.24 0.26 0.28
2007-8 0 0.18 0.24 0.26 0.28
2009 0 0.18 0.24 0.25 0.28
2010-12 0 0.16 0.23 0.25 0.28
2013 0 0.16 0.23 0.25 0.28
2014 0 0.16 0.23 0.25 0.28
2015 0 0.15 0.23 0.25 0.28
Notes: This table shows the marginal tax on an extra euro in taxable income. Net income
is calculated from Gross by taking out a 20% social security contribution in all years. To
nd the eective marginal income tax rate for a wife moving from a mini to a regular
job, we multiply these rates by 0.8, as only 80% of the additional income is subject to
income taxation. For example, if a wife of a person earnings e41000 a year in 2005 goes
from a mini job (which does not count towards taxable income) to a regular job earning,
say e1000 a month, that would add about e12000· 0.8 =e9600 to taxable income. This
extra income only modestly pushes up the marginal tax rate (to 0.27 to be exact) and will
eectively be taxed at a rate of 0.26. This means that e2500 will be due in income taxes
on the e12000; resulting in a marginal income tax rate of 0.21 (= 0.8 ∗ 0.26), when 0 was
due on the mini job earnings. Source: Own Calculations from Table A.2.
189
Table A.4: Budget Set Inputs for Bunching Model
τmini τall τincome ∆T Single ∆T Married t1 Sing & Married t2 Married t2 Single ∆t Married
2002 0.22 0.4128 0.2161 64.17 135.18 0.180 0.521 0.342 0.341
2003(Apr-Dec) 0.25 0.4170 0.2566 8.02 114.17 0.200 0.696 0.483 0.496
2004 0.25 0.4200 0.2470 7.80 109.86 0.200 0.692 0.488 0.492
2005 0.25 0.4190 0.2436 7.88 108.59 0.200 0.688 0.486 0.488
2006 0.3 0.4190 0.2308 16.1 115.33 0.231 0.636 0.445 0.405
2007 0.3 0.3910 0.2308 16.85 117.24 0.231 0.596 0.403 0.365
2008 0.3 0.3880 0.2308 16.90 117.42 0.231 0.592 0.399 0.361
2009 0.3 0.4015 0.2292 16.63 115.87 0.231 0.610 0.419 0.379
2010 0.3 0.3955 0.2278 16.77 115.67 0.231 0.600 0.410 0.369
2011 0.3 0.4035 0.2278 16.58 115.16 0.231 0.611 0.422 0.381
2012 0.3 0.4005 0.2278 16.65 115.35 0.231 0.607 0.417 0.376
2013 0.3 0.3945 0.2278 19.34 130.65 0.231 0.609 0.418 0.378
2014 0.3 0.3945 0.2278 19.34 130.65 0.231 0.609 0.418 0.378
2015 0.3 0.3955 0.2278 19.32 130.59 0.231 0.610 0.418 0.379
Notes: This table shows the budget set gures used in our estimation, calculated from the information in the preceding tax and SSC
tables as described in Appendix A.3. Our nal budget sets for married women, shown for 2002, 2003, and 2013 in Figure 1·1 have a
slope of 1 before the notch, then dip by ∆T Married, and have a slope of 1 − ∆t Married thereafter.
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Table A.5: Dynamic Adjustment Cost Estimation: Married Women
2003 Reform
Year 2002 2003b 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Normalized Bunching (Old Notch) 20.809 9.105 7.336 6.119 5.431 4.903 4.165 4.425 4.160 4.110 3.670
(0.196) (0.135) (0.113) (0.108) (0.103) (0.090) (0.092) (0.115) (0.118) (0.132) (0.141)
Normalized Bunching Less ‘Natural’ Level (Old Notch) 20.809 5.435 3.666 2.449 1.761 1.233 0.495 0.755 0.490 0.440 0
(0.196) (0.135) (0.113) (0.108) (0.103) (0.090) (0.092) (0.115) (0.118) (0.132)
Average Adjustment Cost (ϕ) 39.929
(1.961)
Elasticity (e) 0.136
(0.004)
Cumulative Prob. of Having to Pay Adj. Cost (∏Yeart=2004 pit ) – 1 0.674 0.451 0.324 0.227 0.115 0.115 0.090 0.081 0.000
(0.027) ( 0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.031) (0.000)
SSE 0.034 (0.033)
2013 Reform
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015
Normalized Bunching (Old Notch) 23.656 16.088 12.847 10.572
(0.209) (0.189) (0.195) (0.409)
Normalized Bunching Less ‘Natural’ Level (Old Notch)* 23.656 12.418 9.177 6.903
(0.209) (0.189) (0.195) (0.409)
Average Adjustment Cost (ϕ) 40.836
(0.366)
Elasticity (e) 0.188
(0.003)
Cumulative Prob. of Having to Pay Adj. Cost (∏Yeart=2014 pit ) – 1 0.739 0.556
(0.020) (0.034)
SSE 0.000 (0.000)
Pooled Reforms (pi03/13 = 1) Pooled Reforms (pi03/13 estimated)
Year 02/12 03b/13 04/14 05/15 02/12 03b/13 04/14 05/15
Average Adjustment Cost (ϕ) 43.184 56.962
(0.295) (0.972)
Elasticity (e) 0.162 0.166
(0.003) (0.003)
Cumulative Prob. of Having to Pay Adj. Cost (∏Yeart=03/13 pit ) – 1 0.697 0.514 – 0.563 0.410 0.304
(0.015) (0.026) (0.014) (0.012) (0.017)
SSE 6.963 (0.950) 4.643 (0.816)
Notes: This table shows the results of the xed adjustment estimation described in Appendix A.5. The estimation is for the married
women, whose earnings distributions are shown in Figures 1·2–1·3. Counter-factual densities are shown in Appendix Figures A·6–
A·7. We subtract the bunching mass from 2012 – or the ‘natural level’ – to not overstate bunching at the old notch coming from
imprecision in targeting. Standard errors are bootstrapped 1000 times and account for the counter-factual estimation as well as the
minimum distance estimation.
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Table A.6: Including Firm Level Controls
2003 Reform: Any Adjustment to 400 2013 Reform: Any Adjustment to 450
Any Adj at Firm in 03b Any Adj at Firm in 13
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any Hires 01/11 -0.009 -0.014 -0.008 -0.014 0.000 -0.001
(0.005)* (0.005)*** (0.005) (0.007)** (0.006) (0.007)
Any Hires 02/12 0.025 0.009 0.028 0.002 -0.003 0.009
(0.006)*** (0.005)* (0.006)*** (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Any Hires 03a 0.014 0.003 0.014
(0.005)*** (0.005) (0.005)***
Any Hires 03b/13 0.079 0.073 0.078 0.042 0.040 0.048
(0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.007)***
Any Hires 04/14 0.030 0.030 0.031 0.011 0.010 0.014
(0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)* (0.006)* (0.006)**
Any Hires 05/15 0.023 0.019 0.023 0.004 0.003 0.007
(0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Firm Age (Yrs) -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000)** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Different Modal Occ. Mini and Non -0.016 -0.014 -0.034 -0.033
(0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)***
Fraction of Mini Jobbers at Notch 0.313 0.315 0.253 0.247
(0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)***
Fraction of Mini to Total Jobbers 0.281 0.290 0.197 0.201
(0.069)*** (0.068)*** (0.052)*** (0.051)***
Fraction of Mini to Total Jobbers)2 -0.285 -0.294 -0.140 -0.156
(0.043)*** (0.043)*** (0.040)*** (0.039)***
Fraction of Mini Jobbers in Modal Mini Occ -0.045 -0.049 -0.062 -0.065
(0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)***
Fraction of Workers in Modal NonMini Occ -0.019 -0.022 -0.030 -0.027
(0.011)* (0.012)* (0.013)** (0.014)*
Fraction of Mini Jobbers working year-round 0.058 0.053 0.128 0.072
(0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.015)*** (0.016)***
Fraction of Non Mini Jobbers working year-round -0.017 0.001 -0.030 0.008
(0.012) (0.013) (0.015)** (0.015)
Unemp Rate (02/12) -0.003 -0.001 -0.009 -0.007
(0.001)*** (0.001) (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Unemp Growth 0.015 0.025 0.016 0.017
(0.021) (0.021) (0.037) (0.037)
S.D. of Mini Wages (capped) 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
S.D. of Non-Mini Wages (capped) 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000)* (0.000)** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Av Age, Non Mini Jobbers -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002
(0.000)** (0.001) (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Frac of Commuters, Non Mini Jobbers 0.024 0.024 0.005 -0.002
(0.008)*** (0.009)** (0.010) (0.011)
Frac of Non Germans, Non Mini Jobbers 0.042 0.026 -0.007 -0.020
(0.014)*** (0.017) (0.019) (0.022)
Av Ed Yrs, Non Mini Jobbers 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)* (0.002)**
Frac Female, Non Mini Jobbers -0.003 0.001 0.021 0.007
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010)** (0.013)
Av Tenure, Non Mini Jobbers -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)** (0.001)
Av Occ. Tenure, Non Mini Jobbers -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Av Age, Mini Jobbers -0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.001
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*
Frac of Commuters, Mini Jobbers -0.009 -0.006 0.036 0.041
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010)*** (0.011)***
Frac of Non Germans, Mini Jobbers -0.026 -0.062 -0.086 -0.089
(0.013)* (0.015)*** (0.019)*** (0.021)***
Av Ed Yrs, Mini Jobbers -0.009 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)** (0.002)**
Frac Female, Mini Jobbers 0.082 0.045 0.107 0.111
(0.013)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.015)***
Av Tenure, Mini Jobbers 0.002 0.002 0.008 0.008
(0.001)* (0.001) (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Av Occ. Tenure, Mini Jobbers 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.002
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)**
# of Individuals 491341 521706 491341 398626 418548 398626
# of Firms 80060 94398 80060 76858 86516 76858
Adj. R2 0.198 0.183 0.200 0.182 0.177 0.188
Dep. Var. Mean 0.807 0.796 0.807 0.719 0.710 0.719
Mean Any Hires 03b 0.851 0.834 0.851 0.881 0.868 0.881
Selection on Unobservables for β = 0 (δ ) 0.899 0.775 0.891 0.480 0.435 0.539
Selection on Unobservables for β = 0 (δ ), excl FE 2.395 0.399 2.452 -0.839 -0.499 -0.938
Mini Size Dummies X X X X X X
Reg Size Dummies X X X X X X
Occupation FE X X X X X X
Industry FE X X X X X X
State FE X X X X X X
Notes: Columns (1)-(3) replicate Table 1.4 column (1) with additional rm-level controls.
Columns (4)-(6) replicate Table 1.4 column (5) with additional rm-level controls. Fur-
ther details on the control variables can be found in the Data Appendix. Regressions are
weighted by the number of workers with average monthly earnings (both mini at rm
and overall) between Z − 37.5 and Z + 12.5 in 2002/2012, where Z is the relevant notch
threshold. Signicance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table A.7: Establishment Survey Sample
2003 Reform 2013 Reform
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Any Hires 01/11 -0.060 -0.060 -0.061 -0.059 -0.060 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.024
(0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Any Hires 02/12 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Any Hires 03a -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Any Hires 03b/13 0.060 0.060 0.061 0.060 0.061 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015
(0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Any Hires 04/14 0.033 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.031 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Any Hires 05/15 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.012 0.028 0.028 0.027 0.027 0.027
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
Has Collective 03/13 -0.014 -0.014 0.027 0.022
(0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.021)
Dummy OK Profits -0.020 -0.015 0.007 0.007
(0.038) (0.039) (0.047) (0.047)
Dummy Bad Profits -0.029 -0.025 0.085 0.085
(0.042) (0.043) (0.081) (0.081)
+ive Business Growth 03-02/13-12 0.016 0.015 0.012 0.011
(0.019) (0.019) (0.031) (0.030)
Vacancies 02/12 -0.020 -0.014 0.003 0.007
(0.013) (0.014) (0.020) (0.021)
Vacancies 03/13 0.023 0.022 0.017 0.007
(0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019)
Labor Shortage 12 0.032 0.032
(0.019)* (0.019)*
# of Individuals 45554 45554 45554 45554 45554 50689 50689 50689 50689 50689
# of Firms 5422 5422 5422 5422 5422 5917 5917 5917 5917 5917
Adj. R2 0.327 0.327 0.328 0.327 0.328 0.384 0.384 0.385 0.385 0.386
Dep. Var. Mean 0.483 0.483 0.483 0.483 0.483 0.424 0.424 0.424 0.424 0.424
Mean Any Hires 03b 0.680 0.680 0.680 0.680 0.680 0.686 0.686 0.686 0.686 0.686
Mini Size Dummies X X X X X X X X X X
Reg Size Dummies X X X X X X X X X X
Occupation FE X X X X X X X X X X
Industry FE X X X X X X X X X X
State FE X X X X X X X X X X
Notes: Regressions are weighted by the number of workers with average monthly earnings
(both mini at rm and overall) between Z − 37.5 and Z + 12.5 in 2002/2012, where Z is
the relevant notch threshold. All workers at the rm in the range are used. Any Hires
is a dummy for whether any new mini jobber was hired during that period. Regressions
restrict to rms with at least one mini jobber in all years 01-05 (11-15). Columns (1)
and (6) represent the baseline regression for the EPS-sample without adding any survey
information. Columns (2) and (7) add a dummy equals one, if the rm reports to fall
under any collective labor agreement. Columns (3) and (8) add dummies for the rms
prot-situation aggregated to ’middle’ and ’bad’, where ’good’ is the leave-out category.
In addition we add a dummy equals one if the business volume >= that of the prior year.
Columns (4) and (9) add a dummy on whether the rm reports to have open vacancies in
the pre-reform and the reform year. For the 2013-reform a dummy on whether the rm
reports to have labor shortage in the year prior to the reform is added. Finally, columns
(5) and (10) add all prior survey information jointly. To ensure constant sample sizes, for
missing values in the survey data the respective dummies are set to zero and additional
dummies indicating that original values are missing are added (results not shown).
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Table A.8: Individual-Level Adjustment At Firm on Mini Hires (No Con-
trols)
2003 Reform: Any Adjustment to 400 2013 Reform: Any Adjustment to 450
Adj. Adj. (in Firm) Adj. (Stay/Adj) Adj. Adj. (in Firm) Adj. (Stay/Adj)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any Hires 01/11 -0.035 -0.011 -0.001 -0.032 -0.016 -0.007
(0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004) (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)
Any Hires 02/12 -0.042 -0.004 0.010 -0.051 -0.024 -0.014
(0.003)*** (0.004) (0.004)** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)***
Any Hires 03a -0.014 0.009 0.018
(0.003)*** (0.004)** (0.004)***
Any Hires 03b/13 0.039 0.060 0.074 0.014 0.028 0.038
(0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)***
Any Hires 04/14 0.011 0.023 0.027 -0.001 0.006 0.010
(0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)**
Any Hires 05/15 0.005 0.011 0.016 -0.009 -0.006 -0.005
(0.003)* (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)** (0.004) (0.005)
# of Individuals 533841 388671 323643 428283 346759 293444
# of Firms 99586 96024 87068 91448 86801 81586
Adj R2 0.044 0.047 0.055 0.029 0.026 0.027
Dep. Var. Mean 0.293 0.351 0.484 0.261 0.323 0.381
Mean Any Hires 03b/13 0.825 0.816 0.795 0.860 0.847 0.836
Oster δ -0.967 -1.974 -3.486 -0.449 -1.135 -2.609
Oster δ sans FE -0.137 -0.197 0.268 -0.723 0.248 0.346
Mini Size Dummies X X X X X X
Reg Size Dummies X X X X X X
Occupation FE X X X X X X
Industry FE X X X X X X
State FE X X X X X X
Notes: This table is the individual-level analog of Table 1.4. We take all workers with
average monthly earnings (both mini at rm and overall) between Z − 37.5 and Z + 12.5
in 2002/2012, where Z is the relevant notch threshold. Columns (1) and (4) look at whether
the worker adjusts to between Z + 12.5 and Z˜ + 12.5 (the new notch) at the same rm
in 2003b/2014. Columns (2) and (5) do the same but condition on the worker still being
in their 2002/2012 rm. Columns (3) and (6) do the same but condition on workers who
either stay at Z − 37.5 and Z + 12.5 or adjust to between Z + 12.5 and Z˜ + 12.5 (the
new notch) at the same rm. 2003a corresponds to Jan-Mar 2003; 2003b is Apr-Dec 2003.
Standard errors are clustered at the rm level. Signicance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗
: 1%.
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Table A.9: Individual-Level Adjustment At Firm on Mini Hires (With Con-
trols Shown)
2003 Reform: Any Adjustment to 400 2013 Reform: Any Adjustment to 450
Adj. Adj. (in Firm) Adj. (Stay/Adj) Adj. Adj. (in Firm) Adj. (Stay/Adj)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any Hires 01/11 -0.016 -0.004 0.000 -0.007 -0.002 0.001
(0.003)*** (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)* (0.004) (0.005)
Any Hires 02/12 -0.006 0.011 0.016 -0.008 -0.000 0.002
(0.003)** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)** (0.004) (0.005)
Any Hires 03a -0.001 0.013 0.018
(0.003) (0.004)*** (0.004)***
Any Hires 03b/13 0.047 0.062 0.074 0.027 0.035 0.042
(0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)***
Any Hires 04/14 0.018 0.026 0.010 0.012 0.013
(0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)***
Any Hires 05/15 0.010 0.013 0.017 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Av Monthly Wage At Firm 01/11 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Av Monthly Wage At Firm 02/12 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.005
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Av Monthly Wage 01/11 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000)** (0.000)**
Av Monthly Wage 02/12 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Days Worked Mini At Firm 01/11 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Days Worked Mini At Firm 02/12 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000)*** (0.000)** (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)**
Days Worked All 01/11 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Days Worked All 02/12 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Did Not Work 01/11 0.003 0.007 -0.001 -0.025 0.011 0.005
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004)*** (0.005)** (0.007)
Did Not Work Mini At Firm 01/11 0.128 0.079 0.031 0.156 0.094 0.037
(0.006)*** (0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.010)*** (0.013)*** (0.015)**
Worked in 2 Firms In Year 02/12 -0.094 -0.008 0.000 -0.081 -0.002 -0.001
(0.003)*** (0.006) (0.007) (0.003)*** (0.005) (0.007)
Worked in 2 Firms In Year 01/11 -0.017 -0.011 -0.006 -0.009 -0.008 -0.004
(0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)* (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)
Worked in Mini and Reg At Firm 01/11 -0.009 -0.015 -0.010 -0.014 -0.010 -0.005
(0.004)** (0.005)*** (0.006) (0.005)*** (0.006)* (0.007)
Worked in Mini and Reg At Firm 02/12 -0.039 -0.061 -0.016 -0.033 -0.054 0.055
(0.006)*** (0.009)*** (0.012) (0.006)*** (0.008)*** (0.012)***
Tenure 02/12 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Occ Tenure 02/12 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.000)*** (0.000)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Age 02/12 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)
Ed Yrs 02/12 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Mini Spell Not Split 03b 0.045 -0.043 -0.071
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)***
Female 0.068 0.067 0.071 0.052 0.043 0.041
(0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
Non-German -0.022 -0.030 -0.037 -0.028 -0.027 -0.034
(0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)***
# of Individuals 533841 388671 323643 428283 346759 293444
# of Firms 99586 93303 87068 91448 86801 81586
Adj R2 0.109 0.086 0.087 0.094 0.067 0.054
Dep. Var. Mean 0.293 0.403 0.484 0.261 0.323 0.381
Mean Any Hires 03b/13 0.825 0.805 0.795 0.860 0.847 0.836
Selection on Unobservables Needed for β = 0 (δ ) -1.124 -2.099 -3.696 -0.759 -1.319 -2.727
Selection on Unobservables Needed for β = 0 (δ ), excl FE -7.333 6.638 3.749 -2.168 -6.583 -27.784
Mini Size Dummies X X X X X X
Reg Size Dummies X X X X X X
Occupation FE X X X X X X
Industry FE X X X X X X
State FE X X X X X X
Notes: This table is identical to Table 1.7 but it shows all the estimated controls. See notes
to Table 1.7. Signicance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table A.10: Married Women-Level Adjustment At Firm on Mini Hires (No
Controls)
2003 Reform: Any Adjustment to 400 2013 Reform: Any Adjustment to 450
Adj. Adj. (in Firm) Adj. (Stay/Adj) Adj. Adj. (in Firm) Adj. (Stay/Adj)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any Hires 01/11 -0.023 -0.005 0.005 -0.010 -0.003 0.002
(0.006)*** (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Any Hires 02/12 -0.020 0.007 0.015 -0.022 -0.009 0.000
(0.006)*** (0.006) (0.007)** (0.007)*** (0.007) (0.008)
Any Hires 03a -0.020 0.000 0.008
(0.006)*** (0.007) (0.007)
Any Hires 03b/13 0.057 0.072 0.087 0.035 0.041 0.050
(0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)***
Any Hires 04/14 0.022 0.030 0.031 0.002 0.004 0.008
(0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Any Hires 05/15 0.014 0.019 0.023 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.006)** (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
# of Individuals 53458 46397 40534 44898 42373 38261
# of Firms 43036 38437 34157 35404 33945 31100
Adj R2 0.030 0.033 0.044 0.020 0.019 0.024
Dep. Var. Mean 0.417 0.480 0.550 0.370 0.393 0.435
Mean Any Hires 03b/13 0.640 0.625 0.616 0.695 0.687 0.678
Mini Size Dummies X X X X X X
Reg Size Dummies X X X X X X
Occupation FE X X X X X X
Industry FE X X X X X X
State FE X X X X X X
Notes: This table is the same as Appendix Table A.8 except that it additionally restricts
to the sample of identied married women. Thus, it excludes other at-the-threshold mini
jobbers at the rm in the pre-reform year. Signicance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table A.11: Married Women-Level Adjustment At Firm on Mini Hires
(Controls Shown)
2003 Reform: Any Adjustment to 400 2013 Reform: Any Adjustment to 450
Adj. Adj. (in Firm) Adj. (Stay/Adj) Adj. Adj. (in Firm) Adj. (Stay/Adj)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any Hires 01/11 0.002 0.009 0.016 0.003 0.003 0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)** (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Any Hires 02/12 0.014 0.023 0.029 0.001 0.003 0.009
(0.006)** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Any Hires 03a -0.013 -0.001 0.006
(0.006)* (0.007) (0.008)
Any Hires 03b/13 0.060 0.071 0.083 0.042 0.045 0.054
(0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.008)***
Any Hires 04/14 0.030 0.034 0.035 0.007 0.008 0.012
(0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Any Hires 05/15 0.019 0.019 0.024 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Av Monthly Wage At Firm 01/11 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Av Monthly Wage At Firm 02/12 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.005
(0.001)*** (0.002)** (0.003)* (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)**
Av Monthly Wage 01/11 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Av Monthly Wage 02/12 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.003
(0.001)*** (0.002)* (0.003) (0.001)*** (0.001)** (0.002)
Days Worked Mini At Firm 01/11 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 (0.000)
Days Worked Mini At Firm 02/12 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000)* (0.000)*** (0.000)** (0.000)
Days Worked All 01/11 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)** (0.000) (0.000)** (0.000)*
Days Worked All 02/12 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000)* (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Worked in 2 Firms In Year 02/12 -0.220 -0.056 -0.049 -0.142 0.013 0.011
(0.017)*** (0.042) (0.049) (0.016)*** (0.031) (0.040)
Worked in 2 Firms In Year 01/11 -0.022 -0.020 -0.013 -0.007 -0.014 -0.009
(0.012)* (0.014) (0.016) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015)
Worked in Mini and Reg At Firm 01/11 0.012 0.016 0.034 0.016 0.022 0.027
(0.020) (0.023) (0.025) (0.020) (0.022) (0.024)
Worked in Mini and Reg At Firm 02/12 -0.107 -0.187 -0.134 -0.052 -0.067 0.099
(0.040)*** (0.062)*** (0.078)* (0.030)* (0.04) (0.055)*
Tenure 02/12 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003
(0.001)** (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Occ Tenure 02/12 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Age 02/12 0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000)* (0.000)* (0.000)***
Ed Yrs 02/12 -0.003 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.001)*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)**
Mini Spell Not Split 03b 0.006 -0.039 -0.063
(0.007) (0.007)*** (0.008)***
Non-German -0.037 -0.043 -0.045 -0.057 -0.059 -0.069
(0.010)*** (0.011)*** (0.012)*** (0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.010)***
# of Individuals 45470 39905 35035 40889 38776 35199
# of Firms 37664 33853 30157 32707 31445 28933
Adj R2 0.091 0.070 0.075 0.070 0.056 0.053
Dep. Var. Mean 0.425 0.485 0.552 0.377 0.398 0.438
Mean Any Hires 03b/13 0.625 0.611 0.602 0.687 0.680 0.671
Mini Size Dummies X X X X X X
Reg Size Dummies X X X X X X
Occupation FE X X X X X X
Industry FE X X X X X X
State FE X X X X X X
Notes: This table is the same as Appendix Table A.10 but includes the battery of controls
used in Table 1.7. Signicance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table A.12: Replication on a 25% Random Sample of Establishments
2003 Reform: Adjustment to 400 2013 Reform: Adjustment to 450
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Any Adj. Fraction Adj. Frac (in Firm) Frac (Stay/Adj) Any Adj. Fraction Adj. Frac (in Firm) Frac (Stay/Adj)
Any Hires 01/11 -0.018 -0.033 -0.009 0.004 -0.014 -0.029 -0.017 -0.009
(0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)** (0.004) (0.004)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)**
Any Hires 02/12 -0.007 -0.071 -0.024 -0.002 -0.018 -0.049 -0.030 -0.022
(0.004) (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004) (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)***
Any Hires 03a -0.010 -0.031 -0.002 0.017
(0.005)* (0.003)*** (0.004) (0.005)***
Any Hires 03b/13 0.055 0.020 0.048 0.070 0.023 0.007 0.013 0.029
(0.005)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)***
Any Hires 04/14 0.013 -0.004 0.008 0.017 0.002 -0.014 -0.008 0.004
(0.005)*** (0.003) (0.004)** (0.004)*** (0.004) (0.002)*** (0.003)** (0.004)
Any Hires 05/15 0.010 -0.001 0.008 0.020 0.015 -0.008 -0.000 0.011
(0.005)** (0.003) (0.004)** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.002)*** (0.003) (0.004)***
# of Individuals 337107 337107 324674 307622 478528 478528 459168 437177
# of Firms 103888 103888 95161 85848 137707 137707 126581 114795
Adj. R2 0.192 0.093 0.076 0.079 0.213 0.056 0.031 0.028
Dep. Var. Mean 0.675 0.280 0.390 0.488 0.554 0.197 0.258 0.334
Mean Any Hires 03b/13 0.709 0.709 0.711 0.715 0.698 0.698 0.699 0.701
Mini Size Dummies X X X X X X X X
Reg Size Dummies X X X X X X X X
Occupation FE X X X X X X X X
Industry FE X X X X X X X X
State FE X X X X X X X X
Notes: This table replicates our baseline regression from Table 1.4 on an entirely dierent
sample. The sample here is a 25% random sample of establishments employing at least
one mini jobber on June 1st 2002 (June 1st 2012). Signicance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗∗∗
: 1%.
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Table A.13: Replication of First Di. Regressions on a Random Sample
(Any Adj at Firm 13 − Any Adj at Firm 03b)
(1) (2) (3)
(Anyhire11 − Anyhire01) 0.017
(0.006)***
(Anyhire12 − Anyhire02) 0.012
(0.006)*
(Anyhire13 − Anyhire03b) 0.054 0.044
(0.006)*** (0.006)***
(Anyhire14 − Anyhire04) 0.037
(0.006)***
(Anyhire15 − Anyhire05) 0.026
(0.006)***
(∆ Ln Non-Mini Wagebill 11-10 − ∆ Ln Non-Mini Wagebill 01-00) -0.020
(0.014)
(∆ Ln Non-Mini Wagebill 12-11 − ∆ Ln Non-Mini Wagebill 02-01) 0.007
(0.014)
(∆ Ln Non-Mini Wagebill 13-12 − ∆ Ln Non-Mini Wagebill 03-02) 0.060
(0.027)**
(∆ Ln Non-Mini Wagebill 14-13 − ∆ Ln Non-Mini Wagebill 04-03) 0.036
(0.019)*
(∆ Ln Non-Mini Wagebill 15-14 − ∆ Ln Non-Mini Wagebill 05-04) 0.002
(0.013)
Weighted Total # Individuals 141402 141402 125352
# Establishments 47675 47675 38636
Adj R2 0.002 0.004 0.002
Dep. Var. Mean -0.119 -0.119 -0.110
Mean Indep. Var 13-03 -0.049 -0.049 0.001
Notes: This table replicates our rst dierence regression from Table 1.8 on an entirely dif-
ferent sample. The sample here is a 50% random sample of establishments that employed
at least one mini jobber on both June 1st 2002 and June 1st 2012. Signicance levels: ∗ :
10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table A.14: Firm Size Restrictions (2003 & 2013)
2003 Reform: Any Adjustment At Firm to 400 2013 Reform: Any Adjustment At Firm to 450
BL No weight > 3 at Z > 5 at Z > 5 at Z weight > 10 at Z BL No weight > 3 at Z > 5 at Z > 5 at Z weight > 10 at Z
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Any Hires 01 -0.019 -0.022 -0.014 -0.004 -0.006 0.002 -0.026 -0.024 -0.023 -0.020 -0.012 0.013
(0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.006)** (0.011) (0.011) (0.036) (0.006)*** (0.004)*** (0.009)*** (0.016) (0.018) (0.058)
Any Hires 02 0.000 -0.011 0.005 0.020 0.016 0.009 -0.026 -0.032 -0.025 -0.034 -0.027 0.075
(0.005) (0.004)*** (0.006) (0.010)** (0.011) (0.027) (0.006)*** (0.004)*** (0.008)*** (0.015)** (0.017) (0.056)
Any Hires 03a -0.001 -0.015 -0.002 0.003 0.006 -0.002
(0.005) (0.004)*** (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
Any Hires 03b 0.073 0.054 0.075 0.077 0.091 0.103 0.032 0.015 0.034 0.052 0.071 0.109
(0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.006)*** (0.008)*** (0.010)*** (0.020)*** (0.006)*** (0.004)*** (0.008)*** (0.013)*** (0.015)*** (0.035)***
Any Hires 04 0.028 0.022 0.022 0.036 0.044 0.040 0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.005 0.007 0.012
(0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.006)*** (0.009)*** (0.010)*** (0.020)** (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.012) (0.013) (0.028)
Any Hires 05 0.018 0.010 0.018 0.028 0.031 0.036 -0.003 -0.005 -0.006 -0.001 0.003 0.019
(0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.016)** (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.021)
N (Weighted) 533842 99586 50002 27157 386370 10392 428283 91448 41839 22658 294721 8700
# of Firms 99586 99586 50002 27157 27157 10392 91448 91448 41839 22658 22658 8700
Adj R2 0.180 0.094 0.056 0.051 0.101 0.046 0.168 0.075 0.046 0.047 0.109 0.072
Dep. Var. Mean 0.792 0.571 0.732 0.809 0.885 0.885 0.705 0.485 0.654 0.730 0.814 0.815
Mean Any Hires 03b 0.825 0.617 0.746 0.850 0.923 0.944 0.860 0.688 0.827 0.911 0.953 0.973
Mini Size Dummies X X X X X X X X X X X X
Reg Size Dummies X X X X X X X X X X X X
Occupation FE X X X X X X X X X X X X
Industry FE X X X X X X X X X X X X
State FE X X X X X X X X X X X X
Notes: This table explores the sensitivity of Table 1.4 columns (1) and (5) to alternative ways to account for the number of mini jobbers
at the threshold in the year prior to the reform. Columns (1) and (7) replicate Table 1.4 columns (1) and (5). Columns (2) and (8) drop
the weighting by the number of mini jobbers at the threshold. Columns (3) and (9) drop the weighting and restrict to rms with at least
3 mini jobbers at the threshold in the year prior to the reform. Columns (4) and (10) drop the weight and restrict to establishments with
at least 5 mini jobbers at the threshold. Columns (5) and (11) do the same and weight. Columns (6) and (12) restrict to establishments
with at least 10 mini jobbers at the threshold, without weighting. Signicance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table A.15: Alternative Denitions of Adjustment: Individual-Level Adjustment Not Restricted to Adjustment
At Firm
2003 Reform: Any Adjustment to 400 2013 Reform: Any Adjustment to 450
Adj Anywhere Adj Anywhere (Non-Data Exit) Adj Anywhere (Stay/Adj a.w.) Adj Anywhere Adj Anywhere (Non-Data Exit) Adj Anywhere (Stay/Adj a.w.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any Hires 01/11 -0.030 -0.020 0.000 -0.027 -0.020 -0.017
(0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004) (0.004)*** (0.004)*** -0.005
Any Hires 02/12 -0.031 -0.015 0.012 -0.044 -0.028 -0.008
(0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*
Any Hires 03a -0.013 -0.004 0.016
(0.003)*** (0.003) (0.004)***
Any Hires 03b/13 0.037 0.047 0.070 0.009 0.016 0.042
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)** (0.004)*** (0.005)***
Any Hires 04/14 0.011 0.018 0.027 -0.003 0.001 0.011
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)**
Any Hires 05/15 0.001 0.005 0.015 -0.009 -0.007 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)** (0.005)
# of Individuals 533841 445236 338265 428283 377071 278700
# of Firms 99586 96024 88006 91448 88686 79780
AdjR2 0.036 0.038 0.045 0.024 0.022 0.022
Dep. Var. Mean 0.316 0.379 0.498 0.262 0.297 0.402
Mean Any Hires 03b 0.825 0.816 0.799 0.860 0.853 0.835
Mini Size Dummies X X X X X X
Reg Size Dummies X X X X X X
Occupation FE X X X X X X
Industry FE X X X X X X
State FE X X X X X X
Notes: This table explores the sensitivity of Appendix Table A.8 to dening adjustment in terms of adjustment at any rm, and not
just within the worker’s 2002/2012 rm. Columns (1) and (4) dene adjustment as whether the individual adjusted (at the rm or
elsewhere). Columns (2) and (5) do the same but restrict to individuals that do not exit the data set in 2003b/2013. Columns (3) and
(6) do the same and further restrict to individuals who either continue to earn amounts at the original threshold or up to the new
threshold, but not other lower or higher amounts. Signicance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table A.16: Robustness to Alternative Dependent Variables (2003)
2003 Reform: Any Adjustment to 400
Baseline Any Adjustment (AW) Any Adj Upwards (AF) Any Immediate Adj (AF) Any Delayed Adj (AF) Frac Exit Firm/Data 03b
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any Hires 01 -0.019 -0.008 -0.017 -0.012 -0.010 0.060
(0.005)*** (0.004)* (0.004)*** (0.005)** (0.005)**
Any Hires 02 0.000 0.019 0.004 -0.005 0.011 0.088
(0.005) (0.004)*** (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)** (0.003)***
Any Hires 03a -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.012 -0.002 0.042
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)** -0.005 (0.003)***
Any Hires 03b 0.073 0.062 0.059 0.071 0.046 0.014
(0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.003)***
Any Hires 04 0.028 0.024 0.027 0.017 0.023 0.011
(0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.003)***
Any Hires 05 0.018 0.007 0.012 0.009 0.010 0.002
(0.005)*** (0.004)* (0.004)*** (0.006) (0.005)* (0.005)
# of Individuals 533842 533842 533842 533842 533842 533842
# of Firms 99586 99586 99586 99586 99586 99586
Adj R2 0.180 0.193 0.176 0.134 0.282 0.112
Dep. Var. Mean 0.792 0.826 0.837 0.467 0.690 0.272
Mean Any Hires 03b 0.825 0.825 0.825 0.825 0.825 0.825
Mini Size Dummies X X X X X X
Reg Size Dummies X X X X X X
Occupation FE X X X X X X
Industry FE X X X X X X
State FE X X X X X X
Notes: This table explores the sensitivity of Table 1.4 column (1) to alternative denitions of adjustment. Column (1) simply reprints
Table 1.4 column (1). Column (2) replaces the dependent variable from being whether any mini jobber adjusted at the rm to whether
any of the original mini jobbers adjusted anywhere. Column (3) denes adjustment as adjusted above the old notch, including adjust-
ment into the midi or regular job region as opposed to just adjustment to the new notch. Column (4) denes adjustment as having
any one moving above e387.5 and below 412.5 as opposed to moving above 337.5. This captures persons whose earnings increased
very quickly after the reform. Column (5) denes adjustment as having any one moving above e337.5 but below 387.5 and captures
persons whose earnings potentially started to increase a few months after the reform. Column (6) looks at the fraction of mini jobbers
who are no longer in the data in 2003b. Signicance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table A.17: Robustness to Alternative Dependent Variables (2013)
2013 Reform: Any Adjustment to 450
Baseline Any Adjustment (AW) Any Adj Upwards (AF) Any Immediate Adj (AF) Any Delayed Adj (AF) Frac Exit Firm/Data 13
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any Hires 11 -0.026 -0.013 -0.015 -0.027 -0.011 0.053
(0.006)*** (0.006)** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)* (0.002)***
Any Hires 12 -0.026 -0.018 -0.015 -0.026 0.001 0.084
(0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.005) (0.002)***
Any Hires 13 0.032 0.024 0.031 0.023 0.022 0.028
(0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.003)***
Any Hires 14 0.003 0.000 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.019
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003)***
Any Hires 15 -0.003 -0.009 -0.006 0.005 -0.010 0.010
(0.006) (0.005)* (0.005) (0.008) (0.006)* (0.003)***
# of Individuals 428283 428283 428283 428283 428283 428283
# of Firms 91448 91448 91448 91448 91448 91448
Adj R2 0.168 0.191 0.181 0.166 0.296 0.112
Dep. Var. Mean 0.705 0.737 0.785 0.511 0.551 0.190
Mean Any Hires 13 0.860 0.860 0.860 0.860 0.860 0.860
Mini Size Dummies X X X X X X
Reg Size Dummies X X X X X X
Occupation FE X X X X X X
Industry FE X X X X X X
State FE X X X X X X
Notes: This table explores the sensitivity of Table 1.4 column (5) to alternative denitions of adjustment. Column (1) simply reprints
Table 1.4 column (5). Column (2) replaces the dependent variable from being whether any mini jobber adjusted at the rm to whether
any of the original mini jobbers adjusted anywhere. Column (3) denes adjustment as adjusted above the old notch, including adjust-
ment into the midi or regular job region as opposed to just adjustment to the new notch. Column (4) denes adjustment as having
any one moving above e437.5 and below 462.5 as opposed to moving above 412.5. This captures persons whose earnings increased
very quickly after the reform. Column (5) denes adjustment as having any one moving above e412.5 but below 437.5 and captures
persons whose earnings potentially started to increase a few months after the reform. Column (6) looks at the fraction of mini jobbers
who are no longer in the data in 2013. Signicance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table A.18: Robustness to Alternative Specications (2003)
2003 Reform: Any Adjustment At Firm to 400
Baseline Anyhire03 instead of 03a/b Baseline Up to 03b Baseline 03b only Baseline Logit Basline NO FE Basline Mini FE Only one mini occ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Any Hires 01 -0.019 -0.021 -0.020 -0.086 0.060 -0.023 -0.010
(0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.021)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.007)
Any Hires 02 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.005 0.059 -0.005 0.012
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.022) (0.004)*** (0.004) (0.008)
Any Hires 03a -0.001 0.003 0.005 0.106 -0.002 -0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.027) (0.004)*** (0.004) (0.008)
Any Hires 03b 0.073 0.098 0.098 0.357 0.109 0.067 0.066
(0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.025)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.008)***
Any Hires 04 0.028 0.029 0.141 0.061 0.023 0.030
(0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.025)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.008)***
Any Hires 05 0.018 0.022 0.098 0.053 0.012 0.009
(0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.025)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.007)
Any Hires 03 0.062
(0.006)***
# of Individuals 533842 541996 572552 614686 533825 564783 564783 132092
# of Firms 99586 104030 109747 125790 99582 113784 113784 35581
Adj R2 0.180 0.186 0.184 0.190 . 0.102 0.159 0.216
Dep. Var. Mean 0.792 0.786 0.781 0.77 0.792 0.781 0.781 0.741
Mean Any Hires 03b 0.825 0.851 0.812 0.805 0.825 0.809 0.809 0.739
Mini Size Dummies X X X X X X X
Reg Size Dummies X X X X X X
Occupation FE X X X X X X
Industry FE X X X X X X
State FE X X X X X X
Notes: This table explores the sensitivity of Table 1.4 column (1) to alternative ways to specify the regression equation. Column (1)
simply reprints Table 1.4 column (1). Column (2) combines anyhires in 03a and 03b into one indicator for any hire in either period.
Column (3) drops Any Hires in 2004 or after from the regression. Column (4) only includes Any Hires in 03b. Column (5) runs a logit
regression instead of a linear probability model and shows the logit coecients. Column (6) drops all the dummies listed below the
regression the table. Column (7) takes column (6) and includes only the category dummies for the number of mini jobbers. Column
(8) restricts to establishments in which all mini jobbers are in the same occupation.
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Table A.19: Robustness to Alternative Specications (2013)
2013 Reform: Any Adjustment At Firm to 450
Baseline Baseline Up to 13 Baseline 13 only Baseline Logit Basline NO FE Basline Mini FE Only one mini occ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Any Hires 11 -0.026 -0.031 -0.108 0.078 -0.031 -0.013
(0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.025)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.011)
Any Hires 12 -0.026 -0.026 -0.107 0.056 -0.035 -0.033
(0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.025)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.011)***
Any Hires 13 0.032 0.054 0.044 0.141 0.113 0.021 0.035
(0.006)*** (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.026)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.011)***
Any Hires 14 0.003 0.018 0.087 -0.002 -0.022
(0.006) (0.025) (0.005)*** (0.005) (0.011)**
Any Hires 15 -0.003 -0.011 0.082 -0.011 -0.003
(0.006) (0.026) (0.006)*** (0.005)** (0.011)
# of Individuals 428283 455534 472867 428269 448275 448275 76082
# of Firms 91448 101326 107598 91441 101831 101831 23936
Adj R2 0.168 0.172 0.172 . 0.058 0.156 0.176
Dep. Var. Mean 0.705 0.693 0.687 0.705 0.697 0.697 0.602
Mean Any Hires 13 0.860 0.845 0.843 0.86 0.847 0.847 0.750
Mini Size Dummies X X X X X X
Reg Size Dummies X X X X X
Occupation FE X X X X X
Industry FE X X X X X
State FE X X X X X
Notes: This table explores the sensitivity of Table 1.4 column (5) to alternative ways to specify the regression equation. Column (1)
simply reprints Table 1.4 column (5). Column (2) drops Any Hires in 2014 or later from the regression. Column (3) only includes Any
Hires 13. Column (4) runs a logit regression instead of a linear probability mode and shows the logit coecients. Column (5) drops
all the dummies listed below the regression the table. Column (6) takes column (5) and includes only the category dummies for the
number of mini jobbers. Column (7) restricts to establishments in which all mini jobbers are in the same occupation.Signicance levels:
∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table A.20: Adjustment Cost Estimation Across Establishments w/ Dif-
fering Hiring Patterns
Inputs: 2013 Reform
Sample Any Hires 03b = 0 Any Hires 03b = 1
2012 2013 2012 2013
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Norm. Bunching Old Notch 22.247 12.787 19.844 11.675
Norm. Bunching Less ‘Natural’ Level 22.247 9.117 19.844 8.004
2 Period Estimates: 2013 Reform
Elasticity Elasticity Ind. Adj. Cost Prob. Estab. Allows Adj.
AH13 = 0 AH13 = 1 AH13 = 0 AH13 = 1
eAH0 eAH1 ϕ˜ pAH0 pAH1
2-Periods same e (SSE: 2.888) 0.144 0.144 32.868 0.823 1
2-Periods same e (SSE: 5.815) 0.144 0.144 37.269 1 1
No Di. Across Estab.
2-Periods (SSE: 0.000) 0.165 0.125 35.896 0.945 1
2-Periods (SSE: 0.110) 0.167 0.123 37.142 1 1
No Di. Across Estab.
Notes: This table ts the model from Section 1.6.3 to the 2013 reform. See table notes to
Table 1.9.
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A.2 Data Appendix
We summarize here the key samples, variables, and data sources used in the paper.
A.2.1 Married Women Sample
Our primary sample for examining earnings responses to each reform consists of earnings
record from the Integrated Employment Biographies data le (IEB) from 1999-2015. We
keep all employment spells (quelle = 1), drop all spells with missing wages, and drop any
full duplicates. We restrict to women aged 26 to 55 at the start of their employment spell
and to women whose establishment is located in West Germany.
We further restrict to married women with husband’s annual earnings (from all em-
ployment sources in the data) betweene33000 and 53000. The data do not contain indica-
tors on marital status.1 As mentioned in the main text, we construct a sample of married
couples using the methodology outlined in Goldschmidt et al. (2017). Simon Trenkle, who
works at IAB, conducted the identication procedure. All subsequent analysis used only
an indicator for a “married woman" with attached husband earnings, rounded to the near-
est 10 euro for anonymity. No couple identiers were used subsequently. Matthew Gud-
geon only accessed anonymized social security data on-site in the secure environment
of the research data center in Nuremberg, Germany. Pending the arrival of additional
geo-code data, couples are currently matched only in 2008. Last names are used to ver-
ify these persons are still married in prior and future years (need to still share the same
last name). Thus, all women in our sample need to show up in the data (employment or
unemployment) with their husband in 2008.
One additional feature of the data is that an ongoing employment spell will not nec-
essarily be interrupted for a wage increase. We only observe total earnings and duration,
so a wage increase within-year will be undetectable. For this reason, most of the analysis
1The only exception is for persons who register as job seekers, at which point this is collected.
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is done at the year level. This does not restrict us much except for the fact that the 2003
reform started April 1st. Fortunately, the 2003 reform also required a change in the way
establishments report mini job social security contributions. For the majority of rms,
this required a manual change in the software used for reporting that resulted in the in-
terruption of all ongoing mini job employment relationships on March 30th. Ongoing
mini jobs then resumed as a new employment period at the same establishment on April
1st. The vast majority of mini job relationships are split on April 1st, allowing us to see
exact average monthly earnings in January-March 2003 (2003a) separately from April-
December 2003 (2003b). For non-split spells (like regular jobs and the few mini jobs that
are exceptions to the rule), we manually ‘split’ all spells that go through 1 April 2003.
A.2.2 Establishment Sample
When looking at establishment level variables, we focus on the establishments employing
the married women in our baseline estimation sample. Specically we use all establish-
ments that employ our 26-55 year old identied married women in West Germany with
husband earnings between e33,000-53,000 and average monthly earnings below e1400
in either 2002/2003a or 2012. We use all workers at the establishment to construct estab-
lishment level variables, not just married women.
As an alternative to this establishment sample we also replicate baseline results for
a 25% random sample of establishments with at least one mini jobber on June 30th 2002
(June 30th 2012).
We test our model predictions in Section 1.6.2 on the establishments in this sample
with at least one mini jobber at the threshold in 2002 / 2012 and at least one mini jobber
in each year from 2001-2005 (2011-2015). We weight by the number of mini jobbers at the
threshold in 2002 / 2012. The key variables used in our reduced form results are below.
At the threshold At the threshold (Z ) in 2002/2012 is dened as having average
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monthly earnings between Z − 37.5 and Z + 12.5. The room on the left is motivated
by Figure 1·4. The room on the right allows for small rounding and reporting errors. We
require that average monthly earnings from all sources, average monthly earnings at the
rm, and average monthly earnings in a mini job all fall within this range. This ensures
we are focusing on exclusive mini jobbers.
Any Adjustment (Immediate) We focus rst on 1-year adjustment rates, dening
a worker as adjusted if she increases her average mini earnings within the original estab-
lishment above the old threshold level Z , to between Z + 12.5 to Z˜ + 12.5, in the period
immediately following the reform, where Z˜ is the new threshold. Any adjustment equals
1 if any of the at-the-threshold mini jobbers from the prior year have adjusted by the
above denition. It equals 0 if none of the at-the-threshold mini jobbers have increased
earnings into this higher range.
Fraction Adjusting (Immediate) This is the share of the 2002/2012 at-the-threshold
mini jobbers who adjust according to the above denition. Exits are counted as not ad-
justing.
Fraction Adjusting in Firm (Immediate) This is the share of the 2002/2012 at-the-
threshold mini jobbers who did not leave the rm who adjust according to the above de-
nition.
Fraction Adjusting Stay/Adj (Immediate) This is the share of the 2002/2012 at-
the-threshold mini jobbers whose average monthly mini wage at the rm is within the old-
threshold range or withing the new threshold who adjust according to the above denition.
This allows us to focus on mini jobbers who stay at their same earnings level or adjust to
the new threshold.
AnyMini Hires “Any new mini hire" is dened as a binary variable equal to = 1 if the
rm has at least one entirely new mini jobber in that period and 0 otherwise. Specically,
a new mini jobber is dened as a person appearing in a mini job at the establishment that
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has not been in any job at that establishment in the prior years up to 2000/2010. Per-
sons with both a mini and regular at the same establishment in the same period (which is
uncommon) are counted as regular workers and not mini jobbers). We restrict to estab-
lishments that have at least one mini jobber in all periods we use the hiring variable so
that a 0 is truly no hiring as opposed to simply the establishment no longer existing.
Non-MiniWagebill GrowthWe take the change in the natural logarithm of the total
non-mini wage bill at the rm. The total non-mini wage bill is calculated by adding up all
employee earnings. We rst cap all earnings at the lowest cap across years. We also top
and bottom code the change in the natural logarithm to be between -1 and 1 to address
outliers.
AnyNon-Mini Hires This is the same as Any Mini Hires except it sees whether there
is any entirely new worker in the non-mini employment categories at the rm.
Baseline Controls We choose to include a series of xed eects for 2-digit modal
mini job occupation, the establishments industry (out of 21 options), state (out of 10) and
establishment sizes for mini and regular workers separately in our baseline. Specically,
we dummy out the oor of duration-weighted employment for 1 to 25 workers. Beyond
that we group rms with 26-50, 51-75, 76-100, 101-150, 151-200, 201-300, 301-400, 401-500,
500+ into their own bins.
A.2.3 Other Data Sources
For descriptive purposes we use the Sample of Integrated Employment Biographies (SIAB),
the Establishment History Panel (BHP), and the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
The SIAB is a 2% random sample of individuals in the IEB (see Antoni, Ganzer, and vom
Berge (2016)) from which we select all individuals employed on June 30th of each year
between 2000-2014. The (BHP), a 50% random sample of establishments drawn from the
IEB data, contains employee information as of 30th of June of each year aggregated to
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the establishment-level. The SOEP is an annual, representative panel survey of German
households. While the SOEP has the disadvantage of relatively low numbers of observa-
tions (it contains 1,500 mini jobber in 2010) making it unusable for analyzing adjustment,
it contains a variety of useful descriptive variables like hours worked. We also take ad-
vantage of the Linked Employer Employee Data of the IAB (LIAB). This merges survey
data information from a large establishment panel survey to the administrative data and
allows us to analyze additional establishment-level covariates like the presence of a col-
lective labor agreement. Finally, we use our own survey data that asked mini jobbers who
experienced the 2013 reform about their adjustment experiences (see Appendix A.6 for
details and results).
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A.3 Budget Set Construction
We construct the mini job budget sets shown in Figure 1·1 following Tazhitdinova (2017).
While the construction of the budget sets from the individual perspective, ignoring em-
ployer social security contributions, is relatively simple, we nd it unappealing to ignore
the large changes in employer social security contributions on mini jobs (from 22% to
30%). To this end, we explicitly account for the changes, while retaining the standard
individual perspective in the literature.
To account for the employer contributions, we assume 100% pass-through of taxes
to the employee. We translate what we observe in the data (posted earnings) into gross
earnings, dened as earnings inclusive of the employer social security contribution. Gross
earnings thus correspond to the total cost of a worker. A worker in a mini job in 2002
earning 325 euro a month in posted earnings actually earns 325 ∗ 1.22 = 396.5 in posted
earnings (0 individual SSC and income tax; 22% employer SSC). One minor complication
that arises from looking at gross earnings is that workers with posted earnings at the
threshold (one in a regular job and one in a mini job) are no longer directly comparable.
Across the threshold, the employer taxes drop to 20% and thus a worker with gross earn-
ings just above 396.5 actually earns 330.41 after the employer contribution, slightly above
325. Thus a mini jobber with posted monthly earnings at 325 is comparable in total cost to
a regular worker at 330.41. We calculate tax rates on gross earnings as in Saez, Matsaga-
nis, and Tsakloglou (2012a). Let z be gross earnings inclusive of employer and employee
SSC. Letw be gross earnings net of employer SSC and c be what the worker receives after
individual and employer SSC. τr correspond to the employer SSC rate and τe corresponds
to the employees SSC rate. c = (1 − τe )w and z = (1 + τr )w so c = (1−τe )(1+τr )z = (1 −
τr+τe
1+τr )z.
That is, the sum of employer and employee SSC is equivalent to a combined tax rate of
τ = τr+τe1+τr .
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Calculating taxes as above creates a t1 > 0 below the notch, and a t2 > t1 with t2−t1 =
δt . The vast majority of the public nance literature ignores employer social security
contributions when calculating elasticities (as it does not often change at a notch/kink).
Including t1 as the baseline tax rate dampens elasticities and makes them less comparable
to other work. To keep with the individual-focused literature, we subtract t1 and model
the nal budget set at facing a tax of 0 below the notch and δt above. This essentially
keeps the budget set from the individual perspective, but accounts for employer-level tax
changes over time.
Pre-April 1 2003 Budget Set Below the mini job threshold the employer pays τmini in SSC
and the employee pays 0 in SSC and income taxes. Above the threshold the employer pays
τall/2, and the employee pays τall/2 plus income taxes. Let N be the mini job threshold
and then Nд = N (1 + τmini ) be the mini threshold in terms of gross earnings. Let Xд be
gross earnings, equal to τmini ∗ Xp for mini jobs and τall2 ∗ Xp for regular jobs, where Xp is
posted earnings, or what we observe in the data.
Taxes in terms of gross earnings for persons who do not owe income taxes are:
T (Xд) =
τmini
1 + τmini
Xд if Xд ≤ Nд
T (Xд) =
τall
1 + τall/2
Xд if Xд > Nд
In practice, our married women also owe income taxes, but only if they cross into
the regular job region. Once in a regular job, all earnings are pooled with household
income and hence extra earnings from crossing the notch are taxed at the household
marginal tax rate. We assume households use income splitting. We further assume that
the household marginal tax rate is constant, as opposed to increasing with wife earnings.
This linearizes the budget set and ignores what are in practice for our sample modest
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changes of 1-2 percentage points.2 We use τˆincome from Appendix Table A.3, which is
the marginal household rate for a husband earning 41,000 euro a year (the mean in our
sample) with a 20% deduction rate, roughly corresponding to social security deductions.
Once the wife enters a regular job her earnings are taxable at this household rate, after
deductions dw . In the pre-2003 period we assume a dw = 20% deduction , as for men. From
2003-2005 we use a lower dw = 5%, as close to the threshold midi jobs pay approximately
5% SSC as opposed to usual 20%, lowering the deductions rate. Analogously, for 2006-
2015 we use dw = 10% deduction rate. We call the eective income tax rate for the wife
τincome = dwτˆincome .
The pre-2003 budget set inclusive of income taxes becomes:
T (Xд) =
τmini
1 + τmini
Xд if Xд ≤ Nд
T (Xд) =
τall + τincome
1 + τall/2
Xд if Xд > Nд
It will be convenient to split this up between what is due at the notch and what is due
above. Call ∆T = ∆Tincome + ∆Tssc , the lump sum amount due to the pure notch, which
comes from the additional SSC due right after the notch plus the income tax due. We
compare comparable workers in gross earnings, so crossing the notch means increasing
gross earnings above Nд = N (1+ τmini ). The amount of income tax due right at this point
is ∆Tincome = τincome(1+τall /2) ∗Nд. The extra SSC due is ∆Tssc =
τall
1+τall /2 ∗Nд −
τmini
1+τmini ∗Nд. The tax
rate below the threshold is given by t1 = τmini1+τmini and the tax rate above the threshold by
t2 =
τall+τincome
1+τall /2 . We call δt the dierence between these two. These numbers can be found
in Appendix Table A.4 and are the numbers used in our estimations.
2003b-2012
2See Appendix Table A.3 which shows the eect of adding approximately 10,000 euro a year in taxable
income, well above the 4800 a year from a 401 euro regular job.
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Once midi jobs are introduced the budget set changes. Let Np be the mini job threshold
in posted earnings (e400 a month) and N 2p be the midi job threshold in posted earnings
(e800 a month). Below the threshold nothing changes. Above the threshold, the ocial
midi job formula in terms of posted earnings is given by
T (Xp ) = [τminiNp + (τall
N 2p
N 2p − Np −
τminiNp
N 2p − Np ) (Xp − Np )] if Np < Xp ≤ N 2p
Or
T (Xp ) = [τminiNp + (2τall − τmini ) (Xp − Np )] if Np < Xp ≤ N 2p
This means that a person with posted earnings just above 400 pays τmini ∗400 (the same as
a mini jobber at 400), while a person with posted earnings at 800 pays τall ∗800, the amount
due on regular jobs, with the tax schedule being linear in between the two amounts.
The budget set from 2003b-2013 in terms of gross earnings is thus
T (Xд) =
τmini
1 + τmini
Xд if Xд ≤ Nд
T (Xд) =
2τall − τmini + τincome
1 + τall/2
Xд −
2Nд (τall − τmini )
1 + τmini
if Nд < Xд ≤ N 2д
Again, we nd it convenient to split out ∆T explicitly, now given by ∆Tincome = τincome ∗
Nд/(1 + τall/2). The extra SSC due is ∆Tssc = 2τall−τmini1+τall /2 Nд −
2(τall−τmini )
1+τmini Nд −
τmini
1+τmini ∗ Nд
The tax rate below the threshold is t1 = τmini1+τmini and the tax rate above the threshold is
t2 =
2τall−τmini+τincome
1+τall /2 . Once again, these numbers are shown in Appendix Table A.4.
2013-2015
This is analogous to the budget set from 2003-2013, except N 1p and N 2p change from
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400,800 to 450,850. The budget sets for this period are:
T (Xд) =
τmini
1 + τmini
Xд if Xд ≤ Nд
T (Xд) =
2.125τall − 1.125τmini + τincome
1 + τall/2
Xд −
2.125Nд (τall − τmini )
1 + τmini
if Nд < Xд < 2Nд
Again we nd it convenient to split out ∆T explicitly, now given by ∆Tincome = τincome ∗
Nд/(1+τall/2). The extra ssc tax due is 2.125τall−1.125τmini1+τall /2 Nд −
2.125Nд (τall−τmini )
1+τmini −
τmini
1+τmini ∗Nд
The tax rate below the threshold is t1 = τmini1+τmini and the tax rate above the threshold is
t2 =
2.125τall−1.125τmini+τincome
1+τall /2 . Once again, these numbers are shown in Appendix Table
A.4.
We do not model the budget set above N 2д and its convex kink points. We do not
observe any holes in the data at this point so for simplicity we extend the budget set
past 850. In practice the marginal buncher/unbuncher falls below this, validating this
simplication.
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A.4 Dynamic Labor Demand Model: Proofs and Derivations
A.4.1 Optimization Problem
We assume a rm employs only at-the-threshold mini jobbers who all prefer to work
∆h = h¯ − h
¯
more hours after the reform. The rm pays a competitive wage w and would
normally choose ht optimally. Here, workers are constrained at h¯
= Z/w , where Z is the
mini job threshold. We assume this h
¯
is at or below the optimal hours level, so the rm
sets hours = h
¯
in all periods. This type of limit could also be rationalized if the rm has
to pay a much higher wage to induce hours above the threshold.
Relaxing the threshold, as will happen with the mini job reform, leads rms to want
to increase hours, but the process of re-optimizing is costly and can take time.
The rms dynamic optimization problem consists of choosing Nt and the hiring rate
at to maximize:
maxNt ,at |inft=1
inf∑
t=0
δ t (pF (Nt ,h¯
) −wNth¯ − αatNt ) s.t. Nt+1 = (1 − σ + at )Nt and No given
maxNt |inft=1
inf∑
t=0
δ t (pF (Nt ,h¯
) −wNth¯ − α (Nt+1 − (1 − σ )Nt ) s.t. No given (A.1)
The production function in terms of hours is satises standard conditions:
FN (N ,h) > 0, FNN (N ,h) < 0, Fh (N ,h) > 0, Fhh (N ,h) ≤ 0
It is simplest to specify the production function in terms of man hours Ntht , such as
F = ψ ln(Ntht ) or F = ψ (Ntht )
1
2 . In both cases the rm would prefer one worker working
all the hours. To limit this hours need to either become prohibitively expensive or unpro-
ductive. For our purposes, we think it reasonable to believe that the rm would prefer the
existing workers work more hours. It is unlikely that the dierence between 10 and 12.5
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hours per week seriously diminishes productivity. The curvature in the production func-
tion here comes solely from the fact that extra man hours overall produce diminishing
returns. Put another way, we are stating that a mini jobber working 10 hours per week
has the same production eect (barring training and hiring costs) as 4 mini jobbers in-
creasing their weekly hours by 2.5. For the types of jobs we are considering like cashiers
and cleaners working shifts, this seems a tolerable approximation.
In addition we require that FNH (N ,h) < wp in order to ensure that the rm prefers
lower employment at higher hours levels.
A.4.2 Steady State
The rst order condition with respect to Nt sets the marginal discounted net revenue
stream of an additional hire today equal to the hiring cost. Denoting δ = 1/(1 + r ), the
FOC is:
pFN (Nt ,h¯
) = wh
¯
+ α (r + σ ) (A.2)
Denote N ∗ as the solution to pFN (N ∗,h¯
) = wh
¯
+ α (r + σ ).
If N0 < N ∗ the rm hires immediately to N ∗ and thereafter hires to replace exits
at at = σ for all t . If N0 > N ∗ the rm lets attrition take its employment down until
next period’s employment would rst fall below N ∗ at which point it hires to get to N ∗.
Thereafter, it hires to replace exits at at = σ for all t .
A.4.3 Reform
We model the reform as being an unanticipated shock in period τ , assuming the rm has
already reached its steady state by then. The reform allows the rm to increase all workers
from h
¯
to h¯ hours, should they choose to do so.
Firms cannot only increase some workers’ hours and cannot increase hours by less
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than ∆h = h¯ − h
¯
if they choose to increase hours.
A.4.4 Steady State Comparison
Optimal Employment Size is Decreasing in Hours Worked. Let h¯ > h
¯
and denote
N ∗∗ as the solution to pFN (N ∗∗, h¯) = wh¯ + α (r + σ ). For the stated conditions on the
production function, N ∗∗ < N ∗.
Proof. Letting N˜ (h) be the optimal steady state employment level for any given hours
level h; the implicit function theorem tells us that ∂N˜ (h)∂h =
−(pFNH (·)−w )
pFNN (·) < 0.
Steady States with Higher Hours Are Preferred.
Furthermore, we can show that the rm prefers the N ∗∗ steady state to that at N ∗ as
there are lower turnover costs associated with the lower employment level N ∗∗.
Proof. Denoting N˜ (h) as the optimal steady state employment level for a given h, we let
V (h) = Π(N˜ (h),h) =
1
1 − δ (pF (N˜ (h),h) − (wh + ασ )N˜ (h))
The envelope theorem gives us that
∂V (h)
∂h
=
∂Π(N˜ (h),h)
∂h
Thus
∂V (h)
∂h
=
1
1 − δ

p
∂F (N˜ (h),h)
∂h
−wN˜ (h)︸                        ︷︷                        ︸
>0

This term is positive because hours are constrained. Without the constraint, hours
would be set (if possible) so thatp ∂F (N˜ (h),h)∂h = wN˜ (h). With hours constrainedp
∂F (N˜ (h),h)
∂h >
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wN˜ (h). So, as long as hours are constrained over the range of h being considered, ∂V (h)∂h > 0
for all h.
A.4.5 Transition Dynamics
Here we present a series of results that help understand optimal rm transition behavior.
We show that the optimal transition time is inextricably linked to the attrition rate σ and
the hours change ∆h.
High Attrition ((1 − σ )N ∗ < N ∗∗). We rst discuss a high attrition case. While N ∗ and
N ∗∗ depend on σ , for reasonable production functions and for large enough σ and a xed
∆h it is possible that attrition is large enough such that (1 − σ )N ∗ < N ∗∗.
In this case the rm will always adjust in the period after the reform as it can hire the
gap up to N ∗∗ and be at the (better) steady state more cheaply than hiring all the way back
up to N ∗.
The relevant question in this case is whether or not the rm will adjust immediately
at the time of the unanticipated reform announcement or not.3 Suppose the rm is at the
steady state N ∗ in the reform period.
Adjusting immediately yields a prot stream of
ΠAdj in τ = pF (N
∗, h¯) −wN ∗h¯ − hcost + δ (pF ((N ∗∗, h¯) − (wh¯ + ασ )N ∗∗) + δ 2(pF ((N ∗∗, h¯) − (wh¯ + ασ )N ∗∗) + ...
Were hcost is the hiring cost incurred from increasing (1 − σ )N ∗ to N ∗∗.
Adjusting in the following period yields
3If the reform is anticipated by a period, adjustment will be immediate for this high attrition case.
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ΠAdj in τ+1 = pF (N
∗,h
¯
) −wN ∗h
¯
− hcost + δ (pF ((N ∗∗, h¯) − (wh¯ + ασ )N ∗∗) + δ 2(pF ((N ∗∗, h¯) − (wh¯ + ασ )N ∗∗) + ...
The rm prefers today if
p (F (N ∗, h¯)) − F (N ∗,h
¯
)) −wN ∗(h¯ − h
¯
) > 0
Since Fh (N ∗,h¯
) > wN ∗, the above will be true for suciently small ∆h, meaning
the rm will adjust hours today. If ∆h is large enough, the concavity in the production
function implies that the rm will prefer waiting until the next period to increase h (when
the rm will be at employment level N ∗∗).4
Slightly Less Attrition ((1 − σ )N ∗ > N ∗∗ and (1 − σ )2N ∗ < N ∗∗). Under this condition
and starting at N ∗ in period τ , the rm will have employment above N ∗∗ in period τ + 1.
Let us compare three possible strategies: adjusting immediately in τ , not hiring and
adjusting in τ + 1, and not hiring and adjusting in τ + 2. Note that other strategies could
potentially be better (as we will discuss below), but these three choices are useful starting
points.
ΠAdj in τ = pF (N ∗, h¯) −wN ∗h¯ + δ (pF ((1 − σ )N ∗, h¯) −w (1 − σ )N ∗h¯) + hcost + δ 2 (pF (N ∗∗, h¯) − (wh¯ + ασ )N ∗∗h¯) + ...
ΠAdj in τ+1 = pF (N ∗, h¯ ) −wN
∗h
¯
+ δ (pF ((1 − σ )N ∗, h¯) −w (1 − σ )N ∗h¯) + hcost + δ 2 (pF (N ∗∗, h¯) − (wh¯ + ασ )N ∗∗h¯) + ...
ΠAdj in τ+2 = pF (N ∗, h¯ ) −wN
∗h
¯
+ δ (pF ((1 − σ )N ∗, h
¯
) −w (1 − σ )N ∗h
¯
) + hcost + δ 2 (pF (N ∗∗, h¯) − (wh¯ + ασ )N ∗∗h¯) + ...
4As an aside, it is not obvious why it is ever optimal to adjust immediately, given that N ∗ was chosen
optimally. The reason it can be optimal to adjust immediately without waiting for attrition is that there is a
wedge between the marginal revenue of an extra worker and the marginal wage-bill costwh, driven by the
hiring costs. Post-reform, the rm has a chance to increase production without incurring the hiring costs
so there is some room to increase production, drive down the marginal revenue product of labor, and still
come out ahead over the wage costs. This would not be the case without the wedge. This calculus shifts for
suciently large changes in hours which drive the marginal revenue product of labor too low.
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Where hcost is the cost incurred to increase labor tomorrow from (1−σ )2N ∗ to N ∗∗. The
rm prefers adjustment in period τ to τ +1 if the same condition as before holds: The rm
prefers today if
p (F (N ∗, h¯)) − F (N ∗,h
¯
)) −wN ∗(h¯ − h
¯
) > 0
The rm prefers τ + 1 to τ + 2 if
p (F ((1 − σ )N ∗, h¯) − F ((1 − σ )N ∗,h
¯
)) −w (1 − σ )N ∗(h¯ − h
¯
) > 0
p (F ((1−σ )N ∗, h¯)−F ((1−σ )N ∗,h
¯
))−w (1−σ )N ∗(h¯−h
¯
) > p (F (N ∗, h¯))−F (N ∗,h
¯
))−wN ∗(h¯−h
¯
)
This statement is true as long as FNh is not too large (we limited this complementarity
between hours and employment size by assumption), and it implies that adjustment gets
easier over time. If it was not optimal to adjust period τ , it is possible that adjustment is
desired in τ + 1.
We can also see that, for xed σ , the smaller the ∆h the earlier the adjustment. As σ
gets smaller, the analysis remains similar, with adjustment more likely to come in later
periods all else equal.
Other Feasible Strategies? Suppose, among the three paths above, that the τ + 2 ad-
justment path is preferred. Is it ever optimal to hire a little bit, in period τ , for example?
Second, is it possible that never adjusting is preferred? The answers to both questions is
yes.
Hiring After the Reform? Is it possible that the rm wants to hire slightly after the
reform?
Suppose adjusting in τ + 2 is preferred to the other options discussed above in τ + 1
and τ and that (1 − σ )2N ∗ < N ∗∗. ΠAdj in τ+2 = pF (N ∗,h¯) − wN ∗h¯ + δ (pF ((1 − σ )N ∗,h¯) − w (1 −
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σ )N ∗h
¯
) − α (N ∗∗ − (1 − σ )2N ∗) + δ 2 (pF (N ∗∗, h¯) − (wh¯ + ασ )N ∗∗h¯) + ....
The rm could hire a little in τ (but less than at = σ ) and still adjust in τ + 2. This is
indeed preferred to not hiring at all in τ . To see this, suppose the rm hires at rate aτ = ϵ
for small ϵ . The prots from such a strategy would be: ΠAdj in τ+2, hiring = pF (N ∗,h¯) −wN
∗h
¯
−
αϵN ∗ + δ (pF ((1−σ + ϵ )N ∗,h
¯
) −w (1−σ + ϵ )N ∗h
¯
) −α (N ∗∗ − (1−σ ) (1−σ + ϵ )N ∗) + δ 2 (pF (N ∗∗, h¯) − (wh¯ +
ασ )N ∗∗h¯) + ....
A comparison of the two (hiring in τ vs non) gives:
−αϵN ∗ + δ [p (F (1 − σ + ϵ )N ∗,h
¯
) − F ((1 − σ )N ∗,h
¯
) −wϵN ∗h
¯
+ α (1 − σ )ϵN ∗]
The rm loses (δ (1 − σ ) − 1)αϵN ∗ from paying hiring costs earlier, but gains p (F (1 −
σ + ϵ )N ∗,h
¯
) − F ((1 − σ )N ∗,h
¯
) −wϵN ∗h
¯
from being closer to N ∗.
The FOC tells us that for a small change: p (F (1−σ+ϵ )N ∗,h
¯
)−F ((1−σ )N ∗,h
¯
) = wϵN ∗h
¯
+α (r+ϵ )
and hence p (F (1 − σ + ϵ )N ∗,h
¯
) − F ((1 − σ )N ∗,h
¯
) > wϵN ∗h
¯
+ α (r+σ )1+r = wϵN
∗h
¯
+ α (1 − δ (1 − σ ))
So this small amount of hiring in τ (eectively shifting hiring from the last period
earlier) is worth it. If the rm anticipated the reform by a period, they could do this in the
period before the reform. This reduced amount of hiring in the pre-reform period can be
seen in Figure 1·7 panel (b). Hiring more than this small amount, however, would actually
require delaying adjustment until a later period, which would not be optimal.
Never Adjusting? To see why it is possible that a rm could prefer never adjusting,
compare the dierence between never adjusting and adjusting in τ + 2 assuming this is
preferred to τ + 1 and τ and that (1 − σ )2N ∗ < N ∗∗.
ΠNever Adj = pF (N
∗,h
¯
) − (wh
¯
+ ασ )N ∗ + δ (pF (N ∗,h
¯
) − (wh
¯
+ ασ )N ∗) + ... ΠAdj in τ+2 = pF (N ∗,h¯
) −
wN ∗h
¯
+ δ (pF ((1 − σ )N ∗,h
¯
) −w (1 − σ )N ∗h
¯
) + hcost + δ 2 (pF (N ∗∗, h¯) − (wh¯ + ασ )N ∗∗h¯) + ...
ΠAdjinτ+2 − ΠNeverAd j = ασN ∗ + δ
[
p (F ((1 − σ )N ∗,h
¯
) − F (N ∗,h
¯
)) +wh
¯
σN ∗ + ασN ∗−
α (N ∗∗ − (1 − σ )2N ∗)
]
+ δ
2
1−δ
[
Π(N ∗∗, h¯) − Π(N ∗,h
¯
)
]
You save on hiring costs ασN ∗ in both period 1 and 2; which more than make up for
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the hiring cost paid in period 2 to hire the (small) gap between (1− σ )2N ∗ and N ∗∗. Once
you reach period 3 we are comparing the two steady states, and we know this dierence is
positive. The only losses incurred are those wrapped up in the term: δp (F ((1−σ )N ∗,h
¯
)−
F (N ∗,h
¯
)) +wh
¯
σN ∗. These losses can be thought of as the necessary cost of adjusting and
occur because the rm is temporarily at a lower employment level than optimal under h
¯
.
Lower attrition rates, σ , extend the length of the adjustment periods and make these
temporary costs larger. It is possible, for suciently low σ that undergoing the costly
transition is not worth it.
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A.5 Fixed Adjustment Cost Estimates
Here we apply the method developed Gelber et al. (2017) to quantify the xed adjustment
cost that rationalized the aggregate bunching responses in Figures 1·2–1·3. This exercise
provides estimates of how large adjustment costs for married women are in aggregate –
without specifying any particular source of frictions. We provide these estimates for ease
of comparison to the few others in the literature. The resulting xed cost estimate is very
close to what we estimate in 1.6.3 when we prohibit dierences across rms.
Estimating Adjustment Costs. Following Gelber et al. (2017), we assume workers face
a xed cost of changing their earnings level and that there is a chance in each period that
this xed cost no longer has to be paid. Both processes are very reduced form: the xed
cost encompasses everything from a cost paid to learn the tax system to search costs to
renegotiation costs. The dynamic nature of the process could reect everything from the
natural spread of information to the fact that some costs like search or scheduling costs
may naturally be reset after some other shock like moving a job for alternative reasons to
a rm labor demand shock.
We assume that after a reform workers pay a xed cost ϕ to change their earnings.
This is incorporated directly into their money metric utility function.
ut = zt −T (zt ) − n1 + 1/e
(zt
n
)1+1/e
− ϕˆ1(zt+1 , zt )
Additionally, we assume agents are myopic and that both ability and the elasticity are
time-invariant. In each period after a reform period T , there is a random chance (1 − pit )
that individuals no longer have to pay the adjustment cost and draw a free adjustment.
Thus, ϕˆ = ϕ with probability pit and ˆϕ = 0 with probability (1 − pit ).
Figures 1·2–1·3 clearly suggest that all observable excess mass at the old threshold has
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dissipated by 2002 (2012) after the 1996 (2003) reforms.5 In the lens of the above model, we
take this to suggest that by this time ∏t≥T pit has reached 0. As a consequence, bunching
in the year right before the reform (2002 or 2012) pins down the true structural elasticity.
Bunching at the old notch in the following periods (the reform period and subsequent
years) helps us estimate ϕ and the cumulative products of pi .
Specically, the bunching mass in 2002/2012 alone identies e . In order to be just
identied we cannot estimate pit for each t right after the reform; so we impose pi = 1
immediately after the reform (2003b/2013) and estimate all later pis. When we pool the
reforms we relax this and allow for some to draw a 0 cost immediately. The excess mass
at the old notch in the period of the reform (2003b and 2013) identies ϕ as the cost that
justies the left over bunching. Every person with utility gain from adjusting greater
than ϕ will adjust immediately and the rest will stay. In the following period (2004/2014)
every buncher still left at the old notch who gets a good draw will adjust freely and the
rest will stay. Hence the excess mass at the old notch in 2004/2014 identies pi2004, and
so on. We compare the mass at the old threshold in each period generated by our model
under a uniform counter-factual to the observed bunching and estimate parameters using
a minimum distance estimator with an identity weighting matrix. The model will t the
data perfectly as long as excess mass at the old notch dissipates over time.
We implement this estimation on our married women sample for which we can feel
condent we are correctly specifying the tax notch. The budget set is constructed as
described in the main text (see also Appendix A.3). Appendix Table A.4 shows the relevant
model inputs used.
We make three observations related to implementation. i) We note that the budget
set experience changes in some of the years post-reform. This could potentially shift
around the identity of the marginal unbuncher. In practice, it turns out that the estimated
5The level changed slightly between 1996 and 1999.
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marginal unbuncher is suciently close to the new notch that she wants to relocate to
the new notch point and not to a point above the new notch under all budget sets post-
reform. This simplies the analysis. ii) Another point of note is that in practice people
exit the data, move downwards, or move far upwards in the distribution. In the model we
treat any changes in the excess mass at the old notch as adjustment, but some of these
changes may be due to unmodeled shocks. In practice this means we will under-estimate
frictions. An alternative is to restrict the sample to non-exiters, but this is too restrictive
over the long time horizon. iii) We bootstrap standard errors by drawing 1000 trials with
replacement from the earnings distributions and running all of the counter-factual esti-
mation and model t programs. This means the standard errors take into account both the
natural variation in the data arising from the sample size and variation in the polynomial
t. The minimum distance estimator takes the best t over 20 trials for dierent starting
values of e and pit between 0 and 1 and ϕ between 0 and 100.
Results. Appendix Figures A·6–A·7 show the estimated counter-factuals and the excess
mass at the old notch for the 2003 and 2013 reform respectively. We estimate the counter-
factual densities period by period, keeping the lower omission threshold zl xed. Every
mass point that contributed to bunching at the notch in 2002 continues to be omitted
post-reform and counted as bunching at the old notch. This mass is shaded in gray.
One challenge arises from the fact that the old threshold is relatively close to the new
threshold, such that imprecision in targeting the new notch could be misinterpreted as
excess mass at the old notch. To remedy this we subtract the excess mass left at the old
threshold in 2012 from all estimates to obtain what we term ‘normalized bunching less
the natural level’. For the 2013 reform we do not see far enough into the future to make
this correction appropriately, so we subtract the amount we used for the 2003 reform. We
match these modied moments with our model. This naturally yields a lower adjustment
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cost than the alternative. The normalized excess mass and the normalized mass less the
natural level can be read from Appendix Table A.5.
We estimate elasticities of 0.136 and 0.188 for 2002 and 2012 respectively (see Appendix
Table A.5). These are comparable to those in Tazhitdinova (2017). We estimate an adjust-
ment cost (ϕ) of around e40 in both periods, indicating that right after a reform people
will only adjust if the utility gain from adjusting is larger than a e40 per month raise (the
quasi linear utility function is a money metric). However, this is not true forever; the year
following the reform only 67-74% of people will still have to pay this cost, the rest can
adjust freely. In the year following the reform only 45-56% of people have to pay this cost,
and so forth.
We can perform a back of the envelope calculation to understand the total utility cost
of these adjustment costs. Under a uniform counter-factual, we calculate the total utility
cost in 2003, following the 2003. The utility cost from the marginal un-buncher (with
ability 407) is 40 utiles (the estimated adjustment cost).6 The utility gain from adjusting
for the person with ideal earnings just above 325 is approximately 0. We can integrate
over the utility gain for everyone from 325 to 407, assuming a uniform distribution, to
obtain the total average utility gain from eliminating frictions. This is 15.5 utiles per head.
This number is directly comparable to a monthly wage increase from e325 to e340.5.
It implies an average utility loss from frictions of e139 per head over the whole 2003b
period (April-December) among those stuck at the old notch. The excess mass at the old
threshold in 2003b in our sample is approximately 24% of the persons in mini jobs (dened
as incomes belowe412.5 in 2003b). There are approximately 1,786,621 married females in
mini jobs in 2003b (estimates from the SOEP). If we assume our estimates are valid for all
married women, this implies that over 400,000 of these women will be constrained at the
old notch and losing an average of e139 over the period. In total, the welfare loss due to
6The gain from adjusting to 400 from 325 is 75 dollars less the extra eort cost of 35.
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frictions preventing these married women from adjusting to their optimal earnings level
is approximately e60 million. This only counts the period from April 2003 - December
2003. If we were to include subsequent years this number would of course be larger.
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A.6 Own Survey Results
We performed our own survey of mini jobbers that experienced the 2013 reform.7 The
aim of the survey was to receive more information on the actual adjustment process from
the perspective of individuals that were employed in a mini job at the time of the reform.
A.6.1 Implementation and Survey Structure
As described in the main text, we implemented the survey using an online platform similar
to Amazon Turk – www.clickworker.de – using a two-step survey design. In the rst step
we asked women on the platform aged 25 to 55 (30-59 at time of survey) whether they
held a mini job for at least 10 months in any of the years 2011-2015. If they held a job in
2012, we asked what their monthly earnings were. The blurb indicated that the survey
was geared towards persons with mini job experience. We reached 1042 women in this
rst stage.
We then selected all individuals that responded yes to having worked in a mini for at
least 10 months in 2012 and reported monthly earnings in the range of 350 to 500 Euro
for this year for a follow-up survey. This selection criteria applied to 185 individuals, all
of whom we contacted for a detailed follow-up survey. This main survey asked each par-
ticipant 22 questions, which were mainly related to the circumstances of the reform and
the reason for (not) adjusting to the new earnings threshold. 103 individuals participated
in the main survey and we payed each of them 5 Euro. Some of the questions we asked
to all individuals, but we also implemented forks in the survey that allowed us to target
some adjustment related question in greater detail. The list of questions and results are
available upon request. We present a summary of our main ndings below.
7The survey was conducted with approval from Boston University’s Institutional Review Board’s ap-
proval. The survey was submitted under the title “Survey for Frictions in Adjusting Earnings: Evidence
from Notches in German Mini Jobs" and was classied ‘Exempt’ by the IRB and given protocol number
4375X.
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A.6.2 Summary of Main Findings
In this subsection we present the main ndings of the additional survey. All results are
shown for 3 groups: All 103 people who took the follow-up survey (henceforth: ‘all’), the
sample of individuals in the follow-up survey who continue to say that they held a mini-
job in 2012 (henceforth: ‘In Mini’), and the sample of individuals in the follow-up survey
that report wages in 2012 at the threshold, which is dened as reporting monthly wages
between 365.5 Euro and 412.5 Euro (henceforth: ‘In Mini at threshold’). The latter is our
preferred sample given its consistency with our benchmark results, but sample sizes are
small. Table A.21 shows number of observations for these three groups, split by survey
specic forks. Adjustment was specically dened to include both asking for a raise or
more hours.
Table A.21: Number of Observations by Forks and Sample Restrictions
All In Mini In Mini
at threshold
Not in Mini in both years (2012 and 2013) 25 9 6
Stayed in Mini in 2013 but switched employer 21 16 10
Stayed in Mini in 2013 at same employer, of which: 57 48 30
...I asked my employer for adjustment: 13 13 9
...My employer asked me for adjustment: 18 15 11
...Neither asked for adjustment: 26 20 10
N-Total 103 73 46
Awareness of theReform. To investigate the awareness of individuals about the reform,
we asked three dierent Questions. In Question 2 of the survey we asked "when did you
rst hear about the reform that came into eect in January 2013". The results are displayed
in Table A.22: Of all respondents more than 74% respond to have heard about it at or before
the time of reform. Less than 11% respond to having heard about the reform in 2014 or
later. When restricting to individuals that were in a mini-job in 2012 (in a mini-job at the
threshold), the respective numbers are 80.12% and 7% (82.6% and 6.8%). In Question 32
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we asked individuals directly, whether they think a lack of information was in anyway
related to problems in adjusting to the new threshold. Results are presented in Table A.23.
For all specications, most individuals (80.6% -87%) responded that a lack of information
was not an issue, while between 10.9%-12.6% reported it was. In a third question (Question
33) we asked how people herd about the reform (Table A.24). About three quarter report
they heard it through media, followed by their boss and by friends. Importantly, only
one responded that a new colleague hired after the reform told her about the reform,
suggesting that hires of new mini jobbers are not or at most very weakly associated with
the transmission of information.
Table A.22: In 2013 the mini-job threshold was increased from 400 to 450.
When did you rst hear about this reform? (Question 2)
N (%)-Responses All In Mini In Mini
at threshold
1- Before January 2013 53 (51.1 %) 43 (60.6 %) 27 (58.7 %)
2- In January 2013 24 (23.3 %) 15 (20.6 %) 11 (23.9 %)
3- Later in 2013 15 (14.6 %) 10 (14.1 %) 5 (10.9 %)
4- In 2014 or later 4 ( 3.9 %) 3 (4.2 %) 2 (4.4 %)
5- Not before today 7 ( 6.8 %) 2 (2.8 %) 1 (2.2 %)
N-Total 103 (100 %) 73 (100 %) 46 (100 %)
Table A.23: Do you think a lack of information was in anyway related to
potential problems in adjusting?
N (%)-Responses All In Mini In Mini
In 2012 In 2012 and 2013
0- Prefer not to answer/Other 7 (6.8 %) 4 (5.5 %) 1 (2.2 %)
1- Yes 13 (12.6 %) 7 (9.6 %) 5 (10.9 %)
2- No 83 (80.6 %) 62 (85.9 %) 40 (87.0 %)
N-Total 103 (100 %) 73 (100 %) 46 (100 %)
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Table A.24: How did you hear about the reform?
N (%)-Responses All In Mini In Mini
in In 2012 In 2012 and 2013
0- Prefer not to answer 4 (3.9 %) - -
1- Friends or acquaintance 9 (8.7 %) 5 (6.9 %) 2 (4.4 %)
2- I was hired after reform 1 (1,0 %) - -
3- Media (newspaper, television...) 75 (72.8 %) 56 (76.7 %) 36 (78.3 %)
4- My boss 6 (5.8 %) 6 (8.2 %) 5 (10.9 %)
5- By an old colleague (in company before reform) 4 (3.9 %) 3 (4.1 %) 2 (4.4 %)
6- Through internet 1 (1,0 %) 1 (1.4 %) 1 (1.7 %)
7- By a new colleague (hired at the time of reform) 1 (1,0 %) 1 (1.4 %) -
8- By an employee representation 2 (1,9 %) 1 (1.4 %) 1 (2.2 %)
N-Total 103 (100 %) 73 (100 %) 46 (100 %)
Adjustment-Specic Questions. Table A.25 shows adjustment rates for all 3 sam-
ple groups by dierent categories such as perceived rm demand for mini jobbers and
contract-type. We dene adjustment as individuals reporting a monthly wage for 2013 of
at least 412.5 but below 500 Euro per month. For all specications, there is a clear positive
association with individual adjustment rates and the perceived demand for mini jobbers at
the rm. The adjustment rates for cases that think information was an issue in adjusting
are a bit lower than those who think it was not.
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Table A.25: Group-Specic Adjustment Rates
Adjustment-Rates in % All In Mini In Mini
(Group -specic N) at threshold
by demand for mini jobber at rm*
Had more mini-jobber than needed 25 % (4) 25 % (4) 25 % (4)
Was satised with number of mini jobber 41.5 % (53) 37.5 % (40) 50 % (22)
Wanted to hire a few more mini jobber 53.3 % (15) 40 % (10) 66.7 % (6)
Wanted to hire many new mini jobber 85.7 % (7) 100 % (6) 100 % (5)
by type of contract*
Fixed Number of Hours 42.9 % (42) 44.4 % (36) 55.6 % (27)
Flexible Number of Hours 46.7 % (45) 39.4 % (13) 58.8 % (17)
Do you think lack of Information was an issue?*
Yes 46.2 % (13) 28.6 % (7) 40 % (5)
No 41.0 % (83) 43.55 % (62) 57.5 % (40)
Total 42.7% (103) 42.5 % (73) 56.5 % (46)
Notes: The number of observations is in parentheses. * Categories like "‘I prefer not to
answer"’ left out. Category specic numbers do therefore not necessarily add up to the
total Number of observations.
Path-Specic Questions. Table A.26 - A.28 show the responses to questions that are
path-specic. Table A.26 shows responses to questions that are targeted to individuals
that report that they asked for adjustment. While most of the 13 respond that there where
no problems in adjustment, one responds that a bad business situation was a problem and
two respond, that the employer had to rst reach out to other parties. Table A.27 shows
results for individuals who where asked by their employer whether or not they wanted
to adjust. Table A.28 shows responses for individuals who were neither asked by their
employer nor asked to adjust. Adjustment was explicitly dened to include both increases
in hours or in wages.
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Table A.26: Asked Employer for adjustment
All/ In Mini
In Mini at threshold
Where there any problems in accommodating your request (to adjust)?
Employer had rst to talk to other parties (i.e. workers council) 15.38 % (2) 22.22 % (2)
Bad Business Situation 7.69 % (1) 11.11 % (1)
No 53.85 % (7) 44.44 % (4)
Prefer not to answer/I don’t know/ Other 23.08 % (3) 22.22 % (2)
Did other workers at your rm have similar requests?
Yes 23.08 % (3) 22.22 % (2)
No 30.77 % (4) 22.22 % (2)
There are no other mini jobber s 7.69 % (1) -
I don’t know 38.46 % (5) 55.55 % (5)
Total 100 % (13) 100 % (9)
Notes: This table summarizes question 20 and 21 of the survey, that where asked only
to those who asked their employer for adjustment. The number of observations is in
parentheses.
Table A.27: Employer asked for adjustment
All In Mini In Mini
at threshold
What describes Your Situation best?
Employer oered me more work hours 55.56 % (10) 60 % (9) 63.64 % (7)
Employer oered me a wage increase 44.44 % (8) 40 % (6) 36.36 % (4)
What do you think was the reason your employer oered you a wage/income increase?
Employer wanted to increase wages of all worker. 11.11 % (2) 13.33 % (2) 9.09 % (1)
Fairness. 11.11 % (2) - -
There was more to do and I could work more. 33.33 % (6) 33.33 % (5) 27.27 % (3)
Increased Workload 5.56 % (1) 6.67 % (1) 9.09 % (1)
I only worked more hours 5.56 % (1) 6.67 % (1) 9.09 % (1)
My employer is very social 5.56 % (1) 6.67 % (1) 9.09 % (1)
Because he was obliged by law 5.56 % (1) 6.67 % (1) -
Wanted to keep me in the company 5.56 % (1) 6.67 % (1) 9.09 % (1)
No idea..., denitely not out of kindness 5.56 % (1) 6.67 % (1) 9.09 % (1)
Because he liked me 11.11 % (2) 11.11 % (2) 18.08 % (2)
Did your employer made similar oers to other mini jobbers?
Yes 44.44 % (8) 40 % (6) 36.36 % (4)
No 22.22 % (4) 33.33 % (5) 36.36 % (4)
I don’t know 33.33 % (6) 26.67 % (4) 27.27 % (3)
Total 100 % (18) 100 % (15) 100 % (11)
Notes:This table summarizes question 23-25 that where asked only to individuals asked
yb their employer for adjustment. Number of observations in parentheses.
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Table A.28: Nobody asks for adjustment
All In Mini In Mini
at threshold
Why didn’t you ask for a raise or more hours?
My employer had no nancial resources 3.85 % (1) 5 % (1) -
I didn’t reach the old threshold 7.69 % (2) 10 % (2) -
I thought/knew my employer didn’t needed me 11.45 % (3) 15 % (3) 10 % (1)
I didn’t want to work more/was satised as was 46.15 % (12) 40 % (8) 50 % (5)
I was to shy to ask 7.69 % (2) 10 % (2) 10 % (1)
Other 23.08 % (6) 20 % (4) 30 % (1)
Do you think your employer would have adjusted you if you had asked?
I don’t know 38.46 % (1) 40 % (8) 20 % (2)
Yes 7.69 % (2) 5 % (1) 10 % (1)
No 50 % (2) 50 % (10) 60 % (6)
Prefer not to answer 3.85 % (1) 5 % (1) 10 % (1)
Total 100% (26) 100% (20) 100% (10)
Notes: This table summarizes question 27 and 29 that where asked only to individuals
that did not ask and where not ask whether they could adjust. Number of observations in
parentheses.
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Appendix B
Appendix: The Labor Supply Eects of
Unemployment Insurance for Older Workers
B.1 Budget Set Construction
Budget Set Construction
We assume individuals earn a constant (after tax) wage w and at retirement receive
total pension payments yR (S ) and UI payments yU I (S ). This yields a budget constraint of
the form
C = w (E − s ) + yU I (E) + yR (E)
Here we detail how we compute the budget set. We denote p as the gross pension
replacement rate per year of pension contribution1. In other words, Each year of work
with wage of w will increase pension benets yR (E) by pw . We also denote UI provides
income support of 0.68w . Each year spent on UI increases pension benets yR (E) by
0.8 × pw . We assume individuals take their full UI duration upon exit and then rely on
UA retire, this too can be modied. For illustration purpose, here we assume UA provides
zero income. In the simulation, we assume UA yields 0.30w and workers spendT R −E −P
on UA.
1On average, the net pension replacement rate for an average earner with 45 years of insurance is 70%
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The budget constraint is thus given by:
C = w (E − s ) + bD + 0.8 × pwD × [T −max {T R ,E − s +Tu ]︸                                                      ︷︷                                                      ︸
yU I (E )
+pw (E − s ) × [T −max {T R ,E − s +Tu }]︸                                              ︷︷                                              ︸
yR (E )
Where D is UI duration,Tu is unemployment duration, P is maximum potential UI du-
ration, b is UI benet level,m is the UA benet level. The retirement type r , by denition,
Tu = D ≥ P .
Therefore,
C = Y =

w (E − s ) + bP + pw (E − s + 0.8P )[T −T R] if E < T R − P
w (E − s ) + bP + pw (E − s + 0.8P )[T − (E − s +Tu )] if E ≥ T R − P
The stylized budget sets in Figure 2 make an assumption that worker always retire at
the earliest possible retirement age. Lets take as example the 1924 cohort (where P = 1
and T R = 60). Therefore, the budget set is
C = Y =

w (E − s ) + bP + pw (E − s + 0.8P )[T − 60] if E < 60 − P
w (E − s ) + b (60 − E) + pw (E − s + 0.8 ∗ (60 − E))[T − 60] if E ≥ 60 − P
dY
dE
=

w + pw[T −T R] if E < T R − P
w − b + pw (1 − 0.8)[T −T R] if E ≥ T R − P
Parameters in the budget sets
The baseline busget set by cohort is constructed for the sample of married couple without
dependent children. Given that in our sample, around 80% are married and around 15%
have dependent children, it is representative to construct the life time budget constrain
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for married couple without children. We use the following parameters: s = 20, T = 80,
a = 0.8 and B = 0.68w . The tax rate of married individual with average wage income
and whose spouse makes average wage income for cohort 1924, 1929, 1935, 1941, 1949
and 1951 are 0.22 0.24, 0.22, 0.22, 0.22 and 0.18, respectively 2. The gross average wage
are 19456, 17779, 24886, 24886, 22477 and 22423; and the pension replacement rate p also
varies by cohorts. Moreover, we use a linear approximation to the curved budget set to
measure the changes in slope at the kink point.
The pension replacement rate p
The public pension is calculated on a complex formula of individual career earnings, aver-
age pay, revaluation, and insurance periods. The main determinant of pension payments
is the sum of individual accumulated earnings points (Entgeltpunkte). One pension earn-
ings point (EP) represents annual pension contributions made by a contributor earns av-
erage income. The gross lifetime pension income of a worker who claims old age pension
without nancial adjustment3 and insured for E − s years is the following:
YRдross =
T∑
t=T R
ARt ×
E∑
τ=s
wτ
w¯τ
where ARt is aggregate pension base of year t,wτ is gross individual income in year τ , w¯τ
is the average income of all insured people in the pension system. ARt also represents the
pension value of one EP4. If we assume constant wage and take the mean of ARt and w¯τ ,
YRдross = (T −T R )
AR
w¯
(E − s )wдross = (T −T R ) (E − s )pwдross
where p = ARw¯ is the gross pension replacement rate per year of pension contribution. A
person with 45 years of contribution year has a gross pension replacement rate around
2The tax rates are obtained from https://www.bmf-steuerrechner.de/ekst
3See section for detailed pension calculation when pension types and nancial adjustments are consid-
ered.
4Both ARt and w¯τ are public available information. Table lists ARt and w¯τ of our sample period.
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50%.
Prior to 1982, gross pension is the same as net pension benet. After 1982, pension
is subject to health care contribution (KVdR). This percentage of contribution ranges be-
tween 6.8% and 8.5%.5
YRnet = Y
дross (1−KVdR) = (T −T R ) (E−s )p (1−KVdR)wдross ' (T −T R ) (E−s )p (1−8%)wдross
pnet =
AR
w¯
(1 − KVdR)
Each additional year of S increases life time income by wnet and p (1 − KVdR)wдross .
The p (1 − KVdR) of married individual with average wage income is 0.01128, 0.01077,
0.01173, 0.00969, 0.00953, 0.00945 of the six cohorts, respectively.
5This contribution includes health care insurance contribution and long term care contribution. From
April 1, 2004 pensioners have to pay the full contribution (1.7%) for long-term care insurance instead of
only half of it.
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B.2 Life Cycle Model
Life Cycle Model
Here we describe a life cycle model as in Brown (2013) and how it can be used to estimate
how UI entries vary with maximum PBD duration P (dдtdP ). We assume that all workers
maximize lifetime utility subject to their lifetime budget set. In particular, letT be the last
period of life,C be total consumption and E be the year of exit from the labor force (which
equals total years of work S plus years of schooling s). We assume no discounting and
thatT is known with certainty. We assume the lifetime utility function take the following
function form:
U (C,E) = C − a
1 + 1e
(E
a
)1+ 1e
where e is the labor supply elasticity and a is ability. The heterogeneity is captured by a
a density distribution µ (a). This quasi-linear, iso-elastic utility function rules out income
eect. This model predicts perfect consumption smoothing over the lifecycle: ct = CT .
We assume individuals earn a constant (after tax) wage w and at retirement receive
total pension payments yR (S ) and UI payments yU I (S ) which both will depend on years
worked (in potentially discontinuous and non-dierentiable ways). Note that this yields
a budget constraint: C = w (E − s ) + yU I (E) + yR (E).
Note that we can write the elasticity of exit age with respect to the change in eective
net wage of working an additional period is e = dEE × w
net
dwnet where w
net ≡ w + ∂yU I∂E + ∂y
R
∂E .
This elasticity will be obtained by a bunching estimator.
The FOC of this problem is given by
E = a[wnet ]e
If the distribution of ability µ (a) is smooth, this implies a smooth distribution of exit
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age with density h0(E). We know that a constant potential benet duration of P induces a
convex kink at ageT R−P where the slope of the individual’s budget set exhibits a discrete
decline fromwnetH tow
net
L . Bunching at this kink can be used to recover the elasticity e (see
e.g. Saez, 2010; Kleven, 2016). In particular, under the given utility function, we can use
the fact that the marginal buncher with ability a∗ + ∆a∗ is indierent between locating
at her optimal point under wnet
above
and locating at the kink to get an exact formula for the
elasticity of
e = −
ln
(
1 + ∆E∗E∗
)
ln
(
wnetAbove
wnetBelow
)
The total amount of observed bunching B is given by B =
∫ E∗+∆E∗
E∗ h0(E)dE.
Thus, observed bunching and an estimate of h0(E) can be used to recover e and µ (a).
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B.3 Appendix Tables
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Table B.1: Potential Unemployment Insurance Benet (UIB) Durations as a Function of Age and Months Worked
in Previous 7 Years.
Months Worked January 1983- January 1985- January 1986- July 1987- April 1997∗ - February 2006 - January 2008 -
in prev. X years December 1984 December 1985 June 1987 March 1997 January 2006 December 2007 today (2015)
12 4 4 4 6 6 6 6
16 4 4 4 8 8 8 8
18 6 6 6 8 8 8 8
20 6 6 6 10 10 10 10
24 8 8 8 12 12 12 12
28 8 8 8 14 (≥42) 14 (≥45) 12 12
30 10 10 10 14 (≥42) 14 (≥45) 15 (≥55) 15 (≥50)
32 10 10 10 16 (≥42) 16 (≥45) 15 (≥55) 15 (≥50)
36 12 12 12 18 (≥42) 18 (≥45) 18 (≥55) 18 (≥55)
40 12 12 12 20 (≥44) 20 (≥47) 18 (≥55) 18 (≥55)
42 12 14 (≥49) 14 (≥44) 20 (≥44) 20 (≥47) 18 (≥55) 18 (≥55)
44 12 14 (≥49) 14 (≥44) 22 (≥44) 22 (≥47) 18 (≥55) 18 (≥55)
48 12 16 (≥49) 16 (≥44) 24 (≥49) 24 (≥52) 18 (≥55) 24 (≥58)
52 12 16 (≥49) 16 (≥44) 26 (≥49) 26 (≥52) 18 (≥55) 24 (≥58)
54 12 18 (≥49) 18 (≥49) 26 (≥49) 26 (≥52) 18 (≥55) 24 (≥58)
56 12 18 (≥49) 18 (≥49) 28 (≥54) 28 (≥57) 18 (≥55) 24 (≥58)
60 12 18 (≥49) 20 (≥49) 30 (≥54) 30 (≥57) 18 (≥55) 24 (≥58)
64 12 18 (≥49) 20 (≥49) 32 (≥54) 32 (≥57) 18 (≥55) 24 (≥58)
66 12 18 (≥49) 22 (≥54) 32 (≥54) 32 (≥57) 18 (≥55) 24 (≥58)
72 12 18 (≥49) 24 (≥54) 32 (≥54) 32 (≥57) 18 (≥55) 24 (≥58)
Rahmenfrist - Min emp dur. 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
for new UI eligibility
X - Base Period for P≥12 7 7 7 7 7 5 5
X - Base Period for P<12 4 4 4 3 3 2 2
Replacement Rates on Gross Wages in Percent:
UI (children) 68 68 68 67‡ 67 67 67
UI (no children) 63† 63 63 60‡ 60 60 60
UA (children) 58 58 58 57‡ 57 UIB II UIB II
UA (no children) 53† 53 53 50‡ 50 UIB II UIB II
Source: Hunt (1995), Bundesgesetzblatt (1983-2015) and Dlugosz etal (2013).
∗The reform in 1997 was phased in gradually: For workers who had worked for more than one year during the three years before April 1997, the old rules applied until March
1999 (See Arntz, Simon Lo, and Wilke 2007).
† UI and UA replacement rates were lowered starting in January 1984. Until December 1983, ALG was 68 percent and ALH 58 percent of the previous gross wage, irrespective
of whether the recipient had children.
‡ UI and UA were lowered starting in January of 1994.
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Table B.2: The schedule of earliest retirement age (ERA) by dierent retirement pathways
Pathways 1957 - 2011 2012 - 2020
Regular old age pension 65 from 65 to 67
(qualifying period of 5 years)
1957 - 2005 2006 - 2011 2012 - 2016 2017 till now
Pension due to unemployment 60 60 to 63 63 same as regular
(at least 52 weeks unemployed after 5812 ) old age pension
(qualifying period of 15 years)
1957 - 2016 2017 till now
Pension for women 60 same as regular
(qualifying period of 15 years) old age pension
1957 - 1972 1972 - 2010 2011 2012 - 2025
Pension for long-term insured 65 63 63 to 62 62
(qualifying period of 35 years)
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Table B.3: Retirement age by retirement pathways from 1957 till now
Pathways Time of implementation Aected cohorts SRA Reform
Standard old-age pension 1957 - 2011 <1947 Jan 65 -
(Years of contribution: 56 ) 2012 - 2030 1947 Jan- 1964 Jan 65 to 67 - 2007 Reform
> 2031 ≥1964 Jan 67 -
NRA (no penalty) ERA (earliest possible)
Old-age pension for long-term insured 1972 - 1999 1909 Jan - 1936 Dec 63 - 1972 Reform ‡
(Years of contribution :35 ) 2000 - 2003 1937 Jan - 1938 Dec 63 to 65 63 1992 Reform §
2004 - 2010 1939 Jan - 1947 Dec 65 63
2011 - 2030 1949 Jan - 1964 Jan 65 to 67 63 2007 Reform ∗
Old-age pension due to unemployment 1972 - 1996 < 1937 Jan 60 - 1972 Reform
or part-time work 1997 - 2006 1937 Jan - 1941 Dec 60 to 65 60 1992/99 Reform
(at least 52 weeks unemployed after 58 12 , or 1942 Jan - 1945 Dec 65 60
2 years part-time) 2006 - 2011 1946 Jan - 1948 Dec 65 60 to 63 1992 Reform
(Years of contribution: 15(8 in last 10 yrs) ) 2012 - 2016 1949 Jan - 1951 Dec 65 63
> 2017.1 > 1952 Jan Phased out - 2007 Reform
Old-age pension for women 1957 - 2000 <1940 Jan 60 -
(Years of contribution: 15 (10 after age 40)) 2000 - 2009 1940 Jan - 1944 Dec 60 to 65 60 1992 Reform
2010 - 2016 1945 Jan - 1951 Dec 65 60
> 2017.1 > 1952 Jan Phased out - 2007 Reform
Old-age pension for disabled workers 1972 - 1977 1911 - 1917 62 - 1972 Reform
(Years of contribution: 35) 1978 - 1980 1918 Jan - 1919 Dec 62 to 60 - 1978 Reform
(Loss of at least 50 percent of earnings 1981- 2000 1920 Jan - 1940 Dec 60 -
capability) 2001 - 2006 1941 Jan - 1943 Dec 60 to 63 60 1992 Reform
2007 - 2011 1944 Jan - 1951 Dec 63 60
2012 - 2025 1952 Jan - 1963 Dec 63 to 65 60 to 62 2007 Reform
> 2026 > 1964 Jan 65 62
Old-age pension for especially long-term insured <2016 < 1953 63 -
(qualifying period of 45 years) 2016 - 2028 1953 Jan - 1963 Dec 63 to 65 - 2007 Reform
> 2029.1 > 1964.1.1 65 -
Disability pension : independent of age
<1985 5 years of contribution
> 1985 5 yrs with minimum 3 in last 5 yrs 1984 Reform
† The German public pension system distinguishes "old-age pensions" from "disability pensions": old-age pensions for workers aged 60 and older; and disability benets for
workers below age 60, which at at age 65 are converted to old-age pensions .
‡ The 1972 reform: "exible retirement" after age 63 for long-term insured; retirement at 60 with full benets for women, the unemployed, and older disabled workers.
§ The 1992 reform introduced actuarial adjustment. Since then, we distinguish ERA and NRA. It also increased NRA to 65 for all pathways except for disabled workers. It increased
ERA for the unemployed to 63 (See SGBVI appendix 19).
∗ The 2007 reform increases SRA stepwise between 2012 and 2029 from 65 to 67 for both men and women (see SGB VI 235). For cohorts older born in 1952 and after, retirement
pathway for women and the unemployed are phased out.
Sources: Sozialgesetzbuch (SGB) Sechstes Buch (VI), Börsch-Supan and Jürges (2012), Börsch-Supan and Wilke (2006), Giesecke and Kind (2013).
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Table B.4: Period Specic Restrictions on Working Histories
Periods New Eligibility: Full Eligibility:
contributions* >= 12 months during ... contributions* >= ... during ...
1980-1984 previous 4 years 60 months, previous 7
1986-1987 previous 4 years 72 months, previous 7
1987-1999 previous 3 years 72 months, previous 7
1999-2006 previous 3 years 64 months, previous 7
2006-2007 previous 2 years 48 months, previous 5 years
2008-2010 previous 2 years 48 months, previous 5 years
*As contribution duration we count all regular social security reliable employment relationships. For
simultaneous employment relationships, we take the one with the highest earnings.
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Appendix C
Appendix: The Political Boundaries of Ethnic
Divisions
C.1 Further Background on District Proliferation
Figure C·1 provides a timeline of events over our study period, including major decen-
tralization, redistricting, and electoral reforms. Below, we provide further details on the
implications of redistricting discussed in Section 3.2.2.
Figure C·1: Timeline of Events
Major decentralization laws passed 
First splits in our sample 
Last splits in our sample pre-moratorium 
1st moratorium 
Regulations tighten on splitting 
Last split in our sample 
2nd moratorium 
End of our sample First wave  of splits 
First splits post-moratorium 
Government regulation on splitting 
Parliamentary elections occurred in 2004, 2009, and 2014 
Direct elections of district executive staggered throughout post-2005 period 
1999       2000         2001          2003       2004             2006          2007  2008       2009             2012                 2014 
Sample Period 
Start of our sample 
Size of Government. In the typical district, between 1,200 and 2,000 new jobs are cre-
ated (according to interviews and province-level yearbooks). We have found no evidence
248
that the total number of oces and jobs decrease in the parent district. Thus, the overall
number of civil servants per capita increases substantially, and these newly created jobs
are important for setting and executing public policy.
In addition, there are apportionment gains to redistricting due to the step function rule
used to determine the seat-to-population ratio. Seats in local parliament always weakly
increase with redistricting. For example, an original district with 400,000 people initially
would have 40 seats. If it split into two equally sized districts, each would have 30 seats
for a total of 60 compared with 40 originally.
Fiscal Resources. Redistricting also leads to an increase in transfers from the central
government. We estimate the eects of splitting on total per capita transfers in our sample
using the within-district identication strategy detailed in Section 3.4.1 Once new funds
for the child district start owing in approximately two years after the split, real transfers
at the original district level increase by 18–25 log points o a mean of roughly USD 200
(Table C.1, Panel A, Column 1).2 These revenue increases pass through to signicant
increases in local government expenditures in the following year.
We cannot observe how transfers were divided between child and parent areas be-
fore redistricting. However, one natural benchmark is to assume that pre-split transfers
(T ) were allocated according to population with the parent receiving
(Nparent
N
)
T and the
child receiving
(
Nchild
N
)
T . We use this benchmark to perform two exercises that clarify
the overall scal benets of redistricting and the dierential gains to child districts. First,
we take the original district transfers as given and compare realized transfers post-split
to the expected transfers if they had continued to be allocated proportional to population.
1Initial population is absorbed in the xed eect, and while including time-varying population does
little to change the point estimates, it introduces unnecessary noise as the data is incomplete and requires
estimation and imputation.
2Note that the decline in transfers in the year after splitting reects a short adjustment period when
child district transfers have only slowly started to ow into the new public coers while parent district
transfers have begun to adjust downward to account for their now smaller population.
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Second, we assume that parents and children receive their population shares of the orig-
inal district transfers pre-split (and in the year of the split when nothing yet changes).
Then, we continue this time-series post-split using the actual, observed transfers at these
lower administrative units. This allows us to re-estimate regressions like that in column
1 of Panel A in Table C.1 at the smaller units.
First, we simply compare realized transfers in post-split years at the parent/child level
to expected transfers based on population shares of the realized original district level
transfers in all post-split years. We plot the distribution of these dierences between
actual and expected transfers (based on population shares of the realized original district
transfers) in Figure C·2. This shows the dierence (in USD) for all post-split years and dis-
tricts in our sample but looks comparable if plotted year-by-year. It is evident that children
receive more than expected based on population shares and, consequently, parents less. In
the average post-split year, parents receive USD 7.4 million less than expected (USD 16 per
capita) and children receive USD 5.1 million more (USD 58 per capita). This strongly sug-
gests that the gains from redistricting accrue disproportionately towards children. This
nding is in line with the upfront costs of establishing new government institutions. For
example, around 40–50 percent of expenditures go towards sta, which expanded greatly
in the child but not the parent.
Note that while children gain disproportionately from splitting, parents nevertheless
tend to see an increase in transfers as well. To see this, suppose that parents received their
population share of original district transfers pre-split. Parents receive a lower share of a
larger total transfer ‘pie’. In practice, this still results in an increase in transfers per capita
at the parent level as made clear in the second exercise.
Second, columns 2–4 of Panel A in Table C.1 make these patterns even clearer by
showing that both parents and children benet from splitting in terms of real transfers, but
children clearly benet more. Parent districts experience roughly a 19 log point increase
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in long-run transfers relative to the pre-split period (column 3), whereas child districts
experience a 59 log point increase (column 4). While these results are subject to strong
assumptions about the pre-split allocation of transfers, dierent assumptions are unlikely
to explain away the main takeaways that (i) overall transfers increase in both parent and
child districts, and (ii) child districts benet relatively more than parent districts.
Proximity to Government. In addition to receiving increased transfers, child dis-
trict residents experience a signicant reduction in the average distance to government
institutions. Panel B of Table C.1 shows how reported travel distance to the capital (in
kilometers) changed after splitting. These estimates are based on reports by the village
head in 2000 and 2011 from Podes, which we aggregate to 2010 district borders using pop-
ulation weights. While parent districts experienced little change in distance to the capital,
child districts register an average reduction of around 55 km o of a pre-split mean of 100
km.
Finally, note that these changes imply a signicant reduction in the size of the pop-
ulation governed by any given district. According to Census data from 2000, districts
based on 2000 boundaries have a median population of 400,000 whereas the 2010 district
boundaries imply a median of 250,000.
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Figure C·2: Comparing Fiscal Transfers Between Parent and Child Dis-
tricts
Notes: This gure plots the density of the dierence in actual versus expected scal transfers for parent and child
districts post-split under the assumption that the expected transfers are allocated proportional to population
share of the original district.
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Table C.1: Splitting-Induced Changes in Transfer Revenue and Distance
to Capital
Panel A: Eects on ln(total scal transfers)
Administrative Unit Original Parent Parent Child
District Child
(1) (2) (3) (4)
≤ 2 Years Pre-Split 0.073* -0.005 0.028 -0.017
(0.041) (0.032) (0.030) (0.038)
1 Year Pre-Split reference period
Year of split -0.029 -0.022 0.002 -0.035
(0.023) (0.026) (0.021) (0.035)
1 Year after Split -0.113* 0.073* 0.252*** -0.047
(0.059) (0.041) (0.051) (0.061)
2 Years after Split 0.093 0.314*** 0.211*** 0.368***
(0.057) (0.047) (0.051) (0.060)
3 Years after Split 0.180*** 0.474*** 0.263*** 0.596***
(0.058) (0.042) (0.051) (0.052)
4 Years after Split 0.246*** 0.500*** 0.290*** 0.620***
(0.064) (0.038) (0.056) (0.047)
5+ Years after Split 0.207*** 0.444*** 0.187*** 0.593***
(0.053) (0.050) (0.058) (0.064)
No. of District–Years 765 1,965 765 1,200
Dep. Var. Mean 26.6 25.6 26.0 25.3
Panel B: Eects on Distance to District Capital (kilometers)
Pre-Split Mean Mean Change Median Change
Parent Districts 48.9 -5.7 -1.14
[33.3] [18.2]
Child Districts 99.8 -55.5 -38.5
[79.5] [8.04]
Notes: Panel A reports a regression of log per capita transfer revenue in real 2010 USD (see Appendix C.7) on
dummies pre- and post-split as well as district xed eects, year xed eects, and district-specic time trends.
Details on the transfer time series are discussed in the text above. Standard errors are clustered at the original
district level. Panel B reports the average change in distance to the capital in kilometers, constructed from the
Podes 2000 and 2011 administrative censuses, for parent (and child districts separately. We are missing data for
a small number of the districts in Aceh in 2003. Standard deviations in brackets.
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C.2 Further Background on the Conict Data
C.2.1 Indonesia’s National Violence Monitoring System (SNPK)
Indonesia’s National Violence Monitoring System (NVMS) or SNPK by its Indonesian
acronym (Sistem Nasional Pemantauan Kekerasan) is among the world’s largest single-
country, geospatial conict databases. After compiling several million images from over
120 carefully screened local newspapers, data entrants classify the nature of violence un-
derlying each reported event into one of the 10 categories listed below in Table C.2.3 There
are further subcategories within each category of conict. For example, when available,
each event also includes information on the number of deaths, injuries and buildings de-
stroyed.4
3The data report other information about each event such as the actors involved, the organizational form
of violence (e.g., riot, kidnapping), weapons used, and outcome of external intervention. While potentially
useful, this information is much less systematic and comprehensive than the categorization into types of
violence, which is the most directly related to the conceptual framework and broader interest in the paper.
4Some incidents have no injuries, deaths, or property damage reported in the data due, among others,
to missing information in newspaper reports. However, nearly 85 percent have such information, and our
results are robust to restricting to those. Nevertheless, like the other information on events, these details
are measured with error even if available. Hence, we view the actual reporting of any event as the most
accurate measure of conict incidence.
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Table C.2: Violence Categories in the SNPK
Resource Conict Violence triggered by resource disputes (land, mining, access to employment, salary, pollu-
tion, etc.).
Governance Conict Violence is triggered by government policies or programs (public services, corruption, sub-
sidy, region splitting, etc).
Popular Justice Conict Violence perpetrated to respond to/punish actual or perceived wrong (group violence only).
Elections and Appointment
Conict
Conict Violence triggered by electoral competition or bureaucratic appointments.
Separatist Conict Violence triggered by eorts to secede from the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia
(NKRI).
Identity-Based Conict Violence triggered by group identity (religion, ethnicity, tribe, etc).
Other Conict Violence triggered by other issue.
Violence During Law En-
forcement
Violent action taken by members of formal security forces to perform law-enforcement
functions (includes use of violence mandated by law as well as violence that exceeds man-
date for example torture or extrajudicial-shooting).
Violent Crime Criminal violence not triggered by prior dispute or directed towards specic targets.
Domestic Violence Physical violence perpetrated by family member(s) against other family member(s) living
under one roof/same house including against domestic workers and violence between co-
habiting couples.
As discussed in Section 3.4.2, we rely on this rich, human-led classication system
to isolate social conict as opposed to (unorganized) interpersonal violence or crime. Of
course, the lines between categories are often fuzzy.5 Nevertheless, in a robustness check
in Appendix C.4.6, we eectively show that our core results are not driven by the par-
ticular measure of social conict. Moreover, as proof of concept, it is reassuring that the
dierential social conict around mayoral elections in Table 3.5 is indeed driven in large
part by violence categorized as “elections and appointments conict.”
Event Descriptions. The following Appendix C.2.2 provides several examples of events
5This description from the data manual provides further background that may be illustrative: “According
to NVMS system, violent crime comprises acts of violence that occur without any prior dispute between
parties. The motivation behind a criminal act can be monetary, for example, robbery or abduction; or
personal pleasure, for example, rape or serial killings. In contrast, violence in the context of conict occurs
due to pre-existing disputes between those involved such as dispute over land, election, religion or other
such matters. As such, in the NVMS system, an act of killing can be coded as ‘Conict’ if there is a dispute
behind it, e.g., in a killing of a certain group gure by other groups, or can be coded as ‘Crime’ if there is
no pre-existing dispute between parties, for example, serial killings.”
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in the “elections and appointment” conict category. Below, we provide examples from a
few of the other categories beginning with “governance”, which, like
elections/appointments, is plausibly responsive to a similar sort of sociopolitical changes
associated with redistricting.
1. Pontianak City, 24 July 2006: Hundreds of residents from 6 villages came to the of-
ce of Sungai Kunyit Subdistrict. They protested the perceived unfair distribution of
the unconditional cash transfer (BLT) funds. They then threw a chair at the sight of
a BPS (Central Statistical Agency) representative. Some community leaders and the
subdistrict head calmed the masses.
2. Kotawaringin Timur District, 21 June 2012: People burnt a temporary bridge in
Seruyan Hilir subdistrict because they argued that the government took too long to
build the main permanent bridge.
3. Singkawang District, 5 December 2008: Protests led by Front Pembela Islam (FPI),
Front Pembela Melayu (FPM), and Aliansi LSM Perintis Singkawang. They argued that
dragon statue is a religious symbol, and hence a public road is not the proper place to
build that symbol. In addition, the dragon statue is perceived as Chinese symbol. FPI
claimed that symbols for particular ethnic groups cannot be placed in public places.
Note that the last example above could clearly have also been classied as ‘Identity-Based
Conict’, pointing to the fuzziness across categories as noted earlier. As noted in Section
3.6.2, there are also numerous governance incidents involving violence directed at the
public electricity monopoly (PLN) centered on frustration with electricity allocation. A
few examples follow:
1. Tapanuli Selatan District, 23 November 2011: In the oce of PLN . . . , about 200
people demonstrated and damaged the oce. The action was triggered by anger over
electricity being out for three months.
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2. Sumbawa District, 14 December 2014: In the oce of PLN . . . , there was an attack
perpetrated by local residents on the head of Human Resources. The incident started
when hundreds of residents went to the PLN oce to protest the frequent power outages
in the last 4 months and the recent total power outage for two days without notice.
Angry demonstrators hit the HR’s head, leaving him injured. Fortunately, the action
did not escalate further because the military, police and village heads intervened to
quell emotions.
A few other illustrative examples come from the “resource conict” category:
1. Aceh Singkil District, 30 May 2011: Two hundred people demonstrated in front of the
mayor’s oce of Aceh Singkil in relation to land disputes with companies of Malaysian
origin. They also demanded a fair and xed land [compensation].
2. Halmahera Tengah, 30 Jan 2012: Hundreds of East Halmahera residents burned tires
and blocked roads at the PT Kemakmuran Pertiwi Tambang (PT Harita Grup) nickel
mining site in Loleba village.
Comparison toOtherConict Data. The SNPK data oer several advantages over two
alternative sources of information on violence in Indonesia. First, it oers more compre-
hensive temporal coverage than the triennial Potensi Desa (or Podes) data, which records
information on the violent events at the village-level over the prior three-year period. This
coarse coverage would not allow for the systematic generalized dierence-in-dierence
identication strategy we deploy here. Moreover, Podes accounts are based on the self-
reports of village leaders as opposed to the plausibly more objective, cross-validated news-
papers reports in the SNPK.
Second, the SNPK oers signicantly more comprehensive coverage compared to a
widely used, cross-country, subnational data source. The Uppsala Conict Data Program
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(UCDP) Georeferenced Event Data (GED) (Sundberg and Melander, 2013) has been fruit-
fully deployed in a range of subnational conict studies and with particular success in
sub-Saharan Africa alongside the widely used Armed Conict Location & Event Data
Project (ACLED) data. The UCDP-GED is available for Indonesia whereas the ACLED is
not (yet). Mapping the UCDP-GED events to our original district monthly panel, we nd
very limited coverage of social conict events in Indonesia. While SNPK covers 223 of the
230 original district–month incidents in the UCDP-GED data, there are 4,795 additional
district–months with social conict incidents in the SNPK. Together, these violent events
involve nearly 5,000 deaths over a 15 year period. The more limited coverage by UCDP-
GED is explained by both its more narrow focus on large-scale conict and by its reliance
on international news sources and or English-based ones in Jakarta. The SNPK oers
much deeper coverage precisely because it digitized millions of old newspapers from out-
lying regions of the country that allowed for coverage of violence that may have otherwise
missed the attention of international reporters. Barron et al. (2016) oer a more system-
atic comparison (for all of Indonesia) by applying particular restrictions in the SNPK that
more closely match those applied in the UCDP-GED. Their conclusion is similar to ours;
the UCDP-GED cover around one-third of the events and and deaths reported in the SNPK.
Costs of Conict. The violent episodes in SNPK can be costly. Even if we examine the
least violent years and restrict to social conict, we observe around 500 annual deaths,
7,000 annual injuries, and 1,500 annual buildings damaged. Including crime and domes-
tic violence more than doubles these numbers. Using a methodology due to Fearon and
Hoeer (2014), we estimate that the direct costs of social conict in the post-2005 period
range from 0.2–0.5% of GDP.
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C.2.2 Electoral Violence in the SNPK
As discussed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.2, Harish and Toha (2017) use the SNPK data to iden-
tify three salient types of electoral violence in Indonesia: (1) voter-targeting is “any kind
of election-related violence that aects voters’ preferences participation in elections”, (2)
candidate-targeting directs violence towards “candidates themselves and those around
them by intimidating them into withdrawing and/or physically and forcefully removing
them from the race”, and (3) government-aimed is “violence mounted against a govern-
ment agency responsible for monitoring and enforcing rules of elections.” The authors
use SNPK data combined with supplementary reporting to categorize over 1,000 episodes
of local election violence in Indonesia since 2005. Attacks targeting candidates are the
most common, occurring on 35 percent of the days in a six month window centered on
the election. Voter-targeting occurred in 25 percent of those days, and agency-targeting
on 17 percent of days. Not surprisingly, most candidate-targeting is concentrated in the
lead-up to the election with attacks on election-related government agencies occurring
thereafter.
Drawing upon the same SNPK data, we provide some concrete examples of incident
reports that clarify the types of electoral violence underlying these patterns. The follow-
ing are district-specic examples that we translate from the SNPK:
1. Aceh Singkil District, 2 November 2013: Protest at Komisi Independen Pemilihan
(KIP, Independent Commission for Elections) by supporters of Aan Alan-Pianti Mala
(Walikota-WakilWalikota [mayor–vice mayor] candidate) regarding fraud inmayoral
election. Seven people were reported seriously injured. The election took place on
29 October.
2. Aceh Barat Daya District, 28 June 2012: Supporters of FD (mayoral candidate for
Aceh Barat Daya) were attacked by their competitors in Kuala Terubu Village and
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Alue Sungai Pinang village. The election took place on 9 April 2012.
3. Halmahera Utara District, 16 April 2005: Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah (KPUD,
Local General Elections Commission) oce and the house of the Partai Demokrasi Ke-
bansaan (PDK) chairman were destroyed by people because one of the candidate was
not selected in mayor–vice mayor ticket. Two buildings were damaged and one de-
stroyed. The election took place on 27 June 2005.
4. Kepulauan Sula District, 12 May 2005: Molotov bombing of the local Electoral Com-
mission oce due to anger with the decision about four mayoral candidates. The elec-
tion took place on 27 June 2005.
5. Pulau Morotai District, 21 May 2011: Mass supporters of RS and WP [mayoral can-
didate and running mate] who did not accept the decision of the Morotai Electoral
Commission in the election took action in the Morotai air force base, South Morotai,
northern Maluku, by trying to break. . . Four people were injured, and one building
was damaged. Subsequent violent incidents were reported on May 26 and 27. The
election took place on 16 May 2011.
6. Kotawaringin Timur, 6 June 2005: Incident between supporters of mayoral candi-
dates Wahyu-Amrullah and Thamrina-Mullan Safri because one of them established
billboard in the other candidates’ area (Seruyan) K Timur: On Jalan Mayjen Suprapto,
Seruyan Hilir subdistrict, billboard of mayoral candidate was destroyed, occurred
around mayoral election time. In Danau Sembuluh subdistrict, AS (legislative member
candidate for Dapil [electoral region] II) was attacked by people (one of them was leg-
islative member candidate for Dapil [electoral districdt] II). Two people were seriously
injured. The election took place on 23 June 2005.
7. Bengakayang, 21 May 2010: In the Local Electoral Commission oce, demonstrations
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took place with rioters throwing stones at the building and ocials out of anger over
the election outcome. One building was damaged. The election took place on 19 May
2010.
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C.3 Cross-District Correlations between Diversity and Conict
We document here the strong positive correlation between ethnic diversity and conict
for Indonesian districts as noted in Section 3.3.1. Figure C·3 below presents the raw cor-
relations between ethnic diversity and the log of total social conict incidents per month
from 2000 to 2014 for 164 original districts (outside Papua). Note that some of these dis-
tricts enter the SNPK data in 2005, and hence we scale by total months. These include
the 52 original districts in our analysis of redistricting as well as 112 other districts that
did not split between 2000 and 2010. The strong positive correlations of conict with
F ractionalization and Polarization are consistent with previous cross-sectional work. In
terms of normalized magnitudes, the correlations are very similar for F and P—a one
standard deviation increase implies an 18 log point increase in conict incidence—and
signicant at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. The graphs also look similar when
using the average of binary monthly indicators of any social conict.
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Figure C·3: Ethnic Diversity and Social Conict in Indonesian Districts
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Notes: These gures plot the log incidence of social conict per month from 2000 to 2014
against initial diversity levels based on 2000 district boundaries. The observations are
scaled by population size of those districts.
In Section 3.3.1, we report eect sizes of 8 (15) percent for P (F ), which are based on an
analogous pooled monthly panel specication using an indicator for any social conict
as in our main regressions. We include month and province xed eects to sweep out
broad regional and temporal dierences in the diversity–conict relationship. Formally,
the estimates are given by:
Pr (social conf lictdt ) = α+ 0.096
(0.027)∗∗∗
f ractionalizationd+ 0.051
(0.020)∗∗∗
polarizationd+θt+θp (d )+εdt
(C.1)
where standard errors are clustered by district, and the mean outcome is 0.63. The re-
sults are unchanged when including religious polarization, which has null eects of 0.012
(0.027).
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C.4 Robustness Checks on the Main Results in Section 3.5
This Appendix discusses the main robustness checks discussed throughout the paper.
C.4.1 Outliers and Inuential Observations: Robust Estimation and Inference
This section shows that our simple and generalized dierence-in-dierence are robust
to and, in fact, strengthened by a principled removal of outliers. Moreover, despite the
relatively small eective sample sizes, our qualitative takeaways remain unchanged across
a battery of alternative approaches to inference.
Small-Sample Robustness in Simple DiD
Figure 3·6 presented the raw dierence-in-dierence estimates relating ∆diversity to
changes in the likelihood of social conict after redistricting. These graphs are restricted
to the 38 original districts that split after entering the SNPK data. We further omit one ex-
treme outlier with ∆P greater than six standard deviations below the mean and identied
as extremely high-leverage using any approach to outlier detection (including the Belsley
et al. (2005) method used in the generalized DiD results below). Leaving this outlier in the
analysis renders the ∆P eect null, which is precisely why it is singled out in any outlier
detection method aimed at honing in regressions around central tendencies. The gures
showed a strong positive correlation between ∆P and conict but a null correlation with
∆F . We show here that the estimated results are robust to alternative treatment of outliers,
small-sample inference, and simultaneous regression with both ∆P and ∆F .
Table C.3 presents estimates underlying the regression lines in Figure C.3. These are
in columns 3 and 6. Columns 1, 4, and 7 are estimates based on the full sample includ-
ing the extreme outlier. Columns 2, 5, and 8 implement the Huber (1973) method of ro-
bust regression that removes extreme outlier observations (the same one identied us-
ing the Belsley et al. (2005) method) and further down-weights large residual observa-
264
tions through an iterative process. Columns 3, 6 and 9 report OLS regressions omitting
this objectively identied outlier. The standard errors in the OLS columns are robust
to heteroskedasticity. Together, these results clarify the main ndings from the simple
dierence-in-dierence showing that changes in ethnic polarization are are signicantly
associated with changes in violence on average. Table C.4 shows that a range of alter-
native approaches to inference—dealing with clustering and the small (eective) sample
size—leave these baseline qualitative ndings unchanged.
Table C.3: Simple Dierence-in-Dierence Estimates
Estimator OLS RReg OLS OLS RReg OLS OLS RReg OLS
Outlier Excluded No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.014 0.001 0.002 -0.003 -0.017 -0.021
(0.043) (0.029) (0.038) (0.043) (0.028) (0.035)
∆ ethnic polarization -0.034 0.077*** 0.068** -0.033 0.082*** 0.074**
(0.032) (0.026) (0.027) (0.035) (0.028) (0.028)
Number of Original Districts 38 37 37 38 37 37 38 37 37
R2 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.21 0.18 0.04 0.20 0.19
Notes: This table reports the regression coecients in columns 3 and 6 corresponding
to the simple dierence-in-dierence estimates in Figure 3·6 in the paper. The RReg
columns are based on the robust regression method of Huber (1973), which removes ex-
treme outliers and down-weights inuential observations. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity in the OLS columns. Signicance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table C.4: Simple DiD Estimates: Alternative Inference
∆F ∆P
DiD Estimate -0.021 0.074
Standard Errors
Robust (0.035) (0.028)**
HC2 (0.039) (0.029)**
HC3 (0.046) (0.031)**
Wild Bootstrap [p-value] [0.545] [0.052]*
HC2 + Imbens and Kolesar (2016) DoF Adjustment (0.049) (0.035)**
Young (2016) Eective DoF Adjustment (0.037) (0.029)**
Clustering by Province (13) (0.042) (0.025)**
Wild Bootstrap [p-value] [0.665] [0.067]*
HC2 + Imbens and Kolesar (2016) DoF Adjustment (0.090) (0.038)**
Young (2016) Eective DoF Adjustment (0.048) (0.027)**
Notes: This table demonstrates the robustness of the inference in the column 9 specica-
tion in Table C.3, using alternative clustering and degrees of freedom adjustment proce-
dures.
Small-Sample Robustness in Generalized DiD
As with the simple DiD estimates above, one also worries about outliers in our main gen-
eralized DiD specication based on the monthly district-level panel. However, the use of
district xed eects and time trends can help rule out some of the high leverage obser-
vations that might otherwise drive the results as they do in simpler DiD specications.
Indeed, our baseline results include all observations, and while outliers can still matter,
we show here that a principled approach to their removal does not change our ndings
and, if anything, strengthens them.
Point Estimates. We begin by demonstrating graphically how outliers aect the main
results in Table 3.3. We adopt the widely used approach of Belsley et al. (2005) to identify
observations with high inuence as captured by a d f betaki measure, which captures the
dierence between the regression coecient θ for variable k when the ith observation
is included versus excluded, with the dierence being further scaled by the estimated
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standard error on the regressor coecient, θk . Belsley et al. (2005, p. 28) recommend
as a rule-of-thumb to remove all observations for which |d f betaki | > 2/
√
N where N is
the number of observations. Other authors recommend weaker cutos of 1 (Bollen and
Jackman, 1990).
To visualize outliers detected using this method, Figure C·4 plots the baseline partial
regression coecients and scatterplot of residuals for the original district, parent and
child specications in columns 1, 3, and 4 of Table 3.3. The red circles identify those
residuals with high |d f betai | for ∆P . The black lines correspond to our baseline estimate,
and the gray lines are estimates based on removing the inuential observations. The only
regression line that seems signicantly aected by the inclusion of outliers is post-split ×
∆P at the original district level, which becomes more starkly positive when removing the
high-inuence observations. Panel B of Table C.5 presents the corresponding regression
results alongside our baseline estimates for reference in Panel A.6
6We focus here on outliers in ∆P , but a similar exercise for ∆F suggests that it is also fairly insensitive
to outliers.
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Figure C·4: Principled Removal of Outliers from Baseline Estimates of
Table 3.3
(a) Original Districts
(b) Parent Districts
(c) Child Districts
Notes: These gures present the partial regression plots for post-split ×∆P in our baseline
regressions. The black regression line and 95 percent condence interval are the results
from columns 1 (a), 3 (b), and 4 (c) of Table 3.3. The red observations are district-months
identied by the Belsley et al. (2005) method for removing outliers described earlier. The
gray regression line and 95 percent condence interval are based on removing those ob-
servations and re-running the baseline regressions.
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Table C.5: Robustness to Dropping Outliers
Administrative Unit Original Parent Parent Child
District and
Child
Boundaries 2000 2010 2010 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Baseline
post-split -0.012 -0.003 -0.010 -0.010
(0.025) (0.021) (0.032) (0.026)
post-split × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.036** 0.032 0.026** 0.045*
(0.018) (0.019) (0.013) (0.026)
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.003 0.000 0.062 -0.010
(0.019) (0.012) (0.046) (0.017)
Number of District-Months 7,956 20,220 7,956 12,264
Dep. Var. Mean Pre-Split 0.57 0.33 0.47 0.25
Panel B: Belsley et al. (2005) Removal of
post-split × ∆P Residual Outliers
post-split -0.005 -0.009 -0.010 -0.011
(0.025) (0.022) (0.027) (0.025)
post-split × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.082*** 0.024*** 0.040*** 0.029**
(0.016) (0.007) (0.014) (0.013)
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.027 0.008 0.045* -0.007
(0.018) (0.013) (0.025) (0.018)
Number of District-Months 7,700 19,761 7,789 11,927
Notes: This table compares our baseline results in Panel A to results in Panel B that exclude
outliers using the procedure from Figure C·4. Signicance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ :
1%.
Inference. Besides inuencing point estimates and implied eect sizes, outliers and small
sample sizes more generally can also aect inference. For similar reasons noted above in
the simple DiD, we consider in Table C.6 several alternative approaches to inference in
the generalized DiD panel setup. We reproduce the baseline point estimates and standard
errors clustered at the original district level as would be suggested by the usual Bertrand,
Duo, and Mullainathan (2004) motivation for clustering in xed eects DiD designs.
Below those, we present a series of standard errors or p-values. First, we consider the
Conley (1999) spatial HAC estimator that allows for contemporaneous correlation in un-
observables between all districts within 500 km in addition to the usual within-district
correlation over time. Results are similar using other distance bandwidth. Second, we
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two-way cluster on both original district and month using the method of Cameron, Gel-
bach, and Miller (2011). This is roughly equivalent to a spatial HAC with an innite band-
width. Third, we implement a cluster wild bootstrap procedure to deal with the relatively
small number of clusters (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller, 2008). Fourth, we take seriously
the quasi-random timing of redistricting seen in Table 3.1 and implement a randomiza-
tion inference procedure that randomly reassigns ∆diversity across each of the districts
in the given regression before estimation. We repeat this 50,000 times and recover the
implied nearly exact p-values.7 Finally, we adopt the new “eective degrees of freedom
adjustment” due to Young (2016), who adjusts standard errors by the eective sample size
implied by the inuence of each observation.8 Overall, the main qualitative takeaway of
signicant eects of ∆P remain largely unchanged.
Interestingly, the main exception lies in the “eective degrees of freedom adjustment”
approach, which leads to signicant increases in the standard errors (though all t-statistics
remain over one). Given that this method leans heavily on the role of outliers, it is not
surprising that the upward adjustment in standard errors is much smaller when rst re-
moving outliers using the Belsley et al. (2005) approach. Table C.7 implements this simul-
taneous removal of outliers and adjustment of inference to account for remaining high
inuence observations. Together, this delivers the most consistent evidence that ∆P ex-
erts a signicant positive eect on social conict.
7These are nearly exact as they do not recover the entire distribution of possible estimates as there
2D possible ways to reassign ∆diversity across D districts and with a relatively large number of D > 50
across all specications, this would require far longer than necessary to identify the general shape of the
distribution (and size of the tails) of estimated coecient sizes.
8This novel approach to inference delivers coecient-specic degrees-of-freedom (DoF). For example,
for ∆P , the DoF across columns 1–4 are 11.3, 4.7, 6.2, and 5.6.
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Table C.6: Robustness to Alternative Inference Procedures
Administrative Unit Original Parent Parent Child
District and
Child
Boundaries 2000 2010 2010 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
post-split -0.012 -0.003 0.001 -0.005
baseline: clustering on original district (OD) (0.025) (0.021) (0.032) (0.026)
spatial HAC, 500 km uniform bandwidth (0.024) (0.013) (0.024) (0.014)
two-way clustering on OD and month (0.027) (0.022) (0.029) (0.025)
eective degrees of freedom adjustment (0.026) (0.022) (0.034) (0.026)
wild bootstrap, clustering on OD [p-value] [0.648] [0.911] [0.970] [0.838]
randomization inference [p-value] [0.879] [0.994] [0.654] [0.991]
post-split × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.036 0.032 0.027 0.043
baseline: clustering on original district (OD) (0.018)** (0.019) (0.013)** (0.026)*
spatial HAC, 500 km uniform bandwidth (0.016)** (0.005)*** (0.014)* (0.008)***
two-way clustering on OD and month (0.017)** (0.019)* (0.013)** (0.024)*
eective degrees of freedom adjustment (0.029) (0.023) (0.019) (0.030)
wild bootstrap, clustering on OD [p-value] [0.114] [0.174] [0.173] [0.474]
randomization inference [p-value] [0.103] [0.022]** [0.145] [0.019]**
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.003 0.000 0.035 -0.011
baseline: clustering on original district (0.019) (0.012) (0.046) (0.017)
spatial HAC, 500 km uniform bandwidth (0.021) (0.011) (0.012)*** (0.014)
two-way clustering on OD and month (0.015) (0.012) (0.026) (0.020)
eective degrees of freedom adjustment (0.022) (0.013) (0.030) (0.021)
wild bootstrap, clustering on OD [p-value] [0.873] [0.980] [0.222] [0.591]
randomization inference [p-value] [0.557] [0.489] [0.074]* [0.708]
Number of District-Months 7,956 20,220 7,956 12,264
Dep. Var. Mean Pre-Split 0.57 0.33 0.47 0.25
Notes: This table presents the suite of alternative inference procedures for our baseline
specication as detailed above. Signicance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table C.7: Robustness to Outliers and Eective Sample Size Inference
Administrative Unit Original Parent Parent Child
District and
Child
Boundaries 2000 2010 2010 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
post-split -0.005 -0.009 -0.010 -0.011
baseline: clustering on original district (OD) (0.025) (0.022) (0.027) (0.025)
eective degrees of freedom adjustment (0.026) (0.022) (0.028) (0.026)
post-split × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.082 0.024 0.040 0.029
baseline: clustering on original district (OD) (0.016)*** (0.007)*** (0.014)*** (0.013)**
eective degrees of freedom adjustment (0.023)*** (0.009)** (0.021)* (0.016)
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.027 0.008 0.045 -0.007
baseline: clustering on original district (OD) (0.018) (0.013) (0.025)* (0.018)
eective degrees of freedom adjustment (0.020) (0.013) (0.028) (0.020)
Number of District-Months 7,700 19,761 7,789 11,927
Notes: This table demonstrates robustness to both outlier removal and the eective de-
grees of freedom adjustment developed by Young (2016).
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C.4.2 Ruling Out Confounding Eects of Other Initial District Characteristics
As discussed in Section 3.5.4, we take several steps to address the concern that the eects
of ∆diversity on conict are confounded by omitted district-specic characteristics that
also dierentially matter after redistricting. We follow the standard method of assess-
ing omitted variable bias in heterogeneous eects DiD specications, namely interacting
treatment (post-split) with other factors besides the primary one(s) of interest (∆diversity)
and assessing coecient stability. The key question is how to select those variables. We
consider two approaches: one, subjective and researcher-driven, and a second, more ob-
jective and machine-led. In both cases, we marshal a large set of variables across Census,
administrative, and GIS-based data sources, mapping each measure to the district level of
analysis in the given specication. All variables are time-invariant or predetermined as
measured in 1999 or 2000.
First, we consider groups of variables plausibly correlated with diversity and conict
based on prior literature and intuition. After reproducing our baseline estimate in column
(1), Tables C.8–C.11 present results based on variables broadly capturing: (2) proximity to
security forces, (3) economic development, (4) public goods, (5) demographics, (6) natural
resource intensity, (7) political factors, (8) economic structure, (9) geography/topography,
and (10) remoteness. Across all specications at dierent administrative levels, the esti-
mated eects of ∆diversity are statistically indistinguishable from the baseline in column
1. While reassuring, these tables are nevertheless subject to researcher degrees of freedom
in which variables we include and how we combine them across dierent columns.
Therefore, we address such concerns by taking a second, more agnostic approach to
variable selection based on the double-selection post-Lasso method of Belloni et al. (2014)
to identify covariates that are particularly important in explaining both diversity and so-
cial conict. We elaborate briey on this method here.
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We assume thatpost-split×∆P andpost-split×∆F can be taken as exogenous, once one
controls linearly for a relatively small number of variables–a simple sparsity assumption.
The method uses a three-step approach to help the researcher determine which controls
to include. First, we select, from the set of post-split × control variables, the covariates
that predict post-split × ∆P , and separately, post-split × ∆F , conditioning on the usual
baseline xed eects. This rst step accounts for important confounding factors that are
related to ∆P and ∆F . We use 65 post-split × control variables (detailed in Appendix C.7),
drawn from key Indonesian data sources that cover 1999/2000 and are granular enough to
construct controls at the eventual 2010 boundaries. Selection is accomplished using Lasso.
The Lasso penalty parameter λ is a choice parameter, so we consider a range of values that
yield a reasonable number of controls in the nal step. In the second step, we select vari-
ables that predict the incidence of social conict from the same set of post-split × control
variables, again conditioning on the baseline specication. This step, also operational-
ized using Lasso, helps capture any important predictors of changes in violence intensity,
which keeps residual variance small and can identify additional confounds. Finally, we
estimate our baseline OLS equation including the union of selected controls from these
two prior stages (hence post-lasso). Inference is uniformly valid for a large class of models
under the assumed sparsity condition.
Table 3.4 showed that our main results are unchanged when including these machine-
selected covariate interactions with post-split . The fact that these machine-chosen co-
variates do not alter our results provides some reassurance that the relationship between
post-split changes in the incidence of violence are driven by cross-district variation in ∆P
and not other observable, cross-district variation. Figure C·5 below shows further that
these results are robust to varying the penalty parameter, λ, allowing for the inclusion of
more or fewer additional covariates.9 We see that the estimated eects of ∆diversity are
9In practice, the variable selection tends to pick variables that predict post-split×∆P and post-split×∆F ,
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fairly stable across λ despite large changes in the number of controls selected. In some
cases, estimated eects drop and become noisier as we drop λ and grow the number of
controls, which is to be expected.
rather than social conict. The full listing of included covariates in each specication, including the baseline,
are available upon request.
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Table C.8: Robustness to Additional Controls × Post-Split, Original Dis-
trict Level
+ controls for: – sec. forces development pub. goods demog. nat. res. politics occup. geog. remoteness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
post-split -0.012 -0.017 -0.017 -0.011 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.013 -0.012 -0.018
(0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025)
× ∆ ethnic polarization 0.036** 0.037* 0.034* 0.036** 0.028 0.039** 0.036* 0.036* 0.030** 0.034*
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.014) (0.018)
× ∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.003 0.005 0.000 -0.003 -0.021 -0.007 -0.010 -0.013 -0.022 0.004
(0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.017) (0.017)
× ∆ religious polarization 0.014 0.021 0.015 0.030** -0.000 0.017 0.009 0.014 0.026 0.023
(0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.018)
× log distance to security post -0.009
(0.019)
× log distance to police station 0.037
(0.024)
× nighttime light intensity -0.011
(0.018)
× share with > primary education -0.014
(0.024)
× distance to public market -0.007
(0.026)
× share villages with electricity -0.025
(0.025)
× share villages with safe water 0.018
(0.026)
× share villages with street light 0.019
(0.032)
× share villages with transport center 0.055***
(0.014)
× health centers per capita -0.015
(0.028)
× high schools per capita 0.020
(0.019)
× log initial population 0.027
(0.020)
× population share, 5–14 0.063*
(0.034)
× population share, 15-49 0.052**
(0.026)
× nat. resource revenue per capita 0.020*
(0.010)
× cash crop share of total ag. output 0.025
(0.022)
× share of land area with forest -0.013
(0.016)
× parliamentary vote polarization -0.019
(0.019)
× scal transfers per capita -0.014
(0.016)
× share in agriculture -0.012
(0.044)
× share in forestry/shing 0.019
(0.044)
× share in other -0.007
(0.041)
× land area 0.031**
(0.015)
× share villages on coast -0.278**
(0.131)
× share villages in valley -0.156**
(0.076)
× share villages on hill -0.199*
(0.104)
× share villages on atland -0.239**
(0.115)
× shares villages in highlands 0.026
(0.043)
× log elevation -0.004
(0.026)
× log distance to coast 0.020
(0.041)
× log distance to river 0.025
(0.033)
× log distance to subdistrict capital 0.020
(0.030)
× log distance to district capital 0.003
(0.037)
× log distance to major roads 0.019
(0.028)
Num. of Observations 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956
Notes: This table augments our baseline specication from column 1 of Table 3.3 with
additional interactions of post-split and potentially confounding initial district character-
istics.
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Table C.9: Robustness to Additional Controls × Post-Split, Parent/Child
District Level
+ controls for: – sec. forces development pub. goods demog. nat. res. politics occup. geog. remoteness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
post-split -0.003 -0.007 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.009
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.019) (0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.020) (0.021)
× ∆ ethnic polarization 0.032 0.033* 0.031 0.031** 0.032 0.029 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.032*
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.015) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019)
× ∆ ethnic fractionalization 0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.003 0.005
(0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
× ∆ religious polarization -0.009 -0.004 -0.009 -0.006 -0.009 -0.007 -0.010 -0.008 -0.010 -0.013
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
× log distance to security post -0.031*
(0.016)
× log distance to police station 0.030*
(0.017)
× nighttime light intensity 0.003
(0.015)
× share with > primary education -0.011
(0.017)
× distance to public market -0.004
(0.014)
× share villages with electricity -0.017
(0.015)
× share villages with safe water 0.023
(0.016)
× share villages with street light 0.001
(0.018)
× share villages with transport center 0.053***
(0.014)
× health centers per capita 0.007
(0.015)
× high schools per capita -0.018
(0.016)
× log initial population 0.003
(0.015)
× population share, 5–14 -0.001
(0.016)
× population share, 15-49 -0.005
(0.020)
× nat. resource revenue per capita -0.016
(0.011)
× cash crop share of total ag. output 0.011
(0.016)
× share of land area with forest 0.006
(0.012)
× parliamentary vote polarization 0.002
(0.013)
× scal transfers per capita -0.007
(0.010)
× share in agriculture -0.008
(0.022)
× share in forestry/shing 0.013
(0.023)
× share in other -0.011
(0.024)
× land area 0.008
(0.024)
× share villages on coast 0.021
(0.076)
× share villages in valley 0.019
(0.046)
× share villages on hill -0.038
(0.072)
× share villages on atland 0.009
(0.070)
× shares villages in highlands 0.036
(0.031)
× log elevation 0.005
(0.016)
× log distance to coast 0.006
(0.030)
× log distance to river -0.013
(0.019)
× log distance to subdistrict capital 0.018
(0.020)
× log distance to district capital 0.030
(0.024)
× log distance to major roads -0.031*
(0.017)
Num. of Observations 20,220 20,220 20,220 20,220 20,220 20,220 20,220 20,220 20,220 20,220
Notes: This table augments our baseline specication from column 2 of Table 3.3 with
additional interactions of post-split and potentially confounding initial district character-
istics.
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TableC.10: Robustness to Additional Controls× Post-Split, Parent District
Level
+ controls for: – sec. forces development pub. goods demog. nat. res. politics occup. geog. remoteness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
post-split 0.001 -0.006 -0.007 -0.018 -0.001 0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.006 -0.003
(0.026) (0.024) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.024) (0.026)
× ∆ ethnic polarization 0.027** 0.029** 0.030** 0.063*** 0.036** 0.029 ** 0.028** 0.031** 0.030* 0.037**
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.016) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014)
× ∆ ethnic fractionalization 0.035 0.044* 0.031 0.056*** 0.032 0.041 0.040 0.033 0.045* 0.038
(0.026) (0.024) (0.027) (0.020) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
× ∆ religious polarization -0.031 -0.021 -0.027 -0.012 -0.040* -0.029 -0.040 * -0.035 -0.034 -0.032
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023)
× log distance to security post -0.028
(0.021)
× log distance to police station 0.053**
(0.023)
× nighttime light intensity -0.020
(0.021)
× share with > primary education -0.024
(0.030)
× distance to public market -0.060**
(0.028)
× share villages with electricity -0.067**
(0.025)
× share villages with safe water -0.010
(0.027)
× share villages with street light -0.012
(0.022)
× share villages with transport center 0.076***
(0.017)
× health centers per capita 0.049***
(0.017)
× high schools per capita 0.019
(0.017)
× log initial population 0.017
(0.026)
× population share, 5–14 0.058**
(0.027)
× population share, 15-49 0.011
(0.033)
× nat. resource revenue per capita 0.010
(0.009)
× cash crop share of total ag. output -0.005
(0.027)
× share of land area with forest -0.022
(0.024)
× parliamentary vote polarization -0.027
(0.019)
× scal transfers per capita 0.017
(0.022)
× share in agriculture -0.019
(0.036)
× share in forestry/shing 0.008
(0.041)
× share in other -0.036
(0.038)
× land area -0.018
(0.025)
× share villages on coast 0.006
(0.124)
× share villages in valley 0.041
(0.083)
× share villages on hill -0.024
(0.128)
× share villages on atland 0.003
(0.105)
× shares villages in highlands 0.032
(0.047)
× log elevation -0.029
(0.024)
× log distance to coast 0.013
(0.033)
× log distance to river 0.041
(0.039)
× log distance to subdistrict capital 0.027
(0.033)
× log distance to district capital -0.012
(0.039)
× log distance to major roads 0.030
(0.029)
Num. of Observations 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956
Notes: This table augments our baseline specication from column 3 of Table 3.3 with
additional interactions of post-split and potentially confounding initial district character-
istics.
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Table C.11: Robustness to Additional Controls × Post-Split, Child District
Level
+ controls for: – sec. forces development pub. goods demog. nat. res. politics occup. geog. remoteness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
post-split -0.005 -0.010 -0.004 -0.000 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.010 -0.011
(0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.023) (0.025) (0.022) (0.025) (0.027) (0.024) (0.024)
× ∆ ethnic polarization 0.043* 0.048* 0.042* 0.027 0.045* 0.035 0.046* 0.044* 0.055* 0.049**
(0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.026) (0.025) (0.027) (0.023) (0.026) (0.028) (0.019)
× ∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.011 -0.018 -0.012 -0.007 -0.007 -0.015 -0.006 -0.012 -0.016 -0.006
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
× ∆ religious polarization -0.005 0.000 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 0.002 -0.011 -0.004 -0.008 -0.020
(0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.015)
× log distance to security post -0.034
(0.026)
× log distance to police station 0.027
(0.022)
× nighttime light intensity 0.013
(0.019)
× share with > primary education -0.004
(0.026)
× distance to public market 0.007
(0.020)
× share villages with electricity -0.008
(0.024)
× share villages with safe water 0.026
(0.024)
× share villages with street light 0.011
(0.031)
× share villages with transport center 0.044**
(0.020)
× health centers per capita -0.002
(0.026)
× high schools per capita -0.019
(0.023)
× log initial population -0.005
(0.018)
× population share, 5–14 -0.019
(0.019)
× population share, 15-49 -0.012
(0.027)
× nat. resource revenue per capita -0.034*
(0.018)
× cash crop share of total ag. output 0.029
(0.021)
× share of land area with forest 0.012
(0.015)
× parliamentary vote polarization 0.019
(0.017)
× scal transfers per capita -0.012
(0.013)
× share in agriculture -0.006
(0.026)
× share in forestry/shing 0.013
(0.022)
× share in other -0.007
(0.037)
× land area 0.006
(0.035)
× share villages on coast -0.001
(0.097)
× share villages in valley -0.025
(0.051)
× share villages on hill -0.072
(0.092)
× share villages on atland -0.020
(0.087)
× shares villages in highlands 0.061
(0.047)
× log elevation 0.007
(0.024)
× log distance to coast 0.011
(0.042)
× log distance to river -0.036
(0.029)
× log distance to subdistrict capital 0.032
(0.032)
× log distance to district capital 0.042
(0.030)
× log distance to major roads -0.066**
(0.027)
Num. of Observations 12,264 12,264 12,264 12,264 12,264 12,264 12,264 12,264 12,264 12,264
Notes: This table augments our baseline specication from column 4 of Table 3.3 with
additional interactions of post-split and potentially confounding initial district character-
istics.
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Figure C·5: Varying the Penalty Parameter in Lasso Robustness Procedure
Notes: This gure reports alternative estimated eects of post-split ×∆P based on varying
the penalty parameter λ used to discipline variable selection in the double Lasso proce-
dure. Table 3.4 in the paper reported results for λ = 3, 000 as a baseline. These gures
vary that value from 2,000 to 4,000, leading to a range of variables included as seen in
the red line and “x” points plotted on the right y-axis. The dashed lines are 95 percent
condence intervals on the point estimates from each individual regression.
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C.4.3 IncorporatingChanges in Public Resources and Proximity toGovernment
As discussed in Section 3.5.4, we address other confounding eects of redistricting on
the size and location of contestable public resources. Appendix Tables C.12 and C.13 in-
corporate measures of changes in transfer revenue and distance to the district capital as
motivated in Appendix C.1 with further details on variable construction on page 338 of
Appendix C.7. Appendix Table C.13 augments the specication in Table C.12 with ad-
ditional interactions of ∆diversity and the changes in transfers and distance. Although
noisy, these results generally point towards an amplication eect of changing ethnic
divisions alongside changes in contestable public resources. In some cases, the eects
load onto the interaction while in others they load onto the own terms. It is reassuring
that changes in distance to the district capital have null own and interaction eects for
parent districts given that this is not changing due to redistricting (but may change due
to potentially endogenous road improvements). Consistent with cross-national results in
Campante et al. (2017), violence is more pronounced in child districts where redistricting
leads to larger changes in proximity to the district capital. The fact that the original dis-
trict results in both tables are more muted is likely due to the weaker eects at the parent
versus child district level. Overall, though, the results in these tables are in line with the
predictions from the simple conceptual framework in Section 3.3.2.
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Table C.12: Accounting for Changes in Local Public Resources After Re-
districting
Administrative Unit Original Parent Parent Child
District Child
Boundaries 2000 2010 2010 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
post-split -0.006 -0.001 0.002 -0.002
(0.027) (0.021) (0.027) (0.024)
post-split × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.038** 0.032* 0.023 0.034*
(0.014) (0.017) (0.015) (0.020)
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.006 0.006 0.035 0.005
(0.022) (0.012) (0.027) (0.017)
post-split × ∆ transfer revenue 0.037 0.027** -0.004 0.038***
(0.028) (0.012) (0.021) (0.012)
post-split × ∆ distance to district capital -0.002 -0.012 0.010 -0.033
(0.019) (0.013) (0.016) (0.020)
Number of District-Months 7,836 19,980 7,836 12,144
Dep. Var. Mean, Pre-Split 0.57 0.33 0.47 0.25
Notes: This table augments the baseline specication in Table 3.3 with two measures cap-
turing changes in public resources and proximity to government institutions due to re-
districting. ∆ transfer revenue is the dierence in log average annual transfer revenue
post-split and average annual transfer revenue pre-split under the assumptions of alloca-
tions proportional to population pre-split in the parent and child district specications. ∆
distance to district capital is the population-weighted average village-level dierence in
log reported travel distance to the district capital in 2011 (post-split) and 2000 (pre-split)
as reported by village ocials. All variables are normalized to mean zero and standard
deviation one. These regressions omit one original district in Jakarta on account of it be-
ing in the national capital and not receiving the same stream of general district transfer
revenue. The dependent variable in all columns is an indicator equal to one if there was
any social conict in that district–month. All specications include month FE, district FE,
district-specic time trends, and dummies for the number of papers used by coders for
the given province–month. Standard errors are clustered by original district. Signicance
levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table C.13: Changes in Local Public Resources Amplify the Eects of
Changes in Ethnic Divisions
Administrative Unit Original Parent Parent Child
District Child
Boundaries 2000 2010 2010 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
post-split -0.014 -0.003 -0.013 -0.002
(0.027) (0.021) (0.029) (0.024)
post-split × ∆ ethnic polarization (P ) 0.122 0.002 0.099 0.012
(0.080) (0.024) (0.066) (0.013)
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization (F ) -0.025 0.015 0.036 0.016
(0.053) (0.013) (0.028) (0.014)
post-split × ∆ transfer revenue 0.041 0.029** 0.004 0.049***
(0.030) (0.013) (0.020) (0.011)
post-split × ∆F × ∆ transfer revenue -0.011 -0.006 0.020 -0.016
(0.059) (0.013) (0.026) (0.015)
post-split × ∆P × ∆ transfer revenue -0.036 0.007 -0.029 0.059**
(0.046) (0.010) (0.029) (0.022)
post-split × ∆ distance to district capital 0.004 -0.008 0.012 -0.035*
(0.033) (0.013) (0.015) (0.018)
post-split × ∆F × ∆ distance to district capital 0.008 0.007 -0.007 0.000
(0.031) (0.012) (0.023) (0.018)
post-split × ∆P × ∆ distance to district capital 0.009 -0.024** -0.006 -0.008
(0.074) (0.010) (0.017) (0.014)
Number of District-Months 7,836 19,980 7,836 12,144
Dep. Var. Mean, Pre-Split 0.57 0.33 0.47 0.25
Notes: This table augments the specication in Table 3.3 with additional interactions of
∆diversity with ∆trans f ers and ∆distance . The specication is otherwise unchanged.
Standard errors are clustered by original district. Signicance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5%
∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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C.4.4 Validating the Conict Measures and Ruling Out Systematic Reporting
Bias
Recall that the SNPK data is based on an exhaustive and carefully vetted set of local media
sources across Indonesia. The comprehensiveness of SNPK oers signicant advantages
relative to other event-based conict data sources (see Appendix C.2.1). However, like
those sources, the SNPK still has the potential concern that it systematically underreports
violence in certain areas of the country. While we control for the number of sources being
used by coders in any given province–month, we can still not completely rule out the pos-
sibility that media outlets dierentially report on events in (and hence reallocate resources
and reporters to) more interesting locations. If “interesting” coincides with redistricting
and changes in ethnic divisions, then one might worry that we are over-estimating the
eects of ∆diversity on conict. Subjective reporting is a basic fact facing all conict
research.10 We oer here one important robustness check on our own results and that
might also be fruitfully applied to others using similar data.
In particular, we draw upon Google Trends data in an attempt to rule out confounding
eects of time-varying media intensity. The idea here is that the events taking place in
any given district–month in our data should attract a baseline level of interest from the
(internet-using) population among whom are media actors trying to follow that interest.
Once we partial out that general location-specic interest in that period, the SNPK conict
report is more likely to reect the true likelihood of any incidents rather than just a general
uptick in popular (media) attention. These Google Trends, which capture the relative
frequency of searches for the given district name (original, parent, or child), are indeed
10Indeed, the same concern would apply to nearly every study of conict based on media reports, e.g.
regions facing weather or commodity price shocks might draw media resources and reporters away from
other areas of a given country. Studies at the country level suer from similar concerns insomuch as they
rely on either media reporting of deaths to dene civil conict/war or subjective assessments of conict
scholars as to the timing of conict outbreaks and cessation (see Bazzi and Blattman, 2014).
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highly correlated with major local events such as mayoral elections.11
More importantly, though, our core results remain qualitatively and quantitatively
unchanged when controlling for these Google Trends, which we measure on a [0, 1] con-
tinuum. Table C.14 below shows this for our baseline results from Table 3.3. Results look
similar for the intensive margin specications in Table C.21. Table C.15 shows this for the
the political cycles of conict results in Table 3.5. Note that the Google Trends themselves
are positively correlated with conict, which is consistent with the points above. That the
eects of ∆diversity remain unchanged after removing this media-driven correlation is
all the more reassuring. In fact, across several specications, we nd slight improvements
in precision, which could be due to the Google trends soaking up some of the residual
reporting variation.
Table C.14: Table 3.3 Robust to Controlling for Google Trends
Administrative Unit Original Parent Parent Child
District and
Child
Boundaries 2000 2010 2010 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
post-split -0.011 -0.004 0.003 -0.007
(0.025) (0.021) (0.026) (0.025)
post-split × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.040** 0.033* 0.032** 0.043*
(0.018) (0.019) (0.013) (0.025)
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.005 0.001 0.035 -0.011
(0.019) (0.012) (0.026) (0.019)
Google trends 0.125* 0.071* 0.145* 0.042
(0.067) (0.041) (0.073) (0.039)
Number of District-Months 7,956 20,220 7,956 12,264
Dep. Var. Mean, Pre-Split 0.57 0.33 0.47 0.25
Notes: This table re-estimates the baseline specication controlling for monthly Google
Trends in searches for each district’s name. This measure takes on a value ranging from
0 to 1 indicating for each district–month the relative frequency of searches for its name
when compared to other benchmark searches. Signicance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗
: 1%.
11A xed eects specication suggests that parent/child district names are around 10 percent more likely
to be searched for during the six month window around the direct mayoral elections.
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Table C.15: Table 3.5 Robust to Controlling for Google Trends
Administrative Unit Parent Parent Child
and
Child
(1) (2) (3)
post-split -0.004 -0.001 -0.009
(0.022) (0.027) (0.024)
post-split × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.031 0.031* 0.043*
(0.019) (0.016) (0.025)
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.001 0.033 -0.011
(0.012) (0.027) (0.019)
post-split × 1st election period 0.046 -0.004 0.040*
(0.044) (0.050) (0.021)
post-split × 1st election period × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.026** 0.013 0.027***
(0.011) (0.022) (0.010)
post-split × 1st election period × ∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.005 0.041 -0.012
(0.018) (0.034) (0.020)
post-split × 2nd election period 0.045* 0.035 0.051
(0.022) (0.027) (0.032)
post-split × 2nd election period × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.008 -0.042*** 0.057**
(0.011) (0.013) (0.023)
post-split × 2nd election period × ∆ ethnic fractionalization 0.008 0.021 -0.008
(0.019) (0.028) (0.019)
Google trends 0.062 0.139* 0.027
(0.041) (0.071) (0.040)
Number of District-Months 19,980 7,836 12,144
Dep. Var. Mean, Pre-Split 0.33 0.47 0.25
Notes: This table re-estimates the Table 3.5 specication controlling for monthly Google
Trends in searches for each district’s name. This measure takes on a value ranging from
0 to 1 indicating for each district–month the relative frequency of searches for its name
when compared to other benchmark searches. Signicance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗
: 1%.
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C.4.5 Event Study Specications
We present here the event study generalization of the main equations (3.3) and (3.4) as
discussed in the paper. These gures highlight both the lack of worrying pre-trends before
redistricting as well as provide some insight into the post-redistricting conict dynamics.
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Figure C·6: Event Study: Average Eects of Redistricting on Social Con-
ict (Table 3.2)
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Notes: These gures report coecient estimates and 95% condence intervals from event study versions of the
regression specication in equation (3.3) and given by: conf l ictdt = ν +
∑13
j=−5 βjpost -splitd,t−j +θt +θd +
θd × t + εdt , where j denotes 6 month bins beginning 30 months prior to splitting (i.e., j = −4 for months 30–24
before splitting) and ending 72 months after (i.e., j = 12 for months 67–72 after splitting) with an additional
j = −5 for greater than 30 months before splitting (where dened) and j = 13 for all months after 72. The
reference period is the 12 months just prior to splitting. The graph shows the βj coecients.
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Figure C·7: Event Study: Redistricting, Polarization, and Social Conict
(Table 3.3)
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Notes: These gures report coecient estimates and 95% condence intervals from event study
versions of the regression specication in equation (3.4) and given by: conf l ictdt = ν +∑13
j=−5
[
βjpost -splitd,t−j +
∑
k∈{F ,P } ϕkj
(
post -splitd,t−j × ∆kd
)]
+ θt + θd + θd × t + εdt , where j de-
notes 6 month bins beginning 30 months prior to splitting (i.e., j = −4 for months 30–24 before splitting) and
ending 72 months after (i.e., j = 12 for months 67–72 after splitting) with an additional j = −5 for greater than
30 months before splitting (where dened) and j = 13 for all months after 72. The reference period is the 12
months just prior to splitting. The graph shows the ϕj coecients for ethnic fractionalization on the left and
polarization on the right.
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C.4.6 Alternative Categorizations of Violence
Our main analysis considered a set of violence categories in the SNPK that aimed to cap-
ture group-based conict (see Appendix C.2.1). This appendix rules out two potential
concerns with the measure of social conict we use based on the SNPK groupings.
First, some of the crime-related categories of violence may be shaped by similar
(changes in) ethnic divisions as other categories deemed to fall under conict.12 Hence,
their omission may be deemed arbitrary at best and biasing at worst. Table C.16 shows
that the main results in Table 3.3 are robust to using to not restricting the denition of
violence. Indeed, the estimated eects of ∆diversity are very similar. The increase in
precision may be due to the fact that the broader grouping reduces classical measurement
error of the sort discussed in the background on the SNPK data in Appendix C.2.1.
12Echoing this interpretation, one of the architects of the SNPK notes in a later reappraisal that “What
may appear to be local violence (crime, interpersonal clashes over land) is often linked in complicated
ways to the broader conict” (Barron et al., 2016, p. 25). This would be consistent with the ethnic-related
criminal gangs documented at length in the Wilson (2015) book that we cite in the paper. Indeed, many of
these gangs are often mobilized for conict by political actors during times of instability around elections.
Another, broader interpretation of this concern would be that changes in ethnic divisions further undermine
local state capacity that helps to forestall a breakdown in social order and prevent various types of crime.
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Table C.16: Eects are Similar When Not Restricting to Social Conict
Administrative Unit Original Parent Parent Child
District and
Child
Boundaries 2000 2010 2010 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var.: Any Violence
post-split -0.007 0.018 -0.008 0.036
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.027)
post-split × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.049*** 0.043*** 0.054*** 0.028**
(0.016) (0.015) (0.020) (0.011)
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.013 -0.008 -0.002 0.001
(0.028) (0.019) (0.025) (0.027)
Number of District-Months 7,956 20,220 7,956 12,264
Dep. Var. Mean, Pre-Split 0.76 0.52 0.69 0.42
Notes: This table re-estimates our baseline specication but for all violence reported in
the SNPK. Signicance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
Second, we further gauge robustness to event misclassication by re-estimating our
regressions for all possible combinations of the ten main categories of violence in the
SNPK. Figure C·8 presents the distribution of the estimated coecients on post-split ×
∆P and post-split × ∆F for these 1,023 regressions with the given baseline estimate for
social conict indicated by the dashed, vertical black line. For both our baseline and each
separate regression, we scale the reported coecient by the mean of the given dependent
variable, which varies across groups of categories. The magnitudes are therefore standard
deviation ∆diversity eect sizes relative to the mean outcome over the sample period.
Note that we are not using this data mining approach for inference purposes but rather to
address concerns that our particular designation of categories as conict was somehow
spuriously generating our results. Figure C·8 helps to dispel such concerns and shows
that our core estimated eect of ∆P on social conict appears to be around the middle
of the distribution of eect sizes across all possible combinations of violence categories.
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Moreover, the distribution of these coecients seems to lie mostly above zero, which
again points to the fact that changing ethnic divisions shifts most types of violence in the
same direction. The takeaways are similar for ∆F .
Figure C·8: Distribution of Estimated Eects of ∆ diversity across All
Possible Groupings of Violence Categories in SNPK
(a) Original Districts
(b) Parent and Child Districts
Notes: These graphs present the distribution of estimated eects of ∆diversity across all
possible groupings of the violence categories reported in the SNPK. The estimates are
rescaled by the mean of the dependent variable such that the eects are standard devia-
tions relative to the mean violence in the given grouping. The dashed line is our baseline
estimate from Table 3.3.
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C.4.7 Alternative Measures of Diversity
Following Fearon (2003), we use linguistic dierences to proxy for cultural distance be-
tween groups. We map each of the over 1,000 ethnic groups in the 2000 Census to a
language in Ethnologue, which provides a full classication of the linguistic origins of
each language (see Bazzi, Gaduh, Rothenberg, and Wong, 2016, for details). Recall that
we measure polarization as P = ∑Nej=1 ∑Nek=1 д2j дkηjk . The widely used Fearon (2003) metric
sets ηjk = 1 − sδjk , where sjk measures the similarity between the languages spoken by j
and k as given by the share of common branches on the language classication tree. See
Appendix C.7 for further details. Low δ stresses dierences between languages with the
fewest branches in common; as δ increases, smaller dierences become relatively more
important until in the limit all dierences are equal to 1 unless groups share a common
language. Following Desmet et al. (2009) and Esteban et al. (2012), we set δ = 0.05 as our
baseline. This low δ emphasizes deeper ethnolinguistic cleavages and hence puts more
weight on polarized districts with the most culturally dissimilar groups.
Dissecting Ethnolinguistic Cleavages. In Table C.17 below, we show that increasing
δ leads to weaker estimated eects of ∆P , which suggests that border-induced changes
in ethnic divisions have more signicant eects on conict where those divisions are
among the deeper ones in society.13 This is consistent with ndings in Esteban et al.
(2012) and Desmet et al. (2012) who argue that the positive cross-country relationship
between diversity and conict is driven by countries with deeper linguistic cleavages.
Indeed, Esteban et al. (2012) similarly nd a smaller and less signicant eect of ethnic
polarization on conict when using δ = ∞ (with Ethnologue data) as we do in Panel C.
Nevertheless, we do not push this argument too far given that few of the coecients
13The case study in Section 3.6.3 provided examples of this in comparing distances between Malay and
Dayak versus Malay and Chinese. Similar examples abound across Indonesia’s diverse ethnolinguistic land-
scape.
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across Panels B and C are statistically dierent from the baseline in Panel A. Nor for that
matter are the dierences between ∆P and ∆F (as we discuss in the paper).
In dening F , we allow each self-reported ethnicity in the Population Census to be its
own group. This permits rich sub-ethnic breakdowns within broader ethnic categories.
This data-driven approach is consistent with political science research, which suggests
that ethnic distinctions became increasingly granular in the era of decentralization as
groups looked for ways to mobilize around actionable identities at the local level (e.g.,
Mietzner, 2014). This is dierent from Fearon (2003), which is based on dening groups
according to subjective assessments of ethnic boundaries relevant to social conict. Our
approach is more akin to dening groups based on all of those reported in the Ethnologue
data. Interestingly, when using the Fearon (2003) groupings, Esteban et al. (2012) nd that
F has a signicant positive correlation with conict, but this becomes smaller and even
null when using the full Ethnologue elaboration.
We further clarify the remaining distinction between P and F by considering the Gini-
Greenberg index, G = ∑Nej=1 ∑Nek=1 дjдkηjk . Alongside ∆F , the ∆G then claries what role
the squaring of the own-group term plays in the polarization index. Panel D of Table
C.17 shows the results based on this measure, which makes clear that the squaring of
the own-group term matters above and beyond simply accounting for linguistic distances
between groups in the denition of P . Together, the results in Panels C and D suggest that
the combination of deep linguistic divisions and polarizing eects of having a few large,
similarly sized groups contribute to our core ndings on the importance of ∆P in driving
changes in violence around redistricting.
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Table C.17: Alternative Parametrization of Ethnolinguistic Divisions
Increasing δ Emphasizes Shallower Ethnic Divisions
Administrative Unit Original Parent Parent Child
District and
Child
Boundaries 2000 2010 2010 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: P with δ = 0.05, baseline
post-split -0.012 -0.003 0.001 -0.005
(0.025) (0.021) (0.026) (0.025)
post-split × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.036** 0.032 0.027** 0.043*
(0.018) (0.019) (0.013) (0.025)
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.003 0.000 0.035 -0.011
(0.019) (0.012) (0.026) (0.019)
Panel B: P with δ = 0.5
post-split -0.009 0.000 0.003 -0.000
(0.025) (0.021) (0.026) (0.025)
post-split × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.049 0.014 0.013 0.015
(0.034) (0.016) (0.017) (0.024)
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.022 -0.003 0.029 -0.010
(0.024) (0.015) (0.025) (0.022)
Panel C: P with δ = ∞
(every group equally distant)
post-split -0.008 0.000 0.004 -0.001
(0.026) (0.021) (0.027) (0.025)
post-split × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.022 0.012 -0.013 0.023
(0.038) (0.017) (0.023) (0.022)
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.005 -0.004 0.037* -0.016
(0.029) (0.017) (0.021) (0.022)
Panel D: G with δ = 0.05
post-split -0.010 0.001 -0.002 0.001
(0.026) (0.022) (0.027) (0.025)
post-split × ∆ Gini-Greenberg (G) 0.022 0.003 0.039** -0.010
(0.028) (0.022) (0.015) (0.019)
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization 0.003 0.003 0.030 0.001
(0.021) (0.013) (0.025) (0.017)
Number of District-Months 7,956 20,220 7,956 12,264
Dep. Var. Mean, Pre-Split 0.57 0.33 0.47 0.25
Notes: Panels B and C in this table compare the baseline estimates in Panel A to alternative
parametrizations of linguistic distance in the denition of polarization where increasing
values of δ emphasize shallower linguistic cleavages. Panel D replaces polarization with
the Gini-Greenberg index, which removes the squaring of the own-group term in polar-
ization. Signicance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Esteban and Ray (2011a) Structural Model. To streamline the presentation of our
reduced form natural experiment, we focus in the paper on specications with F and
P . However, as seen in Appendix Table C.18 below, the main takeaways—positive and
signicant eects of ∆P and null eects of ∆F—remain unchanged when also including
∆G/population as in the structural equation of Esteban and Ray (2011a) tested in Esteban
et al. (2012). While reassuring, we do not push this result too far given that correlations
between the three measures make it dicult to interpret the ndings, particularly on
G/N . Indeed, in looking at both Esteban et al. (2012) and the application in Amodio and
Chiovelli (forthcoming), one nds results on G/N that are positive, negative, and null.
Again, though, the key ndings continue to suggest that the political boundaries of ethnic
divisions matter for conict.
Table C.18: Applying the Structural Esteban and Ray (2011a) Specication
Administrative Unit Original Parent Parent Child
District and
Child
Boundaries 2000 2010 2010 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
post-split -0.017 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004
(0.025) (0.020) (0.027) (0.023)
post-split × ∆ ethnic polarization (P ) 0.034** 0.057*** 0.015 0.067***
(0.014) (0.018) (0.044) (0.020)
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization (F ) -0.011 0.007 0.033 0.000
(0.018) (0.012) (0.028) (0.017)
post-split × ∆ Greenberg-Gini / population (G/N ) 0.058*** -0.042*** 0.017 -0.049***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.046) (0.013)
Number of District-Months 7,956 20,220 7,956 12,264
Dep. Var. Mean, Pre-Split 0.57 0.33 0.47 0.25
Notes: This table re-estimates the baseline specication in Table 3.3 augmented with the
∆ Greenberg-Gini index scaled by population as in Esteban et al. (2012).
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C.4.8 Alternative Econometric Specications
As discussed in Section 3.5.5, we present here nine sets of robustness checks on the econo-
metric specications in Table 3.3.
Excluding Historic Conict Zones
Table C.19 below excludes the two regions of Indonesia with the most intense civil conict
in the late 1990s and early 2000s at the onset of democratization. Panel A excludes districts
in the Maluku islands, which saw erce interreligious warfare from early 1999 through
early 2002. Panel B excludes the entire province of Aceh, which was home to a longstand-
ing guerilla movement to secede from Indonesia. The violent campaigned ended with a
peace agreement in mid-2005. Omitting either of these two regions leaves the main take-
aways intact, which is reassuring from the standpoint of generalization outside historic
conict zones per se.
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Table C.19: Excluding Civil War Regions
Administrative Unit Original Parent Parent Child
District and
Child
Boundaries 2000 2010 2010 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Excluding Maluku
post-split -0.025 -0.020 -0.014 -0.026
(0.029) (0.023) (0.028) (0.029)
post-split × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.067*** 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.051***
(0.021) (0.008) (0.012) (0.014)
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.016 0.009 0.071** -0.002
(0.021) (0.012) (0.035) (0.017)
Number of District-Months 6,900 17,100 6,900 10,200
Dep. Var. Mean, Pre-Split 0.64 0.38 0.53 0.29
Panel B: Excluding Aceh
post-split 0.027 0.019 0.035 0.009
(0.023) (0.020) (0.029) (0.024)
post-split × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.026* 0.032 0.024 0.048*
(0.014) (0.022) (0.015) (0.026)
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization 0.009 0.009 0.037 0.001
(0.021) (0.013) (0.030) (0.019)
Number of District-Months 6,696 17,340 6,696 10,644
Dep. Var. Mean, Pre-Split 0.55 0.30 0.45 0.21
Notes: Panel A excludes the districts in the Maluku islands, and B excludes districts in
Aceh. The specication in both panels is otherwise the same as in the baseline Table 3.3
with time and district FE, district-specic time trends, and standard errors clustered at the
original district level. Signicance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Omitting Later Time Periods
Panel A of Table C.20 omits the years 2011 to 2014 from the panel. The results are statis-
tically indistinguishable from the baseline. This suggests that the results are not driven
by periods well beyond the unexpected moratorium on redistricting from 2004–6, which
was already evident to some extent from event study estimates in Figure C·7.
Omitting Later Entrants to SNPK Data
Panel B of Table C.20 omits districts that enter the SNPK data in 2005, thereby ensuring
a balanced panel. The similarity in results is reassuring insomuch as these later entrants
were selected on account of policy concerns about recent violence.
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Table C.20: Alternative Time Restrictions
Administrative Unit Original Parent Parent Child
District and
Child
Boundaries 2000 2010 2010 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Excluding 2011–14
post-split -0.015 -0.008 0.007 -0.020
(0.026) (0.021) (0.024) (0.026)
post-split × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.034 0.040** 0.040*** 0.053**
(0.022) (0.017) (0.010) (0.022)
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization 0.027 0.005 0.055*** -0.018
(0.020) (0.013) (0.017) (0.019)
Number of District-Months 5,484 13,956 5,484 8,472
Dep. Var. Mean, Pre-Split 0.57 0.33 0.47 0.25
Panel B: Excluding 2005 Entrants to SNPK
post-split -0.015 -0.018 -0.013 -0.022
(0.032) (0.027) (0.031) (0.031)
post-split × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.046* 0.041* 0.034** 0.060*
(0.023) (0.024) (0.016) (0.031)
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.006 -0.008 0.025 -0.024
(0.022) (0.015) (0.026) (0.025)
Number of District-Months 5,196 13,020 5,196 7,824
Dep. Var. Mean, Pre-Split 0.52 0.31 0.43 0.24
Notes: Panel A drops all months after 2010m12, and B drops all districts that entered the
SNPK conict data starting in 2005, thereby imposing a balanced panel. The specication
in both panels is otherwise the same as in the baseline Table 3.3 with time and district
FE, district-specic time trends, and standard errors clustered at the original district level.
Signicance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Intensive Margin of Violence
Our baseline specication focuses on the extensive margin of whether there are any social
conict events in the given district–month. This is a sensible baseline given that most
district-months with any events have one or two events (see the left graphs in Figure C·9
below). Even at the aggregate original district level—where 63 percent of district–months
have any social conict in column 1 of Table 3.3—80 percent of observations with any
conict have 5 or fewer events with a very long tail up to 89 events. The skewness is
even starker at the more granular parent–child district level. While each of these separate
event records is meant to capture a dierent incident, it is of course possible that they are
part of the same underlying conict, which means that the intensive margin specication
might simply introduce noise. Nevertheless, there may be substantive empirical content
in the intensive margin variation of incidents.
Figure C·9: Number of Social Conict Incidents by Original District-
Month
Notes: This gure plots the distribution of the number of social conict events by month
at the original district level. The left gure is the raw data. The right gure is the inverse
hyperbolic since transformation used in the regressions.
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Table C.21 presents intensive margin specications based on the widely used hyper-
bolic inverse sine transformation, log
(
#eventsdt + (#events2dt + 1)
1/2
)
, due to Burbidge,
Magee, and Robb (1988). This approach to dealing with zeros has much better properties
than the usual method of adding a small constant inside the log and similarly can help
mitigate the eect of skewness in the outcome distribution. It also allows us to maintain
the basic xed eects OLS specication. While interpreting magnitudes is less straight-
forward,14 the main takeaway from Table C.21 is that the results look very similar to the
baseline extensive margin specication albeit slightly less precise. This lack of precision
is due in part to the continued importance of the long tail (see the right graphs in Figure
C·9. We can increase precision by winsorizing the top 5th percentile of #events to further
deal with the extreme skew, as seen in Panel B of Table C.21.
14Except for very small outcome values, the transformation can be interpreted in approximately the same
way as a log dependent variable.
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Table C.21: Intensive Margin Specications
Administrative Unit Original Parent Parent Child
District and
Child
Boundaries 2000 2010 2010 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Hyperbolic Inverse Sine
post-split 0.005 -0.000 -0.012 0.002
(0.067) (0.039) (0.070) (0.033)
post-split × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.016 0.036 0.034 0.057
(0.030) (0.026) (0.025) (0.036)
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization 0.013 -0.016 0.064 -0.039
(0.050) (0.021) (0.057) (0.034)
Number of District-Months 7,956 20,220 7,956 12,264
Dep. Var. Mean, Pre-Split 1.00 0.48 0.76 0.32
Panel B: H. Inv. Sine, Winsorizing
post-split -0.038 -0.021 -0.045 -0.008
(0.060) (0.033) (0.051) (0.032)
post-split × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.021 0.041 0.030* 0.060*
(0.031) (0.025) (0.018) (0.036)
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization 0.010 -0.018 0.046 -0.037
(0.046) (0.019) (0.049) (0.030)
Number of District-Months 7,956 20,220 7,956 12,264
Dep. Var. Mean, Pre-Split 0.96 0.44 0.68 0.31
Notes: The dependent variable is the hyperbolic sine transformation of the number of
social conict incidents in the given month. Panel B additionally winsorizes at the 95th
percentile of the outcome distribution. Otherwise, the specication is the same as in the
baseline Table 3.3 with time and district FE, district-specic time trends, and standard
errors clustered at the original district level. Signicance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ :
1%.
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Alternative Identication Strategies
Our baseline generalized DiD strategy achieves identication by comparing districts that
split early to districts that split late, while allowing each district to have its own time trend
in social conict. Here, we consider renements and alternatives to this baseline strategy
with the goal of clarifying the key sources of identication.
First, we introduce province×month xed eects which further restricts comparisons
to districts within the same province (of which there are 16). The estimates in Table
C.22 are somewhat imprecise, which is not surprising given the relatively small number
of within-province comparisons in any given month. However, some of the ∆P eects
are signicant at the 10 percent level and all are statistically indistinguishable from the
baseline estimates. This provides some reassurance that the comparison between early
and late splits is not based on far-removed districts operating in very distinct regional
settings.
Table C.22: Including Region×Time Fixed Eects
Administrative Unit Original Parent Parent Child
District and
Child
Boundaries 2000 2010 2010 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
post-split -0.040 -0.020 -0.044 -0.005
(0.032) (0.023) (0.036) (0.029)
post-split × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.026* 0.023 0.032* 0.017
(0.015) (0.022) (0.018) (0.031)
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.017 -0.005 0.039 -0.013
(0.021) (0.013) (0.028) (0.022)
Number of District-Months 7,956 20,220 7,956 12,264
Dep. Var. Mean, Pre-Split 0.57 0.33 0.47 0.25
Notes: This table adds province×month xed eects to the baseline specication in Ta-
ble 3.3 with district FE, district-specic time trends, and standard errors clustered at the
original district level. Signicance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Second, Table C.23 considers an alternative strategy that removes the district xed
eects altogether and incorporates an additional control group in those districts that never
split from 2000 to 2010. In this case, the coecients identify a mixture of dierential
eects of redistricting (i) among early versus late splitters and never-splitters, and (ii) late-
splitters versus never-splitters. However, we also include province×month xed eects to
ensure that each of these comparisons takes place between nearby districts. Note that the
removal of district xed eects means that we not longer identify within-district changes
in conict but rather cross-sectional dierences (i) and (ii) within a given province akin
to a nearest (geographic) neighbor matching-type design. In other words, all estimates
below are with reference to the mean social conict among never-splitters within the
same province in a given month. Interestingly, as seen in Table C.23, this alternative
identication strategy delivers estimated eects of changes in ethnic divisions among
those that undergo redistricting that looks very similar to the baseline. The same holds in
Panel B if we remove district-specic time trends, which is consistent with the fact that
once we hone in on nearby districts, the role of dierential trends becomes less important
for the overall identifying variation in post-split and ∆diversity.
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Table C.23: Expanding the Counterfactual to Include Nearby Never-
Splitters
Administrative Unit Original Parent Parent Child
District and
Child
Boundaries 2000 2010 2010 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Province×Month FE
District-Specic Trends
post-split 0.053 0.028 -0.004 0.019
(0.043) (0.035) (0.049) (0.038)
post-split × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.040*** 0.038** 0.067** 0.056**
(0.013) (0.015) (0.027) (0.025)
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization 0.006 0.004 0.025 -0.004
(0.029) (0.013) (0.040) (0.021)
Number of District-Months 22,896 35,160 22,896 27,204
Dep. Var. Mean, Pre-Split 0.62 0.55 0.61 0.56
Panel B: Province×Month FE
No District-Specic Trends
post-split 0.067 -0.146*** -0.102* -0.249***
(0.051) (0.044) (0.052) (0.050)
post-split × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.038*** 0.030** 0.057** 0.047*
(0.011) (0.012) (0.023) (0.024)
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization 0.012 0.031** -0.006 0.028
(0.029) (0.015) (0.037) (0.023)
Number of District-Months 22,896 35,160 22,896 27,204
Dep. Var. Mean, Pre-Split 0.62 0.55 0.61 0.56
Notes: This table adds districts in the SNPK data that never split over the sample period.
Relative to the baseline Table 3.3, the specication therefore omits district FE but does
include province× month FE. We include district-specic time trends in Panel A but not
Panel B. Standard errors clustered at the original district level. Signicance levels: ∗ : 10%
∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Third, in Table C.24, we consider alternative approaches to specifying location-specic
time trends in conict. Panel A removes the district-specic time trends from the baseline
specication. Panel B instead uses province-specic trends. Together, these results clarify
the importance of accounting for dierential regional trends in conict. The absence of
such trends renders the dierential eects of ∆P much weaker, which suggests that some
of what we are identifying in the baseline specications in Table 3.3 are deviations from
trend over the sample period. The importance of trends is consistent with the history and
time path of violence being very dierent across regions of the country. Failing to account
for these dierences makes it dicult to identify the contribution of political boundaries
to the diversity–conict relationship over time.
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Table C.24: Alternative Identication Strategies: Location-Specic Spe-
cic Trends
Administrative Unit Original Parent Parent Child
District and
Child
Boundaries 2000 2010 2010 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Dropping District-Specic Trends
post-split -0.035 -0.006 -0.027 0.005
(0.030) (0.022) (0.029) (0.023)
post-split × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.015 0.009 -0.002 0.015
(0.016) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016)
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization 0.008 -0.004 0.006 -0.001
(0.037) (0.010) (0.025) (0.014)
Number of District-Months 7,956 20,220 7,956 12,264
Dep. Var. Mean, Pre-Split 0.57 0.33 0.47 0.25
Panel B: Adding Province-Specic Trends
post-split -0.019 0.003 -0.007 0.002
(0.028) (0.022) (0.030) (0.024)
post-split × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.029** 0.008 0.004 0.016
(0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.017)
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.007 -0.007 0.009 -0.005
(0.027) (0.009) (0.024) (0.014)
Number of District-Months 7,956 20,220 7,956 12,264
Dep. Var. Mean, Pre-Split 0.57 0.33 0.47 0.25
Notes: The table omits district-specic time trends in Panel A and adds province-specic
(instead of district-specic) trends in Panel B. Otherwise, the specications are the same
as in Table 3.3 with district FE and standard errors clustered at the original district level.
Signicance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Alternative Inclusion of ∆diversity
The baseline specication includes ∆P , ∆F and ∆Reliд simultaneously. Table C.25 below
shows that results for P and F are nearly identical when omitting religion or entering each
term on its own. This rules out concerns about collinearity between the two measures that
might arise in settings with more limited diversity.
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Table C.25: Alternative Specications of ∆diversity Vector
Administrative Unit Original Parent Parent Child
District and
Child
Boundaries 2000 2010 2010 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Omitting ∆Reliд
post-split -0.012 -0.002 -0.001 -0.005
(0.025) (0.021) (0.027) (0.024)
post-split × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.033* 0.031 0.029* 0.043*
(0.017) (0.019) (0.016) (0.025)
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.001 -0.001 0.035 -0.012
(0.020) (0.012) (0.027) (0.019)
Number of District-Months 7,956 20,220 7,956 12,264
Dep. Var. Mean, Pre-Split 0.57 0.33 0.47 0.25
Panel B: ∆F Alone
post-split -0.007 0.001 0.002 0.000
(0.025) (0.021) (0.027) (0.025)
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization 0.009 0.002 0.031 -0.003
(0.020) (0.012) (0.026) (0.017)
Number of District-Months 7,956 20,220 7,956 12,264
Dep. Var. Mean, Pre-Split 0.57 0.33 0.47 0.25
Panel C: ∆P Alone
post-split -0.012 -0.002 -0.000 -0.004
(0.025) (0.021) (0.028) (0.024)
post-split × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.032* 0.031 0.025 0.040
(0.017) (0.019) (0.015) (0.026)
Number of District-Months 7,956 20,220 7,956 12,264
Dep. Var. Mean, Pre-Split 0.57 0.33 0.47 0.25
Notes: This table removes ∆religious polarization in Panel A, includes only ∆F in Panel
B and only ∆P in Panel C. Otherwise, the specications are the same as in Table 3.3 with
district FE and standard errors clustered at the original district level. Signicance levels:
∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Reweighting for External Validity (within Indonesia)
As discussed in Section 3.5.5, we consider a reweighting approach to account for the two
dimensions of selection in our generalized DiD sample of districts. First, Table C.23 above
notwithstanding, our results are based solely on districts that split between 2000 and 2010.
We know from prior work and our analysis that this sample of districts look dierent
along a number of observable dimensions. One way to assess whether these dierences
are important for our results is to reweight the estimates by the inverse probability of
redistricting, assigning greater weight to those original districts that look more like the
ones that never split. We do this using a standard inverse probability weighting (IPW)
approach in which we rst predict the cross-sectional probability of redistricting and then
apply IPW to our main estimates from Table 3.3. We estimate that probability based on a
logit specication, using Lasso to select relevant variables from a set of 67 baseline district
characteristics used for other exercises in Section 3.5.4. Applying the IPW in Panel A of
Table C.26 leaves our key results unchanged.
Second, our results are restricted to those districts in provinces covered by the SNPK
data. We adopt an analogous IPW strategy to rebalance the baseline sample for these
dierential inclusion probabilities. Doing so in Panel B leaves the results similarly un-
changed albeit less precise. Finally, Panel C estimates the joint probability redistricting
and being in the SNPK, using these to construct the IPWs. Again, the results look similar
to the baseline if a bit noisier.
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Table C.26: Inverse Probability Weighting (IPW) for External Validity
Administrative Unit Original Parent Parent Child
District and
Child
Boundaries 2000 2010 2010 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: IPW: Redistricting
post-split -0.019 -0.016 -0.001 -0.028
(0.027) (0.019) (0.026) (0.024)
post-split × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.036 0.037* 0.030* 0.057**
(0.026) (0.021) (0.015) (0.027)
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.021 0.003 0.053** -0.019
(0.037) (0.014) (0.024) (0.023)
Panel B: IPW: in SNPK
post-split -0.016 -0.001 0.010 -0.006
(0.027) (0.020) (0.026) (0.022)
post-split × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.026 0.024 0.021 0.038
(0.018) (0.022) (0.014) (0.028)
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.014 0.002 0.038 -0.007
(0.024) (0.013) (0.028) (0.020)
Panel C: IPW: Redistricting + in SNPK
post-split -0.027 -0.018 -0.013 -0.021
(0.027) (0.025) (0.026) (0.029)
post-split × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.029 0.029 0.028* 0.043
(0.020) (0.020) (0.015) (0.027)
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.007 0.003 0.064** -0.017
(0.026) (0.014) (0.027) (0.021)
Number of District-Months 7,956 20,220 7,956 12,264
Notes: This reweights each observation in the baseline specication in Table 3.3 by its inverse probability of
redistricting in Panel A, of being in the SNPK data in Panel B, and of both in Panel C. The IPW are estimated in
an initial step based on a logit specication with a battery of Lasso-selected control. The IPW reduce precision,
which is a common nding in these approaches. Standard errors are clustered at the original district level
Signicance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
312
C.5 Further Details on Redistricting Constraints
Section 3.5.4 presented a policy exercise aimed at clarifying the sources of identifying vari-
ation in ∆diversity. This appendix provides further background on that exercise and also
demonstrates further results consistent with the takeaway in the paper: The redistricting
policy itself constrained the possible changes in ethnic divisions, and the associated ef-
fects on conict can be explained by these policy constraints and the underlying ethnic
geography rather than the particular way in which the boundaries were drawn. The con-
cern is that better or worse borders were chosen by districts in manner correlated with
latent conict. We argue here that this is not consistent with the data.
We construct the distribution of feasible ∆diversity based on redistricting schemes
that satised the legal restrictions in terms of the minimum number of subdistricts (3)
and basic viability proxied by contiguity. This “NP-hard” problem is challenging given
the large number of possible splits.15 In order to make headway, we use a heuristic, ran-
domized approach. Specically, we randomly partition the district and then check to en-
sure the partition satises the contiguity requirements.16 We repeat this process until we
get 1,000 valid partitions for each original district, which we achieve for all but two orig-
inal districts. Within each of the valid partitions, we then compute the corresponding ∆P
and ∆F , creating a distribution of feasible ∆P and ∆F for each split. When constructing
∆diversity for parent and child districts separately, we simply assign the simulated par-
tition with the original district capital to the parent and the residual partition(s) to the
child(ren).17 This procedure should provide a reasonably unbiased estimate of various
moments of the distribution of ∆diversity, taking the number of splits as given.
15The number of possible splits of n subdistricts (of a given original district) into k new districts given
by the Stirling number of the second kind (see Fryer Jr. and Holden, 2011). For example, although Aceh
Tenggara only has 255 possible partitions of its 9 subdistricts into the two new districts, Kotawaringin Timur
has 4.236 × 1011 possible partitions into its three new districts (see Figure 3·4).
16Contiguity matrices are computed from shapeles. We connect islands to the closest non-island.
17If there are multiple children we use the location of the eventual capital to distinguish among them.
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While some districts have relatively few feasible options, or many that result in very
similar ∆diversity, others have a range of feasible ∆diversity. It is not obvious, in such
cases, which moment of the feasible ∆diversity distribution is most appropriate. Table
3.4 used the mean. Results hold with the minimum or maximum.
More generally, though, the key insight we derive from this exercise is that the vari-
ation across districts in feasible ∆diversity swamps variation within districts. Indeed,
stacking all random draws r for each district and regressing ∆Prd on district xed eects
delivers a R2 of nearly 0.9. While some districts certainly had choices that would result in
dierent ∆diversity, in general, regardless of their choice, their ∆diversity would dier
from feasible changes in other districts. This can be seen graphically in Appendix Fig-
ure C·10, which plots the distribution of feasible ∆P for six districts across several major
regions of Indonesia.
To formally develop this intuition, we re-estimate our baseline regressions randomly
assigning each of the 50 original districts to either the minimum or the maximum of their
simulated feasible ∆diversity. We then repeat this a large number of times (50,000 in
practice) and plot the distribution of resulting estimates for ∆P and ∆F .18 If strategic
border formation is driving our results, then the baseline estimates in Table 3.3 should
look very dierent for at least some of these permutations.
Figure C·11 shows that this is not the case. In fact, the entire distribution of esti-
mated eects of ∆P lies above zero and is roughly centered on our baseline estimate. This
suggests that regardless of how local policymakers drew the borders, the constraints on
redistricting and underlying geography limited the extent to which redistricting could
reshape ethnic divisions.19
18There are 250 possible ways to permute min and max ∆diversity across the districts in our regressions.
Given computational constraints, we randomize this 50,000 times and appeal to the law of large numbers.
19These graphs look similar when including the Lasso-selected control variables used in the other ro-
bustness checks.
314
Figure C·10: Comparing Distribution of Feasible ∆P Across Districts
0
1000
2000
3000
De
ns
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Distribution of Feasible Δ P
Sanggau: actual ΔP=0.003
Kapuas: actual ΔP=-0.001
Maluku Tengah: actual ΔP=0.003
Poso: actual ΔP=0.003
Luwu: actual ΔP=-0.0001
Aceh Selatan: actual ΔP=-0.0005
Notes: These gures plot the distribution of randomly drawn feasible ∆P for six original
districts in our data.
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Figure C·11: Distribution of Estimated Eects of Randomized Min or Max
∆diversity
Notes: These gures plot the distribution of estimated eect sizes onpost-split×∆diversity
based on randomly assigning each district either its minimum or maximum feasible
∆diversity from the set of feasible partitions. We repeat this exercise 50,000 times and the
bars reect the density of each eect size (standard deviation change relative to mean out-
come). The black solid line is our baseline eect size with actual ∆diversity, the dashed
line is based on the mean ∆diversity as reported in Table 3.4, and the dashed lines are
based on the observed min and max ∆diversity.
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C.6 Additional Evidence Supporting Political Violence Results in
Section 3.6
C.6.1 Further Background on Ethnicity in Indonesian Politics
Section 3.3.1 oered background on the changing role of ethnicity in Indonesian politics
that could be broadly summarized in the following four takeaways: (i) ethnicity is an
important organizing principle for political mobilization, (ii) ethnic-based clientilism and
patronage networks are pervasive, (iii) decentralization and direct, majoritarian mayoral
elections deepen (i) and (ii), and (iv) redistricting further amplies all of these forces.
Here, we provide additional background from the political science literature as well as
fresh empirical evidence consistent with this context.
Political Science Literature. Wilson (2015, p. 92) oers a helpful summary of views
on ethnicity and patronage in the context of redistricting: “As local government and ad-
ministrative boundaries were altered, ‘local selshness’ was reinforced, resulting in conicts
and tensions at the local level (Firman 2013, 180). Just like national politics, local-level pol-
itics was an intense ‘arena of contestation between competing coalitions of social interests’
as networks that had relied upon central state patronage or been regime middlemen moved
to establish new means to access resources (Hadiz, 2011a, 171). This contestation involved
renegotiating the boundaries of collective identities, in doing so dening a social economy of
who had to access to what, and under what circumstances. According to Klinken, from 1998
local elites throughout the country attempted to build ‘an exclusive discourse of ethnicity’,
one that in its construction of group identity formed a ‘language with which elites compete
for power by mobilising supporters’ (Klinken 2002, 68).”
In the context of our case study in Section 3.6.3, Kobayashi (2011) notes from personal
interviews that “A Dayak politician, a strong supporter of the creation of Bengkayang dis-
trict, clearly explained that increase of Dayak government employees was one objective of
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pemekaran [redistricting]. A Dayak department head admitted that pemekaran increased
job opportunities for Dayaks in government by commenting that he himself would not have
been promoted to the position of department head without creation of Bengkayang.
Diversity and Close Elections. Table C.27 demonstrates that ethnic diversity is associ-
ated with signicantly closer mayoral elections. In particular, we regress the victory mar-
gin for the winning candidate on ethnic polarization (P ) and fractionalization (F ) within
the newly created parent and child districts. We consider both the rst and second (when
possible) quinquennial direct election after redistricting.20
The main takeaway is that greater diversity is associated with closer elections, consis-
tent with the importance of ethnic mobilization highlighted in recent literature. Column
1 shows this when pooling across both the rst and second elections taking place in the
new parent and child districts. Both P and F matter, though the former is more precisely
estimated. The eect sizes, though, are not trivial. A one standard deviation increase in
P or F is associated with 10 percent lower victory margin relative to a mean of around
0.14 across all elections from 2005–2014 in these new districts. Results look similar if not
slightly more pronounced for the (districts that have) second elections.
Looking separately at parent and child contests, however, reveals a dierence be-
tween P and F . In parent districts, fractionalization matters much more than polarization
whereas the opposite holds for child districts. These patterns line up nicely with the re-
sults in Table 3.5 where P does more than F to exacerbate violence around elections in
child districts whereas the opposite holds for parent districts. Though perhaps consistent
with dierences in the stakes of political control (as noted in Section 3.6), these dierences
between P and F in Table C.27 are not statistically signicant.21
20As discussed in Appendix C.7, several newly created districts had not yet had their second election by
the end of our study period, while others have missing data on election outcomes.
21 It is also worth noting that we can estimate the relationship between ∆diversity and ∆victorymarдins
for 22 parent and child districts with a direct election at the original district level prior to redistricting. In
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Table C.27: Diversity and Close Elections After Redistricting
Dependent Variable: Victory Margin for Winning Mayoral Candidate in
Administrative Unit Parent/Child Parent Child
Which Election? All 1st 2nd All 1st 2nd All 1st 2nd
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
ethnic polarization -0.014*** -0.013** -0.028*** -0.012 -0.002 -0.021 -0.015*** -0.017** -0.029**
(0.004) (0.006) (0.010) (0.018) (0.017) (0.022) (0.005) (0.007) (0.013)
ethnic fractionalization -0.011 -0.013 -0.018 -0.027 -0.040 -0.056** 0.000 0.000 0.026
(0.010) (0.012) (0.018) (0.019) (0.025) (0.027) (0.013) (0.015) (0.018)
Number of Districts 113 103 68 44 34 32 69 69 36
Mean Victory Margin 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.12
Notes: This table presents simple regressions relating ethnic diversity in the newly cre-
ated parent/child districts to the victory margin in the rst and second direct mayoral
elections post-redistricting. Columns 1–3 pool parent/child districts, and columns 4–9
examine each separately. The ∆diversity measures are normalized, and standard errors
are clustered at the original district level. Signicance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
Ethnic Divisions and Preferences for Mayoral Candidates. We draw upon the
Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS) to provide some evidence in line with these claims as
they relate to border-induced changes in ethnic divisions. In particular, we draw upon
the 2014 round of data, which asks individuals “What factors do you consider in electing
a mayor?”. We observe individuals in 40 of the parent and child districts in our main
sample. In Table C.28 below, we control for basic demographics and relate ∆diversity
to preferences over a large set of mayoral qualities. The results suggest that changes
in ethnic divisions as a result of redistricting are strongly associated with preferences
for mayor’s ethnicity as well as their provision of patronage (formally, “gifts”). We nd
weaker correlations with mayoral experience, political aliation and proposed program
quality, among others. Note that this observation is at the end of the study period by
which time many of these districts have had multiple mayoral elections, some of which
may have been among those that witnessed violence of the sort identied in Section 3.6
particular, we nd that a one standard deviation increase in ∆P (∆F ) is associated with a 2.2 p.p. (3.3 p.p.)
reduction in ∆victorymarдin relative to its mean of 5.3 percent. There are only 10 prior elections and hence
it is not meaningful to conduct inference, but the patterns are nevertheless supportive of the level results
in Table C.27.
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of the paper and described further below.
TableC.28: Changes in Ethnic Divisions and Preferences for Mayoral Can-
didates
Dep. Var. (binary): Respondent in 2014 Believes that the Mayor’s . . . Is Important
Appearance Popularity Program Political Religion Ethnicity Experience Patronage
Quality Aliation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆ ethnic polarization 0.020 -0.014 -0.011 0.020 0.067 0.097*** -0.000 0.034**
(0.017) (0.018) (0.009) (0.016) (0.044) (0.026) (0.011) (0.016)
∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.011 -0.036** 0.010* 0.008 0.047 0.037** -0.003 0.020
(0.013) (0.014) (0.005) (0.010) (0.039) (0.018) (0.009) (0.012)
Number of Individuals 2,343 2,343 2,343 2,343 2,343 2,343 2,343 2,343
Number of Districts 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
Dep. Var. Mean 0.74 0.75 0.93 0.70 0.76 0.59 0.92 0.45
Notes: The dependent variable in each column is a binary indicator that equals one if the
respondent in the 2014 IFLS agrees that the mayoral candidates’ given trait is an important
factor in determining his/her vote. The regressions control for age, age squared, education
level xed eects, and gender. The ∆diversity measures are normalized, and standard
errors are clustered at the district level. Signicance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
C.6.2 Additional Results on Electoral Violence
This section presents additional results and robustness checks on the patterns of violence
around mayoral elections identied in Section 3.6.1.
Close Elections and Conict. The rst set of results in Table C.29 demonstrates
that violence is more likely around new elections after redistricting when those contests
are closely contested. In particular, we interact the post-split×election period indicator
with the victory margin (ranging from 0.004 to 0.55).22 Panel A examines the baseline
outcome of any social conict, and Panel B examine the intensive margin number of con-
ict incidents transformed via the inverse hyperbolic sine used in baseline robustness
checks in Appendix C.4.8. This latter specication allows for the possibility that the in-
tensive margin may be dierentially more important around election periods, which may
22The takeaways are similar when looking at binary indicators for close elections below the median of
0.095 or 25th percentile of 0.06. See Appendix C.7 for details on the vote margin data, which is non-missing
for 47 (out of 51) parent districts and 72 (out of 81) child districts. In the few cases where there is a runo,
second round vote, we take second round as the observation for the given district.
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be generally more intense periods of violence. Together, these results are broadly con-
sistent with the fact that victory margins are signicantly lower in more diverse, newly
created districts (see Appendix Table C.27).
Table C.29: Dierential Conict Around Close New Elections After Re-
districting
Administrative Unit Parent Parent Child
Child
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Any Social Conict
post-split 0.020 -0.002 0.025
(0.029) (0.038) (0.036)
post-split × 1st election period 0.069 -0.030 0.091**
(0.049) (0.063) (0.035)
post-split × 1st election period × victory margin -0.259 0.077 -0.427**
(0.155) (0.201) (0.206)
Number of District-Months 18,120 7,176 10,944
Dep. Var. Mean 0.35 0.51 0.26
Panel B: # Social Conict Events
Hyperbolic Inverse Sine
post-split 0.016 -0.050 0.053
(0.059) (0.105) (0.050)
post-split × 1st election period 0.204** 0.236* 0.106*
(0.097) (0.126) (0.053)
post-split × 1st election period × victory margin -0.652* -1.465*** -0.306
(0.341) (0.515) (0.355)
Number of District-Months 18,120 7,176 10,944
Dep. Var. Mean 0.52 0.84 0.34
Notes: This table examines interactions of the rst mayoral election period with the vic-
tory margin in that election. The interaction of post-split and that victory margin is
included but not shown. The specication is otherwise similar to the one in Table 3.5.
Signicance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
Looking across specications, the evidence in Table C.29 suggests that after redis-
tricting, violence is signicantly more pronounced around close mayoral elections. These
patterns are consistent with both (i) the qualitative background on election violence and
incident descriptions discussed in Appendix C.2.2, and (ii) the conict-amplifying eects
of ∆diversity around elections seen in Table 3.5. While victory margins are potentially
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endogenous with respect to contemporaneous electoral violence, these results provide an
important validation check on our interpretation. Together with the results linking eth-
nic diversity to closer elections (see Appendix C.6.1), these ndings paint a rich picture of
how (changes in) ethnic divisions reshape conict dynamics in settings with high returns
to local political control.
Intensive Margin Results for Table 3.5. Table C.30 below re-estimates the
election period heterogeneity specication in the paper using the intensive margin of
conict measure in the prior table. As noted in the paper, results look very similar to
those in the extensive margin specication.
Table C.30: Changes in Ethnolinguistic Alignment, Elections and the In-
tensive Margin of Conict
Administrative Unit Parent Parent Child
Child
(1) (2) (3)
post-split -0.003 -0.021 -0.004
(0.040) (0.070) (0.033)
post-split × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.032 0.025 0.057
(0.027) (0.026) (0.037)
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.019 0.056 -0.041
(0.021) (0.059) (0.033)
post-split × 1st election period 0.117 0.053 0.070**
(0.083) (0.102) (0.027)
post-split × 1st election period × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.039** 0.053 0.021*
(0.018) (0.054) (0.012)
post-split × 1st election period × ∆ ethnic fractionalization 0.006 0.111 -0.003
(0.025) (0.077) (0.023)
post-split × 2nd election period 0.111*** 0.155*** 0.083**
(0.030) (0.048) (0.039)
post-split × 2nd election period × ∆ ethnic polarization -0.026 -0.100*** 0.054*
(0.021) (0.023) (0.030)
post-split × 2nd election period × ∆ ethnic fractionalization 0.013 0.009 -0.010
(0.028) (0.051) (0.026)
Number of District-Months 19,980 7,836 12,144
Dep. Var. Mean, Pre-Split 0.48 0.76 0.32
Notes: This table re-estimates Table C.30 using the intensive margin specication. Signif-
icance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Ethnic Divisions Are Less Important for Legislative Elections. Leg-
islative elections are another potentially important local political contest around which
ethnic mobilization and grievances may matter. However, unlike mayoral elections, the
proportional representation system for Indonesia’s parliamentary means that the stakes
are very dierent than the majoritarian system governing mayoral elections. Gaining rep-
resentation for one’s ethnic group in parliament can be achieved even for small groups
under this system. Hence, the stakes and incentives for violence around such elections are
arguably much weaker than for mayoral contests. This comparison is one that has been
borne out in a range of other settings including many (newly democratic) countries in
sub-Saharan Africa (see Fjelde and Höglund, 2016). Consistent with this evidence, Table
C.31 below shows that changes in ethnic polarization amplify conict around local may-
oral but not local parliamentary elections. The dierential eects of ∆P around mayoral
elections are signicantly larger than the eects around parliamentary elections.
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Table C.31: Ethnic Divisions and Legislative Elections with Proportional
Representation
Administrative Unit Parent Parent Child
and
Child
(1) (2) (3)
post-split -0.006 -0.008 -0.011
(0.022) (0.028) (0.024)
post-split × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.030 0.028* 0.042
(0.019) (0.016) (0.025)
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.001 0.032 -0.011
(0.013) (0.029) (0.019)
post-split × parliamentary election period 0.152** 0.251*** 0.091
(0.066) (0.079) (0.085)
post-split × parliamentary election period × ∆ ethnic polarization -0.014 -0.004 -0.022
(0.010) (0.030) (0.016)
post-split × parliamentary election period × ∆ ethnic fractionalization 0.011 0.020 0.014
(0.016) (0.043) (0.018)
post-split × mayoral election period 0.046 -0.005 0.040*
(0.044) (0.051) (0.021)
post-split × mayoral election period × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.025** 0.013 0.025**
(0.011) (0.023) (0.010)
post-split × mayoral election period × ∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.005 0.041 -0.012
(0.018) (0.034) (0.020)
Number of District-Months 19,980 7,836 12,144
Dep. Var. Mean 0.33 0.47 0.25
∆P mayor = ∆P parliament [p-value] 0.000 0.510 0.022
∆F mayor = ∆F parliament [p-value] 0.395 0.637 0.307
Notes: This table re-estimates Table C.30 augmented with analogous interactions for par-
liamentary election period as well. Signicance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Additional PlaceboChecks. Tables C.32 and C.33 present two additional placebo
checks that validate the importance of political resources in shaping the relationship be-
tween ethnic divisions and conict. Table C.32 shows that ∆diversity has null eects
on violence around the local rice harvest period whereas the ∆P continues to exacerbate
violence around mayoral elections.23 Similar null results arise during the holy month of
Ramadan, which varies across years with the lunar cycle. Like mayoral elections, these are
signicant local events during which group mobilization may be important. Nevertheless,
we do not nd that border-induced changes in ethnic divisions fundamentally change vi-
olence during these periods. This contrast with mayoral elections is intuitive insomuch as
the zero-sum nature of resource contestation (or cooperation) is most pronounced during
majoritarian elections.
23Rice is the most important crop across Indonesia, and we borrow from Maccini and Yang (2009) who
identify province-specic rice harvest periods ranging from 3–7 months.
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Table C.32: Placebo Check: District-Specic Rice Harvest Season
Administrative Unit Parent Parent Child
and
Child
(1) (2) (3)
post-split 0.001 0.001 -0.005
(0.022) (0.028) (0.026)
post-split × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.029 0.027 0.041*
(0.018) (0.016) (0.024)
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.004 0.029 -0.015
(0.012) (0.028) (0.018)
post-split × mayoral election period 0.044 -0.008 0.040*
(0.044) (0.051) (0.021)
post-split × mayoral election period × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.025** 0.011 0.026**
(0.011) (0.021) (0.010)
post-split × mayoral election period × ∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.004 0.040 -0.011
(0.018) (0.034) (0.020)
post-split × harvest season -0.011 -0.011 -0.010
(0.010) (0.015) (0.015)
post-split × harvest season × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.003 0.007 0.001
(0.007) (0.012) (0.006)
post-split × harvest season ∆ ethnic fractionalization 0.008 0.012 0.008
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011)
Number of District-Months 19,980 7,836 12,144
Dep. Var. Mean, Pre-Split 0.33 0.47 0.25
∆P election = ∆P harvest [p-value] 0.003 0.865 0.007
∆F election = ∆F harvest [p-value] 0.505 0.449 0.296
Notes: This table re-estimates Table C.30 augmented with analogous interactions for the
province-specic rice harvest season. Signicance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
326
Table C.33: Placebo Check: Ramadan
Administrative Unit Parent Parent Child
and
Child
(1) (2) (3)
post-split 0.009 0.005 0.005
(0.022) (0.030) (0.026)
post-split × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.030 0.030* 0.040*
(0.018) (0.017) (0.024)
post-split × ∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.002 0.033 -0.012
(0.013) (0.028) (0.020)
post-split × mayoral election period 0.039 -0.012 0.038*
(0.044) (0.052) (0.021)
post-split × mayoral election period × ∆ ethnic polarization 0.026** 0.013 0.026***
(0.010) (0.021) (0.010)
post-split × mayoral election period × ∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.005 0.041 -0.012
(0.018) (0.034) (0.020)
post-split × Ramadan -0.069** -0.041 -0.079*
(0.029) (0.039) (0.041)
post-split × Ramadan × ∆ ethnic polarization -0.000 -0.012 0.006
(0.006) (0.010) (0.009)
post-split × Ramadan × ∆ ethnic fractionalization 0.004 -0.003 0.008
(0.010) (0.014) (0.014)
Number of District-Months 19,980 7,836 12,144
Dep. Var. Mean, Pre-Split 0.33 0.47 0.25
∆P election = ∆P Ramadan [p-value] 0.000 0.192 0.053
∆F election = ∆F Ramadan [p-value] 0.609 0.231 0.419
Notes: This table re-estimates Table C.30 augmented with analogous interactions for the
calendar month(s) during which Ramadan falls in the given year. Signicance levels: ∗ :
10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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C.7 Data and Variable Construction
We describe here the key variables and data sources used in the paper.
Administrative Divisions
Indonesia’s administrative divisions proceed down from the province to the district to the
subdistrict to the village. These dierent levels of administration and our terminology
for original, child and parent districts as dened below can be seen in Figure 3·3, which
shows one of the districts in our study.
OriginalDistrict: This administrative unit denes all areas based on the 2000 boundaries.
Child District: This represents the subdistricts that eventually become their own new
district with an accompanying capital.
Parent District: This represents the subdistricts that stay with the original district capi-
tal after other subdistricts split o.
Post-Split: This is an indicator that turns on in the month that national parliamentary
legislation rst established a new district within the original district boundaries. In our
main results, post-split equals one for the original district and parent district once the rst
child district splits o from 2000 onward. For child districts, the indicator equals one once
it is ratied into law.
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Conict
The conict data comes from the Indonesian National Violence Monitoring System
(known by its Indonesian acronym SNPK).24 The data are reported at or below the 2011
district level, and hence we can calculate conict within both the 2010 and 2000 bor-
ders over the years 2000–2014. Our main conict measures are binary indicators for any
conict in a given district–month, but we also consider the number of incidents as a ro-
bustness check. Coders read articles and then assign the incident to mutually exclusive
categories based on the underlying trigger. The incidents are rst coded as domestic vio-
lence, violent crime, violence during law enforcement, or conict. Eighty-two percent of
incidents record some property damage, injuries, or deaths.
Any Social Conict: A dummy for whether SNPK recorded any non-crime and non-
domestic violence incidents in the given month.
Active Media: Using data obtained directly from SNPK managers on newspaper avail-
ability and usage by province and month, we calculate the number of papers used in any
given province-month. All conict specications control exibly for media availability by
including dummies for the number of active papers in any given province-month.
Entered 2005: SNPK coverage begins in 1998 for nine conict-prone provinces and in-
creases to 15 provinces plus parts of 3 provinces in greater Jakarta beginning in 2005.
The data coverage is less complete and reliable for 1998 and 1999, and hence we focus on
2000–2014 for most results in the paper.
24We downloaded the data from http://www.snpk-indonesia.com, which is no longer active due to a
recent contracting change. However, as of June 2016, the data hosted on and available through the World
Bank website. A search in their Central Microdata Catalog for “Sistem Nasional Pemantauan Kekerasan”
will yield the data, downloadable year by year, from 1998 to 2014.
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Diversity
All measures are computed using the universal 2000 Population Census. Since this con-
tains data at the village level, metrics can be constructed at both the 2000 and 2010 borders.
Ethnic Fractionalization: Ethnic fractionalization in district d is given by
F =
∑Ne
j=1 дj (1 − дj ), where Ne is the number of ethnic groups in the district, and дj is
the population share of group j as reported in the 2000 Census. We observe over 1000
ethnicities and sub-ethnicities speaking over 400 languages. We also consider the re-
lated Greenberg-Gini version, which allows for non-binary distances between groups:
G =
∑Ne
j=1
∑Ne
k=1 дjдkηjk , where ηjk captures the linguistic distance between groups j and k
as detailed below.
Ethnic Polarization: P = ∑Nej=1 ∑Nek=1 д2j дkηjk , where Ne , дj , and дk are as dened before,
and ηjk is the distance between groups j and k . We map each ethnic group in the 2000
Census to a language in Ethnologue, which provides a full classication of the linguistic
origins of each language (see the Online Appendix Section A.3 in Bazzi et al., 2016, for
details). We set ηдh = 1 − sδдh , where sдh is the degree of similarity between the languages
spoken byд andh as given by the ratio of common branches on the language classication
tree to the maximum possible (14), and δ is a parameter that selects the level of linguistic
dissimilarity to be emphasized. We set δ = 0.05 in our baseline, but consider alternate
values. Ethnicities with missing languages are given province-specic average pairwise
distances (η’s) between all other languages. Missing ethnic groups are necessarily grouped
together, but separately from the “other” category, and also given province-specic aver-
age distances. We drop foreigners as they represent a minute fraction of the population,
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but we retain the ethnic Chinese.
Religious Polarization: Religious polarization, Reliд = ∑Nrj=1 ∑Nrk=1 д2j дk , where Nr is the
number of religious groups, and дj (дk ) is the population share of group j (k). There are
seven religions recorded in the Census, but in most districts, there is a single cleavage be-
tween a Muslim and a non-Muslim group. As a result religious polarization is eectively
identical to religious fractionalization in our data (with a correlation of 0.96).
∆ Ethnic Polarization: To examine changes in diversity at the original district level, we
compute the population-weighted average polarization in the new units (children and par-
ent district) and subtract the polarization in the original district. If original districtO splits
into parent P and child(ren) C1 (C2 if multiple), with populations GO = GP +GC1 (+GC2 )
the change in ethnic polarization is ∆P =
(
GP
GO PP +
GC1
GO PC1 +
GC2
GO PC2
)
− PO . We construct
changes in ethnic polarization at the child/parent level analogously as: ∆P = PP − PO for
the parent and ∆P = PC − PO for each child.
∆ Ethnic Fractionalization: For original district O splitting into parent P and child(ren)
C1 (C2 if multiple), with populationsGO = GP +GC1 (+GC2 ) the change in ethnic ctional-
ization is given by ∆F =
(
GP
GO FP +
GC1
GO FC1 +
GC2
GO FC2
)
− FO . We construct changes in ethnic
fractionalization at the child/parent level analogously as: ∆F = FP − FO for the parent
and ∆F = FC − FO for each child.
∆ Religious Polarization: For original district O splitting into parent P and child(ren)
C1 (C2 if multiple), with populations GO = GP + GC1 (+GC2 ) the change in religious
polarization is given by ∆Reliд =
(
GP
GOReliдP +
GC1
GO ReliдC1 +
GC2
GO ReliдC2
)
− ReliдO . We
construct changes in ethnic fractionalization at the child/parent level analogously as:
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∆Reliд = ReliдP − ReliдO for the parent and ∆Reliд = ReliдC − ReliдO for each child.
Table C.34: Summary Statistics for Baseline Variables
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max.
2000 Borders: 52 Original Districts
any social conict incidents 0.631 0.483 0.000 1.000 1.000
number of social conict incidents 2.631 5.185 0.000 1.000 89.000
post-split 0.787 0.409 0.000 1.000 1.000
ethnic polarization 0.017 0.016 0.003 0.013 0.095
ethnic fractionalization 0.612 0.256 0.062 0.689 0.957
religious polarization 0.119 0.070 0.001 0.130 0.233
∆ ethnic polariation -0.000 0.011 -0.062 0.000 0.061
∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.078 0.153 -0.677 -0.034 0.193
∆ religious polarization -0.008 0.049 -0.192 -0.000 0.109
2010 Borders: 133 Parent and Child Districts
any social conict incidents 0.364 0.481 0.000 0.000 1.000
number of social conict incidents 1.035 2.941 0.000 0.000 76.000
post-split 0.768 0.422 0.000 1.000 1.000
ethnic polarization 0.017 0.016 0.003 0.013 0.095
ethnic fractionalization 0.609 0.258 0.062 0.682 0.957
religious polarization 0.122 0.067 0.001 0.131 0.233
∆ ethnic polarization -0.000 0.005 -0.035 0.000 0.008
∆ ethnic fractionalization -0.059 0.083 -0.342 -0.032 -0.000
∆ religious polarization -0.008 0.020 -0.129 -0.001 0.017
Notes: At the 2000 level, there are 52 districts and 7,956 monthly observations. At the 2010
level, there are 133 Districts (52 parents and 81 children) and 20,220 monthly observations.
See Appendix C.7 for variable denitions.
Voting and Elections
District Head Elections: District elections occur every 5 years. Prior to 2005, district
head elections were conducted by parliament and varied across districts in terms of tim-
ing. From 2005 onward, district and vice-district heads were directly elected by plurality
vote contingent on that vote being at least 30 percent. If not, a second round between the
top two candidates takes place. District heads directly appoint subdistrict heads. We col-
lect data on the date of and vote shares in all direct elections from documents published by
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the General Election Commissions, many of which were graciously provided by Monica
Martinez-Bravo, Andreas Stegmann, and Audrey Sacks. Elections in child districts typ-
ically occur 1.5–2.5 years after the split. Elections in parent districts are determined by
the pre-Suharto election cycles carried over into the democratic era (see Martinez-Bravo
et al., 2017).
1st Direct Election Period: Using the exact date of all direct elections, we construct an
indicator that equals one in the 6 month window around the parent/child’s rst direct
election date. In the case of the latest splits, this can occur pre-split.
2nd Election Period: We construct an indicator that equals one in the 6 month window
around the parent/child’s second direct election date. There are some children (the latest
splits) for which we do not observe a second election post-split.
District Head Election Victory Margins: Using the General Election Commissions
records, we compute victory margins in the district head elections conducted after re-
districting. This continuous measure is simply equal to the vote share for the winner
minus the vote share for the loser (in the second round runo if it occurs).
Control Variables
We list here the rich set of 65 variables from 1999 and 2000 that we interact with post −
split and use as controls to ensure that the cross-district variation picked up by post −
split × Diversity is not picking up other observable dierences across districts. These
are carefully constructed from a variety of data sources, and are generally non-missing.
Several variables are missing for at most one original district, and are imputed simply
using the average across districts.
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PODES Variables
We use the 2000 administrative village census (Potensi Desa or Podes) to construct a num-
ber of control variables relating to education, public goods provision, security, and devel-
opment. Each of these measures are aggregated to the district level at both the original
district level, and eventual, 2010 boundaries.
Health Variables: We construct a variable for the number of health care facilities (poly-
clinics and PHCs) per capita in 2000 at the 2000/2010 district levels. We construct the
(population weighted) share of villages that say they have a midwife available. Further,
we construct the (population weighted) share of villages that say they have a doctor or
access to a PHC.
Education Variables: We construct the number of high schools per capita in 2000 at the
2000/2010 district levels. We also construct the number of Islamic schools per capita.
Public Goods: We construct the (population weighted) share of villages that have access
to water from a pump or a water company; have a trash disposal system (bin/hole); have
most households using gas/kerosene or electricity; and have road lighting. We also use
the number of households per capita with electricity, with a telephone, and with a televi-
sion.
Economy: We construct the number of permanent markets per-capita and the (popu-
lation weighted) average distance to the nearest market. In addition we calculate the
(population weighted) share of villages with a transportation hub (airport, seaport, or bus
terminal). We also construct the (population weighted) share of villages reporting good
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or great economic conditions and the share of villages for which agriculture is the main
source of income. Finally, we construct the (population weighted) average number of nat-
ural disasters in the past 3 years.
Security: We construct the (population weighted) mean distance to the nearest police
post and oce. We construct two variables: the logarithm of (one plus) the distance to
the nearest police outt and the logarithm of (one plus) the distance to the nearest police
oce (which is always larger).
Geography: We construct the (population weighted) share of villages on the shore, on
the coast, in a valley, on a hill, on at land, and at high altitude. We also construct the
logarithm of total land area. Importantly, we also include the logarithm of (one plus) the
(population weighted) mean distance from the village to the 2000 capital and the logarithm
of (one plus) the (population weighted) mean distance from the village to the sub-district
capital.
Census Variables
Using the 2000 population micro census we construct a number of additional demographic
variables. We construct each of the below at both the original district and the eventual
2010 boundaries.
Population Shares: We use the Population Census in 2000 to compute the share of the
population that is aged 5–14 and 15–29 at the original, child, and parent district levels.
We also include the logarithm of total population and mean household size.
Education Shares: We compute the share of the population whose highest educational
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attainment is primary school, as well as the share of the population whose highest edu-
cational attainment is post-primary.
Migration: We compute the share of the population who arrived from a dierent province
in the last ve years and the share arrived from a dierent district in the last ve years.
Geography: We include an indicator for the share of the population living in rural areas.
Sectors of the Economy: We compute the fraction of workers in agriculture, the fraction
of workers in forestry, shing and livestock, and the fraction of workers in other sectors
(industry, trade, service, and transport).
Government Transfers
District Revenues: District revenue gures come from the World Bank’s Indonesia
Database for Policy and Economic Research (DAPOER), which in turn obtains data from
the Indonesia Ministry of Finance. They are given for each district at the time of exis-
tence up to 2013. We add in the 2014 revenue data directly from the Ministry of Finance.
Population data is taken from the same dataset. We construct all revenue and popula-
tion variables at the original district level by aggregating up to the 2000 borders. Both
the population and revenue data are missing in some cases. In our baseline, we impute
these missing observations as described below, but our results are very similar if either
or both variables are left as missing. Population data is missing in 2014 for all districts
and in 2000 for 6 original districts. We impute population using the preceding/following
year and the median growth rate of 1.5 percent. Revenue data is missing in 2000 for 4 of
our original districts, and thereafter there are occasional within-district gaps in the data.
These gaps occur between 2001–2005 and to a lesser extent between 2012–2013, never
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exceeding 8 missing districts. We impute missing revenues using annual median revenue
growth rates. All revenue gures are adjusted for ination using 2010 as the base year.
Total district revenue comes from the general allocation grant (Dana Alokasi Umum,
DAU), the special allocation grant (Dana Alokasi Khusus, DAK), shared taxes, shared natu-
ral resource rents, as well as limited own revenue, and limited revenue from other sources.
We construct 5 control variables, all using the information from year 2000, that account
for all of district revenues while keeping information disaggregated: grants (DAU + DAK)
per capita, shared taxes per capita, shared natural resource rents per capita, own revenue
per-capita, and other revenue per capita. This allows natural resources, for example, to
enter separately. These are necessarily only computed at the original district level, and
are included at that level in the child/parent regressions.
When we examine how transfers evolve over time in Appendix C.1, we use the full
time series of total revenues less own revenue, to capture total transfers from the cen-
tral government. At the Original District level we simply use the logarithm of real total
transfers.
At the parent and child level, we have to make an additional assumption, since we
do not observe how parent and child districts shared transfers pre-split. Specically, we
assume that parent and child districts get their initial 2000 population share of the original
district transfers and use these values up to and including the year of the split. For all
subsequent years, we use actual realized transfers at the lower level, imputing any missing
values using the prior year’s value and median growth rates.
Light Intensity
Fraction of District Area Covered by Lights: We use night lights in 2000 as a proxy
for initial GDP (Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil, 2012). We have data on the coverage
of each village by any lights in 2000, and take the average percentage coverage across
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villages at the original district and eventual, 2010, borders.
Village Level Light Data: For our ethnic favoritism results, we also use the village level
light directly. When looking at how nighttime light intensity varies by share of residents
in 2000 belonging to the largest ethnic group in the eventual child district, we use the
fraction of the village area covered with any lights in each year 2000–2013.
Other Variables
Climate: We compute the population weighted average rainfall and temperature from
1948 to 1978 using village level information from NOAA-GPCP.
GIS Data: We compute the logarithm of the population weighted average distance to the
nearest road, to the coast, and to the nearest river. We also compute the logarithm of
elevation (30 as), and the ruggedness of the terrain (RUGGED3). We include the popula-
tion weighted average forest coverage in 2000. Finally we include detailed indicators for
the slope of the terrain (slope 1– 8). See Bazzi et al. (2016) for details on the underlying
sources and construction.
Cash Crop Share: We use the 2003 administrative village census (Potensi Desa or Podes)
to calculate the value (price × quantity) of each crop produced within the 2000 and 2010
district borders. To proxy for agricultural resources, we compute the fraction of district
agricultural output that is composed of nearly 30 cash crops, the most important among
which include palm oil, rubber, coee, and cocoa.
Party Vote Share Polarization: We use the 1999 parliamentary (proportional system)
vote shares for all 48 political parties at the subdistrict level to construct a measure of
338
party polarization at the original district and eventual 2010 borders level. The measure
for a given district is given by ∑i ∑j share2i sharej over each party i and j. The underlying
data was graciously shared by Audrey Sacks.
Time Varying Transfers and Distance
For use in Section 3.5.4, we construct measures of how distance to the capital and scal
transfers from the center changed with splitting.
∆ Distance: Using PODES 2000 and PODES 2011 we calculate the population-weighted
average distance (in km) to the district capital across villages within the eventual parent
and child units. At the child and parent level we construct ∆ Distance as the dierence
in the natural logarithm of reported distance to the capital in 2011 less that in 2000. At
the original district we take the average of these measures across parent and children,
weighted by district population.
∆ Transfers: We use the information from DAPOER on total transfers less own revenue
(which encompasses the general and specic allocation grants and all tax and natural
resource sharing). As discussed above, we impute missing values using median annual
growth rates and we adjust for ination. At the original district level, we compute ∆
Transfers as the change in the logarithm of real transfers post-split. We compare the
average post-split to the average pre-split (including the year of the split).
We do not observe how parent and child districts shared transfers pre-split. So for the
child and parent level we assume original district transfers were divided according to the
child/parent’s population share in all pre-split years and in the year of the split. Thereafter,
we use actual realized transfers at the lower level, imputing any missing values using the
prior year’s value and median growth rates. Similar to the original district level, we then
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construct ∆ Transfers as the change in the average logarithm of real transfers post-split
to that pre-split.
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